


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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs



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Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-88-039

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[ERRATUM: In JPRS-UPA-88-025 of 7 July 1988 in article LENIN'S ROLE IN COLLECTIVIZATION PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE on p 39, column 1, line 6 should read Excerpts instead of Text]

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**Turkmen First Secretary Speech at Republic
Central Committee Plenum**

*18300271 Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in
Russian 27 Apr 88 pp 1, 2, 3*

[Speech by S.A. Niyazov, first secretary of the Turkmen CP Central Committee, at the 10th Plenum of the Turkmen CP Central Committee: "Primary Party Organizations: The Search for Paths of Renewal"]

[Excerpts] Comrades!

As we stipulated at the Ninth Plenum of the Turkmen CP Central Committee, the Central Committee Buro, with the participation of Central Committee members, party committee workers, and the party aktiv have the studied the progress of restructuring in the party's leading link—the primary party organizations—and are introducing this question for review at the present plenum.

Our attention to problems of the primary organization is dictated by the need to deeply, objectively, and in a principled way straighten out the processes occurring here and define the directions of further work in the practical realization of the tasks of restructuring.

This is where quite a few stagnant phenomena have accumulated. Many party organizations have lost their principled, business-like attitude and operate in a passive and mechanical way. No matter how regrettable it is to acknowledge, the authority of the primary party organization has declined. Irresponsibility, permissiveness, account padding, fraud, and bribery, which have generated dependence and indifference, have done great harm to the moral and psychological climate in party organizations.

It also matters that from the Turkmen CP Central Committee to the rayon party committees there is still a kind of system of party control and party work; but, beginning with the rayon link, party committees work more with economic cadres, leaving the primary party organizations aside. Note that this is exactly where the link of primary party organizations disappears. This is a distortion resulting from stagnation phenomena. There must be a concrete, living tie of all links from the Central Committee to the primary party organizations. And when this thread is severed, especially in the raykom chain—the primary chain—the primary role of primary party organizations in the republic is diminished. Frequently neither the rayon nor the oblast leaders take into account the opinion of the primary party organizations and their communists. But if they worked in this direction better, then, of course, it would be a significant boost to restructuring.

A broad circle of the party aktiv was recruited to make preparations for the present plenum. Members of the Buro, Central Committee secretaries, members of election organs, department chiefs and other responsible

workers of the Central Committee, and party veterans studied the work of more than 1,700 primary party organizations. The republic mass information media gave us a great deal of help in this work.

Practically all members and nonvoting members of the Central Committee and members of the Auditing Commission of the Turkmenistan CP gave their proposals and recommendations on this question.

Special sociological research was devoted to problems of further increasing the activism of the primary party organizations and the vanguard role of communists. The results of the analysis and impressions from meetings and direct contacts with communists and nonparty people all helped us see the real picture of the restructuring of the forms of methods of activity of the primary party organizations.

In summarizing the results of the analysis made, the most important thing can be singled out: the ideas of restructuring through the processes of democratization and glasnost, through participation in carrying out economic reforms, and through normalization of the spiritual-moral atmosphere in the republic increasingly determine the content of the work of all primary party organizations. More than 5,100 primary and 4,170 shop party organizations and 2,500 party groups are now in operation in the Turkmenistan CP. They bring together almost 114,000 full and candidate members of the CPSU. There is virtually no sector of any significance in the sphere of material production, science and culture, and services and management where there is no party collective.

In addition, study showed that a substantial number of the primary party organizations continue to work in the old way and are not keeping pace with the dynamic processes of restructuring occurring in the life of the republic and most labor collectives. The results of sociological research also confirm this: almost half the communists surveyed believe that restructuring has affected their party organizations very little and that some of our cadres have been unable to work in the changed situation. The scope and newness of the problems in all areas of the new stage of restructuring have simply frightened some people, while others who are used to working on orders from above are passive and awaiting new instructions.

The work of the collegial organs of primary organizations, party committees and buros, and party meetings must be improved everywhere. They must be a real school for indoctrination of communists and of democratization of all internal party life. But I must say frankly that many organizations have not yet fundamentally changed their attitude to party meetings and to making preparations for them and holding them. In a number of organizations party meetings are irregular and the charter schedules are flagrantly violated. What kind of democracy can we speak of in the party organizations of

the Ashkhabad AvtoVAZtekhobsluzhivaniye, the municipal vehicle transport office of the production-planning association of housing and municipal services (Sovetskiy Rayon in the city of Ashkhabad), specialized mobile column No 2 of the Turkmenagromontazhspestroy Trust of the city of Mary, and the grain products combine of the city of Chardzhou, if only 2-3 meetings a year have been held in each of these places? The decisions made at many meetings are generally prepared by the party organization secretaries themselves and do not take into account the opinions of communists. Therefore there is an abundance of general appeals and, as a result, these meetings do not influence the activity of the party organizations and their labor collectives.

In November of last year at the party meeting of the Sovetskiy Rayon Department of Internal Affairs, the work of the party buro was acknowledged as unsatisfactory. A decision to develop practical measures, revise the distribution of orders, and hear reports by communists and a number of other decisions were made. They were made and forgotten. Almost half a year has passed but none of what was outlined has been done. And this is how things stand with discipline. In 1986 associates committed 20 disciplinary offenses, in 1987—45, and in the first quarter of this year—8. Some workers were brought to trial. But obviously, the party organization had nothing to do with all this. But what kind of a party organization is this and how can people rely on it? The indifference of the Ashkhabad Gorkom and the Sovetskiy Party Raykom, whose representatives were at the meeting, is also surprising.

By no means have all of our leaders learned how to react to criticism correctly. We must say that people who do not accept criticism sometimes resort to very cunning tricks. Outwardly it seems that they are not offended by the criticism; they do not deny it and even write the critical comments in a notebook. But then they do everything possible to get rid of the person who criticized them quietly, without any fuss, for "legitimate" reasons, so to speak.

Thus, for example, in January of this year Comrade R.V. Dubok, the work superintendent at the Nebit-Dag Central Pipe Base of the Turkmenneft Association, criticized irresponsibility in the shop. Immediately after her statement it was amicably suggested that she retire. But when that did not happen, she was forced to apply for a transfer to another section. Moreover, she and the other workers who supported her were removed from the labor collective council. And all these disgraceful things were done with the silent consent of communists and the primary party organization and its secretary, Comrade A. Magomedkerimov.

We encountered the same kind of thing in May during a reception for citizens. An electric welder of the Shatlykgazdobysha Association had worked for 20 years, was a production leader, and was praised by everyone, but then when she began to fight against outrages during

restructuring, a mass of tricks were found to force her to leave. This was known both in the party obkom and in the party gorkom. Everyone knew but no one took her part and no one wanted to "spoil relations" with the economic planners.

Comrades!

The broadening of democratic principles and extensive glasnost are needed in questions of cadre work.

The introduction of the Law on the State Enterprise and the election of managers increases the responsibility of party organizations for the candidates they recommend. The party organization's influence should be focused on supporting people who are principled, competent, and capable of leading restructuring in their collectives. Attempts under the guise of democracy to put in "their own" cadres, which are often promoted by narrow regional or group interests, must be actively opposed. And in conditions where managers are elected, party organizations are responsible for selecting cadres correctly and placing and indoctrinating them.

Real democracy has nothing in common with spontaneity, which is the atmosphere in which elections in some collectives are still held. Attempts to play at democracy, where party committees and high-ranking organs work in the old way and continue to present collectives with candidates selected in advance in the quiet of their offices, are alien to real democracy.

That is when such questions arise, when people higher up interfere and want to impose their own cadres; that is where the conflict situation comes to a head. Statements were sent one after the other from the Tashauz Passenger Vehicle Fleet to both the Central Committee and the party obkom. Because the Ministry (Comrade Kh. Kurbangeldyyev) had begun to impose its own candidates without consulting the collective. Why do such cases occur? It means that party committees are not reaching these questions. Primary party organizations and enterprise organizations must be given the right to elect leaders themselves. And if it is not suitable, this must be explained. We have an excess of orders and directives, but secretaries often do not have enough time for going to the collectives and meeting with people and giving explanations. The rank-and-file worker who sometimes cannot explain things clearly and is there to "be counted" must be reassigned. The top people must be responsible for the ethical-moral and psychological climate in the oblast, in the rayon, at the enterprise, and in the organization.

Questions of the formation of the elected organs of party organizations deserve special attention. The fact that during the past reports of the buros and party committees alone 250 people were removed from them speaks of the fundamental flaws in this work. We must develop an election mechanism which precludes the nomination of people who lack initiative and do not enjoy prestige

among communists. Of the proposals made on this score during preparations for the plenum attention should be given to introduction of direct election of party committee and party bureau secretaries right at meetings, competitive elections from 2-3 candidates, and others. It is important that the elections be carried out by communists without any pressure from above.

We must say that such an approach proved useful at the last report and election meetings in the party groups and small party organizations. An interested discussion concerning who should be the party leader went on at many meetings. Secretaries of party organizations and party group organizations were elected from two and more candidates in 1,774 organizations and groups. Party organizations should influence comprehensive development of democracy in all spheres of social life through the democratization of internal party life, including such an important part of it as cadres.

Many party organizations are working in the spirit of present demands.

However, there are quite a few examples which confirm that not all primary party organizations and communists have a clear idea of their role and responsibility in conditions of expanding democracy and the operation of the Law on the State Enterprise and do not show activism in resolving economic and social problems. We still encounter political and economic illiteracy in many secretaries of party organizations.

Great reserves for increasing production efficiency and profitability are concealed in introducing scientific-technical advances. Many examples may be cited where primary party organizations are working on these questions purposefully and on a daily basis and seeking nonformal approaches to performing the tasks they face. However, many organizations regard this problem from outdated positions and their impact on the realization of the tasks outlined is inadequate.

For example, these questions proved to be secondary in the work of the party organization of the Chardzhou Silk Combine (secretary—Comrade L.Ye. Vlasova). There are many unsolved technical questions here, the level of manual labor is very high, and the creative activism of the those working is too low. And in addition, the plan to introduce new equipment at the enterprise is only 81 percent fulfilled and measures to mechanize manual labor—52 percent fulfilled. In a year this collective of almost 2,500 members submits efficiency suggestions with an economic effect of only 28,000 rubles. But the combine party committee, citing all kinds of reasons, has virtually withdrawn from influencing the fulfillment of even the minimal measures outlined and has not made communists responsible for these parts of the work accountable.

This attitude of many party organizations to these questions has also led to a situation where throughout the republic assignments to introduce scientific-technical measures are 60-65 percent fulfilled and more than half the ministries and departments cannot handle them. Among these are the Turkmen SSR Gosagroprom, the Ministry of Local Industry, the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, and some others. The party organizations of these ministries and departments have little influence on the apparatus's work to accelerate scientific-technical progress in sectors.

Economic reform specially poses the problems of quality as a focus of restructuring our work. As you know, at the Second Plenum of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee, we adopted the decision to increase production of the highest-quality category of output by a factor of at least 2.5 and raise its proportion to 45 percent. Unfortunately, we have not made any progress here. In the past year the proportion of items with the Mark of Quality in total output certified amounted to 18.7 percent, while in 1985 the figure was 25 percent. The number of enterprises producing low-quality output in Gosagroprom, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Auto Transport, and the Ministry of Domestic Services to the Population rose. Fundamental improvement of the quality of labor—one of the main directions of restructuring the economy—is not yet the focus of activity of many party organizations.

Or let us take the problem of productivity—a most important qualitative indicator of crop-farming. Two kolkhozes—Gyzyl Goshun and Kommunist in Maryyskiy Rayon—have absolutely identical soil and climatic conditions. Last year the former harvested 22.7 quintals of cotton from each hectare while the second harvested only 13.7 quintals. What is the matter here? Above all it is a result of different approaches to the work on the part of the party committees, governing boards, and specialists of these farms.

It would be possible to assemble the communists and consult with them. And the party committee secretary could ask himself and others the question: why are our neighbors able to work that way and earn income, while we do not? Party organizations must locate the bottlenecks and see where to focus efforts.

Quite a few such examples could be cited from other sectors of the economy as well.

The efficiency of the economy and the well-being of every Soviet person are in many respects determined by how material resources are used. Today labor collectives have been given extensive rights in stimulating resource conservation. However, in practice by no means all party organizations have restructured their work in the struggle against poor management and waste, which is especially intolerable in the new economic conditions; they

continue to talk a great deal about the struggle for conservation but are not doing active organizational work among working people.

The party organization of the Ashkhabad Wood Processing Combine (secretary—Comrade N.R. Skripachenko) has been trying to ignore flagrant violations of the technology of wood processing, theft, poor use of lumber wasteproducts, and other shortcomings for a long time. People are poorly taken care of here and the managers of enterprises, shops, and sections are not held strictly responsible; on the contrary, "objective" reasons are cited to try to excuse them. As a result, while the plan supply of lumber was completely fulfilled, the state order for window and door units was 80 percent fulfilled, and lumber worth more than 100,000 rubles was written off. That is how they understand the struggle for conservation here. And the party organization does not give a principled evaluation to these flagrant cases and is under the thumb of the economic planners.

The same attitude toward resource conservation is tolerated at the Ashkhabad Construction Materials Combine, the Mary Oblast Communications Production Association, the Nebit-Dag Iodine Plant, and almost one third of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

At the present time 40 percent of the people working in industry are covered by cost-accounting forms of organization of labor, while at the republic's kolkhozes and sovkhozes 37 percent of the subdivisions in crop-farming and 41 percent in animal-husbandry work on some form of contract, in construction 50 percent are covered by a collective contract, and in motor vehicle transport it is 17 percent.

Study of the local state of affairs and analysis of the results of the work of contract collectives show that on the whole this process is moving slowly. Many managers and specialists of farms and secretaries of primary party organizations do not even know the essential features of the contract.

Comrades! Questions of social policy and concern for the person have been and continue to be the focus of attention of our party. Therefore, the primary party organizations and every communist must be attentive to people's needs and wants and to performing social tasks.

The most important of these, a task which demands daily attention, is supplying people with housing and children's institutions and improving trade, domestic, and medical services.

Party organizations and other labor collectives must do practical work to solve the housing problem and extensively utilize such reserves as the in-house method and cooperative and individual construction of housing to do it.

Fundamental changes are not occurring in meeting public demand for consumer goods and paid services. Primary party organizations are not showing the proper influence on improving the state of affairs in the services sphere.

The party organizations of most trade organizations are not taking an active, aggressive position in the struggle against violations of the rules of Soviet trade.

But still, a great many communists work there. And we will not right the matter and put things in order in trade until the communists themselves get down to business properly.

In the first 2 years of the 12th Five-Year Plan 69 cases of major embezzlement were discovered in the Ministry of Trade system; the losses from these cases totaled 657,000 rubles. In 1987 violations of the rules of trade were established in one out of every three enterprises checked and one third of them involved false weights and measures and mischarging customers. Large-scale cheating of the population is tolerated at public catering enterprises. In 1987 25.7 percent of the dishes in dining halls at industrial enterprises and 24.6 percent at student dining halls were found unsatisfactory for lack of full ingredients, adulteration, and violations of food-preparation procedures. The total value of ingredients left out, misweighing, and excessive prices established in the school dining halls of the Lenin and Soviet public catering trusts in the city of Ashkhabad and the Chardzhou and Tashauz trusts amounted to 40,600 rubles.

Analysis of the activity of the primary party organizations of labor collectives shows that at the present time they are still not completely performing the role of political nucleus in work to accelerate socioeconomic development, introduce new methods of economic activity, and expand the initiative and creative activism of the broad working masses. As a result, the decisions of the Second Plenum of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee on augmenting industrial and agricultural production and the volume of construction-installation work and strengthening the material-technical base of the social sphere are not being fulfilled.

In their practical activity primary party organizations and party committees must proceed from the idea that restructuring the management of the economy is a most important political task. Manifestations of command methods of management must be stopped decisively and attention must be focused on developing economic approaches, and that will enable labor collectives to substantially increase their work.

Comrades!

The role of the primary party organizations in ideological and political-indoctrinational work is increasing in the present stage of continued development and deepening of democracy and expanded glasnost. Despite the

favorable conditions for refining ideological work and the affirmation of glasnost, openness, and democratism, restructuring has had very little effect on the primary link. What is the reason for that? In our opinion, it is that many secretaries of party organizations do not have enough political instinct and feeling for new developments, and they do not always detect the realities existing in collectives and the diversity of the problems of human existence. In some party organizations ideological questions are not discussed at meetings for years.

Recent study has revealed serious shortcomings in Ashkhabad and Chardzhou oblasts and, in particular, the party organizations of the Turkmen Scientific Research Institute of Hydraulic Engineering and Reclamation, the POSh Factory imeni Poltoratskiy in the city of Mary, the Chardzhou Garment Factory, the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Construction, the Leningrad Kolkhoz in Chardzhouskiy Rayon, and many others. The communists there who are charged with managing schools and seminars are passive; they have not been able to overcome the gap between studies and life, and classes do not help generate new thinking and words or raise the students' political sophistication.

Also, primary party organizations and their buros and party committees are still tolerant of serious omissions and breakdowns in classes and they rarely hear reports by propagandists and communist students on work to increase their ideological-theoretical level. Moreover, they do not evaluate those who have lost their taste for studying.

There are many complaints against the department of propaganda and agitation of the Turkmen CP Central Committee in the formulation of ideological work. It seems a great deal is being done but there are no appreciable results yet, especially in restructuring Marxist-Leninist studies and increasing their influence. There are many omissions in other questions as well. Communists working in these sections must work much harder. Ideological work, especially in primary party organizations, must be raised. Especially now in the period of restructuring this must be one of our most important causes.

The republic's party organizations, above all its primary links, must keep questions of multinational relations a focus of attention given the multinational make-up of labor and educational collectives.

We have a right to be proud of the fact that on a common level with all workers of all nations of the country the peoples of the former national frontiers, including Turkmenistan, have certainly stepped into the socialist future. Healthy relations among the representatives of dozens of different nationalities have become established in the republic and are making a worthy contribution to developing the country's unified economic complex. Most of the nations and nationalities which live in the republic are represented in the soviets of

people's deputies and in the ranks of the Turkmenistan CP and of the leadership organs of party and social organizations and in all sections of economic and cultural construction.

In the process of the revolutionary restructuring that has taken shape in the country, problems arise which we did not study adequately in the past. Among them are questions of the development of national and multinational relations, which in the years of stagnation underwent a certain deformation.

Cases of complacency, neglect, and sometimes even infringement on the rights and vital interests of particular peoples, and underestimation of this delicate sphere of national relations unfortunately are appearing to a certain degree in certain regions of the republic.

In the meantime party organizations and leaders of labor and educational collectives ignore such cases while party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms do not always give them a party evaluation.

The language and culture of every nation must be developed and the interests of any national or ethnic group living in the republic must not be infringed upon. That must be the main concern of party committees. In that rayon and that oblast where these principles are violated, the first secretaries of party committees will be personally responsible, and let them work with their own aktiv and cadres. Recently we punished several managers because they arbitrarily stopped the broadcast of Uzbek Television programs in Charshanginskiy Rayon. Quite a few Uzbeks live in this zone and they regularly watched the programs in their native language, but some bureaucrats turned up who never thought of asking people and finding out their opinion. The programs were cut off and the party raykom and obkom did not give the necessary political evaluation to these actions.

In the interests of strengthening international ties party organizations must utilize and more extensively develop traditional socialist competition which has taken shape among the collectives of Tashauz and Chardzhou oblasts with the neighboring oblasts of Uzbekistan and of Krasnovodsk Oblast with the labor collectives of fraternal Azerbaijan and the workers of Ashkhabad and Dushanbe, Nebit-Dag and Novaya Kokhovka, and others. The creative ties of figures of culture, literature, and art, the performances of artistic collectives, and the activities of student construction detachments as well as other forms of cooperation with the collectives of the fraternal republics must be raised to a new level.

Among the most important directions of work by the primary party links is the ethical improvement of labor collectives and the moral elevation of the individual. It is extremely important today to awaken a sense of personal

involvement in the work of restructuring and to stimulate social and labor activism. Party organizations, communists, and the ideological aktiv have done quite a lot to insure that the ethical climate is more pure and the moral atmosphere strengthened.

At the same time, however, certain party organizations have not been able to oppose and wage a decisive struggle against drunkenness, drug addiction, nonlabor incomes, theft, and harmful traditions and customs. Frequently communists and secretaries of party organizations take an accomodating position and show lack of principles in dealing with those who introduce negative phenomena.

And that is a result of the fact that old approaches predominate in work with people; indoctrinational efforts miss the target and do not have the proper effect. So, we often engage in atheistic, antialcohol, and anti-drug propaganda among people who are not affected by these vices. Party organizations are doing a poor job of using the force of the labor collective in the struggle against drunkenness, drug addiction, and other phenomena, the bearers of this evil are not held accountable, and glasnost and the influence of communists are undervalued. But on the average throughout the republic 1 out of every 11 people working in the sphere of material production and the administrative apparat is a party member; that is a great force and must be focused on overcoming negative phenomena. Each primary party organization should work out a system of measures focused on forming public opinion concerning harmful survivals and other antisocial phenomena and all communists should rise to the struggle against them.

We must also mention the course of the struggle against drunkenness. In some places it has begun to abate and sentiments of returning to the past are appearing. I must warn that there must not be any indulgence. Every person that tolerates the abuse of alcohol must be held strictly responsible. This is especially relevant to communist managers who themselves should set the example and be active propagandists of a healthy way of life.

Party and Komsomol organizations should devote special attention to indoctrinating youth. Our duty and the duty of every communist is to do everything possible to protect young people from the destructive influence of alcohol and drugs, help them organize their daily life and leisure to be interesting and meaningful and find work to their liking, and direct young people's energy to useful practical work.

Comrades!

For all the diversity of the forms of work of party organizations to develop the production and sociopolitical activism of the working people, the example of communists is of most significance. Their vanguard role stems from the very nature of our party which is the leader and organizer of the masses. It would seem that

there is a paradox in the words themselves—passive communist. In the last 2 years more than 1,500 people in the republic's party organization were expelled from the ranks of the CPSU and even more were penalized. When the personal files of communists are examined, it is revealed that most of them have been passive and undisciplined for a long time and essentially diminished the militance of the party organization through their own positions. Moreover, even today there are still quite a few party members who have in reality lost contact with the life of party organizations and work and at times behave worse than nonparty members.

Last year one-third of the penalties imposed on primary party organizations were set aside as too lenient and increased by party gorkoms and raykoms. I think that exercises in delicacy when it is a matter of the purity of party ranks and the pure and honest appearance of the party member is not only inappropriate but even harms the cause.

In connection with this overcoming mistakes in replenishing party ranks made in the past is of special significance. The CPSU Central Committee decree on the Tashkent Oblast Party Organization gave a principled evaluation to this. Careless acceleration of admission to the CPSU ranks, neglect of the Leninist principles of party membership, formalism, and mechanical regulation of party recruitment were characteristic of practically all the republic's obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms. The matter is now being corrected, but slowly.

Many party organizations and party gorkoms and raykoms, above all those of Krasnovodsk Oblast and the cities of Ashkhabad and Chardzhou, continue to try to fit admissions to the percentages and ratios that have become established in past years. Increasing the number of people accepted to the detriment of their quality has still not been eliminated.

And it is no accident that in the last 2 years 316 candidate members of the party have been brought to party responsibility for violations of party and state discipline and other negative phenomena.

That is a very high figure for our party organization. More worthy candidates must be chosen. The omissions of party committees are concealed behind these figures; therefore they must be held responsible. In criticizing the primary party organizations for incorrect admissions today, we direct all these shortcomings to the leaders of party raykoms and gorkoms sitting in the hall. A more principled attitude is needed.

The formalistic approach of the people making recommendations toward evaluating the practical and political qualities of those joining the party remains a weak point in the work on selection for the CPSU. Analysis of the

content of recommendations shows that they are frequently vague and copy one another and do not reveal all the merits and shortcomings of those joining or their attitude and participation in restructuring and behavior in daily life.

Party committees should increase the responsibility of primary party organizations for the purity of the party ranks, preventing untrained and haphazard people and people who are trying to penetrate the party for selfish purposes from joining those ranks.

It is fundamentally important, as the Central Committee decree "On the Results of Admissions into the CPSU in 1987" noted, that the process of selecting new reinforcements for the party be more democratic and open and that each candidate must be first examined at meetings in labor collectives.

Once again I want to emphasize that some party gorkoms and raykoms know very little about the situation in the lower party links and give them too little practical help, especially small party organizations, and do a bad job of summarizing and disseminating progressive experience. Work with those organizations in which things are not going well is not always formulated correctly. Many party workers have learned to uncover shortcomings and register blunders but do not have the ability to give clear and practical recommendations on how to correct them. For example, the buro of the Kalinin Party Raykom examined the state of affairs at the Pobeda Kolkhoz four times in the last 2 years and noted the same shortcomings in the party organizations' work but, unfortunately, did not go any further than that.

The secretaries of primary party organizations of kolkhozes and sovkhozes are doing an especially poor job. Many of them are not on top of the situation, are only superficially familiar with economic problems, and do not have a vigorous effect on solving them.

Shortcomings in the work of secretaries in many respects are the result of the low level of their training. Some of them do not have the necessary knowledge, organizational talents, and ability to work with people and lack a firm, principled, and persistent attitude in the work.

We must introduce a system so that when Central Committee members, especially ministers and other economic managers, are in collectives, they become involved in the work of the primary party organizations and help them in their work.

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AzSSR Party Official Interviewed on Interethnic Relations

*18300425a Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
15 Jul 88 p 3*

[Interview of A. F. Dashdamirov, under rubric "Our Interviews," by N. Kuptsova: "Giving the Priority to General Interests"]

[Text] On 2 July, in **KOMMUNIST** newspaper, the printed organ of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of Armenia, ArSSR Supreme Soviet, and ArSSR Council of Ministers, correspondent V. Sarkisyan, discussing the meeting that a delegation from our republic had in Moscow, at the press center of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, with Soviet and foreign journalists, took a tendentious approach to throwing light on the situation. In this regard a **BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY** correspondent has requested A. F. Dashdamirov, chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet's Commission on Matters of Interethnic Relations and International Education, after returning to the discussion at the press conference, to comment on certain of its aspects and to answer a number of questions pertaining to the problems of interethnic relations.

[Question] Afrand Fridunovich, let us begin with the chief thing that has caused perplexity about the item published in the Armenian republic newspaper. That item quotes your words to the effect that "representatives of many nations live in the trans-Caucasus, and therefore the conflicts are natural." Could you please explain what you said in this regard, and what you had in mind at such time?

[Answer] First of all, I cannot fail to mention an impression of mine: the author of the item that you mentioned made a conscious effort to give my words a fundamentally different semantic nuance.

When I spoke of the possible conflicts, I had in mind the fact that, in such a multinational region as ours, the interacting nationalities have behind them, in addition to the commonality of their fundamental interests and the socialist way of life, their own unique historic and social experience, and under the conditions of everyday life there is a varying degree of acuteness in the social, economic, and cultural problems that have built up.

If the problems are not resolved promptly, the interests (that is, the true interests, rather than the imaginary ones) are not satisfied, or, to put it another way, if the contradictions that are natural for any social progress are not resolved, this creates the ground for social tension, and creates a conflict situation which is frequently carried over onto the ethnic ground. But we should not confuse the objective contradictions with the difficulties in the national processes that have been engendered by mistakes, the voluntaristic actions of officials, or the incendiary actions of people with an extremist frame of mind.

Those difficulties, of course, cannot fail to have an effect upon the resolution of the objective contradictions, but they can be reduced to the minimum. If, I repeat, everything is done promptly.

It must be said that the years of stagnation had an especially painful effect upon many national groups and national minorities. Especially painful because the interests and needs of those people were encroached upon at times to a greater degree than among the rest of the

population, but also because of increased national sensitivity, when a hypertrophied attitude toward one's own concerns, which were viewed in a manner completely separate from the common concerns, developed into national insults, at the base of which there were actually violations of justice and distortions and deformations of the national policy. But there was also here a rather large number of situations that were invented or exaggerated, that proceeded from intolerance and onesidedness in the approach to the existing problems.

We encounter a similar situation in many of our country's multinational regions, and that situation received its acute expression also in our republic.

[Question] But the author of the article in **KOMMUNIST**, which is published in Yerevan, went even farther. This is the conclusion that he comes to: "So does this mean that Sumgait" (he has in mind the tragic events in Sumgait) "is completely natural?"

[Answer] From what I have said previously, there is no way that anyone can conclude that the Sumgait tragedy is natural. On the contrary, it is unnatural, and the very attempt to ascribe that thought to me is, in my opinion, provocational. I completely fail to understand how people can continue to speculate on that tragedy. However, it must be admitted that there are people who are attempting to use those events actively for the purpose of inciting the passions even more, in order to complicate even more the interrelationships between the two nations, and to aggravate the situation that is complicated enough already. Once again there arises the question: in whose interests is this? Who needs this?

I would like to recall once again that the gangster actions in Sumgait that resulted in human sacrifices must not be equated in any way with the Azerbaijani nation. They were provoked by a group of criminal hooligan elements. Everything that happened in Sumgait has been censured both by the republic's workers and the official agencies. A number of workers in the party, soviet, and law-enforcement agencies have received severe punishment. The most important thing now is to heal the wounds that were inflicted. We must do everything to ensure that nothing like this can ever be repeated. And that work is actually under way.

[Question] The editorial offices of the republic newspapers have received hundreds of letters written by people of various nationalities. They are indignant at what has happened, they express their profound sympathy for the families of those who died, and they censure the city administrators for their shortcomings in organizing and political work.

[Answer] Yes, that is so. All of us are feeling deeply what has occurred. The republic is taking all steps to assure that nothing like this will ever be repeated. And to hang the label of genocide on those to whom, unfortunately, these gangster, hooligan actions are beneficial. But

applying political labels in this situation means engaging in political speculations that do not have anything in common with humanitarian interests and considerations. I would like once again to mention the dangerous role that has been taken on by those who are playing on the contradictions and emotions, and who are continuing to "rock the boat," to destabilize the situation, pushing into the background all common sense and the intelligent, carefully weighed approach to the situation that arose, and the search for real ways to normalize that situation.

[Question] Afrand Fridunovich, the press has already communicated, and at the press conference in Moscow you mentioned, what has been done, what is being done, and what will be done to fulfill the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers with regard to Nagornyy Karabakh. Could we please dwell on the questions that were raised in the article written by my associate in Yerevan? He writes, in particular, that in Baku the Armenian theater and schools with instruction in the Armenian language have been closed. What can you say in this regard?

[Answer] The Azerbaijan State Theater of Armenian Drama was organized in Baku in 1920. In March 1949, on the basis of a decree by USSR Council of Ministers, our republic's Council of Ministers decided to reduce the state subsidy paid to theaters and to take steps to introduce order into their financial activities. It was at that time that the Administration for Matters of the Arts, of the republic's Council of Ministers, eliminated the following theaters: the Azerbaijan State Theater of Musical Comedy, and the Russian Operetta Theater. But it was decided to combine the Azerbaijan Theater of Armenian Drama with the Stepanakert Drama Theater, and to locate the combined theaters in the capital of the autonomous republic. Thus, it is not completely true to speak about the closing of the Armenian theater. Several years ago, the theatrical public of Azerbaijan celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Stepanakert State Drama Theater imeni M. Gorkiy, the merits of which have been recognized by the "Badge of Honor" award. I would like to add that we consider it abnormal that Baku does not have an Armenian theater. Such a theater is currently being built. The decision has been made to send for noncompetitive admission to the acting department of the Yerevan State Artistic-Theatrical Institute the creatively gifted young people from Baku, NKAO, and other cities and rayons in our republic.

And now, as pertains to the Armenian schools in Baku. Until 1971 five interethnic schools had grades with instruction in Armenian. Gradually those grades were closed, since there was no one who wanted to attend them. Currently our only school that has instruction in Armenian is School No. 152 in grades 8 through 10. In the eighth grade there are two students; in the ninth, four; and three Armenians completed the tenth grade this year. Whether Armenian schools will be opened in

Baku depends upon the desire of the Armenian population to have their children attend Armenian schools, rather than Russian ones. AzSSR Ministry of Education will do everything to satisfy those needs. But, one way or another, this is a situation, it seems to me, when we are dealing with objective contradictions: the processes of internationalization have created similar situations in all other major cities throughout the country and one cannot fail to take this into consideration.

[Question] The demands concerning the transfer of NKAO continue to nag...

[Answer] First of all, they are not typical of socialist society, and contradict the historic experience, and the gains and interests of the multinational Soviet state.

In M. S. Gorbachev's report at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, he noted that "recently we have frequently come up against attempts to use democratic rights for antidemocratic purposes. It appears to a few people that this method can be used to resolve any questions—from redefining the borders to creating opposition parties... Such abuses of democratization fundamentally contradict the tasks of perestroika and run counter to the interests of the nation." It must be emphasized further that Nagorny Karabakh does not have any problem—economic, social, or cultural—that cannot be resolved within the confines of the existing autonomy; there are no reasonable national interests and needs that cannot be satisfied by consistently carrying out the well-known decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers.

[Question] I would also like to draw attention to the recently widespread references to the principle of the self-determination of nations as the political foundation for the demand to transfer NKAO to another republic.

[Answer] First of all, the right of nations to self-determination is only one of an entire system of principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism that constitute the basis of the party's national policy and the national-state structure of our society. These principles include the equality and equal rights of nations and nationalities; the respect of the rights, national dignity, and interests of the individual, regardless of the ethnic group to which he belongs; the priority of the nationwide, interethnic interests over the republic-level, national interests; and, finally, the key demand of interethnic solidarity and the unity of the workers of all nations and nationalities; etc. It is obvious that one should not isolate, much less oppose, a separately taken principle from the total set of principles. This approach inevitably leads to the distortion and deformation both of policy and of social practice.

As was emphasized at the party conference, we have only one path: within the confines of the structure of the union state that has developed, to guarantee the maximum consideration of the interests of every nation and nationality and of the entire community of Soviet nations. Another approach under our specific conditions

is simply impossible. Any attempt to take another path would be disastrous.

Secondly, if one returns to the question being discussed, one must not confuse the right of nations to self-determination with the civic, political rights of a segment of the population of Armenian nationality. The Armenian population of NKAO is part of the Armenian nation that lives compactly on the territory of another republic. We might mention, incidentally, that 36 percent of the Armenians in the Soviet Union live—and, in a number of instances, compactly—outside the confines of Armenian SSR. But this does not provide any justifications for separation.

We proceed from the fact that the Leninist concept of the self-determination of nations opened up the true path not only to the creation and development of the socialist national state system, but also to the voluntary, stable union of Soviet nations and nationalities.

The interests and rights of the Armenians of Nagorny Karabakh were observed by the territorial autonomy that was created for them. And we can discuss its perfection, consolidation, and expansion, the strict observance of the established legal status of NKAO, etc. Any other posing of the question is juridically incorrect and politically dangerous, since it leads to extremely serious consequences.

One should not forget that behind these groundless demands stand the fates of people and the interests of an entire region.

The question of the transfer of Nagorny Karabakh, for understandable reasons, has more than local importance. It deeply affects the interests and sovereign rights of Azerbaijan SSR and is directly linked with the interests of the USSR, a single multinational state. And, finally, it contradicts the interests of the Azerbaijani and Armenian population and the other nations and nationalities that live in the oblast and the republic, and of our country, and also contradicts perestroika. And it is completely natural that the Presidium of the AzSSR Council of Ministers viewed the decision of the session of the NKAO Soviet of People's Deputies concerning the unilateral withdrawal of the autonomous oblast from Azerbaijan SSR as an encroachment upon the national-state structure of our republic, as established by the USSR Constitution and the AzSSR Constitution. This decision of the oblast soviet was deemed to be illegal and was abrogated. The sovereignty of the republic was assured, and the stability of the constitutional principles was confirmed.

Yes, the very attempt to reconsider the territory to which NKAO belongs had a negative effect upon interethnic relations and brought misfortune to hundreds and thousands of people. The further preservation of this explosive situation is inflicting a tremendous amount of irreparable political and moral damage to national relations.

I would like to end our discussion with the words of M. S. Gorbachev in his report at the 19th All-Union Party Conference: "We are striving for a situation in which a

person of any nationality actually enjoys full rights in any part of the country, in which, wherever he is, he can implement his rights and legal interests."

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UkSSR CP CC Forms New Problem-Solving Council
18000660 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 13 Jul 88 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Problem-Solving Council Meets"]

[Text] The UkSSR CP CC Department of Propaganda and Agitation held the first meeting of the Interdepartmental Scientific Council on the Problems of National

Relations, Soviet Patriotism and Proletarian and Socialist Internationalism. The council consists of leading scholars affiliated with academic institutions of the humanities, teachers of social sciences at institutions of higher education, and representatives of republic ministries and departments.

During the meeting, urgent questions on the theories of national relations were discussed, and suggestions were made on methods to perfect organizations for the patriotic and international education of workers, and especially youth. The council set a schedule of work for the upcoming months.

Journalist Criticizes Coverage of NKAO Events

18310020 [Editorial Report] Baku AZARBAYJAN MUALLIMI in Azeri 22 June 1988 carries on page 2 a 2500-word interview with Professor Tofiq Rustamov, dean of the journalism faculty at the Azerbaijan State University, in which he criticizes press coverage of the NKAO events and discusses the situation in detail. "Unfortunately, some of the articles which appeared in

the central press and on television were unable to give readers objective information. Why was all this not reflected in our own information organs? Are we still maintaining a passive position? Are we satisfied with general observations on the friendship of peoples rather than supplying relevant information about the focal points of the events, communicating the ideas and opinions behind the meetings and demonstrations to the reader and viewing audience and providing objective analysis?"

**Molodaya Gvardiya Article Defends Stalin,
Assails Raskolnikov**
*18000524 Moscow MOLODAYA GVARDIYA in
Russian No 4, Apr 88 pp 257-275*

[Article by M.I. Malakhov, of Moscow, under the "Controversial Issues Rostrum" caveat: "The Meaning of Our Life: A Letter from a CPSU Veteran"]

[Excerpts] Glasnost... This word, just like other words which are often repeated these days—"acceleration" and "perestroyka"—are now uttered in many foreign countries sans translation. And that is because our foreign friends are listening carefully, with unconcealed curiosity, taking in everything that stands behind these words, that gives them their concrete substance. And our enemies are watching the processes going on in our country as if it were an ideological, political and intellectual strip-tease; they bawl at the top of their lungs that nothing will come of perestroyka and glasnost—that it will only bring harm to the Soviet people. They insult our history and the heroic achievements of the Soviet people, and behind all this commotion they are trying to surreptitiously foist their corrupt bourgeois values on us.

I am no scholar, engaged in study of the social sciences; nor am I a literary critic, nor a politician. But I am an old communist: I've been a member of the Communist Party for over 60 years; my work experience adds up to nearly 70 years, just about as long as our state has been in existence—the workers' and peasants' state. I am a veteran of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War. I defended the gains of the Revolution with a rifle in my hands, and I have contributed my labor to the overall cause of building socialism in our country. I cannot, therefore, remain silent, when I see propagandists making unjust accusations in the pages of our magazines and books, on our TV and movie screens, on the radio and from lecterns; and yes, they are even slandering the generation of people which gave its life for our Revolution; which established our socialist system; which brought us from a backward nation to the front lines of progress; which saved the world from Fascism; which resurrected our Motherland on the ruins of war; and which made it a great power.

For some reason certain literary figures are constantly abusing the pioneer builders of the socialist society, depicting them here as thick-skulled bureaucrats and misanthropes, or as "trembling creatures," or as ignorant savages, allegedly building a new kind of state on the bones of the people, strangling the intelligentsiya and distorting Lenin's policies.

Works of literature, critical articles and even certain scientific publications have begun to follow the trend of shifting the blame for the shortcomings in the economy, in industry and in intellectual life in recent decades, onto the shoulders of people of my generation. And all this purportedly out of love for historical truth and under the slogan of glasnost. Hiding behind these words, they put

under suspicion not only the achievements of our socialist society, but also the personal triumphs of those who have earned the right to wear the decorations of the Motherland; its titles, orders and medals of distinction.

And just what, from my point of view, is glasnost? It is a most important, integral part of our perestroyka, serving the purpose of strengthening our socialist system, and therefore providing complete information about the true state of affairs in all sectors of our contemporary life. Glasnost means public access to, acquaintance with and discussion of many questions from our past, including the most complex moments of our history, our present and our future. And you see, it is namely our history that has the most to offer; yet certain people are exploiting glasnost only for the purpose of besmirching the 1930's and 1940's, depicting them only in dark colors. And those citizens who have a weakness for sensationalism, and uninformed young readers as well, are being bombarded with numerous literary works of doubtful value.

Highly characteristic of this trend is A. Rybakov's novel, "Children of the Arbat." Judging from the responses in our press I will evidently be swimming against the current in my analysis of this novel; in my personal conversations, however, many people were solidly on my side. And therefore I request that you give me the right to speak out. In all my long life I cannot remember a single instance in Soviet literature in which even before publication of any kind of work, the mass information media had not only created public opinion for it, but also defined the official attitude toward it. They began to speak of the novel as if it were a significant literary phenomenon, and unconditionally awarded it their highest Mark of Quality.

The magazine OGONEK pulled out all the stops. What first comes to mind is the collection of enthusiastic comment on a novel that had just come out. The names that Rybakov assembled! V. Bykov, V. Kaverip, D. Granin, G. Baklanov, M. Ulyanov, G. Tovstonogov, L. Anninskiy, and others. Here are just a few excerpts from letters addressed to the author of "Children of the Arbat" and published in OGONEK: "You have produced a grandiose work on the 1930's, and have provided an in-depth cross-section of society from the party Central Committee 'to the very edge of town'; "I would compare this novel with the canvases of our very finest itinerants—Surikov, or Gay, or Yaroshenko"; "the novel 'Children of the Arbat' successfully combines the high ideals of design and the embodiment of artistic perfection"; the novel "adds strength to our society, and raises its prestige"; "the appearance of this novel will become a great event in our lives," and so on, in that vein.

If the author's name had not been mentioned in the letters about the work, of which critic D. Ivanov writes in the same magazine—that "the language of the novel is not too expressive, and many of the images are flat and uninteresting"—one would think that they were speaking about a classic of Soviet literature. Then why on

earth do respectable people consider an artistically-imperfect novel, "a great event," thereby misleading the readers? And why did the magazine provide such unprecedented publicity for a novel just published? There can be only one answer: in order to give "Children of the Arbat" a green light, and to suppress criticism from people who greet this work with distrust. And subsequently, critical opinions about the novel were given two or three lines; but for articles praising "Children of the Arbat," there was oceans of space. Thus, sharp literary criticism, which until recently had been considered complimentary, is praising a weak novel to the skies, creating the illusion of nationwide support for it.

I am a living witness to those events described in Rybakov's novel, "Children of the Arbat." And I would like to tell about my own generation of party members, and about the days of our youth. You see, many of them are no longer among the living and they cannot defend themselves. I would like my voice to be heard and understood.

In those memorable years I was far from Moscow and from Rybakov's Arbat. The son of a worker, I accepted the Revolution with my whole heart: I was only 14 years old when I took up a rifle to defend our young Soviet Republic from domestic counterrevolution and foreign intervention, during the Civil War. I was one of the first Komsomol members at the Sumy Machine Building Plant imeni Frunze, where I was working at that time. I became a highly-skilled worker there, and graduated from the evening machine-building institute without a break from production; it was there that I studied Komsomol and party work as well. At present, as I think back upon my social burdens, my studies at the institute, and my work at the plant I am amazed at how we had the strength for all that. And you see at that time there were very few of us young leaders, who bore Komsomol and party cards. But we did not bend, for we knew that there was no one to whom we could shift our concerns. When did we sleep and eat? And when did we find time to love, to rejoice and to raise our cultural level? Our Komsomol girlfriends also combined work, studies and social affairs, and still managed to be very pretty, sweet, modest, kind and loving. And they were able to manage at home too, without shirking any kind of work. And how chaste the relationships were among the young women and men! We were afraid to offend our young girlfriends with awkward advances, with immodest words, or with crude behavior. I remember how we often hid our tender feelings deeply, knowing that we had to rapidly recover from the destruction wrought by the Civil War; to lay the foundation of a new society and build socialism. And we knew that our personal affairs had to be put in second place. We studied, and we taught young people who were not part of our group, inviting them into our midst. And when it turned out that we were in error, the people corrected us.

No, we were not downtrodden, nor primitives, nor dumb robots, mindlessly obeying someone else's will, as certain

people try to depict us. Our labor enthusiasm was a conscious act, and no one ever did anything under the lash. Today we are criticized for the fact that the socialist transformations in the 1930's went on at a too-rapid pace; that everything was done "at any cost," as certain of our critics like to say, forgetting that such a pace was dictated by life itself, in deciding the question of whether our socialist state was to be or not to be. CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's report, "October and Perestroika: the Revolution Goes On" speaks about this period in our history: "Those were years of stubborn labor at the limit of human capabilities, a sharp and many-faceted struggle. Industrialization, collectivization, the cultural revolution, forging a multinational state, asserting the international positions of the USSR, and new forms of management of the economy and all social life—all of those things came to pass in that very period. And all of this has had far-reaching consequences (...). For it was then that the building of the first socialist society in the world commenced. It was a feat of historic dimensions and historical significance."

At night we slept soundly: we were very tired from our hard and intensive labor, and we did not lay awake listening for the knock on the door. What's more, the door to the house was seldom locked; for it was always open for our friends and neighbors, and thieves had no use for our poor possessions. These days it's acceptable among young people, if everything is not just so at home or at work, to write, to demand, to complain to all levels of authority. In my time such things simply could not be: there was no one and nowhere to complain to. What we couldn't do ourselves, we did collectively. We did not wait for some uncle to come and organize our leisure time. We ourselves furnished empty buildings in the city as Palaces of Culture, clubs and Red Corners; and incidentally, in nearly every house there were evening classes, there were reading rooms in peasant huts, or libraries. And all of this served as political-educational activity among the young workers. The most interesting, simply fascinating disputes were held, on political, religious, literary and everyday topics. I cannot remember a time when the hall was empty, or when the people did not take part and show their interest. And the presentations of the "live newspapers" and the "blue smocks," which they now contemptuously refer to as "agitators"! Oh, those were bright and merry performances on burning issues of the day, with impartial criticism of bureaucratic administrators, loafers, shoddy workers, drunkards, speculators, money-grubbers and narrow-minded philistines! And our Komsomol and party meetings, where everything was on the very highest plane: there was both criticism and self-criticism! They were often stormy, unrestrained, and everyone was allowed to speak his mind.

And how we struggled for the purity of our own ranks—here no allowances were made, not for anyone: only those selflessly devoted to the cause of the Revolution and to socialism, a bold and self-sacrificing communist,

could be a member of our party. There were, perhaps, certain "overzealous" people, in their demands on themselves and their comrades: it was considered shameful to visit restaurants; divorce was condemned, as were unofficial marriages, and modish or ostentatious clothing. But on the other hand, high value was placed on labor, knowledge, friendship, patriotism, social activeness, discipline and proletarian internationalism. Narcotics addicts and prostitutes were simply unheard of in our working milieu, and drunkenness and absenteeism were punished severely. We created new rites, no less solemn than the old church rituals: Komsomol weddings and Red "Christenings parties" for newborns. We organized masquerade parties and political carnivals; we rang in the New Year with wide use of popular traditions; and in the Spring and Summer, all the plant workers, from the director to the ordinary worker, went out into the country for picnics, with orchestras, samovars and pirogi.

I understand how every era places its own conditions on Komsomol and party members; but, I think, it would no do harm to remember and to resurrect certain of the traditions of my own era.

Our life was not idyllic: there were many hardships. There was hunger and cold; the destruction of basic tools and equipment in the ruin of the civil war; there was an acute ideological war, and sabotage and wreckers (Yes, yes, wreckers—These were not figments of the imagination of state authorities suffering from acute paranoia; there were wreckers, and quite a few at that); and there were difficult quests for the new, along with mistakes, with night vigils and endless work to improve oneself. We wanted universal knowledge: we studied philosophy and literature; we were interested in scientific innovations; we delved into politics; we learned to know music and the fine arts: everything which our family and school were unable to give us. But the most important thing is that every day, every hour, we increased and expanded our professional knowledge. Thus a qualitatively new intelligentsia was forged, which has given the country a multitude of outstanding scientists, designers, industrial leaders, state figures, innovators: people of creative labor, who have brought glory to our Fatherland. The words, "to be the master of one's country and one's own fate," were taken literally.

But then I read Rybakov here—and it's a completely different world: the young people—"my" young people—have different interests, different thoughts, different moral criteria, and different moral values. I do not rule out the possibility that such young people once lived on the Arbat—for whom the norms of life were free love, chasing after rags and restaurants; prostitutes; associating with swindlers and foreigners; fistfights; scorn for the "poorly-educated" workers; or hatred for Soviet power and Chekists. But why make them the symbols of the epoch? No, excuse me, my dear L. Anninskiy. It was not those "iron boys" who were the "first offsprings of socialism"; they were not the ones who "bore the full

brunt of the war"! It was not the children of the Arbat who fulfilled the first five-year plans ahead of time, with high quality; nor was it they who built and put into operation in record time 1,500 new enterprises, among which were Magnitka, Kuzbass, Dneproges, Uralmash, the Khibinskiy Kombinat, the automotive works in Moscow and Gorkiy, the Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor plants, or Rostselmash; nor was it they who created from scratch a modern ferrous-metallurgy, tractor, automotive, chemical, aviation, and defense industry. They were not the ones who built Komsomolsk-na-Amure, Turksib and the great Fergana Canal. They were not the ones who carried out the collectivization, which for some reason it has now become fashionable to censure—although, in the words of M.S. Gorbachev, it firmly established the positions of socialism in the countryside, and "It created the social basis for modernization of the agrarian sector and for switching it onto the tracks of crop management; it allowed us to significantly increase labor productivity, and it freed up a significant portion of the workforce, needed in other spheres of socialist construction." It was not they who took part in the elimination of the kulaks as a class, in the fierce struggle with whom many of my comrades perished—the finest people in the party and the Komsomol. It was not they who brought about the disappearance of unemployment in the country, when—especially in the period of NEP—hundreds of thousands of workers lost their means of existence. While the country was creating a new society by the sweat of its brow, certain people in their holes and dark alleys gloated wickedly over our every misfortune and our every miscalculation, abrogating to themselves the position of bystanders.

But it was not the choice of subject-matter in this novel that I found astonishing; rather, the fact that the author deals so lightly with our historic men of state and with the facts of our history. And he took it upon himself, in the words of critic Dm. Ivanov, to continue—no more no less—the "great cause of the 20th Party Congress." And he went further: "Rybakov hazarded to enter the soul and mind (of Stalin), into which one was previously forbidden entry." I'm not talking about the fact that the figure chosen by the author for "penetrating the soul and the mind," is too complicated, too irregular or controversial; but not such a one-dimensional and oversimplified figure as Rybakov's. In his report at the 70th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution, M.S. Gorbachev declared: "While remaining on the side of historical truth, we must look at both the indisputable contribution of Stalin in the struggle for socialism and the defense of its gains, and at the gross political errors and the arbitrary rule permitted by him and those around him..."

A class, political and especially a psychological interpretation of historic events and personalities is a very responsible and delicate matter. Here above all the author needs knowledge, and a broad and objective outlook; for one must not, as Balzac said, examine the greatest of events and personalities under a reducing

lens. And although Rybakov, in his interview with *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* assures the readers that "not a single act of Stalin in the novel was made up; they are all well-founded;" and to inspire greater confidence he modestly makes a parallel between himself and A.S. Pushkin, comparing his novel with "Boris Godunov" and "The Captain's Daughter"—he has not convinced me. First of all, the author's figures are not comparable; secondly, Pushkin, in creating his great works, traveled throughout half of Russia, familiarized himself with the locale of Pugachev's uprising, and studied the documents of that epoch of which he wrote (I advise Rybakov to familiarize himself with the "draft foreword to Boris Godunov," in which Pushkin stresses that he was working on a tragedy, and was "not confused by any kind of temporal influence"; that is, he approached his depiction of events in an objective manner, and at the same time made a thorough study of Karamzin and the old chronicles); and thirdly, in Pushkin's discourses on historic prose, the idea is prevalent that history is many-layered and many-faceted; therefore, one must not depict individual personalities, nor periods, in a single hue—black or white. And there is still another of Pushkin's principles that Rybakov has forgotten: When creating a portrait of a historical personality in an artistic work, one must strive to ensure that it completely coincides with the historical reality.

Unfortunately, Pushkin's precepts were violated in the novel, "Children of the Arbat." The writer oversimplified the image of Stalin, putting his own ordinary and often simply primitive ideas into his mouth—without taking the time to familiarize himself with the numerous memoirs about him, to look at the close-ups from film documentaries of those years, to carefully read his works and letters, or simply to talk with the people who knew the man well.

Of what use is, for example, the discourse by Stalin, invented by Rybakov, on the sufferings of man—which is worth discussing in order to build a new society? "Kirov is a dangerous idealist. He demands material goods for the working class, and does not understand that a man who is well-off materially is not inclined to make sacrifices and is not disposed toward enthusiasm but develops a bourgeois mentality. Only suffering can summon the peoples' greatest energies, which can be directed both toward destruction and to creation. Man's suffering leads him to God—the basis for the main postulate of the Christian religion which the people have been taught for centuries; it has become part of their flesh and blood. Socialism, an earthly paradise, is more attractive than a mythical Paradise in the heavens—although for that one must also pass through suffering. But the people must, of course, be convinced that their suffering is temporary and serves to achieve great goals..."

There is no doubt that our scholars should shed light upon both the phenomenon of Stalin and the concept of the "personality cult." But they must be guided not by

market conditions, but by historical truth. In connection with my duties I was fated to meet with Stalin on more than one occasion; and I have heard testimonials about him from prominent scholars, writers, designers, military leaders and industrial managers even after the 20th Party Congress. Their opinions varied on some things, but on one thing they agreed—this was a brilliant person. It was no accident that the greatest of his contemporaries paid tribute to him—Maxim Gorkiy, Aleksey Tolstoy, Maurice Thorez, Klement Gottwald, Georgi M. Dimitrov, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and many others. Among them was also Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, whose poem, "Strana Muraviya," we remember.

It was transparently hinted in the novel that the murder of S.M. Kirov was engineered by Stalin, who saw in him a rival. At least that is how it is presented in the novel. And here I would like to quote the words of the historian V.A. Kozlov: "The right of moral judgment over the past is, indisputably, a problem of historical knowledge." And what kind of historical knowledge does Rybakov possess, to make that kind of assertion? What documents does he have?

Rybakov makes other scathing attacks as well. M.S. Gorbachev and our leading scholars of history say that we had built socialism by the end of the 1930's; yet the writer assures us that, "Stalin had created an altogether different regime, worse than the Tsar's." (Do you recall the words, "humbly" and "timidly" uttered by Sofiya Aleksandrovna, when Rybakov for some reason put into her mouth the well-known saying of Aleksandr Nevskiy? Didn't he understand, that in the context of the novel it sounded ridiculous, at best?). Here I agree with V. Bovshe, a department head at the BSSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy and Law, who, criticizing O. Kuchkina's review of the novel, "Children of the Arbat," said: "The reviewer utilizes in a positive sense the bourgeois conception of Stalinism, and approves Rybakov's interpretation of our political system under Stalin, placing it under the maliciously anti-Soviet theory of a totalitarian society." Having no arguments with which to refute Bovshe, A. Adamovich, who cited this quotation in his conversation with correspondents from *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*, pathetically exclaimed: "And this was said after the 20th, the 22nd and the 27th Congresses!" One would like to ask the writer, would the party congress really permit us to print articles which discredit our socialist system? But then why hang labels on people right away, such as "Belorussian Orthodox," and "Vendee"? To embarrass the scholar? Democratization presupposes the struggle between different points of view. I can also express my own point of view.

When Lenin was working out the NEP system, he was counting on only a period of transition, and not on an epoch of completed socialism. But what does Rybakov want? That NEP should exist forever, "in earnest and for a long time"? Does he see this as Stalin's departure from Lenin's precepts? After all, Lenin himself dreamed earnestly of that time when "a socialist Russia emerges from the Russia of the NEP."

For academic scholarship the problem of the personality cult, the problem of the dispossession of the Kulaks, and many others as well, are all "blank spots" in our recent history, which for a long time was out-of-bounds for researchers. But Rybakov, in accordance with his own conception of "acceleration," has painted over the blank spots in black, and has himself resolved all the historical problems, without burdening himself with lengthy research projects.

How can historical justice be resurrected in a few magazines or in a few published articles? Our history has become cluttered up with myths; events are taken out of context from certain occurrences and are offered up to us as the signs of the times. Quite often this is not even one aspect of a historic phenomenon, but a half-truth, which in essence is more dangerous than lies, since it is a camouflage of the truth—a verisimilitude. And verisimilitude quite often leads the readers into delusion.

The manner in which the facts were jumbled is evident from the publication of an excerpt from Z. Sheynis' book about M.M. Litvinov, published in OGONEK. I noted with pleasure that finally they've remembered a man I deeply respected, an outstanding Soviet diplomat. But, after reading the article, "Maksim Maksimovich Returns to the Fold," with interest, I wondered why the editors prefaced the article in heavy boldface type with a preamble of rather strange substance. After providing a few general remarks about Litvinov (the dates of his birth and death and his term of office), the authors of the preamble, in the best tradition of detective novels, wrote: "One evening in May, 1939, the building of the Peoples Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (then located in Moscow on Kuznetskiy Most) was cordoned off by the NKVD. Molotov, Malenkov and Beria, who had arrived before dawn, informed Litvinov of his removal from the post of People's Commissar." Just two sentences in all, but they provide the appropriate foundation for the acceptance of further, on-the-whole, more-or-less objective information. According to the logic of things, what should have been told briefly about a man of which the contemporary reader knows almost nothing, was provided in an introductory passage to a fragment from Sheynis' book: about how, in the early 1930's Litvinov was fighting on all levels for general world disarmament. In a recently-shown television documentary film, contrary to historical truth, the creators of "Risk" try to convince the viewers that the Soviet Union began the struggle for general disarmament in the person of N.S. Khrushchev, only in the 1960's; this thought was developed by Academician A. Sakharov in MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI (No 45, 8 November 1987, p 14); about his titanic work on the establishment of an anti-Hitler coalition, about the agreement signed with President Franklin Roosevelt on establishing diplomatic relations between the USSR and the USA, about the defense of the independence of Ethiopia and Spain in the League of Nations, and many other things which characterized the foreign policy of our country in the 1930's, which did

everything possible to forestall the Second World War. Litvinov was in the vanguard of the Soviet Union's struggle for peace.

One would think that these very facts from Litvinov's biography are in harmony with our times, and that they should have dwelt on them, and told about this brilliant and unique personality. But the magazine's editors focused the readers' attention on a political dust-up, painting it in thick layers, and did not explain the true reasons for Litvinov's removal from the post of People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs. But the reasons lay in the fact that the Soviet government was forced to temporarily shift its foreign policy and to conclude a shaky agreement, which the country badly needed, with Nazi Germany (this is described in great depth and detail in M.S. Gorbachev's report dedicated to the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution). Anyone with a lick of common sense could understand that no diplomat who had been striving to create a world system of collective security against Fascism, and spoke out in denunciation of the aggressors in the League of Nations, could hold talks with Ribbentrop.

It was precisely for this reason that V.M. Molotov replaced Litvinov. The circumstances of the replacement of the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, which was made necessary by the action of our government, is not sealed with seven seals: they are known to the author of the article as well as the editors of OGONEK. But, having invoked only one aspect of life in the 1930's, the publishers decided to take one fact from the biography of a figure of state out of the context of objective circumstances, and present it as an example of "ill will," or lawlessness. Does such an approach to our history promote the establishment of the truth?

Or yet another untruth, dressed in the clothing of verisimilitude: L. Lukyanova is trying to convince readers of PERVYY, her little information sheet, that a benefit concert, the receipts from which are supposed to go toward building renovation at the Church of the Great Ascension in Moscow, is the first in our country; that philanthropy was forbidden, "by the fact that for a long time it was strictly defined for us what to say aloud and what in a whisper, what was outmoded and what, on the other hand, was timely." Philanthropy was not recommended, "since it was neither ours nor theirs..." According to such banal facts, which are presented to us as news ("to be charitable—to be a benefactor, is to do good"; and, "In days of old, people learned that by giving, you gain"). From the emotional content of the article (that philanthropy is only now being revived) it is evident, that all of this is only very remotely related to the truth. Otherwise the author would have informed us that philanthropy has always existed in our socialist society. Workers and employees at enterprises and in military units would take responsibility for orphanages, for old folks who lived alone, for invalids, for poor and unfortunate families; and they gave them material and moral assistance—entire brigades would donate a portion of their labor for their cause.

I know people who have passed on their State Prizes to orphanages. I do not want to dwell on such examples of philanthropy; they were very common in my time, but were not given such wide and noisy publicity: good deeds are ordinarily done by modest people. I will just say this: no ban was ever placed on philanthropy; but it is another matter, whether or not one could find unselfish philanthropists. I have cited only two examples of the "inaccuracies," to put it mildly, which abound in the articles published in OGONEK.

The party, at its 27th Congress and in the report of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev, dedicated to the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution, has not forgotten to give due regard to all the kind, wise, and progressive accomplishments of the people during the period of building socialism. It seems to me that the blunders of 1937-1938 and the crimes, which we have no right to forget, are not a topic to relish. Like every major mistake in our lives, it is a sore spot for the people and our party. And if each of us were to pour out upon the socialist system "our hidden offenses, our thirst for retribution, our feeling of the need for just deserts" (OGONEK, 1987, No 40, p 23), there would not be any such thing as perestroika, and everything would boil down to ideological permissiveness, which under such circumstances inevitably leads to anarchy, and would rock the foundations of the socialist system. We ourselves, competent party organs and our historians, must determine the causes of such mistakes on the basis of in-depth and unbiased study of the documents, and on objective scholarly interpretation of them.

Currently one quite often encounters the opinion that the late 1950's to the early 1960's were a "golden age" in our history. One cannot agree with that. By that period the wounds of a terrible war were basically healed, cities and towns had been rebuilt, and destroyed factories and plants had been restored. M.S. Gorbachev, in his report on the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution noted that, "The heroism of everyday labor in those difficult postwar years is the source of our achievements, our economic and scientific-technical progress, our mastery of atomic energy, the first launches of space ships, and the growth of the people's material and cultural well-being." Having restored the national economy, it became possible to develop agriculture, housing construction, light industry, and the services sphere. It became possible to satisfy more fully the everyday needs of man. But if we close our eyes to the difficulties, blunders and victims of this period, we will be sinning against the truth. From my own point of view, it is very important for our perestroika to deal with the mistakes which followed the purifying, as it is now acceptable to say, 20th and 27th Party Congresses.

Without negating their positive significance in unmasking the personality cult and its consequences, or in the restoration of socialist legality (of this much has been said and is now being said), I would like nevertheless to

bring up, whereas many have forgotten or give the appearance of having forgotten, the fact that in certain of our fraternal socialist countries, negative processes have begun, and counterrevolutionary forces have raised their heads. How many Communists, loyal to the cause of socialism, lost their heads then, in Hungary or in Czechoslovakia, for example? I am a living witness to these terrible events. A nihilistic attitude toward the worker-communist movement has appeared. Certain of our foreign friends have, unfortunately, spurned us. All these are historical facts, and we must not close our eyes to them; rather we must now delve into all of this with all seriousness, and draw conclusions from it. Meanwhile, within the country "heterodox thinkers" have become active, and are preaching all sorts of ideological filth, on the basis of which a lack of spirituality and social apathy are flourishing wildly among a certain part of our young people, as well as vulgarity and a philistine attitude toward life, while antipatriotic and nationalistic moods have begun to form. I believe A. Adamovich is wrong when he asserts that pandemic drunkenness is our "shame and misfortune," the cause of which allegedly lies in the fact that the people, having "thrown off" the oppression of Stalinism since the 20th Congress, "suddenly sensed such devastation from the severe strain they had been under," that they began to drink. I was quite shocked by such a tendentious oversimplification. Actuality is much more complex than preconceived ideas. And so they would destroy some values without a second thought, while others virtually acquired the status of sacred relics—hence the nihilism and emptiness. The people gradually lost faith not only in their real and their literary heroes, but also their faith in man per se. It is far more likely that drunkenness and materialism flourished on the soil of lost ideals.

After the 20th Party Congress, the political accusations against a number of party and state figures, against many communists and non-party workers, managerial and military cadres, scientists and cultural figures, were withdrawn. Thousands of innocents who suffered were completely rehabilitated. Unfortunately, the process of the restoration of justice often took place in haste, and at times without the proper responsibility as well. Along with the honest people who were vindicated there were also those who were guilty both of illegal repression, and those who deliberately denounced honorable people. I remember, that when I was elected first secretary of the Kolomenskiy City Committee of the VKP(b), my activity in this post began with the gorkom sending a letter in my name to the VKP(b) Central Committee and to the government, addressed to all Central Committees of national communist parties, kraykoms, obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms of the VKP(b). (It is strange that today there is no record of this letter anywhere, just as with other party documents of that time—for example, the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum resolution of January 1938). This letter contained a directive to all party organs to re-examine the cases of those illegally repressed. By that time People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Yezhov and his assistants had been condemned

and had received their just punishment. Guided by this letter, I attempted to re-examine the cases of those condemned in 1937 and 1938, and their release from confinement. After this, the joint buro of the Kolomenskiy party gorkom and raykom expelled from its ranks the chief of the Kolomna Internal Affairs Directorate for violation of Soviet laws. The case was brought to court, and he was convicted. Imagine how surprised I was when I encountered this man in the late 1950's, at large, holding high rank, and found out that he was numbered among the victims of Stalin's despotism. I have always remembered his cynical words to me: "I regret that I did give you the death sentence in 1937; the case had already been prepared." I also knew a famous journalist, who at one time was the head of one of the central newspapers, and then a literary magazine. After he returned from the places of confinement, honest people tried to avoid shaking his hand, although he was also among the victims of Stalinism: for the lives of several of our writers were on his conscience. And one learned man, who had not yet even managed to return from exile, engaged in anti-Soviet activity on his way to the capital, sending for publication abroad materials of poignant quality, which compromised our statesmen and well-known writers. He had been illegally engaged in this dirty business for almost ten years, before the security organs grabbed him by the arm. These "publications" cost many honest and respected people their health. He was not too tired after his disclosures to break up the collective of a Moscow scientific institute, helping its individual workers in every way to move abroad. Incidentally, quite recently, V. Kaverin lovingly reminisced about this "scholar," as he described the Tynyanov Circle in Leningrad.

At a ceremonial session in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, dedicated to the 70th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution, M.S. Gorbachev stated in his report that the Central Committee Politburo has created a commission to examine the cases of those convicted in the 1930's and 1950's, in order to restore justice to those who became innocent victims of lawlessness and arbitrary rule. This is a gratifying resolution, and one would also like to see that the living witnesses of those years—the old Bolsheviks—are invited to sit on the commission. For maximum objectiveness in this responsible, in my opinion a great deal of openness is required to familiarize the party rank and file with the documents and facts pertaining to the cases of those convicted.

The names of the party and state officials, military leaders and scholars, economic officials and cultural figures, communists and non-party people—all of those who were falsely accused and perished, must be restored and evaluated justly. Articles must be written about them, and the people must come to know them. Our history must cease to be faceless; not one single state or party official should be silenced, no matter what ideological position he occupied. Nevertheless, remembering them does not mean that we approve them all; each one must receive an objective political evaluation.

Three times in 1987 I saw F. Raskolnikov's picture in the press. He had been rehabilitated after the 20th CPSU Congress and the magazine OGONEK dedicated a large article to him by Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Polikarpov, in which Raskolnikov is presented to us as a victim of the personality cult. And this is said about a man who scorned Soviet laws, abandoned the position of ambassador with which the Soviet government had entrusted him, and fled under the protection of a millionaire relative to France, where he began to collaborate with the White Guard and the French right-wing press. His declaration, "How I Was Made an Enemy of the People," and his open letter to Stalin of 17 August 1939 were full of slander and malice toward our social system. In his time S.P. Trapeznikov provided an objective, politically precise characterization of Raskolnikov, through which one can attempt to dispute Polikarpov, although his opponent has since died. I am not saying that the arguments which the doctor of sciences uses against Trapeznikov are not very convincing. What difference does it make whether Raskolnikov's letter was printed in Kerensky's NOVAYA ROSSIYA or in Milyukov's POSLEDNIYE NOVOSTI? And even the tone of the discussion is altogether above criticism: here we have both "accommodation of 'scientific' thought," "subservience," and "repeated punishment" of Raskolnikov, "a fighter against the troubadours of bourgeois ideology" and "the apologists of the bourgeoisie," as Trapeznikov tried to present himself. Since when has the struggle against bourgeois ideology become a criminal offense for a Soviet scientist? Why is he held in reproach for taking a principled party position? I am not saying that all of this ardor is directed against the late communist and scientist. But we should consider that this is not the essence but the form. In essence, Polikarpov attempts to justify Raskolnikov not on the basis of newly-discovered documentary materials, but through excerpts from Raskolnikov's own letters. Now this is something new in scholarly debate! But, perhaps Raskolnikov's letter truly contains the objective truth, which we ought to listen to? Let us turn to the letter, which Polikarpov tried to publish almost entirely. In what does Raskolnikov reproach Stalin?

1. "You have resurrected the institution of political commissars." But has this institution really been abolished; did it really not justify itself during the time of the Great Patriotic War; in the army right now is it not a bulwark of our party? Who roused the soldiers to the attack; who bore the banner during the attack, and perished with it first? The commissars. Is that not so, honored doctor of sciences?

2. "You have placed art in a vise, from which it is suffocating and dying." And this was said at a time when the national art of the people was being established; people who did not have any art prior to the revolution, who were illiterate as well. A time in which many theater groups, films, music and the fine arts were flourishing. When you talk about the "no-talent scribblers," you evidently have in mind Maxim Gorkiy with his "The

Life of Klim Samgin" and with all his plays, which were the work of a genius; Mikhail Sholokhov, with his "And Quiet Flows the Don" and "Virgin Soil Uplifted"; Aleksey Tolstoy with his "Purgatory" and "Petr I"; Vladimir Mayakovsky; Konstantin Fedin; Aleksandr Fadeyev; Fedor Gladkov; Arkadiy Gaydar; Leonid Leonov; Valentin Kataev; Nikolay Ostrovsky; Ilf and Petrov; and countless others—all of the classics of Soviet literature which came to us in the 1930's through the 1950's. Or is all this unknown to you, O honored scholar, who have declared solidarity with every word in Raskolnikov's letter? Let me remind you of all our musicians, composers, painters, sculptors, producers, and artists of those times, who are treasured by not only our own culture, but that of the entire world? Or are you able to restore the gaps in your memory with the help of popular literature?

3. "You have deprived Soviet scholars (...) of the least amount of freedom of scientific thought." And how, without scientific thought, were the works of V.I. Vernadsky, A.N. Krylov, A.Ye. Fersman, I.P. Pavlov, S.A. Chaplygin, I.V. Michurin, S.N. Bernshteyn, A.Ye. Favorskiy, V.A. Steklov, N.D. Zelinskiy, N.S. Kurnakov, D.S. Rozhdestvenskiy, L.V. Pisarzhevskiy, P.L. Kapitsa, L.D. Landau, N.N. Semenov, A.F. Ioffe, I.V. Kurchatov, I.Ye. Tamm, N.Ye. Zhukovskiy created? Not to mention many other scholars whom I have not named, not because I don't want to or don't remember, but because the list would be too long. Every name represents a scientific school of worldwide significance. It is precisely these people who laid the foundation for our modern Soviet science. And so the assertion of Raskolnikov, that "the best scientists are running away from your 'Paradise,'" also has no basis. The fact of the betrayal of the Motherland by two organic chemists, Academician V.N. Ipatov and A.Ye. Chichibabin, can in no way be associated with personality cult; one fled abroad in 1927, and the other in 1930. Yes, how was the young Soviet state able to furnish them normal conditions for scientific work and life; whereas abroad they were paid more and they sold their knowledge and talent—and along with them sold out their Fatherland. Did such things really happen only in the 1930's and 1940's? I would like to lay special emphasis on the fact that the best thing they did for science in their lives were done here at home in the Motherland.

I presume that Polikarpov the humanitarian is not acquainted with the entire history of our science and therefore is in solidarity with Raskolnikov on that question also. But a man with scholarly degrees is obliged to know the history of the humanitarian sciences. I will remind him of just a few of the prominent names among our sociologists who had worked successfully at that time: B.D. Grekov, M.N. Tikhomirov, V.S. Nemchinov, A.M. Deborin, P.F. Yudin, D.N. Ushakov, K.N. Kornilov, P.P. Blonskiy, V.V. Vinogradov, V.F. Asmus, K.V. Ostrovityanov, D.D. Blagoy, and N.K. Gudziy. The list could go on. I suppose that today there is no one to

compare with these leading lights of scientific humanitarian thought. The works of Academicians V.P. Volgin and Ye.V. Tarle are striking—not only for their vast erudition and in-depth research, but also for their brilliant literary style: even non-specialists have become engrossed in them. These were truly popularizers of science. I do not wish to say that at that time there were no pseudo-scientists and opportunists; they have always been around to a greater or lesser degree. But in comparing today's science with that of yore, I can say with confidence: Is it not strange, that in the 1920's through the 1950's there were less.

4. To Raskolnikov's rhetorical question, "Where is Tupolev, the best designer of Soviet airplanes?" I can answer very simply: The great patriot and citizen, aviation designer and scholar A.N. Tupolev has always been with his people. He has served them faithfully and truly all his life. I knew this magnificent man and I can confirm this. Even when Tupolev was unjustly placed under arrest—when somehow the enemy sent the blueprints for his new military aircraft to Fascist Germany—he remained a true son of his Motherland.

5. "Agents of the gestapo and Japanese intelligence (...) are flooding you with false documents, attacking our finest, most talented and honest people." It was not all that simple. Czechoslovakian President Eduard Benes informed our government of the existence of a plot among the military and the allies of L.D. Trotsky and his followers—and not agents of the gestapo and Japanese intelligence. Was this a provocation or premeditated falsification? Without authoritative documents it is difficult to answer this question, if we wish to establish the objective facts. It is not difficult to establish the historical truth of this version with the help of our Czechoslovakian friends, who have made a study of Benes' archives. One should also pay heed to the hypothesis proposed by historian V.A. Kozlov; it seems promising to me and requires further scholarly development (See: KOMMUNIST, 1987, No 12, p 75). The "false documents," of which Raskolnikov writes, if they have survived, should also be made public and be given serious study, in order to escape false rumors.

One must give Raskolnikov his due: in his letter he is more objective than his defender. Polikarpov writes, that "Stalin was captive to the illusion of the possibility of forestalling a military conflict with Germany," while Raskolnikov asserts that in the 1930's we transformed the Red Army with the last word in technology, and made it invincible. "Incidentally, concerning Stalin's 'illusions,' it is time to remove the scales from our eyes. The country was feverishly increasing its military might, depriving itself of every necessity, and our historians assure us that our head of state did not believe in the possibility of war. And how about the numbers? In 1931 we had 860 aircraft; in 1938, 5,469; tanks, respectively, 740 and 2,271; cannon, 1,911 and 12,340; and so on. And we were at the limits of our industrial capacity. A colossal amount of work was undertaken in preparing

the entire population of our country for war. As for the painstaking attempts of our diplomats to establish an anti-Hitler coalition? You see, it was only the lack of results of these persistent efforts that forced the USSR to enter an agreement with Hitler's Germany, in order to gain just a little more time; to strengthen the army, and to establish the industrial capacity to equip it with military equipment. This period in our history was brilliantly analyzed in M.S. Gorbachev's report at the ceremonial session dedicated to the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution.

I do not think that further commentary on Raskolnikov's letter would be useful. I would only like to stress that the letter of the former Soviet diplomat was directed not so much against Stalin, as much as against our socialist system. Therefore, Polikarpov's conclusion gives rise to doubts—that Raskolnikov's letter "serves as an important source" for the study of the "causes and conditions for the rise of the cult" and the historic experience of the struggle against it. Here our scholar is somewhat tardy: long before him sovietologists in the West had been taking advantage of such "sources" in their "works"—nor do they shun them today. If Soviet historical scholarship continues to surmount such unwanted obstacles in its midst with the help of letters of this type, our descendants will never learn the truth about our history.

Let us return once again to the distortions in the economic and party spheres which were observed in the late 1950's and early 1960's.

"Diarchy" was introduced in party organs—rural and industrial raykoms and obkoms—which not only promoted an inordinate bloating of their staffs, but also made the administration of the region more difficult, both in the political and the economic sense. The thoughtless directive "on strengthening" the kolkhoz—when indiscriminate resettlement of the peasants began, moving them from their farmsteads, villages and auls where they had dwelt for centuries, where their way of life, traditions and work habits had been formed, on to centralized farm centers—brought neither economic, nor spiritual, nor moral results. Presently we are painstakingly attempting to resurrect the abandoned villages and auls. The Food Program which our party has planned actually corrects the mistakes of those times: it was namely then that individual private subsidiary farms were eliminated, both in the rural areas and in urban settlements. This dealt the state not only a material blow (Many products of animal husbandry and agriculture disappeared from the shelves), but also caused moral damage.

I will not dwell on the Sovnarkhozes which have made hardly any changes for the better in our national economy but only demanded enormous funds during restructuring, for the infamous corn-planting and other reforms of those years, which in the final analysis did not justify themselves. I will touch only on the commendable words of Academician A. Sakharov about Khrushchev, printed

in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, No 45, 8 November 1987, where he wrote: "One of his steps was a significant reduction of the army and armaments in the USSR." I would like to stress the "and" in this question. During the years 1955-1957 (At that time I was working as deputy chairman of USSR Gosplan and was concerned with defense industry), certain responsible officials' heads were turned over the successes of defense industry in creating atomic, jet and other kinds of new weaponry—and they began to show less appreciation to the development of aviation, classic weaponry, armor, and shipbuilding. We then unilaterally destroyed an enormous amount of modern military equipment as "useless."

It seems to me that our social sciences must finally take up the subject of what it is we should take and develop from the political, economic and intellectual experience of the 1960's; which of its legacies should be rejected; and what sort of lessons we should derive from the mistakes of that period.

A scholar may like or dislike this or that fact of history, or this or that historical personality; but he must not have a tendentious attitude toward them or ignore them. If certain sections of history are removed or hushed up, or if everything is tied up in a single bundle, this will lead to a situation in which the truth of history is lost.

Without clarifying theory, we will not catch the essence of the achievements and mistakes of the past; and consequently we will be unable to properly orient on them. However, if a scholar embraces only one thought—that everything done in the past in our party theory was bad, that dogmatism, subjectivism, axiomatism, opportunism, and eclecticism flourished then—then from such a scholar one cannot expect works which correctly reflect the true state of affairs.

Passionate outbursts are appearing on all sides in the periodical press, and ill-considered, half-baked generalizations, behind which stand incompetence and prejudice. We've reached the state in which we are challenging 10th-grade students to debate; such is the system in which we live. Here is a dialog between Dm. Gubin and a teacher at a school in Volokolamsk (OGONEK No 42, 1987, p 15):

"I am being asked," the teacher declared unhappily, "what sort of system do we live under? Previously I would tell them that we live in a society of developed socialism, because it is basically completed; but then, that we have started building it; but what should I tell them now?"

"Well, you don't have to tell them a thing. Why pelt one another with words? Give us some advice..." And so on... Gubin does not even understand that doubts are

even being cast on the name of our country, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Apparently we will be forced to change it, to suit the whim of some jaunty correspondent.

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Impact of 1956, 1965 Political Changes in USSR Compared

18300251a Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 4, Apr 88 pp 74-88

[Article by Ye. Yu. Zubkova, candidate of historical sciences: "The Experience and Lessons of the Incomplete Turning Points of 1956 and 1965"]

[Text] 1956 and 1965. First they were called decisive turning points, the beginning of great changes; later they were called a time of unrealized opportunities and not fully justified hopes. Interest in the events of those years is growing and becoming more and more evident as the processes of present-day restructuring develop further. This interest is as natural as the desire to move ahead, taking into account the experience of the past and not repeating its mistakes. Today we must return to many issues which were raised in the 1950's and 1960's, but which at that time did not find practical resolution, or else were resolved inconsistently, by half-measures, in a piecemeal fashion.¹

Many things must be reinterpreted and remade. And sometimes it is more difficult to remake, to rebuild, than it is to build something new. Not only in the concrete, material sense, but also in a psychological sense. I feel that we do not yet fully appreciate the inertial force of mistrust of measures taken repeatedly, when it seems that "we have seen all this before" and "nothing can be changed." The unique interweaving of new and old tasks, old problems and new approaches to finding ways to solve them, is one of the characteristic features of restructuring, and also one of its difficulties. We can only understand restructuring's place in the overall historical process by clarifying what actually did take place back then, in the mid-1950's and mid-1960's, why the social renewal begun at that time was "frozen" in the end, and why many plans of those years never became reality.

The need for research analyzing the historical process at its "critical points" is dictated by the pivotal nature of our times. In this area the historiographical tradition is not yet strong enough to permit us to speak of an established approach. We have major works devoted to the October Revolution, the transition to the New Economic Policy, the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the economic reform of 1965 and other events in Soviet history which may all be considered turning points (though they differ in their content and nature). However, despite all the books that have been published we

still cannot judge the role of the various turning points in the life of our country. As a result, the boundaries of history are becoming either too vague, or else purely formal in nature.²

One approach that has been very common in the science of party history has been the idea that party history is a progression from one congress to the next, with each congress being regarded as a new stage in the gradual development of Soviet society and a contribution to the enrichment of Marxist-Leninist theory. The problem with this approach is not so much the fact that the significance of truly pivotal events such as, for example, the 20th and 27th party congresses, is lost against this backdrop of equalization, but rather that this type of approach hampers comprehension of the particularities of the development of the party's strategic course at various stages of social development, and prevents one from seeing and evaluating this process together with all its complexities and contradictions.

As for books dealing with the history of Soviet society, to a large extent scientists have grown accustomed to dealing with "periods," "stages" and "five-year plans" to which specific-historical content is attached. In this approach the starting point for research is analysis of the preconditions for the transition to a given stage and of the corresponding party or economic resolution which marked the beginning of that transition. This approach is fully justified when the historian sets himself the task of illustrating *how* various events in our country's history developed. But as soon as he attempts to answer the question of *why* this chain of events occurred in precisely this rather than some other sequence, he runs up against the limitations of the traditional model. The source of these limitations, as has already been noted in this journal,³ is to be found in the lack of a dialectical approach based on analysis of the contradictions which, so long as historians continued to "think in periods," somehow got lost in the "junctions" between those periods.

Focusing analysis on "critical points" directs the historian's attention to the interconnection of problems, to the "node" of contradictions which, if understood, can explain the logic of the development of the period as a whole. Nodal points in history are not merely turning points which mark the beginning of a new stage and help resolve matters of periodization, but are also "growth points" which to a large extent determine social development over a more or less lengthy period.

An historical turning point is always a moment when the contradictions in the functioning of society are resolved. The depth and nature of those contradictions determine the nature and form of the turning point's development. It can be evolutionary or revolutionary, carried out with the aid of consistent reforms or as a result of a decisive break, proceed to manifest itself as an economic process or remain incomplete. What is more, it is always a

moment of seeking, of choosing, of weighing alternatives. It is the critical point of reality at which the objective and subjective factors of history intersect: the objective necessity for urgent changes, comprehension of this necessity by the party and the people, and readiness to take practical steps. The contradictions of objective reality, its "sore points," are a kind of guideposts which help society choose the right direction for its further progress. The choice itself and its concretization in a program for practical action depends upon the degree of "inclusion" of the subjective factor in the process, the level of its maturity and readiness for the pending changes. The "involvement" of the subjective factor begins with a realization of the place and depth of the turning point, and to a large extent this also determines the logic of development of all subsequent events, and of attitudes toward V. I. Lenin's appeal to "go onward, unfaithfully onward."

The 11th Congress of the Russian CP (Bolshevik). Lenin appraises the situation in the country as it makes the transition to the New Economic Policy: "This year we have proven quite clearly that we are not capable of managing the economy... Either we prove the opposite during the coming year, or else Soviet power cannot continue to exist."⁴

"Otherwise they will do us in!" said I. V. Stalin, justifying the need for the turning point of the late 1920's and early 1930's.

Whether or not socialism would continue to exist—this was also the alternative posed by the year 1941.

"Such a radical change in course is essential, simply because no other path is open to us. We cannot retreat, and there is nowhere for us to retreat to."⁵ This conclusion was pronounced at the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and reaffirmed by the January 1987 Plenum.

The turning points of 1921, 1929, 1941 and 1985. At their root was resolution of the fate of socialism, a problem that can arise not only during a transitional period or in conflict with external aggression, but also at the stage where socialism has grown strong and is developing under peaceful conditions. The alternative of "to be or not to be" arises, as a rule, from a crisis situation, from a real threat to the realization of socialism, or else forms under the threat of serious deformations of socialism. It can also arise under conditions where there does not yet exist a crisis situation *per se*, yet where there are symptoms of the possible appearance of a crisis. In the pre-crisis situation which existed, for example, at the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's the establishment of a foundation for the turning point framed strictly in terms of alternatives was justified. At the time socialism's choice persisted as a result of the incompleteness of the transitional period, and the question of "who whom" remained on the agenda. In addition, there was another factor in operation: during the

years of socialist construction the mechanism of the "sharp break" was successfully mastered, a mechanism typical of periods of "Sturm und Drang"; however, "siege" methods and strategies, i.e. consistent "reformational" restructuring, were mastered to a significantly lesser degree. This factor is of particular significance, in this case not so much with regard to understanding of the "acceptability" of various methods for bring about the turning point of 1929 as with regard to definition of the place and role of the events of 1956 and 1965 from the standpoint of the development of the turning point mechanism as a whole. The significance of 1956 and 1965 lies precisely in the fact that during those periods the first real attempt was made to master the mechanism of "reformational" turning points, turning points which, if carried through to completion, would lift society to a qualitatively new level of development. In this sense they may be regarded in terms of their nature and their overall orientation as revolutionary, which is not only not in contradiction to the reformational form of their development, but also represents, we feel, one of the conformances to law in socialist progress.

The turning point of 1956 resulted from the general economic and political situation existing in the Soviet Union in the late 1940's and early 1950's. The postwar period of rebuilding had come to an end; this was attested to not only by economic development indices, but also by the affirmation of a peaceful mood throughout society, a mood connected with the social and psychological transition from war to peace. A certain reevaluation of values took place, including a reevaluation of the stimuli and factors involved in increased labor activism. The principle of work "at any cost" was losing its justification (the toll of war, the difficulties of rebuilding, etc.) to an ever greater extent. The further the war receded into the past, the more clearly people began to realize that the extreme wartime situation of personal deprivation and intensive labor also belonged to the past. The question was framed bluntly: "The war is over, we have all experienced the privations of war, and we are well aware that a period of peaceful construction has begun. How long can we go on sleeping on sawhorses?"⁶ Thus, in essence it was the mass consciousness which determined one of the watershed moments in the development of Soviet society, the uniqueness of which moment lay in the need for a change in course in the direction of social programs, basically in the direction of adequate implementation of the fundamental economic law of socialism. However, the mechanism of its specific functioning under conditions of socialism developing "on the basis of itself" remained to be "discovered" and utilized. The need for a search based on interpretation of the contradictions of reality was becoming ever more socially essential.

This was indicated by the discussions which took place in the late 1940's and early 1950's (on problems of economics, philosophy, biology, literature, etc.). Virtually all of them transcended the bounds of their subject, going on to analyze a number of general socioeconomic,

political and ethical problems: public thought was persistently seeking a forum for discussion of urgent contemporary problems and was exploiting any opportunity available toward that end. There was a rising wave of critical statements "from below" directed against shortcomings in the organization of production, everyday difficulties and various abuses. "Who is to blame?"—this question, and in precisely this form, most often accompanied the search for the causes of a social "ill." Thus the "ill" assumed a strictly personalized form, and in general the problem of responsibility was reduced to a group of persons directly "to blame" for various dysfunctions, breakdowns and difficulties. Thus the methods of the "struggle against shortcomings" of the transitional period were transferred to the modern era, and the logic of that struggle was perceived of as something absolute and so well "mastered" that it became a part of the public psyche. The experience of the past was transformed into a sort of reservoir, the sole source of all the answers to all the questions of the present.

An uncritical attitude toward the methods and forms of guiding social processes during the transitional period led to a certain degree of absolutization of those processes. Absolutization, which attaches universal applicability to a means of action that is correct within certain limitations, is always a cause of error.⁷ The transformation of relative aspects of socialist practice into absolutes played a role in the development of the concept of socialism which took shape mainly in the 1930's. According to this concept, socialism increasingly came to be regarded as an uninterrupted, gradual and quite non-contradictory progression of society toward the heights of communism. This theory was based on ideas appearing in the initial postwar years that all the difficulties of socialist construction could be explained by a lack of experience and historical preconditions, "that after a certain amount of time has passed everything will run smoothly: tasks of economic and social construction will be performed much more easily, without complications and various costs."⁸ In this theory real socialism becomes the simple sum of "vestiges of the past" and "young shoots of the future"; the former are to be eradicated, the latter are to be supported and developed in every way possible. This idealized and simplified perception of socialism became part of theory and began to a large extent to define both social practices, which in a way "copied" that perception, with everything that did not fit into this structure being labeled "alien," "vestigial" or "not ours." Frozen trade and financial relations, curtailed cost-accounting, virtually total centralization of administration, etc. were the results of this schematic approach to reality, with the idealized perception obscuring the real world. When the state of real socialism signaled certain imperfections in the system thus created, its idealized image was slightly "amended" and updated. In this regard emphasis was always on the *extent* of the necessary transformations rather than on their *quality*. The orientation of the changes made (both in theory and in practice) was determined by the need to eliminate "bottlenecks," i.e. those problems which lay

on the surface and were perceived as having priority. Hence a desire to take action only in a single direction with the aid of various levers and partial corrections.

The search for a new approach based on rejection of the principle of "one-time actions" and a transition to comprehensive programs of social renewal occupied a very long period of time and in the end led to the current concept of restructuring. At the end of the 1940's and beginning of the 1950's successful development of this search was hampered by the conditions under which it was formulated. From the very start it was in a way an "assigned task" and was limited to rather narrow bounds. These bounds were set by authoritarianism. The pressure exerted by authority, in particular the authority of I. V. Stalin, limited the development of a public consciousness and public thought, the political intellect of society which must lead the search for ways to resolve contradictions in public affairs. Stalin's name was often used as a "shield," as the argument to end all arguments, the one which won any debate and which decided the outcome of any discussion. An opponent's position was often not merely discussed, but actually subjected to an obligatory "defeat," with that position subsequently being denied the right even to exist (the first instance of this sort that comes to mind is the VASKhNIL session of 1948). As a result of what seems to be a paradoxical situation was created: the need for change was gradually beginning to be felt at all levels of public consciousness (as attested to by the increasingly critical mood), yet at the same time people stubbornly attempted to avoid contemporary problems (in this regard a significant role was played by the principle of "lest something happen"). This "vicious circle" had to be broken. The sole alternative that there could be to authoritarianism was democratization of public life.

The "thaw" was the symbolic label people attached to the period immediately preceding the 20th Party Congress. "...1954-1955 seem like a lengthy prologue to a book of tumultuous adventures, unexpected turning points and dramatic events," recalled I. Erenburg. "However, this was not the case. In my personal life that time was by no means dull; my heart thawed, I seemed to be starting life over again. Those years were not dreary ones in the history of our country either. The beginning of a just evaluation of an unjust past was no coincidence; it did not depend on the good intentions or on the temperament of any one politician. Critical thinking had awakened, and the desire to find out about some things and to test others had been born."⁹ Following this there was 1956, the 20th Party Congress, denunciation of the cult of personality, and the course toward broad democratization of society. Renewal. A turning point.

The alternative posed in those years was perceived as follows: "...Either the party openly, in a Leninist manner, discusses the mistakes and distortions which occurred during the period of the I. V. Stalin personality cult and rejects those methods of party and state leadership which are impeding progress, or else the party will

be dominated by those forces which are chained to the past and resist all that is new and creative."¹⁰ As a consequence the choice assumed a primarily *political* nature.

The process of renewal which affected various areas of public life in the 1950's began with the reestablishment of democratic principles in party affairs, Leninist standards of party life and collective leadership. Party congresses and Central Committee plenums began to be held on a regular basis, and it became the practice to discuss party and state documents more widely in the press and at meetings of labor collectives. Meetings involving a broad range of experts began to be held on the most important issues pertaining to the development of various sectors of the economy. The functions of party organizations were more clearly defined; party organizations were relieved of their direct, day-to-day management tasks, and these were transferred to specialized economic administrative organs. The party was given the opportunity to focus its attention on the development of strategic programs for the country's social and economic development and on selection of priority orientations and the means of implementing them. There was a simultaneous upsurge in the activism of soviets, trade unions and the Komsomol in the direction of developing independence and initiative. The basic requirement in restructuring of the work of these organs and organizations was that they decisively turn and "face" the people. The 20th Party Congress created a seeking atmosphere, one that set public thinking free; new ideas and approaches were developed, providing fertile soil for renewal in science, literature and the arts.

The course toward democratization of public life was to be adequately continued in the economy. All the economic restructurings of the second half of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's were envisioned as solutions to the problem of democratization of administration: expansion of union republics' economic rights through transfer to their jurisdiction of matters which had previously been handled at the center; establishment of closer ties between administration and local areas; reduction in the size of the administrative apparatus; etc. The unique feature of all the economic reorganizations of the 1950's and first half of the 1960's lay in the fact that their development was to a great extent influenced by the "political determinism" of the 1956 turning point. In those years attempts were made to solve many economic problems by using purely political strategies and methods. Later an economic administrator's degree of party-mindedness was measured by his attitude toward the planting of corn, and increased crop yields were placed in direct subordination to one's level of political consciousness. "If in certain regions of our country corn is being planted in a formalistic manner and in those places kolkhozes and sovkhoses are obtaining small harvests, then that is not the climate's fault, but rather the administrators' fault," said N. S. Khrushchev. "In those places where corn will not grow there is a 'component' which discourages its growth. That 'component' can be

found among the leaders... We must replace those workers who have sucked dry and continue to dry up the corn crop, who do not give it an opportunity to develop to its full potential."¹¹ Tasks connected with the development of the virgin lands and Siberian construction projects were performed using the tried and true methods of direct appeals to conscientiousness, enthusiasm and self-sacrifice. The movement to promote communist labor—a notable event of those years—resulted primarily from a wave of political activism, on that same basis of conscientiousness and enthusiasm. However, the first attempts to link enthusiasm and economic self-interest (the beginnings of the brigade contract) were perceived mainly as manifestations of "acquisitiveness," "self-promotion" and virtual "capitalism" in the economy.

It seems that people's mental image of communism, for which the material and technical basis was promised within 20 years, had a must greater influence on the economic and social policy of the late 1950's and early 1960's than did analysis of the economy of that time and its problems. It was precisely as a result of this attempt to "speed up time" that on the whole this period ended in failure. However, at the same time this aided greatly in creating an atmosphere favorable to seeking, daring and efforts to go beyond the bounds of the possible. Man's breakthrough into outer space was an event that is inseparable from that era. The successful solution of priority scientific and technical problems only served to contrast with shortcomings in the state of the "day-to-day economy." Some work was done in that direction, its vector was on the whole correct: renunciation of excessive centralization, expansion of economic independence, utilization of prices, profit, credit and other economic levers in practical economic activity, transition to contractual relationships between enterprises, etc. These questions were discussed in the course of economic discussion which, beginning in the mid-1950's, then for a time abating, then flaring anew, continued throughout the entire subsequent decade. As a result of these discussions the basic contours of a future economic reform gradually took shape. And, no less importantly, they contributed to the formation of economic thinking and prepared public opinion for the pending changes. People were taught to see through the carelessness of individual administrators and glimpse the shortcomings in the system of economic management, the imperfection of the economic mechanism as a whole. But over time the content of these discussions, which at first encompassed the broad aspect of economic problems, became ever more circumscribed, first to debate concerning indices (according to which enterprises' operations were supposed to be judged), then concerning the "principal" index, finally assuming a clearly expressed "anti-quota" nature. Thus, the "starting" potential of the economic reform was already reduced. To a large extent this was connected with changes in the overall political situation at the end of the 1950's and with the specific nature of the development of democratization processes during that period.

The depth of democratization processes can be "measured" by examining the relationship between criticism of the past and criticism of the present. Each new stage of social development naturally begins with evaluation of the road already traveled, with critical interpretation thereof. The fair and in many ways courageous evaluation of the past given by N. S. Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress provided a serious impetus for the process of social renewal. Denunciation of the personality cult and its negative effects on the people and the country and the mere fact that frank discussion of painful contemporary problems was occurring were earth-shaking to people of that era, regardless of whether the evaluations of the past given at the congress were a revelation to them or simply a long-awaited tribute to justice. At that time three years had passed since the death of I. V. Stalin. During that time many instances of arbitrary actions against honest Soviet citizens had been made public, L. P. Beria had been convicted, and mass rehabilitation had begun. However, the moment when the term "personality cult," which had appeared some time previously, was attached to a specific individual, when evaluations of Stalin's role and place in the life of the party and the country acquired objectivity and balance, was for millions of people too sharp a turn, and this required a certain restructuring of the mass consciousness.

Whereas acknowledgement of the fact of Stalin's personal responsibility for the violations of the principles of socialist justice which had been committed and his errors during the first stage of the Great Patriotic War, as well as criticism of the moral aspect of a number of his actions, could basically be accepted immediately, the speed with which previous evaluations were replaced with their exact opposites, the fact that someone who until recently had appeared almost divine was transformed into the "evil genius" of history (with the cult of personality subsequently being cited to justify absolutely everything) could not fail to alarm or, in any event, give one pause. Presented in this exclusively personalized form, the problem of responsibility for the "errors of the past" objectively curtailed the basis for analysis of the contradictions that had been created, all the more so as many of them had still not been alleviated as a result of criticism of the personality cult. And the question "who will be the judges?" was not merely a rhetorical one during that period. Party ethics had always been a part of party policy. Criticism of the past and a decision on the basis of that criticism concerning responsibility for the mistakes made was one aspect of the problem of confidence in the vanguard, which is the basis for the party's ties to the masses. It is one thing to boldly point out others' mistakes (although often this really does take courage), and quite another to have the courage to admit one's own mistakes and accept a share of the responsibility.

Attitudes toward the problem of the party and state responsibility of the political leadership of the 1950's was already quite well defined in June 1957, when the

Central Committee Plenum was held at which the "anti-party group" of V. M. Molotov, L. M. Kaganovich, G. M. Malenkov and others was denounced; their behavior since the 20th CPSU Congress had been to a significant extent connected with the fact of these individuals' responsibility for arbitrariness and lawlessness during the "period of the personality cult."¹² With the denunciation of the "anti-party group" the question of responsibility for the past seemed to come up of its own accord. However, the country's political leaders remained exempt from criticism.

There was a gradual change in attitudes toward the search for the "truth of life" in the arts due to the rebirth of the dogmatically interpreted principle of "unanimity of thought." V. Dudintsev's novel "Not By Bread Alone", which had provoked tremendous interest among the reading public, was declared a "slandorous work" in which the author "intentionally paints a bleak picture and expresses malicious joy at shortcomings."¹³ B. Pasternak's novel "Doctor Zhivago" did not even reach a mass readership; however, this did not prevent it from being subjected to universal, organized denunciation or its author from being expelled from the USSR Writers' Union. The not-yet-forgotten era of the struggle against "cosmopolitanism" seemed to be returning. "Attacks on writers were connected not with criticism of their literary works, but instead with changes in the political situation," observed I. Erenburg. "People tried not to remember the 20th Congress and, of course, could not foresee the 22nd. Attempts were made to intimidate young people, and students stopped talking at their meetings about what they were thinking, talking only among themselves. The fear that had made people keep quiet about Stalin had disappeared. It was replaced by more mundane worries... if one made too much fuss, one could be assigned to some job far from Moscow."¹⁴

Up until that time the process of social renewal had not yet become irreversible; the presence of shifts and even outright deviations in its development is in a certain sense conformal to law, the natural reflection of the struggle between the proponents and the opponents of change. The possibility of "revenge" on the part of the latter makes the turning point process "vulnerable" and subject to the influence of many attendant factors, both internal and external. We feel that the "lesson" of the Hungarian crisis of 1956 played a significant role in the fate of the turning point of the mid-1950's. Counterrevolution under the slogan of "democratic socialism," dissension in the leadership of the ruling party, intensification of revisionist thinking and, as a result, the October-November revolt—in the light of these events the facts of our own history in 1957 and 1958 become clearer. And although Hungary at that time was essentially only at the beginning of its socialist path, while in our country socialism as a social system had been in place for 40 years, the Hungarian "lesson" was in fact taken as support for the absolute in our own path. However, there were changes in the overall evaluation of the past, and criticism of the past began to emphasize different things.

The problem of authority figures, past and present, was sounded in a different key. Just criticism, "regardless of authorities," continued to be recognized as an important instrument of instructive influence. Yet at the same time regret was expressed with increasing frequency that supposedly one seldom read anything positive about directors of enterprises, the chairmen of rayispolkoms or other administrators.¹⁵ It was felt that this approach "could inspire a disdainful attitude on the public's part toward all administrators, a lack of confidence in them, regarding them as all being alike! One could also hear it said that there was a need to start talking about authority figures; one could hear people were starting to whisper 'Let's have the cult again, let's go back to the old days.'" ¹⁶ The position that states that "the people that builds communism needs authority figures," ¹⁷ requires no polemical discussion due to its incontrovertible nature. But the fact that in the public consciousness of the 1950's and early 1960's the concept of an authority figure was often identified with the concept of the personality cult requires some thought. The public consciousness usually is quick to reflect and fix upon the external, superficial connection between events and phenomena, relating them to previously established concepts, perceptions and images. This relative persistence was characteristic of the concept of the personality cult, which in real life and, consequently, in people's consciousness was for a long period of time virtually the final word on the matter of authority.

The destruction of stereotypical thinking is a lengthy process. Mastery of new concepts takes place through critical elimination of outdated ones, with the two groups in an ongoing relations to each other. If, on the one hand, the personality cult is condemned and there is talk of the need for strict compliance with the principle of collective leadership, and even if this principle is actually complied with (more or less consistently), yet on the other hand the previous attributes began to be used with reference to a new leader—just the external, "ceremonial" attributes, but the same ones that accompanied the personality cult—then this creates in the mind of the public a situation which will inevitably be labeled "a return to the past" (as a result of the persistence of previous perceptions and their external similarity to the new phenomenon). And this external aspect was quite obvious: a new authority figure was gradually being raised in place of the one that had been overthrown. As early as the 22nd Party Congress facts pertaining to the "heroic struggle" of the Ukrainian CP against the "provocative actions" of Kaganovich under the leadership of N. S. Khrushchev were "made public."¹⁸ Later there were references to the "successes" for which "we are indebted" to the one who was head of the party at that time, and to his "inexhaustible energy and revolutionary ardor"^{19,20} (these words were spoken by a person who only four years previously had himself condemned the bearers of "revolutionary ardor" for their voluntarism and "errors," yet now to this new leader, we "will be indebted" for our latest "successes").

In any event, the changed emphasis in criticism of the past and the lack of critical perception of the present became a serious obstacle on the road to further democratization of Soviet society. The tasks of developing criticism were restricted to the attributes of "special" periods—the periods of "sorting and clearing", the unique preparatory stages which signaled the start of a new "offensive." The "sorting and clearing" begun in 1953 was considered complete by the conclusion of that decade.²¹ The process of democratization, perceived more precisely as a *precondition* for social renewal rather than as its basis, its spirit, its internal, essential nature, became something of a valve which could be opened wide, opened partially or simply shut. It was this approach which to a large extent prevented the development of a fundamentally new long-range strategy for the country's social and economic development which would take into account not only the experience of the past, but also the failures of the present. The political leaders of those years, who remained essentially above criticism, deprived themselves of the freedom to select and evaluate their own actions. The uniformly positive formulation of the decisions made during that period, the perception of them as being final and without alternative (resolving a problem once and for all), the inability to correlate momentary successes (the initial effect) with the inevitable appearance of new problems—all these things could not fail to result in serious miscalculations in practical economic and political leadership.

The failure of the Economic Councils was just one link in this chain. During the period of preparations for restructuring of administration according to the territorial principle the work of ministries was rightly criticized. However, some experts were seriously alarmed at the pending elimination of those ministries, and in this connection it was proposed that at least some ministries be preserved, or at least that new organs having the function of drawing up an overall policy for the development of individual industrial sectors be created. Some experts noted the positive aspects of the planned Economic Councils, yet expressed the concern (later borne out) that these advantages would rapidly be exhausted and that elements of localistic tendencies would appear. It is a well-known fact that these proposals and doubts, just like proposals that a preliminary series of economic experiments be conducted, were not taken into consideration.²² When the Economic Councils began to go into decline after initially "taking off," a decline caused by the accumulation of contradictions within the territorial system of administration on the "model" of the 1950's, and after there was an increase in the influence of negatives tendencies (localism, an increasing amount of unnecessary paperwork, loss of the sector-oriented perspective on development, etc.) these phenomena were not ascribed to the system itself, which was regarded as "correct." The reasons for the breakdowns were sought outside of the system, and therefore were most often explained in a subjective manner: by citing the slowness of economic administrators, their inability to conduct their affairs, etc. "Correcting the situation"

meant forcing economic administrators to work "properly." Hence the natural return to an old familiar course: recourse to methods of pressure and dictate, and from there to the "catastrophe of bureaucratic administration."

In the mid-1960's special party decisions were adopted which condemned voluntarism and excessively bureaucratic administration of the economy as being serious hindrances on the path to economic development. As for the process by which voluntarism came into being as a social phenomenon, this would require a more in-depth and specialized treatment, which is beyond the scope of the present article. Therefore we will limit ourselves to a few comments which pertain directly to the turning points of 1956 and 1965. Since management of society was not entirely free from voluntarist approaches either in the prewar period or after the denunciation of voluntarism in the mid-1960's, one can scarcely call voluntarism a phenomenon of the early 1960's, much less a "personal error" on the part of N. S. Khrushchev. The first serious blow to the absolute of arbitrary administrative methods that ignored the laws of social development was struck in the mid-1950's by criticism of the cult of personality. However, the primarily "upper-echelon" nature of that criticism, tracing the roots of the cult to I. V. Stalin's personal shortcomings, did not permit at that time a more in-depth analysis of this highly complex phenomenon or an understanding of the system behind the personality, the authoritarian (or in a broader sense, bureaucratic) system behind the authoritarian personality.

Centralized administration has a tendency to promote expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus. The growth thereof creates the preconditions for the formation of an all-encompassing bureaucratic system whose influence extends not only to the economic realm, but throughout the entire social organism. This very real possibility of bureaucratization must be countered by the democratic political nature of the socialist system. Strong will is indispensable in the administrative process, but initiative is equally essential. Furthermore, there is an objective need for both will and initiative on the part of all participants in public production and administration, not just the "commanders." In the case of a strict separation of functions in which some persons "command" while others "carry out orders" there is a growing danger of voluntaristic actions. However, voluntarism (and this makes it akin to the phenomenon of the personality cult) is not merely a factor that "accompanies" the bureaucratic system, but rather is its dependable "shield": in the event that a pre-crisis situation arises one can always place the blame on individual "commanders" and thus avert a blow to the system itself.

The danger posed by expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus arose almost immediately after the victory of the socialist revolution, when on one side of the scales was the "dedication to the struggle for socialism,"

"enthusiasm and sincerity" of the working class, combined with its low level of culture, including administrative culture; on the other side of the scales was the professional competence and "elements of knowledge" of the old experts, combined with their alien political views. As a result of their professional and overall cultural unpreparedness the new people brought into the sphere of state administration could "master" and successfully apply only one of the external, organized forms of administration: bureaucratic administration. "I have noticed how some of our comrades, who are capable of having a decisive influence on affairs of state," wrote V. I. Lenin in 1922, "are exaggerating the bureaucratic aspect, which is of course indispensable at the proper place and the proper time, but which should not be confused with the scientific aspect, with the encompassing of broader reality, the ability to attract people, etc."²³ In practical state administration during the initial years of Soviet rule competence and bureaucratic administration were often separated not only functionally, but politically as well: the new "administrators" were supposed to monitor the old "professionals." Solution of the problem of how to combine these opposites, these two aspects of administrative work, should become, according to Lenin, an important part of restructuring of the entire state apparatus. In this respect the principal role was to be played by correct cadre selection; Lenin considered the task of combining competence and the ability to handle the bureaucratic aspects of a job in the same individual a very difficult one.²⁴ This combination had not been achieved in practice even decades later, when the country had a "homegrown" administrative corps. In this corps were quite a few individuals who combined the qualities both of good professionals and good organizers. But as soon as they had to choose between professional competence (i.e. the true interests of the job) and the demands of the bureaucratic hierarchy, the "administrator" in each of them prevailed (one need only recall Onisimov, the hero of A. Bek's novel "The New Assignment"). Thus a line of demarcation between two irreconcilable halves ran through each person—one of the first signs that the apparatus was to a large extent continuing to operate according to the old principles, remaining essentially a "subject" of the old culture, subordinate to its influence. This occurred as a result of limitations on democratic traditions, the narrowing of the basis for development of elements of self-government and monitoring of the functioning of the apparatus from below—the very factors which alone could resist progressive bureaucratization. The curtailment of democratization processes during the 1920's and 1930's led not only to expansion of the administrative apparatus, but also to the formation of an all-encompassing bureaucratic system. "In order to understand the situation in those years we must bear in mind," noted M. S. Gorbachev, "that the administrative-command system, which began to take shape during the course of industrialization and which received new impetus during collectivization, has had an effect on all social and political life in our country. Taking hold in the economy,

it expanded to encompass the superstructure, limiting development of the democratic potential of socialism and restraining the process of socialist democracy."²⁵

The development of the process of democratization as a result of the turning point of 1956 had as its concomitant a reduction in bureaucratic influence as a result of reduction in the size of the purely administrative apparatus, and also as a result of increasing initiative from below. However, during the initial stage (roughly until 1958) it appeared to be primarily a measure originating at the center. When the process received noticeable support from below (thanks to the movement to promote communist labor and the first experiments with self-management of production), the center had already begun to vacillate, demonstrating inconsistency and a lack of comprehensiveness in its actions. This gap in time between the point of maturity of the various motive forces of social renewal objectively strengthened the position of those who had the support of the bureaucratic system. The latter had much greater endurance than the elements of democratization which were directed against them, and reacted very skillfully to vacillations and concessions in the development of the democratic process.

The first half of the 1950's and early 1960's passed under the hallmark of struggle between democratic and bureaucratic tendencies in the development of public life. At the end of this period the democratic tendency began to weaken, primarily as a result of the inconsistency of actions from above, and there was a greater danger of voluntarism and bureaucratic administration; subsequently this served as a direct precondition for strengthening of the positions of the bureaucratic system. This did not occur immediately: until the mid-1960's processes of democratization gathered positive inertia, spreading from the political to the economic realm, or, more precisely, having their continuation in the economic realm. The development of the turning point of 1965 was therefore influenced by two divergent tendencies: whereas the economic decisions of the second half of the 1960's were a de facto continuation and deepening of the experimentation of the preceding decade, the political situation after 1964 was essentially "at odds" with the basic principles of the democratic course set at the 20th Party Congress.

The main content and basic thrust of the turning point which came in 1965 was defined by economic reform. By this time the party and society at large were becoming aware of the limitations of the practice of making partial corrections and individual improvements, and a need was felt for the development of systematic measures; this thought was clearly enunciated at the 23rd Party Congress.²⁶ Through elimination of voluntaristic tendencies in the management of the country the party began to deal with the problem of finding new approaches to administrative practices, placing them on a scientific basis. These new approaches were drawn up at the March and September (1965) CPSU Central

Committee plenums. Measures adopted in the mid-1960's for the purpose of improving the system and principles of economic administration were the most major attempt in the entire postwar period to restructure the economy in accordance with the new requirements of the times. In contrast to previous attempts, the decisions of the 1960's affected several sectors simultaneously: industry, construction and agriculture. The five-year plan was affirmed as the principal form of state planning, plans were made for expanded application of cost-accounting at enterprises and in sectors, measures for improving the incentive system were outlined, etc.²⁷ The most significant changes were in the system for managing industry and construction. There was a reduction in the number of indices prescribed for enterprises from above; the index of goods sold became the primary basis for evaluation of an enterprise's operations, replacing the "quota"; and special incentive funds were established. Enterprises that made the transition to the new system experienced an overall improvement in their operating indices as compared to enterprises and branches of production which continued to operate under the old system. However, over time this difference became less noticeable. Only a relatively small number of enterprises were operating under the new principles, and they were in a more advantageous position, both in terms of receipt of state capital investment funds and with regard to utilization of their own resources. As the reform developed many enterprises which formally continued to operate under the old principles adopted elements of the new system, thereby improving their own production indices.²⁸ At the same time, this was an indication that the reform had still not penetrated deeply, had not affected the foundations of the economic mechanism. "We have picked up only those things which we can pick up without stooping," stated an article in the magazine *KOMMUNIST*. "It is time to seek new reserves for increasing efficiency."²⁹

"Do not let reform come to a halt" was the leitmotiv of the most constructive speeches on the problems of economic reform in the 1960's. The alarm was justified: the newly created system of economic administration was yielding one position after another (amendments to plans were becoming more frequent, enterprises' rights were being circumscribed, more dictates were being issued by the center, etc.). The reform seemed to stop at mid-point, at the enterprise level, without reaching the individual workplace, on the one hand, and not affecting the echelons of administration, on the other. Attempts to push reform "from below" were diverted into a whole economic experimentation movement.

However, the initial successes of the economic reform, which gave impetus to creativity "from below," had quite a different effect on the central leadership: there they served as justification of the "adequacy" of the measures taken. Here one must also take into account the "involvement" of an external factor. In the mid-1960's virtually all the European socialist countries commenced an economic reform analogous to ours. The

most radical measures were carried out in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary (in those countries the system of directive indices was almost completely abolished, enterprises were granted quite broad rights regarding the disposition of their income, a flexible pricing system was introduced, etc.).³⁰ In Czechoslovakia economic contradictions were tightly interwoven with political ones. The consequence of the worsening of these contradictions was the crisis of 1968-69. The Czechoslovakian events of that time undoubtedly require a most thorough analysis. And that analysis is important. As for our own country, "...fundamental changes in society were needed, as well as, of course, the appropriate political will—this is the current evaluation of the situation that existed in those years. Both were lacking. And a great deal of that which was decided remained merely on paper, was merely left hanging. The rate of our development slowed seriously."³¹ As a result, the turning point of the mid-1960's could not achieve its full potential. Democratic processes were basically blocked by the forces of bureaucratic conservatism. The turning point of 1965 could not therefore carry to completion the tradition of 1956, although logically and historically it was a continuation of the turning point of the mid-1950's.

Thus what we have is a single process which is internally unified yet discrete in its development, in a way a *single turning point*, in which the events of 1956 and 1965 represent two sides, two components: a course toward democratization of society and a course toward economic restructuring. But this discrete nature, complicated by inconsistency of actions, was one of the reasons for the destroyed unity and the ultimate incompleteness of the turning points.

The principle of consistency in the implementation of turning points is of particular significance and helps overcome *critical points* in their development. Any turning point has at least two such critical points. One of these is connected with the transition from statements and the development of a program of action to actual practical steps. Turning points which are born of crisis pass through this critical moment rather quickly, owing to the effect of powerful catalysts, among which are the external impetus (military crises) or a sharp increase in the activism of the masses caused by the extreme nature of a given situation (internal political and economic crises). As a result such turning points are implemented almost immediately as a simultaneous movement from above and from below. When the situation has not arisen as the result of a crisis and the turning point is to a certain extent of a preventive nature, then as a rule the inclusion in the process of the various social forces which have a direct or indirect stake in the process proceeds unevenly. In this case it is always necessary to begin at the top—this is a particular characteristic of "reformational" turning points in general. As they develop there occurs a gradual strengthening and widening of the turning point's social base as new forces are attracted. However, in our history attempts have been made to

accelerate the flow of this process, these attempts being expressed by efforts to use methods of coercion and outright pressure, as was the case, for example, during the turning point of 1929, in the transition to universal collectivization. The experience of 1956 demonstrated that attempts at bureaucratic introduction of a new system and intensification of dictates from the center without consideration for the actual situation lead to direct growth in voluntarist tendencies in the running of the country and only serve to slow down the process of social renewal. The complexity and contradictory nature of the situation in such a case results from the fact that the new mechanism cannot be "set in motion" without direct administrative action. In another approach these initial measures can be regarded and applied as preparatory measures, "mobilizing" measures that open up possibilities for the utilization of economic levers and stimuli for the implementation of the programs that are adopted. The course of development of the turning points of 1956 and 1965 leads one to the conclusion that the masses are drawn into the cause of restructuring gradually, in proportion to increases in the positive effect created by the transformations undertaken. During this initial period the main job of restructuring falls on the shoulders of the vanguard.

However, it would be wrong to characterize the development of the turning point process at its initial stage as exclusively a task for the center. Generally speaking, turning points are inconceivable without the participation of the masses, without their support. Another question concerns the form and scale of this support and participation. Time must pass between comprehension and approval of the measures taken at the top and the coming into being (what is more, the "natural" coming into being) of forms of movement from below that will be adequate to the planned strategic concept of social renewal. The development of this process accelerates in proportion to the appearance of positive, quite tangible results from the decisions adopted. On this basis the "phenomenon of confidence" in the political leadership's measures takes shape among the masses; this in turn prompts a sharp increase in activism from below (recall the "explosion" of the movement to promote communist labor at the end of the 1950's, or the scale of the "low-level" economic experimentation of the late 1960's).

At this moment a turning point approaches the next critical point, at which the factor of unity of action by the center and the masses assumes its final form, as it is strengthened not only by approval of the course set at the top, not only by the self-sacrificial work of the vanguard, but also by broad practical support from below, support based on people's conscious willingness to set aside their immediate interests for the sake of long-range interests.

1956 and 1965 revealed serious contradictions in the efforts of the center and the masses at precisely this critical point, and this to a large extent determined the ultimate outcome of those turning points. In those cases

the movement from below to continue and deepen social transformations ran into a certain passivity on the part of the center, where "initial successes" were taken as a de facto guarantee of ultimate success, with the result that the measures already taken came to be regarded as "all that was needed, and adequate."

The ability not only to take practical steps, but also to see their immediate and long-range consequences, as well as a constant readiness to resolve new problems that may arise, are essential conditions for the implementation of social and economic turning points. Therefore the main lesson to be drawn from any turning point remains Lenin's: "to go *onward, unfailingly onward...*"³²—both in terms of consistent implementation of a program of revolutionary reforms, and especially in terms of development of the process of democratization. This is the leitmotiv of the conclusions which, gradually taking shape in the heart of the people and their party, have led our society to its present concept of restructuring, to the development of new political thinking on the basis of Marxist-Leninist dialectics and study of the lessons provided by historical experience.

Footnotes

1. See M. S. Gorbachev, "Perestroyka i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira" [Restructuring and New Thinking for Our Country and for the Whole World], Moscow, 1987, p 40.
2. This is clear, in particular, from discussions on problems of CPSU history and the history of Soviet society, including some published in this journal. But a detail treatment of the question is beyond the scope of this present article.—Ye. Z.
3. See, for example, V. A. Kozlov, "Istorik i perestroyka" [The Historian and Restructuring], VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 5, 1987, p 119. The author regards attention to the "juncture" points of Soviet history as one of the main thrusts of his subsequent methodological structures (ibid., p 122). The approach suggested was used as the basis for the present article.—Ye. Z.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 45, p 80.
5. "Materialy Plenuma Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS, 27-28 yanvarya 1987 goda" [Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 27-28 January 1987], p 15.
6. TsGAOR SSSR [USSR Central State Archive of the October Revolution], Section 7676, List 9, Document 888, Sheet 237.
7. See: E. V. Ilyenkov, "Dialekticheskaya logika. Ocherki istorii i teorii 2-ye izd., dop." [Dialectical Logic: Essays on History and Theory. 2nd Edition, revised], Moscow, 1984, p 45.
8. A. S. Tsipko, "Nekotoryye filosofskiye aspekty teorii sotsializma" [Some Philosophical Aspects of the Theory of Socialism], Moscow, 1983, p 5.
9. I. Erenburg, "Lyudi, gody, zhizn" [People, Years, Life], in OGONEK, No 22, 1987, p 23.
10. "XXII syezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. 17-31 oktyabrya 1961 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchet." [The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 17-31 October 1961: Stenographic Record], Vol. 1, Moscow 1962, p 102.
11. Ibid., p 80.
12. Ibid., p 105.
13. N. S. Khrushchev, "Za tesnyuyu svyaz literatury i iskusstva s zhiznyu naroda" [To Promote a Close Connection Between Literature and Art and the Life of the People], Moscow, 1957, pp 22-23, 25.
14. Erenburg, OGONEK, No 24, 1987, p 28.
15. See: "Plenum Tsentralnogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 18-21 iyunya 1963 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchet." [Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, 18-21 June 1963. Stenographic Record], Moscow, 1964, p 76.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. See: "XXII syezd Kommunisticheskoy partii....," op. cit., Vol 1, pp 280-281.
- 19.-20. Ibid., p 340.
21. See: N. S. Khrushchev, "K novym uspekham literatury i iskusstva" [Toward New Successes in Literature and the Arts], Moscow, 1961, pp 9, 10.
22. See: L. N. Lisitsyna, "Iz istorii podgotovki ekonomicheskoy reformy 1965 g." [From the History of Preparations for the Economic Reform of 1965], in ISTORIYA SSSR, No 2, 1971, p 4.
23. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 45, p 351.
24. Ibid.
25. M. S. Gorbachev, "Oktyabr i perestroyka: revolyutsiya prodolzhayetsya" [October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues], p 20.
26. See: "XXIII syezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. 29 marta—8 aprelya 1966 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchet." [23rd Congress of the CPSU, 29 March - 8 April 1966. Stenographic Record], Vol 1, Moscow, 1966, pp 53-54.

27. See: "Resheniya partii i pravitelstva po khozyaystvennym voprosam" [Party and Governmental Decisions on Economic Matters], Vol 5, Moscow, 1968, pp 606-609, 658-685.

28. See: A. Rumyantsev and V. Filippov, "Novaya sistema planirovaniya i ekonomicheskogo stimulirovaniya promyshlennogo proizvodstva" [A New System of Planning and Economic Incentives for Industrial Production], in "Khozyaystvennaya reforma v SSSR" [Economic Reform in the USSR], Moscow, 1969, p 17.

29. KOMMUNIST, No 18, 1966, p 71.

30. See: "Ekonomicheskiye reformy v sotsialisticheskikh stranakh Yevropy. Vyp. 6" [Economic Reforms in the European Socialist Countries, 6th Edition], Moscow, 1969, pp 13, 25-36.

31. Gorbachev, "Oktyabr i perestroyka....," op. cit., p 29.

32. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 37, p 196.

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Historians on Ways To Improve Quality of CPSU Historiography
18300338 Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in
Russian No 5, May 88 pp 152-157

[Report by K.V. Gusev on meeting of Presidium of USSR Council of Ministers Higher Certification Commission in Moscow on 12 February 1988: "Quality Is the Main Consideration"]

[Text] The science of party history is playing a prominent part in the struggle for the qualitatively new state of Soviet society by assuming the important commitments of the ideological substantiation of perestroyka. The dramatically increased interest it has aroused in history is not the result of idle curiosity or a thirst for sensationalism. It stems from the urgent and objective need to separate the negative from the positive, reality from fiction, and essentials from incidentals in the historical process. The study of the past is one of the factors securing the advancement of society and is made necessary by life itself. History reveals the indissoluble connections linking the past with the present and the future.

The analysis and interpretation of new, previously unavailable documented information and of new data resulting from the improvement of the methodology of historical research should aid in the discerning reconsideration of earlier points of view and the reassessment of past events and facts and of various periods in history. Only under these conditions will the genuine development of the science of party history, the deeper analysis of historical processes, and the effective enrichment of

historical knowledge be possible. "The Marxist-Leninist approach to the analysis of social history," M.S. Gorbachev stressed, "presupposes persistent, intense, and discerning mental effort. It takes time, talent, and responsibility....It is impermissible when whimsical theories which are more likely to obscure the facts than to illuminate them are widely disseminated in the place of truly scientific research. We must put an end to this practice."¹

The most important purpose of the science of history has always been the use of past experience as a basis for transforming activity in the present. By summarizing the colossal experience of the multifaceted activities of the CPSU and social development, this science can play an important role in solving today's urgent problems and in molding the historical awareness of the Soviet people as an integral part of the socialist social consciousness. At this time, however, we cannot say that this duty is being performed satisfactorily, because the quality of works on party history does not always meet current requirements.

The Stalin cult of personality and the stagnation of the 1970's and early 1980's had a profound effect on the science of party history. For many years historians did not analyze real conflicts, difficulties, and errors but portrayed the augmentation of the party's guiding role as a continuous, automatic, and immanent process, without taking subjective factors into account. Party history began to seem conflict-free, impersonal, sanitized, embellished, and altered to fit common stereotypes. Soviet scholars still have much to do to rid the science of party history of numerous distortions, dogmatism, and the non-objective interpretations of the facts and events of whole periods in history.

Setting higher academic standards for dissertations on CPSU history and party construction and improving the certification of pedagogical personnel in this field of science should contribute to the successful completion of this extremely difficult task. This was discussed with great enthusiasm and concern at a meeting of the presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers Higher Certification Commission (VAK), held on 12 February to discuss the work of the Expert Council on the CPSU History and Party Construction in 1985-1987.

The meeting began with an introductory speech by Academician Ye.I. Shemyakin, chairman of the VAK.

A report on the work of the expert council was presented by its chairman, Professor N.N. Maslov, doctor of historical sciences. On the average, he said, 50 doctoral and 400 candidates dissertations on the council's subject matter are defended each year. These figures are impressive, but there has been a significant decline in the number of works submitted to the expert council in recent years. Apparently, the main reason is that scholars do not want to defend dissertations written according to earlier standards. Besides this, specialized councils are now more exacting.

The issue of the scientific level of defended dissertations, their quality, and the relevance of their subject matter, the speaker stressed, is still an extremely important matter today, 3 years after the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and after the 27th party congress. It is essential to bear two of its aspects in mind: first, the degree to which dissertations advance the science of party history, the degree to which they add to the knowledge of party history and party construction; second, the degree to which the certification of scientific and pedagogical personnel helps to reinforce the personnel potential of our science. We must never ignore the fact that the degree of a doctor of sciences not only attests to the scholar's qualifications and acknowledges his contribution to science but also opens the door to faculty appointments and professorial positions.

This was also discussed in part by Professor O.I. Terno-voy, doctor of historical sciences and chairman of the specialized council on CPSU history of the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute imeni V.I. Lenin (MGPI). In the last 10 years not one of the dissertations submitted by the two institute councils has been rejected by the VAK, and 70 doctoral and 130 candidates dissertations have been defended. Several works, however, were not accepted by the councils because of their low academic level. In this time 60 of the people who defended doctoral dissertations became VUZ professors, and 30 of them were elected department heads, 10 continued to head departments, 6 became chancellors, vice-chancellors, and deans, 4 became the heads of scientific establishments and organizations, and 2 took jobs on the party staff. Therefore, as far as the training of pedagogical personnel is concerned, the results are not bad. The institute's specialized councils are still keeping a close watch on the careers of their former scholars.

An analysis of their participation in scientific work by the specialized council, the speaker said, indicated that only one-third of the people who defended doctoral dissertations actively pursued creative work, writing and publishing articles and monographs connected with the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the perestroika, the acceleration of socioeconomic development, and the reinterpretation of history. The reason is probably that most people are in their fifties or sixties when they are awarded a doctorate, and only four of the scholars became doctors before the age of 40. The situation in the specialized council of the MGPI reflects the overall situation with regard to highly qualified personnel in the science of party history. After all, most of them are VUZ instructors.

The publications required of scholars seeking a doctorate in historical sciences were a subject of controversy at the meeting. There is the opinion, and it was expressed by some speakers, that the future doctor must have published a monograph. Many specialized councils make decisions on the acceptance of dissertations to be defended precisely on this basis. Their position has played a definitely positive role—the number of people

who have published monographs on their research findings has risen considerably. They now represent around three-fourths of all scholars seeking advanced degrees.

There have been some objections, however, to this requirement. They are connected in part with the age of these scholars. In the first place, dissertations in history, just as in the other social sciences, are already defended quite late because their preparation usually takes around 10 years on the average. Under these conditions, in view of the difficulties connected with the publication of books, the publishing requirement could mean that the dissertation would be defended even later, but it is important today to find ways of "rejuvenating" the group of doctors of sciences.

Second, this requirement puts the scholars in Moscow, Leningrad, and the capitals of union republics, who have much greater publishing opportunities, and the scholars in outlying regions on an unequal footing. Of course, the approach to the publishing requirement must be different in each specific case, especially now that the new draft "Statute on the Procedure of Conferring Academic Degrees and Titles" puts the emphasis on the defense of dissertations in the form of a scientific report. Specialized and expert councils, however, are still paying too little attention to the publications of scholars. Only one recent case comes to mind of the rejection of a doctoral dissertation by the USSR VAK on the grounds that the results of the research were not reflected properly in works by the author. And after all, for a party historian, just as for any social scientist, it is precisely publication that is the principal way of informing the public of research findings and their practical applications. For this reason, USSR VAK could take steps to facilitate the publication of monographs.

The departments of the MGPI believe, and we can agree with them, that the intensification of the scientific work of party historians will necessitate the improvement of the organizational forms of their participation in research. One such form is the scientific problem group (the MGPI now has three of them), which not only discusses and reviews dissertations but also conducts debates on major academic topics. Current contacts between these groups and specialized councils should be expanded and reinforced, because this is one way of raising the academic standards of dissertations.

The "technology" of the defense and examination of dissertations can play an important role in enhancing their quality and have a direct effect on the augmentation of the number of doctors and candidates of sciences. It is therefore quite understandable that methods of stimulating the activity of specialized councils, the expansion of their powers, and the establishment of closer ties between specialized and expert councils were discussed at the meeting. Academic degrees in the history of the CPSU and party construction are now conferred by 65 specialized councils, 25 for doctors of sciences and 40 for candidates of sciences. They function

in all large scientific centers and all union republics with the exception of the Moldavian SSR. The VAK expert council is establishing closer contact with specialized councils: It has received reports from five of them and has invited the heads of these councils to its meetings.

It must be said that some specialized councils are not as exacting as others. Works submitted by the councils of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, and the Moscow, Belorussian, and Voronezh state universities meet high standards. The percentage of candidates dissertations meeting minimal quality requirements, as evaluated by the experts, is small—around 5 percent. Poor work is no exception to the rule, however, in the Kazakh State University council, for example. Standards are also low in the councils of the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, and the practices of the specialized council of the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, which made unprincipled decisions and did not make the necessary demands on the quality of dissertations to be defended, were suspended after the expert council had heard its report.

The expert council has recently rejected only around 3 percent of all doctoral dissertations. Is this figure too low? This is not a rhetorical question. The important thing is not to raise this indicator but to determine the degree to which the assessment of dissertations corresponds to the general state of the science of party history. The demands made on works to be defended must be adjusted in such a way as to eliminate the typical shortcomings of the science of party history—dogmatism, scholasticism, and superficiality. When decisions are made on these requirements, the expert council must have an important say in the matter because it has extensive information at its disposal for judging the merits and shortcomings of dissertations.

The tendency toward the reorganization of science in the spirit of perestroika, said Professor V.G. Karasev, doctor of historical sciences and co-presenter of the expert council report, consists in reviving the Leninist principle of "Less but better is better." Regardless of the many steps taken to improve the quality of doctoral dissertations, however, we must frankly admit that there has been little success here to date.

The council, a speaker noted, is mainly concerned with evaluating the content of dissertations, but is this the main consideration? Probably not. In the future it should probably put more trust in specialized councils and concern itself less with monitoring the content of dissertations than with overseeing the work of specialized councils and assisting them. The present situation, VAK Chairman Ye.I. Shemyakin said, is one in which expert councils try to take the place of specialized councils or

simply overwhelm them, although the specialized councils are made up of the same kind of specialists as the expert councils and their membership is even larger; the expert councils repeat examinations that have been performed well on the previous level of certification. This is an unproductive waste of time and energy and, furthermore, it sometimes causes friction between expert and specialized councils. The expert council should pay more attention to establishing closer contact with specialized councils and, what is most important, intensifying analytical work.

In general, this kind of work is being conducted. Professor A.I. Chugunov, doctor of historical sciences and deputy chairman of the council, reported that the council had analyzed the doctoral dissertations defended in the last year, in the last 2 years, and in the last 6 years (300 works) with an eye to subject matter, ingenuity, research region, and academic background. The results were reported at a conference of specialized council chairmen in Riga last May.

What did the analysis reveal? Contemporary topics are prevalent in the subject matter of dissertations, and this is due less to the requirements of the science than to transitory considerations. The Lenin period in CPSU history, on the other hand, is dealt with in around 10 percent of the doctoral and 5 percent of the candidates dissertations, and the 1941-1961 period is discussed in 10 percent of each. There are no valid grounds for this kind of chronological distribution of topics. Furthermore, these historical periods have not been studied so much that they need no further investigation. After all, some of the problems of these periods are those now known as "gaps" in history and were the origin of many characteristic features of subsequent stages in the development of the party and the society. Current objectives demand the more thorough investigation of the problems of the period of transition, the New Economic Policy, etc.

The distribution of subjects by historical stages, however, is not the only problem. The development of the study of CPSU history has not been uniform on the regional level either. The history of the communist parties of the Moldavian, Turkmen, Kirghiz, and Tajik SSR's does not meet the necessary requirements. Several works have been written on Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, but the level of their credibility is quite low in light of recently acquired information. The history of the activities of party organizations in the Far East, Siberia, the European and Asian north, and the Non-Chernozem Zone has not been studied sufficiently either.

Works dealing with the 1961-1987 period pay little attention to the party's policy on nationalities, and only a few works analyze the leadership of the political system and the foreign policy activity of the CPSU. Dissertations on the history and activity of local party organizations say little about the human factor, usually discussing the party organization as a whole while ignoring its leaders and the party aktiv.

Another shortcoming of dissertations on the history of the CPSU discussed at the meeting was the purely descriptive nature of some dissertations containing a simple list of facts and frequently offering no serious conclusions or generalizations. Acknowledging this shortcoming, Professor N.N. Maslov, doctor of historical sciences, said that the expert council has negative feelings about these dissertations but believes that this is part of the legacy of previous decades in all of the social sciences. The expert council is trying to discourage this practice, but apparently with little success to date. Of course, it takes many years to write dissertations and it is unrealistic to expect today's works to be written completely in the new manner. These works are more likely to be of a transitional nature, reflecting perestroika and the reinterpretation of historical events, and this process should be encouraged. To avoid impermissible delays in the reorganization of the Soviet science of history, however, the subject matter of works according with the new phase of the science's development should be chosen now. The expert council should take more vigorous action in this sphere. Analysis is not an end in itself; it is needed primarily for the discernment of tendencies in the development of the science of party history and should serve as a basis for the active choice of dissertation topics, which are still being chosen arbitrarily in spite of the existence of a coordinating council.

The problem of coordination was discussed by several speakers—Doctor of Historical Sciences M.V. Iskrov, head of the Department of Branches and Research Coordination of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism; Professor A.I. Chugunov, doctor of historical sciences; Professor N.N. Maslov, doctor of historical sciences; and Professor K.V. Gusev, doctor of historical sciences and member of the USSR VAK Presidium. What is this problem? The very existence of a coordinating body—the All-Union Council for the Coordination of Scientific Research in the History of the CPSU and Party Construction—offers great possibilities for vigorous efforts by the expert council to enhance the quality of dissertations and the effectiveness of research so that the work of the person seeking a degree not only serves as the basis for the conferment of a doctorate in historical sciences but also contributes to the development of the science of party history. These possibilities, however, are not being utilized to the fullest extent.

The activity of the coordinating council was commended and was also subjected to constructive criticism, primarily for its failure to perform any functions other than registration. When the person seeking a degree submits his topic with a brief outline to the council, a council member reviews it and reports his conclusions to the council. The council then either approves the topic or withholds its recommendation. In a system as simple as this one, if the reviewer does not agree with the general theory, his subjective opinions could lead to the rejection of a good topic.

Of course, it is a good thing that the coordinating council is making higher demands on the subject matter of

dissertations. Most of the topics submitted at recent meetings, according to M.V. Iskrov, were not recommended for defense or were returned to be reworked because the people who chose the topics could not break free of old stereotypes or see the new objectives of the science of party history in connection with its reorganization. When the council rejects proposed topics, however, it does not recommend new ones.

It would be best for the coordinating council to conduct, in closer contact with the expert council (this kind of contact exists, but it should be more systematic and comprehensive), a deep and complete analysis of the subject matter of defended works and those now being written to learn the degree to which they deal with unionwide or regional problems, the prevailing chronological periods, and the topics overlooked by historians. The analysis should reveal the "gaps" in dissertations on party history and their relationship to the "gaps" in CPSU history and tendencies in the study of these periods. On the basis of this analysis and the materials of the expert council which handles all defended doctoral dissertations, recommendations can be issued to specialized councils, scientific establishments, and the people seeking degrees to advise them of special areas of concern and research guidelines, along with a discerning analysis of existing shortcomings in interpretations of various problems. Dissertations on party history should also be coordinated with dissertations on the history of the USSR, especially the Soviet society, and on the history of the international communist and workers movement (unfortunately, contacts of this kind are virtually non-existent at this time).

Of course, this will be a massive and difficult task, but in view of the concentrated strength of the coordinating and expert councils, it is completely feasible. The coordinating council will probably not have to formulate the exact topics of future dissertations. It is the job of the applicants themselves to word the topics correctly, in line with the purpose and goals of their research, but the council could set the basic guidelines, specify the problems requiring investigation, and suggest areas of emphasis.

The coordinating council has already begun drawing up a recommended list of priority fields of research and the issues of the greatest scientific, practical, and political importance in all periods of CPSU history. It has enlisted the aid of the republic coordinating councils of branches of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, problem and regional councils, the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, and higher party schools, and the personal contribution of several prominent party historians. We can only applaud the plans to publish these recommendations in VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS for the purpose of extensive discussion.

In the opinion of several speakers, the work on these recommendations should be stepped up (it is now

expected to be completed by the end of the year), because this will have a beneficial effect on the quality and effectiveness of dissertations.

It was no coincidence that another matter discussed at the presidium meeting was something like an inventory of topics approved earlier by the coordinating council and listed on 2,118 cards in the files of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism. The fact is that many of them are not being defended or are being defended in a form marking a departure from the earlier definition of the topic. This obscures the actual progress in the investigation of various problems. The Ukrainian council has already checked the status of research into topics approved over the last 20 years, particularly those included in the plan for 1986-1990, and the Belorussian council has rejected 60 previously approved topics.

When the coordinating council considers dissertation topics, it should pay closer attention to the publications of applicants, to their quality, and to what they offer science and the reader. This is particularly important today, now that dissertations are to be defended in the form of scientific reports and now that a published monograph does not necessarily have to exist. If the coordinating council takes this into consideration and the expert council pays closer attention to publications, the academic degree will be conferred not only on the basis of 400 pages of typewritten text, but also with a view to the applicant's actual contribution to the science of party history.

One of the serious shortcomings in the subject matter of dissertations which was mentioned during the discussion is the lack of concern for historiography, the study of sources, and the methodology of party history. After all, it is difficult to move ahead without assessing past accomplishments, but historiographic works on CPSU history are few in number. The quality of research and the level of scientific theories will depend largely on the resolution of problems in the study of sources and methodology. It is a well-known fact that many of the shortcomings of dissertations and of scientific research in general are the result of methodological errors and the indiscriminate acceptance of sources. The expert council should pay closer attention to the scientific basis of dissertations and instruct specialized councils to do the same. Unfortunately, not all of our researchers are able to work with archives and some do not even feel there is any need to do this. Speakers also considered the need to grant researchers broader access to archives. This is a valid request, but there have been cases in which researchers have used them only to satisfy a craving for sensationalism and have ignored general sources. For this reason, the study of sources will be a more significant part of the science of CPSU history when researchers are granted broader access to archives.

Professor V.V. Ryabov, doctor of historical sciences and deputy chief of the Department of Science and Academic Institutions of the CPSU Central Committee, spoke at

the meeting. He said that the analysis of the activities of the expert council should begin with an analysis of the current state of the science of party history in general, which has been charged with serious defects in party central committee decisions. This science was propelled for a long time by transitory considerations, dogmatism, and conformist thinking. If we do not realize this and do not conduct this kind of analysis, we will continue our automatic approval of the colorless stream of dissertations which has been flowing for years and has generated enough momentum to keep on flowing.

Of course, there were also some objective reasons for this, but the years of stagnation cannot be blamed for everything. There were also subjective reasons for the situation in the science of party history, and there will be no escape from this situation until we analyze our own behavior and look into our own consciences. Why, for example, were we bragging just 3 years ago that two-thirds of the dissertations dealt with the contemporary period? Is it possible that we were then unaware of the need for serious investigations of the Lenin period or of the acute problem of "gaps" in the history of the 1920's? Of course, we knew they were there, but we tried to get around them. Today we condemn these practices, but unless we analyze our own behavior in depth, we could simply adapt to the situation again. The members of the expert council should be the conscience of the science of party history. They make policy in this field and constitute its highly qualified personnel potential, and they should be aware of their responsibility for the important work they do and not confine it to such indicators as the number of approved doctoral dissertations. The analysis of the subject matter of defended candidates and doctoral dissertations and of their substance has not revealed any qualitative changes in the situation yet, and today's discussion should signify an advance in the work of the expert council.

V.V. Ryabov agreed with the speakers who expressed the opinion that the most characteristic feature of many works on party history is their theoretical weakness, sometimes combined with methodological impotence and, what is most regrettable in works of a historical nature, with the occasional absence of a serious analysis of sources and a tendency to ignore foreign sources, foreign literature, and world experience in the study of the historical process. Criteria for the evaluation of doctoral dissertations should be defined by the expert council. It should work more closely with specialized councils and encourage them to make higher demands and to make the scientific community aware of the reasons for these demands.

The Presidium of USSR VAK should also make stricter and more responsible assessments of the level and quality of dissertations in the social sciences, because any error or any lowering of standards can inflict moral injuries on the society. Performance evaluations, V.V. Ryabov stressed, will play a prominent role in the

reorganization of the social sciences because this problem cannot be solved without good personnel training. The VAK Presidium and leadership must take great care in choosing the experts responsible for setting the standards for dissertations in the social sciences. All democratic methods must be employed to appoint the most qualified and conscientious specialists to expert councils in the social sciences.

The USSR VAK Presidium passed a resolution on the report of the expert council, summing up the results of its work, noting shortcomings in this work, and listing the proposals and remarks made during the discussion. The resolution obligates the expert council to make a more active search for ways of improving the quality of the work of specialized councils and monitoring the fulfillment of the requirements listed in the "Statute on the Procedure of Conferring Academic Degrees and Titles." It proposes the intensification of efforts to define and organize priority research projects in the history of the CPSU and party construction through closer interaction with the All-Union Coordinating Council of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism. The expert council should continue its efforts to establish the optimal network of specialized councils and keep the

scientific community informed of the training and certification of scientific and pedagogical personnel in the history of the CPSU and party construction and of the results of research.

The meeting was attended by Doctor of Historical Sciences N.A. Slamikhin, sector head in the Department of Science and Academic Institutions of the CPSU Central Committee; Professor V.V. Zhuravlev, doctor of historical sciences and deputy director of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism; and the chairmen of several large specialized councils on the history of the CPSU and party construction.

Footnotes

1. M.S. Gorbachev, "Ideology of Renewal for the Revolutionary Perestroyka. Speech at CPSU Central Committee Plenum of 18 February 1988. Decree of CPSU Central Committee Plenum," Moscow, 1988, p 11.

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**Religious Affairs Council Chief Notes Current
Stand on Religion**
*18000460 Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 21,
21-28 May 88 pp 26-28*

[Interview with K.M. Kharchev, chairman of the Council on Religious Affairs, by the writer Aleksandr Nezhnyy: "The Conscience Is Free"; date and place not specified]

[Text] On Saturday, beginning at 10 am, Konstantin Mikhaylovich Kharchev received believers. I sat next to him and took notes.

Three from the village Mashanets of Chernovtsy Oblast: A middle-aged woman and two elderly men with medal ribbons; one without legs. "Where did you lose your legs?" asked Konstantin Mikhaylovich. "In 1943, near Tallin," answered Vasilii Mefodyevich Shevchuk. His comrade fought in the 3rd Ukrainian; in the family of their companion the father did not return from the war. Before Kharchev lay the letter they had brought: 572 signatures. Orthodox believers ask that their church be returned to them, which was taken away from them at the beginning of the 1960's. At one time the Table of Honor stood in the temple; now grain is stored there. . .

Two women from Alushta: On behalf of the Orthodox believers of the city, they ask for the registration of a religious society and the return of the church in honor of the great martyr Fedor Stratilat, which was closed in 1963. "Why do they write to me: citizen? Because I am a believer?"

A deputation from Cheboksar: They ask that a second Orthodox society be registered and the church be turned over to it. "The church is being destroyed. They use it to store brooms and barrels. . ."

Visitors from Gorki: There are almost 2 million inhabitants in the city and only three small Orthodox churches in remote districts. The believers ask that the Spaso-Preobrazhenskiy Cathedral be turned over to them, which is now being used as a warehouse for collapsible platforms.

Pentecostalists from Ternopol, Baptists from Chernovtsy Oblast, and Orthodox from Rostov Oblast—the latter the thirty-first delegation Kharchev received at 9 pm. "When in 1962 they closed the church, there were many courageous people, they did not even ask people, but they broke down the emergency doors and broke everything there was: The altar, the iconostasis, the benches. . . But when we ask to open it, there are no courageous people: Everyone is blaming everyone else."

Konstantin Mikhaylovich, I said during our next meeting to the chairman of the Council on Religious Affairs, it is sufficient to be at the reception which you hold to understand and sense the extreme seriousness of the

problem. Moreover, I have at my disposal a large quantity of similar facts that I picked up during trips throughout the country, from meetings with believers, and from the mail I receive. We must recognize with bitterness: More often than not, the constitutional rights of believers and the legislation on religious cults are being violated at the local level.

[Answer] "More often than not" is nevertheless too categorical. We have sufficient examples of the other sort, examples of a respectful attitude of local authorities to lawful requests of our believing fellow countrymen. I can report that, after the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, approximately 300 religious associations of various confessions have been registered. But, undoubtedly, very, very many unresolved questions in this sphere of social life remain. Executives permitting themselves not to take into consideration the norm of the law have still not been transferred. Finding themselves captive to old conceptions, living by the ideas of yesterday and even the day before yesterday, they resort to administrative pressure, prohibition, and shameful bureaucratic red tape, which has helped them more than once in the past, solely for the sake of not making what from their point of view are inadmissible "concessions" to the church.

[Question] The former secretary of the Kirov Party Obkom, Yu. Karacharov (he is now in retirement) made the following statement to me: "Not a step back before the church!" And meanwhile the question was the realization of the legal rights of the inhabitants of the city of Kirov, who had tried to attain the registration of a second Orthodox society.

[Answer] The Council on Religious Affairs under the USSR Council of Ministers has registered this society, you know. It goes without saying, our intervention would not be required, had the local comrades in charge, above all, been concerned with the execution of the requirements of the law. In the final analysis, this is their direct official duty.

[Question] Every failure to fulfill the law must be punished. Only in this way is it possible to cultivate in people an unconditional respect for law including for that part of it which protects the most important principle for society: freedom of conscience.

[Answer] I completely agree with you. What is more: I am deeply convinced that the fortunes of restructuring are in many respects determined by the attitude of believers to it. To whom they will give their heart, what they will become: Passionate, energetic supporters of restructuring, passive observers, or even opponents of the changes taking place in the country. Here, in my opinion, lies one of the most important questions of our political life! Understand: We have tens of millions of believers in our country, somewhere under 70 million people. And although the majority of the population consists of people who share a materialist world view, for

the time being there is no reason to talk about a mass departure from religion. So there: Millions, tens of millions of believers. But you see, as is well known, politics begins where there are millions. The question, thus, is utmost simple and clear. If the believers feel that restructuring is proceeding, that it decisively repudiates the view of the believer as a "second class" person, that on all levels of society it demands the strict observance of the principle of freedom of conscience and the norms of law resulting from it, then I am convinced they will become its consistent allies and participants.

Restructuring, democratization, and glasnost, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev underscored, when meeting with the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, concern the believers fully, without any limitations.

We should also ponder something else. We try to attain trust among nations; in this lies the essence of our foreign policy. And, indeed, what life can there be on the small planet Earth, what universal human ideals can we talk about if there is no mutual trust among nations! But it is hardly less important to restore the trust of the believers in the party and the state. The potential of trust at present has been lost in many respects. Having restored it, we support the movement of restructuring with a multimillion human factor and, as in the first post-October years, we involve the believers on our side.

[Question] You suggest, Konstantin Mikhaylovich, that Soviet power during the first years of its existence was able to win the support of the believers?

[Answer] Undoubtedly! The ideals of October: justice, freedom, and equality proved to be consonant with the ideals of Christianity dear to the believers. The ability for self-sacrifice of the Bolsheviks, their personal modesty, and the absence of the thought of their own well-being, all of this could not but call forth among the believers (in other words, among the majority of the population of the country) involuntary comparisons with martyrs for the faith, always so revered in Russia. Here, by the way, is the reason why this lesson, this, if you wish, precept of the first post-October years, is so important to us, who are conducting at present an enormous amount of work of spiritual renewal. The more pure the moral character of the communist, the more the people believe him.

It is impossible, moreover, not to do justice to the wisdom of the Leninist Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church, which was adopted 70 years ago. The decree affirmed the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the freedom of conscience as the dialectical unity of freedom of religion and atheistic convictions. In substantiating this principle, V. I. Lenin wrote in 1905: "The state should not be involved in matters concerning religion, and religious societies should not be linked with state authority. Everyone must be completely free to profess any religion or not to acknowledge any religion, i. e., to be an atheist.

... Any differences between citizens in their rights depending on religious beliefs are completely inadmissible. Even references of any sort concerning this or that religion of citizens in official documents must be absolutely destroyed."

In reading and rereading Lenin's works, you understand better and more fully what determined the approach of Vladimir Ilyich to the problems of the interrelationship of the socialist state and the church. This is, above all, democratism and respect for the feelings of believers. One example. Separating the school from the church, the Decree at the same time granted the possibility of being instructed in religion on a private basis. Parents who decided to teach their children the foundations of religion could for this purpose invite a priest to their home.

[Question] How is that, Konstantin Mikhaylovich? On the one hand, a decree defending freedom of conscience, and, on the other. . . . In an "Anti-Religious Textbook," published in 1940, we read: "The class enemy, defeated inside the country, has not yet been finished off completely. The religious organization, which disseminates ideas hostile to socialism, continues to be one of its refuges. The monks and nuns who have left their nests, thousands of priests of various religions who still recently raised the banner of rebellion, have not yet become reconciled to the idea that their cause is lost once and for all." Between the democratism of the Leninist decree and this sinister aggressiveness lay a whole abyss. For some time, we have spoken a great deal of the bitter, at times terrible, truth about the illegalities of the Stalin period. The peasantry, the working class, the intelligentsia, the party and military cadres—many went the agonizing and mortal road of exiles, camps and sentences of the so-called "troikas." The people suffered. . . . But the believers and priests—do they really constitute an inalienable part of it? And did they suffer proportionately less? A wild idea goes through my head. The disdainful and scornful attitude toward everything connected with the church, cultivated in us for decades, is still the master of our conscience and compels us, as it were, to forget that many priests became victims of the repressions. As if some old and nasty voice is whispering: "Think a little, a priest!" But this priest is Pavel Florenskiy, in whom Russia should take pride equally with her best sons; this priest is Voyno-Yasenetskiy, the archbishop of Luk, whose "Essays on Purulent Surgery" to this day remain a masterpiece of Soviet medicine; this priest is simply a man. . . . The roots of our present-day problems are there, in the past. I am convinced of this. And our conscience will only feel really free when we will say directly, honestly, without concealing anything, everything about the people of the church who turned out to be victims of the terror.

[Answer] I share your position. The commission of the party's Central Committee Politburo, in all probability, is studying this question as well, for, without a doubt, here, too, we must speak the whole truth. At the same time, I would like to elaborate on a number of extremely important circumstances. If, in talking about the mass of

believers, we can assert with full justification that they accepted the revolution, then, in talking about the Russian clergy, especially about the higher clergy, we can say, with precisely the same justification, that it not only did not accept the revolution—it resisted it. This is a historical fact. And how could it be otherwise?! The revolution is not only the greatest flight of the spiritual forces of a people, but it is also a tragedy; a revolution splits the society, it splits the people and the intelligentsia, it also splits the church. Later on, in a significant part of the Russian intelligentsia which did not accept October, the attitude to it underwent changes of one sort or another. N. A. Berdyayev, for example, who in 1918 had written "Philosophy of Inequality" with its vehement non-acceptance of October and the Bolsheviks, in the twilight of his life, in the 1950's, expressed himself more calmly and wisely. The understanding of the historical inevitability of the revolution to many, I repeat, came later; to some it did not come even then. The tragedy of the Russian Orthodox Church can be understood and assessed only through the tragedy of the Russian intelligentsia. To one part of the intelligentsia, October gave the possibility of emancipation, the liberation of creative forces; for another, it turned out to be the collapse of their personal and social hopes. It was precisely the same in the church; for one part of the clergy, October was a purifying calamity leading the Russian Orthodox Church from a most profound crisis, called forth by its transformation into a state, bureaucratic department, for another—the destruction of the foundations of religion and the accustomed world order.

This drama of the Russian Orthodox Church was fully expressed, I believe, by Patriarch Tikhon (Belavin). Unfortunately, it is somehow accepted in our country to depict him in one color. An anti-Soviet propagandist—and that's all! Well, he did, indeed, do a great deal of harm to Soviet power. In January 1918 he anathematized Soviet power and declared war against it. In connection with the Brest Peace he issued the appeal: "Is this the peace for which the church has been praying, for which the people thirst?"

[Question] As is well known, far from all the leaders, even in the party, accepted the Brest Peace.

[Answer] Tikhon is not alone here, that is true. In 1922 hunger tore the young Soviet republic to pieces, and the government was compelled to adopt a decree on the confiscation of a part of the church valuables. The patriarch responded to this with an appeal which could not be interpreted in any other way than a call to armed struggle.

That is one side of the personality of Tikhon. But there is another one. Let us recall his letter to the RSFSR Supreme Court (June 1923). He writes: "... Being educated in a monarchical society and finding myself to my very arrest under the influence of anti-Soviet forces, I did, indeed, have hostile inclinations toward Soviet power, moreover the hostility from time to time turned

into active deeds. . . ." And further: "... I declare to the Supreme Court that from now on I am not an enemy of Soviet power. I once and for all and decisively dissociate myself both from the foreign and the domestic monarchical-White Guard counterrevolution."

[Question] I happened to hear, Konstantin Mikhaylovich, that Patriarch Tikhon does not have anything to do with this letter. He was forced to sign it—and that's all.

[Answer] Such an opinion exists, I know. However, it does not take into account one extremely important circumstance, namely: The force of the personality of Tikhon. It does not take into account the enormous internal work that was, undoubtedly, taking place inside him. Of course, for the time being the czarist church bureaucrat, who aspired to preserve the church to which he was accustomed, predominated in him. But at the same time, he could not but acknowledge that the revolution liberates the church as well! Hence—the tenseness of his situation. To break the patriarch, to compel him through force to write (or to sign) a confession of his own dangerous errors and the promise of complete loyalty to Soviet power, was impossible, I believe. Similar to Metropolitan Filipp and Patriarch Germogen, Tikhon would sooner accept the martyr's crown than to give up his convictions.

[Question] But I ask again about the same thing, Konstantin Mikhaylovich. . . . Patriarch Tikhon declared that he is not an enemy of Soviet power. In 1927, 2 years after his death, Metropolitan Sergiy (Stragorodskiy) and all the members of the Synod proclaimed a message, which stated the following: "We want to be Orthodox and at the same time recognize the Soviet Union as our civic fatherland, whose joys and successes are our joys and successes, and failures—our failures." Moreover, even those representatives of the Russian clergy, who by that time had been sent to the Solovetsky Islands—even they, in the so-called "Solovetsky Message" of 1927 declared that the church "does not strive for the overthrow of the existing order and does not take part in actions aimed at this goal, that it never calls for arms and political struggle, that it obeys all laws and orders of a civilian character, but it wants to preserve fully its spiritual freedom and independence, granted to it by the Constitution, and cannot become the servant of the state." But all this did not save the Russian Orthodox Church from persecutions. Seven bishops (besides Metropolitan Sergiy) signed the message of 1927. Among them are the metropolitan of Kiev, Konstantin (Dyakov), the metropolitan of Tver, Serafim (Aleksandrov), and the metropolitan of Odessa, Anatoliy (Grisyuk), who died in 1938. . . .

[Answer] We already said that the church—including the Russian Orthodox Church—together with our entire people, experienced the tragedy of the 1930's. There was no special persecution of the church and believers. The attitude to it was determined by the Stalinist thesis on the intensification of the class struggle in proportion to the successes of socialist construction. And the church,

as an institution which cannot be separated from society, together with all of society, experienced the terrible consequences of the application of the Stalinist theory in practice. I would like to again underscore: Everything that happened with the church during the various stages of our history—all of this in one way or another happened with the whole country. It is impossible to single out the religious question from the complex of other social questions and raise it by itself. True, this sphere is burdened by the—to all sorts of figures—alluring possibility of reeducation by force in accordance with the principle: If you don't want to, we will force you! To force out some ideals in the years considered and replace them with other, correct ones—this, really, is much more simple and therefore a much more inviting duty, a difficult one, which requires greater intellect and tact of work. To close or even to blow up the church—does not at all mean to put an end to the religiousness of the masses. On the contrary: Every persecution only increases it and imparts it with a tinge of selflessness, the consciousness of its own moral superiority and rightness. We speak—and speak correctly—about the illusoriness of religious conceptions. Meanwhile, do we ourselves really not fall into the same illusoriness bordering on religiosity when we propose that the lock on the doors of the church will call forth a change in the consciousness of the people? To fit reality to one's conceptions of it—is this not a variety of religion?

I repeat: The church experienced what the entire society experienced. Including administrative, rigidly bureaucratic methods of control. I have in view the legislation of 1929 with its petty regulation, with its aspiration to prevent literally every step, every action of the church, and, thus, depriving it of any independence. Only the severe reality of the war years forced Stalin to change his attitude to the Russian Orthodox Church.

[Question] You have in mind September 1943, which in a certain sense has become a turning-point in the fate of the Russian Orthodox Church?

[Answer] The decisions taken in September 1943 concerning the resumption of the activity of the ecclesiastical schools, the publication of the JOURNAL OF THE MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE, and the convocation of the Council of Bishops, which elected the metropolitan Sergiy as patriarch—all this can be regarded as the secret acknowledgment, by Stalin, of his great political mistake. This acknowledgment, very likely, came to him with the greatest difficulty. Indeed: After a decade and a half of ruthless persecutions, to change course and arrive, in essence, at the Leninist principles of the relations between the state and the church! It goes without saying, the patriotic activity of the Russian Orthodox Church from the first days of the Great Patriotic War and its appeal addressed to all believers to rise to the defense of the Fatherland played the main role here. Once and for all the myth was destroyed that the church is the enemy of the Soviet Fatherland. I would like to underscore especially the fact that Metropolitan Sergiy, on the day

the war began, 22 June 1941, addressed a message to the priests and believers, which was at once circulated to all parishes. In particular, he wrote: "... it is not the first time that it has fallen to the lot of the Russian people to endure such trials. With God's help, this time, too, it will reduce to ashes the fascist enemy force. Our Orthodox Church always shares the fate of the people. Together with it, it also bore the trials and sought consolation in its successes. And now, too, it does not leave its people. It blesses with a divine blessing also the coming national heroic deed." You know, probably, that during the years of the war the Aircraft Squadron imeni Aleksandr Nevskiy and the Tank Column imeni Dmitriy Donskoy were created with funds of the church. At the end of the year 1944 alone, the sum of payments from the Russian Orthodox Church for defense came to 150 million rubles.

[Question] The postwar years, indeed, gave reason to think that the worst days for the church were over. In the Trinity-St. Sergius Lavra, a monastery, ecclesiastical academy, and seminary appeared once again. Ecclesiastical schools were opened in Leningrad, and divine services were held in hundreds of churches. . . .

[Answer] In 1953, about 15,000 Orthodox churches were in operation. Before the war—10,000.

[Question] And now?

[Answer] According to data for 1986—6,794.

[Question] Just a little earlier, Konstantin Mikhaylovich, we talked about the fact that a mass departure from religion is not observed in our days. Whence such a sharp—twofold—reduction in the number of operating churches? It is clear that this process is unnatural.

[Answer] But is mass corn natural?

[Question] In other words, you again return to the idea that the church, figuratively speaking, is drinking from a common cup.

[Answer] Precisely! The voluntarism characteristic of N. S. Khrushchev and the unwillingness to take into consideration reality made itself felt here, too. But, in my view, there is one important peculiarity here. Personally, N. S. Khrushchev, I am fully convinced, did not have any special malicious feeling toward the church. And I would in general not begin to connect the attitude that arose at the boundary of the 1950's and 1960's to religion, the churches, and believers exclusively with his name. To do so, of course, is more convenient. He said: "The Khrushchev period"—and everything is clear. Real life, as this is always the case, is significantly more complex and dramatic. Judge for yourself. In the shortest time, the consequences of the war were overcome. The fixed capital was restored and renewed. We achieved high rates of development. We began to live a better life. We flew into space. . . . The feeling was created that we

can do literally everything! In the presence of rapid development, the head began to spin. Hence—communism, which is already not far off; hence—the conviction that once the most complex technology is subject to us, then we will cope with man, in any case, for sure; hence—the aspiration to put an end to religion within the shortest time, for under communism there cannot be either the church or believers. But, you see, religion is a conviction! Though, from our materialist point of view, a mistaken one, but nevertheless one which reigns over the thought and heart of man. You don't change the human consciousness, and even more so the consciousness of a believer, through an order. It is possible to obtain the very opposite here through an order—the believing man becomes only more firm in his views. When the so-called religious survivals, more correctly, the rates of overcoming them, came into contradiction with the perfection of the public consciousness planned from above, then an administrative-bureaucratic apparatus was set into motion.

[Question] Not long ago, an eloquent document of the year 1961 fell into my hands—a document for which Saltykov-Shchedrin, if he were living in our day and age, would have paid a high price. This is the decision of the Slobodskiy (Kirov Oblast) City Soviet of Workers' Deputies Ispolkom. I quote: "Having reviewed the petition of public organizations: The Aurora Movie Theater, the pre-school children's home, Kindergarten No 2, the Children's Sports School, the department of the militia, the city rayon military committee, . . . and other organizations and individual citizens—concerning the prohibition of bell ringing, which prevents citizens from watching movies with concentration in the theaters, interferes with the normal rest of children in children's institutions and citizens in their apartments after the work day. . . and being guided by the instruction concerning the application of the legislation on cults, the gorkom ispolkom decides: To prohibit bell ringing in the Yekaterininskaya Church. The bell ringing, you see, prevents "concentrated watching of films!"

[Answer] If we talk in terms of essence, this is a gross violation of the legislation on religious cults. Unfortunately, even up to the present bell ringing is prohibited in a number of cities and whole oblasts. In Saransk, for example, . . . In Arkhangelsk and Sverdlovsk oblasts, in many populated areas of Belorussia and the Ukraine. You were present at the reception of believers, and, probably, you paid attention: In the overwhelming majority of cases, the question concerned religious societies that were removed from registration precisely in the 1960's. They closed the churches—the believers remained. Here you have a most striking example of voluntarism! It is asked: Did this strengthen the confidence of people in Soviet power? Was it conducive to the unity of society? Did it inspire conviction in the firmness of law and the inevitable responsibility for its violation? When they closed the churches, moreover when in the eyes of the people they even destroyed them, did the

excuses for executives think about the fact that through their anti-democratic actions they are sowing bitterness in the souls of people?

The consequences of this administrative itch: Close! Close at whatever cost!—we feel even today. During the past year alone, the Religious Affairs Council at the USSR Council of Ministers received more than 3,000 complaints from believers. We must come into conflict with the manifestations of the most savage bureaucratism. Instead of trying within the framework of the existing legislation (and, with all its shortcomings, it does offer such possibilities) to facilitate to the maximum degree the spiritual life of the believers, some executives do not lose an opportunity to build an obstacle literally in an even place. For years the arguments can go on: Is it admissible to build a new prayer house or to rebuild the old one so that it has a cupola? The believer is not in a position to comprehend: Why can the building itself be constructed, but a cupola over it is impossible.

[Question] The most convinced atheist, who stands for consistently democratic positions, will consider this as an encroachment on freedom of conscience.

[Answer] Moreover, it is clear to all who puts obstacles in the way: The city architect, the secretary of the rayispolkom or gorispolkom, and other representatives of Soviet power—all, as a rule, party people. And what do they tell the believers? This cross, you understand, will be visible from the windows of the school! Impossible! Or: The cupola will destroy the architectural ensemble! Or: This sign—Baptist Chapel—must be removed. And some especially zealous representative of our Soviet undertakes to determine how many minutes the bells may be rung. Even the schedule is sent to the church! We have abolished a procedure requiring parents, who have made up their mind to baptize their child, to present their passport—an illegal procedure, by the way!—and people report from the provinces: By hook or by crook. . . Now they require birth certificates and other documents.

[Question] Everything further does not constitute any secret: There follows a report to the place of work, a discussion at a meeting, caricatures in wall newspapers, and administrative measures as well....

[Answer] But you see, this is the private matter of the believer, a matter of his conscience, whose freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution! The spiritual sphere cannot be controlled by force! This is the indisputable lesson of our history which we have gained through suffering—but we, it would appear, have not yet realized all its enormous significance to the end.

[Question] The coincidence of subjects is striking, so to speak. The struggle for the cupola that you mentioned was fought in Krasnodarsk Kray (this was discussed, by the way, in OGONEK). But here I was in Uzbekistan not long

ago. There is a town there called Dzhizak, where Orthodox believers, in reconstructing their church, erected a cupola on it, which is also necessary, by the way, for the ventilation of the premises. Central Asia, however, is heat. . . . One fine June night in 1986, on the order of the local authorities, the church was surrounded and the cupola was destroyed. Since that time, the believers are trying—up to now without results—to have it restored. I, in their place, would turn to the court. What do you think, Konstantin Mikhaylovich?

[Answer] And the court, proceeding from the letter and spirit of the law, should punish the guilty in exemplary fashion!

[Question] Notes from the same trip: Not far from Frunze, in the settlement of Romanovka, Evangelical Christian-Baptists, having registered the necessary documents, built a new chapel. One of the executives of the republic, having seen this chapel, decided that it is too good for the Baptists, ordered it taken away and turned over to the pioneers. You, Konstantin Mikhaylovich, know very well what the consequences of similar, illegal, and immoral actions are.

[Answer] People run to religion from formalism, from our hard-heartedness. . . . I will repeat again and again: It is impossible, in any case, it is impossible to act against the church from a position of strength. It is time to understand: To separate the church from the state does not mean at all to separate it from society. The believers—these are our, Soviet people, who have grown up and been molded in Soviet times. It is impossible to separate the organization of the believers, which is their church, from the processes that are taking place in society, from participation in the solution of our domestic problems, from politics. What is more, the present-day clergy, as was shown, for example, by the recent bishop's conference of the Russian Orthodox Church, in the overwhelming majority, actively supports restructuring and decisively repulses attempts to introduce dissidence into the ranks of the believers and to lead them away from participation in the democratic transformations of our life.

In the 1930's we developed a relationship to religion and to believers exclusively with a "minus" sign. Now this relationship must be changed. You don't go very far in the exploitation of negative feelings. The time has come to become restructured. The dialectic of the relations of the socialist state and the church is a complex and, I would say, extremely delicate dialectic. Religion as a world view, against which Marxist ideology will conduct a constant struggle, is one thing, and the church as a social institution, consisting of the clergy and believers, is quite another. And we should not transfer the contradictions characteristic of one sphere into another where the principle of mutual respect of the sides should operate. Now, in the conditions of democratization, the determining consideration must be the Leninist thesis that the creation of paradise on Earth is more important

than the unity of the opinions of the proletarians concerning paradise in heaven. In the end, there are tasks that, indeed, are priority tasks, whose solutions is of enormous significance now. The socio-political problems of our society, the struggle for peace, and ecology—this is where the unity of all forces, ready for sincere and active participation, is necessary. And if it turns out for us to live in a mixed society, consisting of materialists and believers, we will build socialism and realize restructuring together with the believers, and not separately from them!

The spiritual life on another ideological basis from ours follows its own course, its own channel. It is impossible to either eliminate it, this channel, administratively, or to fuse it ideologically with ours. But it is possible and necessary to combine the efforts and aspirations of people for universal human, moral and spiritual values, for peace, for our good. We can and must secure this unity even if all of us in many respects will have to learn anew, as it were.

[Question] A remarkable example of the new relationship is given by the journal KOMMUNIST. I cannot help but cite: "The time has come to put an end once and for all to the suspicious and malevolent attitude to believers and such ideals professed by them as humaneness, love, and moral self-perfection." And more: "Only respect can call forth the conscientious attitude of many believers to general civic duty, their lively participation in the fate of every man, their readiness to come to the assistance of their neighbors. The millions of believers of different denominations are not an unfortunate blunder of history, but a reality." The word must be followed, probably, by the deed. I have in mind not only the necessity for all workers of the soviet and party apparatus, without exception, to observe in the strictest manner the legislation on cults, and not only the responsibility for its violation. The time has come to perfect the legislation itself, is that not so?

[Answer] Now, it seems to me, the difficult period is coming to an end when the registration of every new religious society was perceived as a step backward, as an ideological defeat, and as a concession to the believers. This is the legacy of our recent past, it is an integral part of Stalinism as a method of government, and we repudiate it irrevocably. Thanks to glasnost, there has in many respects been a change in the moral climate of the relations of believers and non-believers. There has been a strengthening of the material base of the church. Recently—from 1985 on—the Russian Orthodox Church has acquired, built and rebuilt 35 prayer houses, the Evangelical Christian-Baptists—49, the Seventh Day Adventists—12, the Pentecostals—9, and the Muslims—11. You know, the Danilovskiy and Tolgskiy monasteries, and the Optina Pustyn have been turned over to the Russian Orthodox Church. . . . At present, there are more than 15,000 religious associations in our country, which represent approximately 40 confessions and small denominations. Thirty monasteries. Nineteen

of them belong to the Russian Orthodox Church, two—to the Georgian Orthodox Church, two—to the Buddhists, and seven—to the Armenian Apostolic Church.

[Question] In passing, Konstantin Mikhaylovich: What is the fate of the Kievan Cave Monastery? Many also ask: Will not the Valaamskiy Monastery be turned over to the church?

[Answer] The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church is asking for permission to resume, in the Kiev-Pecherskaya Lavra, the activity of the church that was closed in 1961. The Antoniyevo (distant) and Feodosyevy (near) Caves, in my view, may also be turned over to the church. Evidently, the complex of the Kievan Cave Monastery should have two masters in all: The Russian Orthodox Church and the UkSSR Ministry of Culture. As far as Valaam is concerned, this question is now being discussed. My personal opinion: The museum there can fully neighbor with the monastery. I am convinced that, through their combined efforts, they will bring this priceless monument of our history and architecture into the condition which it deserves.

The positive advances do not mean at all that in our country there are no reasons to think about the improvement of the legislation on cults. One example: Legislation prohibits the church from any charitable activity. That is, the church may contribute funds to the Fund for Peace (annually more than 30 million rubles), to the Fund for the Preservation of Cultural Monuments (about 5 million rubles), may help those who suffered from the accident in Chernobyl, the natural disasters in Georgia. . . . But all of this is depersonalized. The believers—and, you see, it is their money which the church is transferring—do not know for what purposes the funds donated by them are being expended.

[Question] The church is not a bank, Archbishop Vladimir Sorokin, the rector of the Leningrad Ecclesiastical Academy, has correctly noted. The rubles from the people should go to precise addresses.

[Answer] To deprive believers of the right to do charity work means not to give them the opportunity of following the foundations of the Christian doctrine. This is fundamentally incorrect. Assistance to the sick, the aged, and orphans, direct assistance to hospitals and children's homes—our believing fellow citizens have the right to take part in all of this. I will note that the first step has already been taken: The Baptists and Seventh Day Adventists, on a so-called voluntary basis, are helping to tend to the sick in two Moscow clinics. The believers, I am proposing, as Soviet citizens have the right to create their cooperatives, publish a religious newspaper, and publish spiritual literature on a broad scale. During this year, in connection with the 1000th anniversary of the baptism of Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church is publishing the sixth edition of the Bible: 100,000 copies. As a gift from Western churches we are receiving more than 1 million copies of the Bible, The New Testament, and prayer books.

[Question] There is apprehension that, after the festivities devoted to the 1000th anniversary of the baptism of Russia, a "tightening of the screws" will follow.

[Answer] There can be no question of this. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said at the meeting with the patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Pimen and the members of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church: "We are at present restoring fully the Leninist principles of the relationship to religion, the church, and believers. The relationship to the church and to believers should be determined by the interests of strengthening the unity of all the workers and our entire people."

And we regard the anniversary measures as a visible landmark on the road to the improvement of the relations of church and state. Improvement in the spirit of the Leninist decree.

[Question] So we could declare with full right: The conscience is free!

[Answer] Precisely so.

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Icon Exhibit Opens at Georgian State Museum of Fine Arts

18000658 [Editorial Report] Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian on 13 July 1988 carries on page 3 an 850-word article by Nonna Elizbarashvili, head of the Georgian State Museum of Fine Arts Department of Technological Research, on an exhibit of Russian icons currently being displayed at the Georgian State Museum of Fine Arts. There are more than 50 icons in the exhibit and a major portion of the display is devoted to copies of icons from Kiev and Novgorod. According to Elizbarashvili, the reproductions of ancient icons exhibited are unique because many of the originals were lost during World War II. She also states that the "ethical and artistic ideals of bygone ages break through the religious facade of these icons." The article goes on to describe various schools of icon painting, as well as individual icons in the exhibit.

Properties Returned to Georgian Orthodox Church
18000659 GRUZINFORM Report: Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 12 Jul 88 p 3

[GRUZINFORM Report: "In the GSSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic of Ministers has examined a number of requests made by the patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church.

It has been decided to hand over permanently and without charge to the Georgian Orthodox Church the Gelatskaya Monastery Church and the Shiomgvi and

Anton Martkopskiy Monasteries. The Metekhs kaya and the Anchiskhatskaya Churches in Tbilisi will begin functioning this year. It has also been decided to register religious communities in a number of cities and regions and to hand over to these communities the correspondent churches.

The Bible will be published in 53,000 copies; 50,000 of the copies will be published in the contemporary Georgian language and 3,000 copies will be published in the

Old Georgian language. Starting in 1989, 10,000 more copies of the Church Reference Calendar will be published than are being published now, and a collection of theological writings will be published 3 or 4 times a year.

The GSSR Gosplan, Goskomizdat and other government departments have been instructed to guarantee the publication of these items by supplying the requisite paper as well as other necessary materials.

**Critic Describes 60's Attack on Novyy Mir,
Tvardovskiy**

18000471a Moscow *OGONEK* in Russian No 17,
23-30 Apr 88 pp 26-29

[Article by Nataliya Ilina, under rubric "Literary Notes":
"My Prolonged Lessons"]

[Text] Nataliya Iosifovna Ilina is a well-known Soviet writer. She is the author of a collection of satirical articles, "The Phosphorescent Screen" (1974); the novel "The Return" (1957-1965, books 1-2); the book "Roads and Fates: Autobiographical Prose"; and four booklets of satirical articles that were published by the KROKODIL Library.

In June 1964 Tvardovskiy gave me as a present his poem "Terkin in the Other World" (SOVETSKIY PISATEL, 1963), with the inscription, "To Nataliya Iosifovna Ilina with great affection for her writing."

How had I deserved those words?

By that time, the KROKODIL Library had also published collections of my satirical articles. ZNAMYA magazine, at the end of the 1950's, had published the first book of my novel "Vozvrashsheniye." But it would seem that those were not the works that Tvardovskiy had in mind. Instead it was the article "The Question of Tradition and Innovation in the Genre of the Woman's Short Story."

Incidentally, that had not been an article, but a satirical piece on literature—my first serious attempt at satirical criticism. In certain novels written by present-day female writers I had been struck by the similarity with prerevolutionary female writers such as Nagrodskaya, Lappo-Danilevskaya, and chiefly Verbitskaya. I had gone back to the Lenin Library to refreshen my memory of those novels that I had read in my youth. My suspicions were confirmed. It was obvious that the genre of the "woman's short story" was still alive and continuing its job of corrupting the reader's tastes. It was necessary to prove that by quotations. There was a tremendous amount of work to be done. I contracted with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, which had already published several of my works, to publish this satirical article. The topic was approved, and, convinced that my work would be acceptable, I dashed into the work. I sat for hours in the Lenin Library, copying out quotations. Then, at home, I would type them out, study present-day works, and copy out quotations from them. The number of typed sheets kept growing, and after that mountain overflowed my desk, the sheets covered the bed, the chairs, the window sill, and if a sheet that I needed at that precise moment had disappeared because I had accidentally thrown it out, rather than run back to the Lenin Library I would calmly, calmly, without any panic, without cursing myself, because that would not help in any way, just keep searching through everything... And that is how I see myself in that autumn of 1962, on my

knees in front of the bed, calmly searching through each and every sheet, with the voice of my husband, A. A. Reformatskiy, coming from the next room, asking, "Aren't we ever going to have dinner tonight?"

Finally the work was finished. The article seemed to me to be successful. At LITERATURNAYA GAZETA they also found it to be successful. But too long. I would have to cut it down. It was painful to have to do it, but I did cut it down. Now everything depended upon the editor in chief—V. Kosolapov. But now it turns out that the person who really has the last word is not Kosolapov, but A. Chakovskiy. While I had been writing, suffering, and rejoicing, there had been a change of editors in chief at LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. The article was returned to me with the notation: "The chief didn't like it."

Okay, then, the chief didn't like it. But what was it specifically that the chief didn't like? I guessed what that was. He did not want to offend the authors of the works that I had made fun of. I had not mentioned the authors' names, but they would have immediately recognized themselves from the quotations, and, of course, would have been offended. It seemed to me that I had taken the truthful path of the fight against vulgarity. I was walking in the footsteps of K. I. Chukovskiy with his venomous articles about Charskaya and Verbitskaya, and I recalled the article by prerevolutionary journalist Vasilevskiy Ne-Bukva, which began with the words, "Nations of Greece! Greece is becoming stupid!" The topic of discussion was the raging success of Verbitskaya's works, the fact that in the libraries her novels were requested 40 times more frequently than the novels of Lev Tolstoy... As I went home, I recalled all this and I thought, "Why was it authorized to fight for the tastes of the prerevolutionary reader, but it is not authorized in any instance to fight for the tastes of the present-day one?" And I also thought of how unlucky I had been. If the change in the editors-in-chief had been delayed only about two weeks, my article would have got through!

How often it is that we do not know what is good for us and what is bad! During those bitter moments I did not know that I had actually been lucky, I had been unbelievably lucky, and that I was on the threshold of a new stage in my life and I would mark with a "white stone" the day when my work had been rejected by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA!

I used to go to NOVYY MIR. They would give me works from the so-called "free flow" to review. In addition, during the years when K. M. Simonov was editor, the magazine had a "humor corner" under the name "Incidentally..." for which I would write satirical items from time to time. But in 1958 the magazine was again headed by Tvardovskiy and the humor section was eliminated. Later on I heard from Aleksandr Trifonovich that he had a dislike for such "corners," since it was nothing else but the attempt to chase satire into a corner. It was as though the reader was being told: this is where we have our humor. We used to joke about it. Please don't be

offended—it's a joke, son! Tvardovskiy did not want to convert satire into a firecracker that landed modestly in the place assigned to it... He took a serious attitude toward that genre.

The idea of submitting my rejected work to NOVYY MIR first seemed to me to be absurd. Because, after all, it was not an article but, stating it outright, a satirical piece. I had never seen works of this kind on the pages of NOVYY MIR. Nevertheless I took the risk. I was acquainted with A. Maryamov, a member of the editorial board. He was a neighbor of mine. So I brought him my piece. I did not harbor any special hopes. I operated according to the principle, "Don't give up until you have done absolutely everything that you can do. And then what will be, will be!"

And what happened was that, a few days later, the telephone rang: I was asked to drop by at the editorial office. I dashed over there practically without putting the receiver down. The person who spoke to me was V. Ya. Lakshin, who at that time headed the criticism department. I saw him for the first time on that day. Scarcely believing my ears, I heard that NOVYY MIR was ready to publish my piece. However... Then a number of comments were made and advice was given. Until today I remember that Lakshin suggested giving the satirical piece the headline "Experiment in Literary Analysis." That emphasized the parody nature of my piece, its pseudoscientific style. For the same purpose I was advised to speak a bit about the "sources of the genre," and to mention Prince P. Shalikov, the editor of DAMSKIY ZHURNAL, which had caused a sensation at the beginning of the past century. The intellectual and educated nature of Lakshin, who was quite young at that time, delighted and surprised me. I knew absolutely nothing about that Shalikov, incidentally! And so I had to work some more on an article that I had considered to be completed, and it was a considerable amount of work. But I trusted Lakshin and felt that, by following his advice, I would be able to raise the article to a higher level, and work did not frighten me.

My satirical piece on literature, "The Question of Tradition and Innovation in the Genre of the Woman's Short Story," appeared on the pages of the March 1963 issue of NOVYY MIR. I read it and reread it. I liked it. It seemed to me that was the best thing that I had written in that genre. The magazine's exactingness, its high level, had forced me to pull myself up, to find within myself the capabilities that apparently I had not been able to employ previously. That was my first lesson.

But later on, dropping in at the editorial office to pick up some issues, I met A. T. Tvardovskiy. He had just arrived from somewhere. He had gone into his office accompanied by two or three people (I do not remember who they were), and I was invited to join them. Tvardovskiy had not yet sat down at his desk. He was standing near it, smoking, and those people whom I didn't know were also standing alongside. Shaking my

hand, Tvardovskiy said some kind words about my work. Then the people who were standing with him began vying with one another in praising me. One mentioned a certain session at which my article had been cited as an example for certain critics—this is the way in which the critic should berate people elegantly. Then Tvardovskiy said, "Yes. Without a single crude word!"

I had many years of experience behind me in writing satirical pieces. I was already the author of a novel. But the publishing of my work on the pages of NOVYY MIR seemed to me to be my highest literary achievement, and under Tvardovskiy's serious, well-wishing glance I sensed the pride of a schoolgirl, the pride of a person who had been disappointed in her expectations...

Soon I learned yet another lesson.

Prior to that time I had never been berated on the pages of the Soviet press. But neither had I been especially praised. I was not spoiled by the attention of the press. But the March issue of NOVYY MIR had scarcely appeared—and, so far as I remember, it appeared late—when, in the June issue of OKTYABR, a tremendous article appeared. Everyone who is aware of the sluggishness of our fat magazines can evaluate the responsiveness that was displayed by OKTYABR magazine!

My God, practically three decades have passed since then, and you can just imagine how many people have appeared on this earth who have absolutely no idea of what happened at that time! And so it is necessary for me, speaking "from another generation," to explain what the placement of forces was. During those years a rather large number of newspapers and magazines attacked Tvardovskiy's NOVYY MIR. But the magazine's chief opponents were: among the newspapers, LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, and among the magazines, OGONEK, which was headed by Sofronov, and OKTYABR, which was headed by Kochetov.

At that time I could not even pick up a copy of OKTYABR, but since they had reviled me, I had to know what for.

It turned out that it was not just me that they were reviling. They were also abusing I. Vinogradov, as well as NOVYY MIR in general. It seems that in 1962 Vinogradov had published an article "Apropos of a Certain Eternal Topic," that mentioned certain typical attributes of "woman's literature." "And so the lawful question arises," the OKTYABR reviewer wrote, "as to what had induced the editorial office of NOVYY MIR magazine, over the course of a half-year, on two occasions..." to return to that topic.

And it seems that this is what had induced them. The "eternal topic"... "was of interest to I. Vinogradov not in and of itself, but only as an opportunity, in a more or less camouflaged manner, to drag in the concept of 'inner freedom.'" But events that made that concept especially

vulnerable had burst out. What were those events? There was N. S. Khrushchev's meeting with literary and artistic figures in the Kremlin. Among other things, Khrushchev had stated, "Society cannot permit anarchy or willfulness on the part of anyone at all." Vinogradov had not crawled out in time with his shameful ideas! And that was why NOVYY MIR had decided to publish N. Ilina's opus, since she, "as it were, limits the meaning of the article written by her 'predecessor,' as though fighting against vulgarity and adultery."

And so the slyness of the editorial office had been guessed. The attempt had failed—the attempt to cover Vinogradov's antisocial position by a work by Ilina, who had pretended to be fighting against vulgarity. The author of the review in OKTYABR had unmasked those subterfuges. He could not be deceived, "even if the adherents of that anarchical willfulness dress themselves up in the clothing of warriors against vulgarity and imaginary immorality." The clothing was ripped off. The masks too. This revealed the very essence of Vinogradov, who had dragged in anarchical ideas of inner freedom and abstract humanitarianism. The true face of Vinogradov's confederate—Ilina—had also been revealed. Peering out from behind the mask of a self-styled warrior against vulgarity was the ugly face of a slanderer, since Ilina's article was an "unsubstantiated calumny on Soviet literature." It was a "lampoon." And what was also revealed at the same time was the role of NOVYY MIR, which had given the rostrum to anarchists and slanderers.

I learned a useful lesson which I became acquainted with in that article signed by Yu. Idashkin. It was the first time that I had penetrated properly into the work methods of the opponents of NOVYY MIR. Those methods evoked a sense of amazement and even a certain admiration. What dexterity! You are talking about literature, but it is not about the substance of the matter at hand that you are arguing. Instead, your opponent keeps taking his arguments from another pack of cards. The argument has been shifted to other ground, and now your opponent is armed to the teeth. He has at his disposal an entire well-tested set of terms such as "abstract humanitarianism," "inner freedom that makes the transition to anarchism," and various useful details such as the little words "allegedly," "as it were," "as though," "it is no accident," etc. The stack of cards also includes a trump ace: a quotation from a recent statement made by an extremely responsible person. And so you, who had decided to speak innocently about the low level of certain literary works, are already accused not only of slandering all your native literature as a whole, but also of political unreliability.

Reading at that time that fascinating article, I sensed something in addition to amazement... Yes, yes. I felt flattered! I had been included among the NOVYY MIR authors. I had been reviled along with them. How could I not be delighted?

Starting in the autumn of the same year 1963 I received the fortunate opportunity to meet and speak with A. T. Tvardovskiy in an unofficial setting. Shortly before that autumn Tvardovskiy had acquired a house in the dacha settlement of Krasnaya Pakhra. My friends—painter O. G. Vereyskiy and his wife—also lived there. I frequently visited them. And starting in 1968 A. A. Reformatskiy and I spent our summer months in a small house with two rooms and a verandah on the Vereyskiys' land.

It was the last days of October 1965. A telephone call came from NOVYY MIR. They asked me to drop by. I went there. V. Ya. Lakshin handed over to me issue No. 9 of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA magazine. It contained a work by M. N. Alekseyev, entitled "A Story About My Fidgety Friends." I was asked to respond to that story. I was told that Tvardovskiy would also be included in the request... The next day I was at Pakhra with the Vereyskiys. Aleksandr Trifonovich dropped by. His first words directed to me were, "Well, did you get your work assignment?"

At home I dig deep into the story. The author describes how he himself, a well-known writer, and his friends, also well-known writers, went to a remote village of Usukh: "...our brother poet was frequently forced to leave comfortable housing in a Moscow apartment and replace it by homeless wandering somewhere in the Bryansk woods, in that same Usukh..." What had forced the writer brothers to go to Usukh was their passion for casting for fish. Things were bad in that neglected village. There was no decent road to the rayon center, no medical aid, no electricity, and the store was empty. But the fidgety friends would go fishing, would make fish stew, would have drinking parties "in the meadow by the birch tree," and would also write. Some would write prose, and others would write poetry. "Ilya never did learn how to sweat for a long time over a line, to search around in the pile of verbal ore for 'le mot juste.'" He was perfectly happy with whatever turned up." This was stated jokingly, but there is scarcely a poet friend who would find that kind of recommendation pleasant... After reporting that there were no more than about ten men still left in Usukh, the author adds, "But when we walked down the street with our fishing poles, the women would giggle, would shout double entendres to us, and would obviously encourage us to take aggressive actions." This was stated playfully, however....

The jocular tone, the playful intonation of the story, the description of happy drinking parties and friendly card games do not jibe with the background against which these amusements occurred. What, then, were the author's real intentions? Why had he decided to tell the reader about this? Did the reader really have to understand the private life of famous people? I recalled Akhmatova's words: "People frequently do not hear what they are saying." That was precisely the situation I had in front of me!

My satirical piece "Tales of the Bryansk Woods" appeared in issue No 1, 1966 of NOVYY MIR. "I'm rereading Lenin," Tvardovskiy told me. "He foresaw that it is not an external danger that threatens us, but an internal one—the new growing bureaucracy with its terrible alienation from the people. And that's exactly what you wrote about. Did you understand that yourself, or didn't you?"

Very quickly, in March, the unslumbering OGONEK (No 11) responded to my work. It was pointed out that "...M. Alekseyev's essays are essays about Russian nature, about the Russian language, about the Russian writer in his attitude toward his land." It was added that the author of the story had "expressed his pain and alarm: our beloved nature is dying out. But Nat. Ilina did not hear that shout..."

(Reading the article at that time, I did not yet know how frequently the authors of Tvardovskiy's NOVYY MIR would be accused of indifference to the Russian language, to the Russian people, and the Russian land!)

V. Arkhipov, the author of that response, used the very same method that Yu. Idashkin had used: the arguments are taken from a field that has nothing to do with literature. Both authors, in addition, had been required to wound NOVYY MIR. Whereas one added onto my composition I. Vinogradov's article, the other recalled Yu. Burtin's article, which "...was written in the same style, in the same tonality. And that leads... to very sad reflections." What kind of reflections? This is what kind: the critics of NOVYY MIR are engaged only in persecuting true patriots, the sale of the Russian land! But who are those "fidgety friends," the heroes of M. Alekseyev's story? They are children of "Saratov, Bryansk, and Yaroslavl muzhiks." They are those who "walked behind the plow, who experienced need... who defended their country and faced all deaths as a soldier, and with other soldiers, from Stalingrad to Berlin. They are the ones who are under suspicion by the NOVYY MIR critic..."

It had been pointed out to NOVYY MIR that there exist authors whose works, whatever they may be, are not to be criticized. The editorial board of NOVYY MIR had not heeded that warning. A little while later, Tvardovskiy asked me to write about V. Kozhevnikov's novel "The Shield and the Sword." Tvardovskiy strongly disliked that novel. I was not even convinced that he had read it completely. He said, "In order to find out whether a watermelon is good, all you have to do is eat one bite!" But, discussing Kozhevnikov, he said, "He's writing about Germany. But what does he know about it? Just that one German is called Fritz, and another is called Hans." I wanted to complete the assignment. But my husband intervened. Learning what I was planning to do, he said, "You can't do that! ZNAMYA has just published the second book of "The Return," and you will be flinging yourself at its editor-in-chief. That would be awkward!"

So I went back to the NOVYY MIR editorial office, to tell Tvardovskiy about my refusal. We had the discussion in his office. I did not tell him what my husband had said. I pretended that I myself had realized that it would be awkward for me, that people do not act that way. Tvardovskiy listened to my somewhat inconsistent speech without interrupting me. There was a serious, slightly sullen, expression on his face. Then he nodded and said, "You're right. We won't act the way they do."

(They. That is what he called his opponents, those members of the Writers' Union who eternally denounced, blamed, and accused NOVYY MIR. Sometimes he used the pronoun "they" to refer to highly placed officials who were keeping a vigilant watch on the magazine and who were always putting spokes in its wheels.)

And so he agreed with me. This did not, however, prevent him later on, at Pakhra, in an unofficial setting, to ask me jokingly, "What's the matter? Were you afraid?" "Tell me honestly: were you afraid?" "Come on, now, and admit it: you were afraid, weren't you?" At first I tried to justify myself in a serious manner, but then I would just wave my hand—I realized that they were teasing me... But Tvardovskiy did not reject his idea of making a statement about Kozhevnikov's novel: a review that was by no means laudatory appeared in NOVYY MIR. I read it and I thought—and I hope that the reader will forgive my immodesty—"What a pity that I didn't write it. I would have made it sharper, I would have made it more cheerful..."

In late 1966 and early 1967 MOSKVA magazine, which at that time was headed by Ye. Popovkin, gave a present to its readers: in two issues (No 11, 1966 and No 1, 1967) it published the novel "The Master and Margarita." With cuts, obviously. As usual, the reader's innocence was preserved: he did not have to know that and did not have to be reminded of that. But the widow of writer Ye. S. Bulgakov told me that the cuts in issue No 1 were caused not so much by protective considerations, as by a lack of space! Bulgakov's text had been squeezed down so that the magazine could print completely, without any abridgements, the story "Autumn in London."

What kind of masterpiece was that, for the sake of which it had been necessary to cut pieces out of Bulgakov's prose? I became acquainted with the masterpiece. I had a strong impression from it. There arose within me a desire to share my feelings with the reader. I knew just one thing about the author—B. Yevgenyev: he was a member of the editorial board of MOSKVA magazine. As to whether he had walked behind a plow, experienced need, or fought as a soldier, I made no attempt to find out: I ignored V. Arkhipov's lessons! And so my satirical piece "Katya Abroad" appeared in NOVYY MIR, issue No 7, 1967.

All I had to do was to await the response or, rather, the outcry. What would they try to teach me? Why would they revile me? I had ridiculed a story that dealt with a tourist trip to London, and I assumed that, together with NOVYY MIR, I would be accused on "cosmopolitanism," of "eroding the ideological boundaries," and also, possibly, of "adulation of the West." I expected all of this, but certainly not what actually happened: the press did not pay any attention at all to my "Katya." I was reminded of her many years later, but then I wasn't interested. What was the matter?

Well, the matter was that my satirical piece had been given cover by I. Grekova's story "Undergoing Tests," which had been published in the same issue. That story had drawn the fire to itself. It had been squall fire: right now I cannot recall how many newspapers and magazines had come crashing down on the story almost simultaneously. But I will allow myself to exclaim, "It is not by accident!" Without an order "from the top" it would scarcely have been possible to have such unanimity, displayed by the most diverse organs of the press. The story was judged by the old method: no mention was made of its artistic level. Instead, political accusations were made. The method used was the same, but every publication attempted to adhere to its own style, to adapt to the tastes of its readers. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (17 January 1968) spoke in intellectual terms of the "high predestination of human studies," asserting that I. Grekova's story, with its elitist tone "in the system of esthetic relations toward reality" had entered "into contradiction with that high predestination." The understanding had to be: I. Grekova did not like the simple Soviet person without higher education. This, then, was the "elitist tone," that leads "to the blurring of moral criteria."

MOLODAYA GWARDIYA (No 1, 1968) took a simpler approach to the matter. It does not use any high-sounding words. Instead the reader encounters the rather crude directness of the soldier. In the story "Undergoing Tests," the author mentioned several times an institution that some people call the "toilet," others call the "latrine," and still others call the "head." That was all that was required to give the catchy headline to the review "Prose With a Smell" and to call the story a "foul-smelling caricature of the military and technical intelligentsia, and of the army officer class."

As for MOSKVA magazine, it acted as the defender of mores. It was concerned by the influence that the story would have on young people! "Soviet officers and their wives have been shown to be... insignificant people, people who have been stultified, wallowed in deception, lies, and petty squabbles." "And one asks the natural question—what kind of spiritual steadfastness and self-possession, what kind of experience will tomorrow's lads acquire after they come into the army, if they take it into their heads to imitate commanders like this?" The magazine delayed somewhat in its attack upon I. Grekova (No 5, 1969), but in the very same issue, under the

common headline "Truth of Exploit and Truth of Art," it takes a pot shot at yet another NOVYY MIR author: "A heavy impression is left by V. Bykov's story 'Attack on the Run.'" "...The reader sometimes does not believe this completely distorted depiction of the events of those terrible years. And he cannot perceive this work in any way other than the vilification of that very great exploit of the Soviet Armed Forces who defended our Motherland's freedom and independence during a prolonged and bloody struggle."

And so NOVYY MIR, in the person of its authors, distorts our reality, slanders it, and insults our sacred objects. All this, apparently, is aimed at depriving our upcoming generation of any ideals and at doing everything possible to pervert the reader. Fortunately, the reader's interests are being firmly guarded by the agencies of the press that are unceasingly unmasking NOVYY MIR's suspicious actions.

And they actually did unmask them unceasingly. Because was there, during those years, even a single important statement in NOVYY MIR—whether it be a novel, a short story, or political-affairs article, or criticism—that one, two, or even several organs of the press at the same time did not jump on with loud shouts? The accusation of distorting reality was leveled at Abramov, Bykov, Aytmatov, Trifonov, Iskander, Shukshin, Astafyev, Mozhayev, Yashin, Semin... Those attacks were made on NOVYY MIR, which, by the second half of the 1960's, remained probably the only magazine that spoke in its prose and political-affairs articles the truth about our life, and in the criticism department, the truth about our literature.

There is no sense in naming and quoting all the organs of the press that defamed I. Grekova's short story. That is a separate story. But I cannot remain silent about an article in RUSSKAYA RECH (No 1, 1968): from that article I learned of yet another method that the attackers used.

The magazine's area of specialization, of course, obliges the magazine to deal with—and the article actually does deal with—not "latrines," but the "language and style" of the short story. And so I. Grekova is accused of "linguistic snobbery," and, consequently, of elitism! But what is interesting is that the article has the headline "In the Genre of the Woman's Short Story," and its author, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences L. Skvortsov, begins with a laudatory review of my reviled satirical piece "The Question of Tradition and Innovation..." And he ends the article this way: "All that remains is to add that the woman's short story 'Undergoing Tests' was published in NOVYY MIR (No 7, 1967), the very same NOVYY MIR that, several years previously, had so brilliantly and in such an evil manner ridiculed on its pages the present-day continuers of that truly deathless genre."

Now that was something new! The work of one NOVYY MIR author is used as a weapon for beating another NOVYY MIR author. And the magazine is accused of inconsistency: yesterday it came out against the vulgar short stories written for women, but today it has printed a short story of that kind! The candidate of sciences does not even attempt to prove that I. Grekova's work belongs to the genre of "women's short stories" that I had ridiculed. It would have been impossible to prove that, but the opponents of NOVYY MIR did not make such attempts. They were saved such efforts, because much was allowed to them for their clear goal. There was just one goal: to stifle NOVYY MIR. Everything could be used to achieve that goal, including the wagon-shaft method: wherever you turn it, that's where it goes. Yesterday it was advantageous to call the NOVYY MIR article "slander against Soviet literature," but today it is advantageous to agree with that article...

Another year will go by and the clear goal will be achieved. As for I. Grekova's short story, even though it is one of the writer's best works, it has not been included in her collections for almost 20 years.

In the summer of 1968, at Pakhra, I heard the following words from Tvardovskiy: "I would really like you to write about ROMAN-GAZETA. But I pity you. You will have to read an awful lot!"

Tvardovskiy's attitude toward literature reminded me of Akhmatova. For her, literature was a matter that pertained to her closely and directly offended her, so that she could not forgive anything. She was implacable in this regard. "They beat you with sticks on Sennaya for stuff like this!" she said, after reading in a newspaper rhymed lines that were supposed to be poetry. And Tvardovskiy had the same passionate attitude toward the printed word. He knew the measure of literature's responsibility to the reader, and understood its influence upon mores.

ROMAN-GAZETA, with the dirt-cheap cost of its booklets and its tremendous print runs, was supposed to make accessible to the mass reader the best modern works of our writers. Perhaps when that publication began operating, it was actually that way, but in the 1960's it was no longer so. It happened, of course, that truly artistic works were becoming accessible, but that did not happen frequently. It was much more frequent when the books with printing runs of one, two, or even three million copies were dull, colorless, if not barely literate books. Tremendous print runs promised a good income. The authors who attempted to be published in ROMAN-GAZETA were those who had connections, a big impact, and power. The publishing house did not withstand their attacks, and as a result... The results were deplorable. And that is what alarmed Tvardovskiy.

I read more than 20 issues of ROMAN-GAZETA. I chose three that seemed to me to be most typical. One of them laid claim to be called "historical" and occupied

three booklets of ROMAN-GAZETA. The press responses to those works were utterly enthusiastic—I was convinced of that as I leafed through newspapers and magazines at the library. Praise was given even to a "historical novel" whose author not only did not know the subject about which he had undertaken to write, but who was practically illiterate. And that work had come out in a print run of almost 3 million copies! To the applause of the press. One could understand Tvardovskiy's alarm...

Early in December I went to NOVYY MIR to read the galley proofs of my article. It was planned for issue No 1, 1969, under the title "Literature and the Massive Print Run." In the courtyard, near the doorway to the editorial office, I almost collided with Tvardovskiy, who was coming out. He was pale and seemed to be concerned about something. He was rushing somewhere. But he stopped in order to praise my article. "I wanted to call you from Pakhra, but the telephone wasn't working. We waited two days for the repairman, but he still hasn't shown up!" He was joking, but it was cold laughter. "Apparently criticism has caught up with him!" He started toward the car that was waiting for him, but after taking one step, he turned around and said, "Your article is good, but there won't be any magazine!"

Where was he going? In what high institution would it be necessary for him to "eat soap" (his expression!) that day, fighting for his magazine, trying to get them to authorize him to publish things that it was not authorized to publish? After leafing through the bound issues of NOVYY MIR for the two last months in 1968, I assume that at that time the fight was over N. Voronov's novel "Youth in Zheleznodolsk." For a long time no authorization could be obtained to print it. But inasmuch as, in issue No 11, the first part of the novel had nevertheless appeared, apparently someone had given the authorization. But later on, after thinking it over, that "someone" (or maybe it was some other "someone") banned the printing of the continuation. But, after all, the statement had been printed "To be continued," and the reader was waiting! Well, let him wait. But what position had the magazine been placed in? What was it supposed to say to its subscribers? Well, it could say whatever it wanted. Just disassemble the type, and that's all there is to it! "There won't be any magazine!", Tvardovskiy told me on that December day. Obviously he was driving there with a firm intention: either get them to remove all hindrances to printing the continuation, or he would resign from the magazine. He did not want to hem and haw with the reader, or to deceive him. I do not know whether he had to "eat soap," or by what means he managed to get his way, but he did get his way. The magazine came out after a long delay, but it printed the continuation to the novel and it existed one more year. Exactly one more year.

I shall make no attempt here to write the "story of the days and passions" of the NOVYY MIR of the 1960's. I did not work on the magazine staff. I was only one of its

authors. And that means that there are certain things that I do not know, and there are certain things that I do know approximately and, consequently, do not have the right to write about. But even in my modest experience I felt the consequences of some part of what was occurring during those years. In addition, I had met and spoken with Tvardovskiy in the dacha settlement ("Pakhra on the Desna" is what Aleksandr Trifonovich called that settlement) and I recorded certain words that he said.

Here are my transcripts that pertain to 1966 and 1967...

Vereyskiy and I dropped by to visit Mariya Illarionovna. She made tea for us. Aleksandr Trifonovich came downstairs from his study and sat at the table with us. Making a wry joke, he asked, "What's happening? Why are you giving the guests my best jam?" He was obviously upset by something. But what? Soon we found out. The night before, he had had a conversation with a certain highly placed person who did not like a novel that had been published by NOVYY MIR. But specifically which one? That was unimportant. During those years, whatever NOVYY MIR printed, everything had something wrong with it. There is something else that is important: it became obvious from the conversation that the person who did not like the novel had never read it. So Tvardovskiy told him, "If you hadn't read 'The Captain's Daughter,' how could I prove to you that Grinev was not an insurgent?" Tvardovskiy said, "He told me, 'The nation will criticize you. It will not make you a deputy!'"

Mariya Illarionovna exclaimed sorrowfully, "And you remained silent?"

"Yes, I did."

An awkward silence hung over the table. Then Aleksandr Trifonovich continued, "Obviously, he had not read the novel. And yet he knew *what* to require of a novel. The people *there* do not read at all. It's not just that there is no need to, but it's also undesirable. If you have not read something yourself, then later on you can jump on others, saying, 'You misinformed me!' They have a new style now: they talk quietly and evasively, and their attitude is 'We're not prohibiting anything—you yourself think it over very carefully...'"

The conversation swung around to writers and opponents of NOVYY MIR.

"But the crux of the matter is that I am not printing them! If I were to print them tomorrow, they would stop cursing me! They're just trying to bribe me. Sofronov phoned me. He offered to publish me in the OGONEK Library. That would have been a sure thing: a large printing run, they pay individually for each poem, there would be a lot of money. But I refused."

"Why did you refuse?"

"Because of you, Masha. I want you to be able to respect me when you're old and gray."

Tvardovskiy made just as high demands on satirical prose as he did on any other kind of belletristic prose. He had to know *how*? And he had to know *why*? Once he told me, "A pun is the lowest form of humor. It is acceptable for table-talk, but that's all!"

We were talking about Hemingway once and I said that I had stopped admiring that writer. I was pleased to hear from Tvardovskiy that he also had stopped admiring him. "Hemingway doesn't have feelings—he has sensations."

Another time I recorded words that he had expressed in a context that I do not remember, but that struck me: "Talent is punishment!"

Not joy, not a gift of fate, not happiness. No. A punishment! How is one to understand that? Well, apparently, a person who possesses talent is given no rest, no time off, by his gift during his entire life. It is wealth that takes fierce vengeance if it is not expended. Years after Tvardovskiy's death, when I was writing about the tragic death of MKhAT actress Kornakova, I constantly recalled, "Talent is punishment!" Talent takes vengeance also when it is profaned, when it is used for situational, selfish purposes that lie outside of art. How does it take vengeance? By the fact that it abandons the person to whom it is given. Recently, reading memoirs about Aleksandr Yashin, I stumbled across these words of his: "For too long I wrote shop-salesman poetry in which I could not give full range to my talent, which, since childhood, since youth, I had felt as a strange force that was destructive for me..." Talent did not abandon Yashin: he had time to expiate his guilt to it. But talent does not fit into everything. It has its purpose. Its own purpose for everyone to whom it is given. It is necessary to find that purpose, that road, and, having found it, not to turn away from it. Eternal labor. Eternal responsibility.

We were talking about a certain young poetess. On the pages of NOVYY MIR during those years I do not remember her poems and I do not know *what* Tvardovskiy thought about them. But he sensed her talent and it seems to me that, as a person, she appealed to him very much. He told me, "But she's from nowhere! She doesn't have any roots."

After reading in a newspaper the latest in a series of attacks against one of the items published in NOVYY MIR, an attack that was entirely constructed on misrepresentations and jugglings of the facts, he said, "When they found out that a person can lie and act shabbily in order to benefit himself, they really rejoiced!"

The discussion swung around to Bykov's novel "Dead People Do Not Hurt," which was published by NOVYY MIR in the early 1960's. At numerous sessions in Minsk,

Bykov was trampled and branded for having written that novel. After mentioning this to Tvardovskiy, Bykov added, "We have a terrible situation in our agriculture, so they all get together and come crashing down on literature!" "So I told him," Aleksandr Trifonovich said, "that what was important for them was not the situation, but the depiction!" Then, after a pause, "For a long time I have wanted to write an article about the **fear of fantasy**, but I just don't have the time!

I did not realize what those words meant. It seemed that, for him, a person who fought unceasingly for the opportunity to speak the truth, it would have been more natural to write about "fear of the truth"! I think that Tvardovskiy had in mind the fear of **artistic fantasy**, without which there is no art. It is one thing to learn from the newspapers that at definite times we had millions of innocently sentenced people, and another thing to see this, to experience it. And literature—a novel or a short story—can help a person to see and experience it. In literature the writer deals not with millions, but with a single fate, a single victim, for example, the mother or wife of the person who was arrested. The writer deals with the way she stands in uncounted lines, what the weather was like that day, how she returns home to her room, where every object reminds her of the person who was taken away from there, what her neighbors were like, her gradual transitions from hope—"This cannot be happening, it's a misunderstanding, it will all be cleared up soon!"—to despair, and into **what** her life is turned. And the more talented the writer, the more artistic details he finds to force the reader to see this, to penetrate deeply into it, to suffer alongside of that person, and to go through the same experiences.

It was that suffering alongside of others, that going through the same experiences, that were feared by those who wanted to drown our past in oblivion.

In any case, that is how I understood Tvardovskiy's words about the "fear of fantasy."

And this is a notation that bears a date: 4 May 1968.

Aleksandr Trifonovich is sitting in Orlik's (O. G. Vereyskiy) studio. He is depressed about something. He reads Bunin's poetry: The calf bellows as though it is mute/And the mournful fir trees incline/Their green needles/"Oh, my God! Oh, my God!"

He finished reading it, then he repeated, "Oh, my God! Oh, my God!"

Then he added, "There's nowhere to go. And no one to explain to... A certain retired colonel keeps writing to me, 'You ought to leave that magazine, Aleksandr Trifonovich! Why do you need it?' Why do I need it? Well, I know the role that the magazine plays in the public's self-awareness. Yes, I know it! But he says, 'Leave it! Oh, my God!'"

I could have said that it was not only the retired colonel, but also certain other writers living at Pakhra, were saying, "Why does he torture himself with NOVYY MIR? He is a universally recognized poet. He could live calmly." Obviously, I did not mention the advice given by those people who knew how to live calmly. He did not know how to live like that. His conscience would not allow him to do so. His sense of responsibility to his fellow-countrymen, to those who were perplexed and tricked by lies, would not allow him to do so.

The year 1969 came. I received the January issue of NOVYY MIR—I no longer recall when I got it, perhaps in February or March—with my article "Literature and the 'Mass Printing Run.'"

The response came immediately in OGONEK, No 20. This time it was a long article. The entire criticism department at NOVYY MIR was hit with a barrage. One reviewer was reviled because he had not liked V. Zakrutkin's "Creation of the World," and the reader was given an explanation of the reason why. The reason, it turned out, was that "...V. Zakrutkin has been so bold as to mention repeatedly the merits of Stalin... And the people at NOVYY MIR did not allow V. Zakrutkin that artistic (sic!) boldness." After which the author of the article, V. Petelin, takes me on. "I have been a reader of NOVYY MIR for a long time. I am used to everything... But when I read Nataliya Ilina's article 'Literature and the Mass Printing Run'... I became completely depressed as I wondered... exactly where is the limit of the nonobjectivity and cynicism of the NOVYY MIR critics?..." Reading farther into that article, I learn that I had allowed myself "in a blasphemous manner to write ironically about the bravery of a young girl who, together with the rest of the nation, had undergone difficulties and deprivations." Then it turns out that I had also written an ironical "description of an oven furnace. Apparently, N. Ilina has never had to fire a furnace. Or even to observe how this is done." After accusing me also of "lightly and casually" canceling out "the author's large amount of serious work" (the topic of discussion was the relatively illiterate novel that had been proffered as a "historical novel"), V. Petelin hurls himself at yet another NOVYY MIR critic. This critic is reviled because he praised a collection of stories by A. Borshchagovskiy, entitled "Noah's Ark." Those, it seems, were slanderous stories, since "it turns out that the village is populated by cruel people who are indifferent to other people's misfortune, people who are selfish and egotistical. What falsehood!"

There is something touching, or even naive, in that exclamation, "What falsehood!" A person who is incapable of telling a lie himself is astonished—he simply cannot believe his ears—when he learns that there are people who are capable of lying like that! But let's put emotions to one side. Let us talk seriously with the slanderers! We have to remind them of a few things: "In our time the question that arises before all the writers in the world more sharply than it has ever arisen before is

the question of responsibility to one's time. Therefore it is precisely in our time that the artist must be truthful, must possess a sense of special responsibility to the nation, to the reader." After appealing to Tvardovskiy's NOVYY MIR to be truthful and responsible to the nation, V. Petelin ends his article in this way: "The time for preparation has passed. The time has come for feats of daring, the time has come for exerting all one's efforts. And for us, the readers, the time has come for large expectations." Specifically what expectations? What is V. Petelin and the nation waiting for? What is he hinting about? That his patience has run out. That he is no longer able to tolerate that magazine!

I think that it was the very next day after the appearance of this article that, in our courtyard, I met a certain writer who lived in the same building.

"Well, have you read it yet? OGONEK really gave you a good working over yesterday!"

That was said with a malicious delight that I had not expected from that person. He died many years ago, and I do not want to mention his name. Tvardovskiy, to whom I communicated those words, shrugged his shoulders and said, "Why does that surprise you? You certainly ought to know that there are people who are always on the side of strength!"

Yes. That summer it was already obvious to everyone that the strength was not on the side of NOVYY MIR. And, as V. Petelin justly remarked, "the time had come for feats of daring." In May he himself performed such a feat. In July, 11 writers performed one all together. And not simply the members of the Writers' Union, but also persons who occupied "positions," including the editors in chief of thick magazines. In a collective letter entitled "What Is NOVYY MIR Speaking Out Against?", they objected to A. G. Dementyev's article (NOVYY MIR, No 4, 1969). There were things in that article that could have been argued about, but why did that necessitate such a high-powered group? It turned out later that Dementyev's article had only been a pretext. A massive attack was being waged at the entire magazine as a whole, since that magazine published materials that were "blasphemous" and "slandorous," and that "desecrated" our holy objects. The letter mentioned a number of prose writers and critics who engaged in this blasphemy and desecration. But Tvardovskiy's name was not mentioned. During the same month of July—on 31 July—that gap was filled in by SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA newspaper. Another "open letter." But this one was addressed directly to "Editor in chief of NOVYY MIR magazine, Comrade A. T. Tvardovskiy." A certain lathe operator called upon Tvardovskiy to reply "to the working class."

But had it been a lathe operator? What if he had written the letter as dictated to him by someone else?

That summer of 1969 I frequently went to Peredelkino to visit Korney Ivanovich Chukovskiy. During one of my August trips, Korney Ivanovich met me with the question, "What's new with Aleksandr Trifonovich?" I answered, "He's suffering." "How could he not suffer?" Chukovskiy said, "because he is Russia. What a person! What a poet! A classic author, living in our midst... And his work at NOVYY MIR has no parallel, except perhaps Nekrasov. But things were much easier for Nekrasov!" Then he added, "His line will be victorious. It will definitely be victorious—in about 60 years. It's just that you and I won't see that!"

Judging from the data that was written in Tvardovskiy's hand, he dropped by to see A. A. Refomatskiy and me in that small house where we were living in Pakhra. It was 24 August 1970. He brought us as a present his dark green, recently published two-volume work: "Vasiliy Terkin" and "Far, Far Away: Lyrical Poetry." The first volume—to Aleksandr Aleksandrovich—was inscribed, "With a good state of mind." The second—to me—was inscribed, "With good feelings."

On that day, on our small verandah, I spoke with Tvardovskiy for the last time. A half-year had already passed since he had been deprived of his magazine, of his brain-child. "I know what this magazine means for public self-awareness. I know!" Yes, he did know. He also knew how people loved that magazine, how they felt drawn to its truthful word. And in order to assure that the magazine existed, in order to prolong its life, Tvardovskiy proudly and silently suffered humiliations in his discussions with highly placed officials and was forced to read slander on the pages of the press. But those years of suffering had ended. Now it was possible, following the advice of the retired colonel and other well-wishers, for him to live calmly. But other sufferings began. Tvardovskiy was given no peace. He was torn to pieces by his awareness of his helplessness when faced by the wall of lies that nothing could break through. "There is nowhere to go. And no one to explain to!" It was not in honest combat that he suffered defeat. That burned him. And it consumed him with that fire.

That day on the verandah he spoke sadly and tenderly as he mentioned aloud the names of NOVYY MIR employees and authors.

I communicated to him Chukovskiy's words to the effect that the line of the lost NOVYY MIR would be victorious in 60 years.

"Sooner than that," Tvardovskiy said. "Sooner! In about 20 or 30 years!"

Has that prophesy come true? Yes, it has. Not just in a single magazine, but in many magazines we read today the truth about our past, about our life. However, those who do not find this truth to their liking object, just as they used to do in the olden days, by misrepresenting and

juggling the facts, by replacing arguments with accusations that are made up out of whole cloth. Well, they have become accustomed to that. They will have to be taught how to conduct an honest argument. But I do not believe in the victory of those who will not be able to learn this.

I was given a lot by my ten years of proximity to Tvardovskiy's NOVYY MIR. I often repeat his lines to myself, as an incantation: "Without straying or retreating from your footpath/Be yourself/That is how you will cope with your fate/In such a way that any fate finds itself in it/And pain releases anyone's soul."

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Attacks on Historical 'Distortions' in Shatrov Plays Continue

18000491a Moscow AGITATOR in Russian
No 7, Apr 88 pp 11-13

[Article by L. Kunetskaya, senior scientist at the Museum of V. I. Lenin's Office and Apartment at the Kremlin, Komsomol Prize Laureate: "Do Not Distort Historical Truth: On M. Shatrov's Plays 'The Brest Peace Accord' and 'Onward...Onward...Onward!'"

[Text] As much as it hurts to admit it, the historical sciences today are in a most unenviable position, in particular those scientists who study the history of our party. They maintain their silence, rarely attempting even to comment on the abundance of novels, short stories and plays that have been published about various periods in our country's biography.

Meanwhile a number of cultural figures have appealed for a repeal of bans on every topic, taking upon themselves the responsibility for illuminating in a new way the fundamental problems of party policy, the paths taken since the October Revolution, characterizations of party and state officials and portrayal of the great Lenin. And they are not pleased by what we know about Vladimir Ilich or, more precisely, what he was like when he was alive. They are looking for something unknown, some completely new traits of his personality or new motives for his behavior. Some authors assumed a quite unforgivable tone when doing so. Thus, A. Adzhubey plainly called his review of the play "The Brest Peace Accord," "Without Makeup" and hailed the stripping away of "whitewash" from the portrayal of Vladimir Ilich.

Yes, such is the power of art that people will attend plays where Lenin "himself" explains his feelings and actions. But it is sad and even dangerous that Vladimir Ilich has become the object of unrestrained self-promotion on the part of certain authors, the principal character of their alleged discoveries and sensational revelations. I have in mind the recent plays by Mikhail Shatrov "The Brest Peace Accord" and "Further...Further...Further!"

Let us begin with the play "The Brest Peace Accord." From a historical standpoint it contains nothing new. Every slightly literate individual who has ever read any, I repeat, any work on CPSU history, the memoirs of N. K. Krupskaya or commentaries on the Complete Works of Vladimir Ilich should be familiar with the discussions surrounding the stipulations of the Brest Peace Accord, who voted how in the Central Committee or at the 7th Party Congress and the tragic position of the army and the country as a whole. What is "new" in this play is that Lenin's interlocutors throughout are two persons who have not previously appeared on the stage: Trotskiy and Bukharin. The author has Vladimir Ilich entranced by the eloquence of the one and by the youthful bluntness of the other. Despite the fact that these contacts were psychologically absolutely impossible in the form in which they are presented in the play—both men were too strongly opposed to Lenin to the very end. Trotskiy was not merely a phrase-monger; he was Lenin's complete opposite. In the play we see how Trotskiy wavers, is "tormented" and at times even agrees with Lenin and abstains from voting at the decisive Central Committee meeting, because he "did not want to prevent the creation of a majority, so that a unified course could be adopted." Here is what Krupskaya wrote about this episode: "The vote on the question of whether to accept the German conditions or not was: seven in favor and four opposed, with four abstentions, including Trotskiy, who was unwilling to accept responsibility at such an important moment on such an important issue."

A word in passing about the actors who play Lenin. Recently they have been screaming a great deal and falling into endless hysterics (A. Kalyagin, and in particular M. Ulyanov), forgetting that under any circumstances Lenin remained a strong, steadfast and essentially wellbred individual. Allow me to quote A. V. Lunacharskiy, who knew both Lenin and Trotskiy firsthand and wrote in 1919: "Trotskiy is tremendously conscious of his historical role and would probably be prepared to make any personal sacrifice whatsoever....to remain in the memory of humanity wreathed in the aura of a tragic revolutionary leader....He is more often capable of making mistakes, lacking Lenin's virtually unfailing instinct; being a hot-tempered and by temperament choleric individual he is capable of being, at least temporarily, blinded by his passion, whereas Lenin, who is steady and always in control of himself, could scarcely be seized by a fit of rage even for a moment."

Has M. Shatrov gotten the leading figures in his play mixed up? And have the actors further widened the gap between the true Lenin and the person portraying him on stage?

A word about Bukharin. His tragic death in 1938 should not be used as an excuse for his behavior at the time of the Brest Accord. He was Lenin's most unyielding opponent. Nothing could change his mind, neither the quite

real danger of the Soviet State perishing, nor the possibility that Vladimir Ilich would quit the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. And endless conversations between Lenin and Bukharin would scarcely have been possible at that time. Lenin needed a supporter, not a frenzied opponent who was prepared to teach revolution to the workers and peasants through the horrors of German occupation, and who was also quite willing to give up Petersburg and Moscow. At the 7th Party Congress these were Bukharin's exact words: "Our only salvation is in the fact that the masses will learn from their own experience, in the process of struggle, what German occupation is, when peasants will have their cows and their boots taken away, when workers will be forced to work 14 hours a day or else be taken away to Germany; when they have an iron ring in their noses, then believe me, comrades, then we will have a real holy war."

Yet in the play Bukharin accuses Lenin of cruelty! Everything is distorted and turned inside out. For after the congress sided with Lenin it was Bukharin, Kollontay, Krestinskiy, Ryazanov, etc. who resigned from their party and state posts. What is that if not a stab in the back?! And Trotskiy, perhaps realizing his full measure of responsibility for his actions, gave a long speech at the 7th Congress attempting to justify the fact that he had broken off negotiations. What "new" things does M. Shatrov offer his viewers and readers? Misrepresented facts and quotes? Yes.

One reviewer of Shatrov's play "The Brest Peace Accord" noted that the play had the air of a quick palliative. But how can we talk about haste when the author claims that the play was written 20 years ago? In that length of time he could have verified and polished not only every sentence, but even every word, every punctuation mark.

The play contains quite a few everyday scenes of the worst sort. For instance, the members of the Soviet Government are depicted holding each other's place in line at the Council of People's Commissars cafeteria. This is not true. Firstly, female waiters served there, as was the practice everywhere at that time, and, secondly, Lenin never went to the cafeteria; he and Nadezhda Konstantinovna ate at home. And, thirdly, the people's commissars of 1918, who literally worked day and night, would scarcely have had time for a chummy midday break.

Or another episode, one which seems touching to the uninformed: three revolutionaries—Lenin, Dzerzhinskiy and Sverdlov—are cooking dinner after shooing the "ladies" out of the kitchen. The only problem is that, according to Krupskaya, Vladimir Ilich never did housework, and her line: "Suit yourself, you old underground workers!" is not applicable to Lenin, just like the rest of this fake, drivelling scene. Just like Bukharin's "sport coat." In 1917 no one wore a sport coat, not even young

people. Seemingly a trivial matter, but trifles also set the stage and create an unrealistic backdrop for the events of those terrible and heroic years.

Much could be said about other historical personages brought out on stage by the author, but one would hope that competent defenders of Gorkiy and Blok will be found among literary historians. And they do need to be defended. Shatrov puts his hostility toward Gorkiy in Stalin's mouth.

I fully understand that I am not levelling criticism at a scientific treatise, but rather at a work which its author regards as "artistic." However, Shatrov prefaces every word in his play with the statement that the play is based upon true facts. Neither the viewer nor the reader can ask Shatrov personally, therefore they deluge us, the museum staff, with endless questions every day: "Is it true...? Did it really happen...? Did they say that...?" and so on. And in the majority of cases we reply: no, no, no!

In Shatrov's early plays we find fictitious characters. Now, confident of his infallibility and exemption from criticism, he packs his plays with historical figures. I will not dwell on the casual way in which they are selected; that is a dramatist's prerogative. But it is time that something was said about his arbitrary, freestyle treatment of their reputations, actions and character. Comrade Bozhko, a communist from Zaporozhe, appeals for this, asking with pain in a letter addressed to our museum: "Who will come to the defense of the dead?"

Today V. I. Lenin is threatened by a serious danger: the danger of each author interpreting him on the author's own mental, spiritual or cultural level, ascribing false words and actions to him.

I have something else to say about a certain personality and the way that that personality is being portrayed to our contemporaries. In our revolution and perhaps in the entire history of the world revolutionary movement there is no woman equal to Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya. Naturally Shatrov used her memoirs extensively, without any citations or footnotes whatsoever. Yet in all his works he has left her in the role of a faceless statistic. In "Further...Further...Further!" he described her as "nowhere to go onward to". Yet two pages before there is a detailed biography of Trotskiy: where he was born, where he studied, how he struggled, etc. In the cast of characters Nadezhda Konstantinovna is in almost last place, after characters like Denikin, Spiridonova, Dan and others. And this is what Shatrov has her say about herself: "Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinovna, did party work relating to education. Wife of Ulyanov. On 24 October I was at the Vyborgskiy Raykom, to which Fofanova brought Ilich's memoranda, and I passed them on to Smolnyy." Period. Perhaps Nadezhda Konstantinovna, who was very modest and always strove to remain in the shadows, would simply laugh at this opus. But we, her posterity, communists, do not find it amusing. Not amusing at all.

What does he mean by "work relating to education"? This of someone who was a highly active member of the founding cell of the Union for the Struggle to Liberate the Working Class? Or who once wrote a report on the organizational work of ISKRA for the 2nd Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party? Or who used to encode illegal letters containing directives? (During the years abroad she wrote 30,000 of them, and her handwriting was familiar to revolutionaries in every corner of the country. She held all the codes, addresses of safe houses and addresses for the distribution of party literature.) Or who was once a liaison between the Central Committee and Lenin, who was in Finland, and fearlessly crossed the border using a passport in the name of Agafya Atamanova? Or...???

"Wife of Ulyanov." Yes, a beloved wife, a person in whom he believed as much as he did in himself.

I do not know what Spiridonova talked about in the corridors, or what Kerenskiy was thinking. But when words spoken by Lenin during Krupskaya's lifetime are ascribed in the play to Inessa Armand, who was not even at Smolnyy at that time, one involuntarily gets the feeling that the author is not merely being imprecise, but that there is a definite tendency here which coincides with much that has been written by our opponents abroad.

Lenin, the final day before the storming of the Winter Palace. Again, that same obsessive idea that he was locked up in Fofanova's apartment and maliciously kept out of Smolnyy. And, of course, that is Stalin's fault, even though even in Shatrov's plays he did not in 1917 have the influence which he acquired at a considerably later point in time. Would it perhaps be better to recall that Stalin refused to divulge Lenin's secret location to a Provisional Government court?

In the play "Further...Further...Further!" Kerenskiy is merely a weak, ineffectual person, but was it not the Provisional Government of which he was head that declared Lenin an outlaw and slandered the Bolsheviks? And was it not Kerenskiy who introduced the death penalty at the front? Neither Podvoyskiy, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, nor active council member Antonov-Ovseyenko have any role in the play. Only Trotsky and Stalin, who once again settle personal scores after the fact. And once again in Trotsky's favor.

The conflict between Stalin and Krupskaya is elaborately exaggerated. No one is attempting to justify Stalin, just as it is impossible to justify those who irresponsibly brought him into conflict with Nadezhda Konstantinovna. Basically, no one knows what Stalin said to Krupskaya. But nothing is a secret to the author of this play, and one hears the most vile things spoken on stage. Obviously Shatrov thought long and hard about how to say the most filthy things possible. One feels ashamed for him.

In general the characters' language is uniformly coarse. For example, never would Georgiy Valentinovich Plekhanov, one of the most cultivated men in Europe, have spoken with Lenin in such a tone that he would call him simply "Lenin." Nor could Stalin have said: "Listen here, Krupskaya!" This gutter language would have been impossible among the intellectual party members of the 1920's.

A monstrous line spoken by Martov: "Silent, ailing Lenin put his affairs in order, never dictating." This statement contradicts elementary facts and logic. Vladimir Ilich began dictating his final letters and articles just one week after his most severe stroke. And he argued with his doctors rather than with the members of the Central Committee when he defended his right to go on with his work. Has the author never known anyone who was ill? What physician would permit a patient to work after a serious stroke? Yet after the slightest improvement in his health Lenin dictated regularly, sometimes for as much as 40 minutes, twice a day, day after day. Professor Rozanov's memoirs contain very heavy-hearted comments about the way Lenin drove himself physically, how embarrassed he was by his weakness in front of doctors, nurses, orderlies and stenographers. His embarrassment and uneasiness were so great that for a time he dictated over the telephone. A secretary/stenographer would sit in the adjoining dining room listening to the phone and writing as Lenin dictated lying in the bed in his room.

Undoubtedly Lenin was disturbed by the conflict between Krupskaya and Stalin, but there is an ancient maxim that one thing following another does not necessarily mean that the former caused the latter. Vladimir Ilich worried about everything. About his inability to speak either at the Congress of Soviets or later at the party congress. About the conflict in Georgia and the foreign trade monopoly. About party unity. And about many, many other things, especially when he realized the seriousness of his illness. Or does Shatrov doubt the diagnosis of Lenin's illness? Neither N. Semashko, people's commissar for health, an old Bolshevik and long-time friend of Lenin's, nor any of the other doctors who treated Lenin, including the foreigners who went home following his death, ever differed concerning their diagnosis. The sclerosis of his brain was so severe that Semashko and other doctors were amazed that he kept his mental powers until his death. And Lenin lived for another year. And he continued to struggle, remaining strong and courageous.

...Readers fight over copies of NOVIY MIR and ZNAMYA, suffering and accepting on faith every word in the plays. They cannot help noticing how Lenin's words wander into the mouths of Bukharin, how Trotsky, who was the most bitter enemy of Lenin and Leninism, is suddenly transformed into a veritable ally of Vladimir Ilich, how Lenin fades into the background in comparison to the activism of the other characters, how he is portrayed as neurasthenic and pessimistic, how

he seems thoroughly cut off from real life and from the truth. Previously we diligently strove to include Stalin among his friends; now we have replaced Stalin with Bukharin and Sverdlov (incidentally, both of them were much younger than Vladimir Ilich and had met him on very few occasions prior to 1917). Kollontay or Armand is at his side instead of Krupskaya. We hear continual "heart-to-heart talks," although it is a well-known fact that Vladimir Ilich disliked precisely that sort of conversation and called empty talk that did not serve any specific purpose "chatter."

We could dissect every line, every scene in these two Shatrov plays and, comparing them with the historical situation we would see in many of them the author's deviation from reality and how his portrayal of Lenin is fundamentally distorted. The "Lenin" presented to us by Shatrov never could have traveled a very difficult path to victory across a quarter of a century, triumphing in the struggle against autocracy, opportunism and vacillations, as well as against betrayal by his former comrades. Petty is the only word for the idea that Lenin is somehow to blame before the Soviet people on account of his early death.

Art is a very powerful weapon, and it should be used honestly and in the interests of genuine restructuring.

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12825

Literary Critic Kozhinov Raps Rybakov Novel, Defends Stalin

18000503 Moscow NASH SOVREMENNİK in Russian No 4, Apr 88 pp 160-175

[Article by Vadim Kozhinov: "Truth and Absolute Truth"]

[Text] In today's discussions about literature, the word "truth" is used probably more often than any other. The main goal of the writer is perceived by many to be perfectly clear: to speak out, finally, on all that we had kept quiet about before. In reading today's journals and newspapers, we often find ourselves in the role of observers of a sort of competition between writers, publicists and critics. Each of them is trying to express the most acute and the most complete "truth."

It is hard to keep from getting carried away with this spectacle. However, after a certain time one notices with bewilderment that among the competitors there are also writers who just yesterday maintained grave silence about the very same things of which they speak today so loudly and with such selfless courage. This unwittingly confuses the soul: is it not too easy of a thing—"to speak the truth"? As it turns out, it is quite enough simply to

get the proper "permission," and even a writer who is totally "inexperienced" in the matter of speaking the truth is capable of achieving the greatest success at it...

Yet the question of truth is immeasurably more complex and contradictory than it may seem at first glance. In 1947 Mikhail Prishvin wrote down an observation which deserves most attentive scrutiny:

"Truth requires stability: One must stand up for truth or hang on the cross for it, and mankind is moving toward absolute truth."

"One must adhere to the truth, but absolute truth must be sought out."

Truth is a thing that is more or less evident and synonymous. You cannot deprive people of freedom, you cannot destroy innocent people through terrible crimes. It is not permissible to inflict harm on the basics of human and natural existence for the sake of achieving a limited task of the present day. It is unforgivable to suppress thought, creativity, or the spontaneous labor activity of the people.

The recognition of truth does not require any intense and extensive work of the mind. Truth is not so much a "cognitive" as a moral phenomenon. To speak the truth means basically to perform a courageous act, and ultimately—a heroic deed. And the value of truth is essentially a moral value.

Therefore, under conditions when anyone and everyone is able to speak the "truth," it, strictly speaking, loses its basic ethical value, and becomes a simple statement of fact.

The absolute truth is an entirely different matter. It is not and cannot be evident and synonymous, and requires great effort of the cognitive and thinking spirit, as well as special courage. This is already not the courage of deed, but the courage of thought, and finally, a rather high culture of the thought process itself.

I repeat once again. The truth may have a definite and even limitless value—but only under certain conditions, when to utter it means to perform a noble and courageous act.

Under such conditions, synonymy and even frank directness not only do not reduce the value of the truth, but on the contrary may give it additional force. Thus, the uncircumspect moral demand that you should not kill people, regardless of who they are might have had great significance in those days when executions were becoming an everyday occurrence.

Having visited the site of the execution of Nicholas II and his family, Mayakovskiy wrote:

Ask yourself—raise your hand—to execute or not? It is not for me to stand at the turning point. I will throw up both my hands now: I vote against!...

We have turned the course of history. Say goodbye to the old forever. A communist and human being cannot be bloodthirsty.

Yet this truth remained in the notebook and was publicized only after 1956...

A quarter century ago, some very expressive fragments were published from the correspondence between the leading prosaic Yevgeniy Zamyatin and the no less notable critic Aleksandr Voronskiy. It is appropriate to add that these two men were the same age (both were born in 1884) and practically fellow townsmen (the former was from around Lipetsk, the latter—from around Tambov). On the eve of 1905 both became Bolsheviks, and later devoted themselves to literature at about the same time. Their paths diverged only after October. Nevertheless, they thought quite highly of each other.

However, Zamyatin wrote to Voronskiy in 1922: "No matter what—I cannot accept the murder of a bound man." Voronskiy disagreed with Zamyatin in his letter of reply: "You say you can't kill a bound man, but I don't understand that. Why can't you? Sometimes you can't, and sometimes you can."

Fifteen years later, in 1937, the arrested Voronskiy in all probability understood how dangerous this "not understanding" of his was, but he understood this all too late...

From this it is easy to conclude that Zamyatin was totally correct in this argument. However, even here the truth turns out to be more complex.

The quoted letter of Voronskiy contains the following accusation aimed at Zamyatin: "It must be that you are removed from the real struggle of the present day, and that way you can't judge what one can and can't do." This too has its truth, its measure of absolute truth, which is particularly clear because in 1931 Zamyatin preferred to leave his homeland and thereby fully found himself "removed." However, we can rightly assume that thanks to this choice, Zamyatin died (that very same year, 1937, we might add) not in a cell or barracks, as Voronskiy died in 1943, but in a Paris apartment, from a severe attack of stenocardia.

Thinking about these individual fates, one understands the complexity and lack of synonymy of the absolute truth, which after all must somehow correlate two human truths. And of course, it is even more difficult to understand the absolute truth of an entire society, the people's absolute truth.

Nevertheless, today's writers all too often solve the most difficult and tragic problems in a swoop and "straight from hip," thus presenting the narrow and specific truth as the absolute truth or, more correctly, what they hand out is not really the truth at all (since it truly lives only as an expression of moral courage), but rather certain strict facts. In many cases even these facts are prepared and distorted.

1

In order to demonstrate this, we could turn to an entire series of recently published fictional and journalistic writings. I will concentrate on one—the novel by Anatoliy Rybakov entitled "Children of the Arbat." Why specifically this work? First of all, this novel expresses that notion of "truth" which is characteristic for many other works and, in speaking of "Children of the Arbat," we can interpret and evaluate the entire sphere of current literature and journalism. Furthermore, A. Rybakov's novel covers a rather broad circle of happenings, and makes an effort to depict the life of the country in general. Finally, A. Rybakov's work has received the loudest and most enthusiastic reviews. Here are a few quotes from some of the published reviews: "A grandiose work...an in-depth cross-section of society from the party Central Committee down to 'the very outskirts'"; "richness of artistic ideas... accuracy of details... meaningful truth"; "large-scale historical-social setting"; "real truth about the time"; "Shakespearean truth"; "truth about everything experienced by the country and the people"; "an accurate, unbiased...chronicle," etc.

These definitions and evaluations, as I will try to prove, do not correspond at all to the real meaning of "Children of the Arbat." I have no doubt that after a comparatively short time—after a really serious study and interpretation of the epoch depicted in "Children of the Arbat"—the superficiality and direct falsehood of that concept of the epoch which the novel presents will become evident to the overwhelming majority of its readers.

We should begin with that which is more or less indisputable—the historical inaccuracies (to put it mildly) of many of the scenes in the novel.

On the very first pages of "Children of the Arbat," Mark Ryazanov, "one of the leaders of industry," is talking—in the fall of 1933—with his nephew, student Sasha Pankratov, who asks his uncle:

"Is it true that Lenin wrote that Stalin was crude and disloyal?"

"How do you know that?"

"What's the difference? I know."

The surprised question of Ryazanov ("How do you know that?") is totally senseless, since a leader of that rank could not help but know that 6 years before his conversation with Sasha, on 2 November 1927, PRAVDA published the text of Stalin's speech, which was subsequently republished in mass circulation. In this speech, Stalin specifically announced:

"They say that...in his 'testament' Comrade Lenin suggested to the Congress that, in view of Stalin's 'crudeness,' they should consider the question of replacing him in the position of Secretary General with another comrade. That is entirely correct."

If Sasha had asked his uncle this question prior to November of 1927, that would be understandable. But the fact that he asks it in 1933 may serve only as an indication of his ignorance, his lack of familiarity with important political documents. As for the perplexed question of Ryazanov, who will soon become a member of the Central Committee, it is really absurd.

Nevertheless, in A. Rybakov's novel this essentially ridiculous conversation arises as practically the main menacing twist in the pivotal point of the plot. Supposedly, having secretly learned about Lenin's evaluation of Stalin which was known to very few, Sasha Pankratov enters for this very reason into dramatic conflict with the "Stalinist" forces...

Or, here is another example. A. Rybakov gives a detailed description of the Central Committee meeting held on 14 July 1934 and devoted to the plan for the reconstruction of Moscow. In conclusion, he says the following: "Stalin was happy with the outcome of the meeting. It was HE who spoke at it...as the initiator and organizer of the reconstruction of Moscow... It was HE, specifically HE, and HE alone who satisfied the deep Russian feeling of love for Moscow and respect for Moscow. And for this reason, Moscow was now HIS city, and the future Moscow would be a monument to HIM."

A sort of internal monologue by Stalin which develops this theme takes up several pages and, as A. Rybakov tries to convince the readers, the "Moscow" idea holds for Stalin a huge, exceptional importance. Yet if things had really been this way, it remains totally unclear why the real Stalin was not able to bring to the public consciousness either the fact that "it was specifically he, and he alone" who was the "initiator and organizer of the reconstruction of Moscow," or the concept that this reconstruction was meant to satisfy the "deep Russian feeling of love for Moscow and respect for Moscow."

Let us turn to the historical evidence. A little over a month after the above-mentioned Central Committee meeting, speaking at the First Congress of USSR Writers on 25 August 1934, one of the practical leaders of the Moscow reconstruction work, Korobov, announced: "There is no Kitaygorodskiy wall, no Sukharevka, none of that antiquity which many cling to, none of that

antiquity which hindered us from rebuilding old Moscow into socialist Moscow. Some insisted on clinging to this antiquity. Our tested leader, L. M. Kaganovich, the *initiator* (italics mine—V. K.) of the new architectural formulation of Moscow, gave a firm rebuff to this resistance, and the Kitaygorodskiy wall stones, the stones of 'forty-forties' we buried in our tunnels."

And so, the "initiator" is different, and there is no hint of the "deep Russian sense of respect for Moscow." Perhaps it was that the "idea" of Stalin had at that moment simply not had time to enter the consciousness of the people? No, even in a year, on 11 July 1935, the joint Plenum of the VKP(b) Moscow City Committee and the Mossovet addressed Kaganovich as follows (this document was brought to public information): "You, dear Lazar Moiseyevich, have led us on great endeavors in the radical rebuilding of our capital... Under your leadership and with your constant and untiring participation, the General Plan for the reconstruction of Moscow was created—this document which reflects the greatness and beauty of our socialist epoch."

We cannot believe that Stalin, had he really been possessed by that "Moscow" idea which A. Rybakov so persistently ascribes to him, would have allowed the laurels for its "implementation" to go to another, or for the implementation itself to be perceived by his contemporaries not in the spirit of a "deep Russian sense of respect for Moscow," but as a total rejection of many centuries of Moscow "antiquity."

"Children of the Arbat" contains very many such clearly unauthentic scenes, which testify either to the author's lack of familiarity with such documents of the epoch which in general and on the whole were accessible for study, or to the fact that the author simply ignored these documents.

However, there is hardly any sense in concentrating specifically on this aspect of the matter, since the main content of "Children of the Arbat" may be characterized as the fruits of the thought and imagination of the writer rather than as the result of study of historical documents.

We must stipulate, however, that this cannot be viewed as a "shortcoming" in and of itself. First of all, a writer always has a right—even a relative right—to conjecture and fabrication. These, provided they have a truly creative character, are sometimes capable of bringing the artist closer to the absolute truth even in a greater measure than would a study of the facts. Secondly, the documents which are accessible to us today give a rather limited picture and, moreover, we cannot exclude the fact that certain very significant facts relating to the epoch cannot be researched at all based on reliable documents (these, possibly, may not have been preserved, or simply never existed).

And finally, since we are speaking not of a research work, but of a novel, the most important thing is not the accuracy of the depiction of certain individual occurrences, but rather a vision of the overall movement of history. It is specifically to this that we will now turn, keeping in mind, of course, certain factual inaccuracies.

2

Evidently, one of the main tasks of this novel is to show how Stalin retained his limitless power and, accordingly, his "cult." The task itself, undoubtedly, was correctly formulated by the writer, since it was specifically from 1934, when the action of "Children of the Arbat" begins to develop, that this cult began to turn into something grandiose and exceptional. In order to be convinced of this, it is enough to compare the relatively moderate and not too frequent praises addressed to Stalin which resounded in July of 1930 at the 16th Party Congress with the unheard of glorification characteristic for every single speech presented at the 17th Congress held only 3 1/2 years later, in January-early February of 1934.

As if competing with each other, all the speakers at this Congress glorified Stalin—those who seemingly comprised his irreconcilably bitter opposition such as Zinoviev, Kamanev, Radek, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy, as well as those leaders who, in the opinion of A. Rybakov were his "unreliable" fellow fighters such as Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, Kuybyshev, Rudzutak, and finally, all the other speakers as well.

The novel makes certain mention of this glorification, but for some reason does not give any definite understanding or evaluation of it.

The unrestrained praises lavished on Stalin by the famous leaders of the opposition are evaluated only in the reflections and discourses of Stalin himself as depicted by the writer. Stalin evaluated these praises as being deliberately false, dictated either by fear of him, or by the desire of Kamenev and others to regain their leading role. The author has no comment on this evaluation.

As for the "unreliable" members of the Politburo, the writer tries to characterize their attitude toward the matter in the internal monologue of Kirov. "He (Kirov—V.K.) supported Stalin and his line, he fought against his enemies, supported his authority, and did this sincerely and with conviction," since, as is stated later in this same monologue on Stalin, "his methods were unacceptable, but his line was correct."

Finally, there was one other type of person who supported Stalin. These were the people who glorified him, as depicted in the novel, based on low self-seeking interests.

Ultimately, however, all this glorification is clearly not given too much importance. Something else is much more significant, from the standpoint of A. Rybakov—that about which Kirov muses as follows: "Stalin... knows the secret of power... He has been able to instill in the people the conviction of his omniscience and his omnipotence."

Kirov comes to this conclusion in the scene of the novel relating to the summer of 1934. Yet it was just then that S. M. Kirov's composition entitled "Stalin—The Great Organizer of Victories by the Working Class" came out, and in which he said, for example:

"It is difficult to imagine the figure of the giant that Stalin is... We know of no turn in our work, no endeavor of any importance, no slogan, no direction in our policy of which comrade Stalin was not the author, but someone else. All the basic work—and the party must know this—takes place at the direction and initiative, and under the leadership of Comrade Stalin. The mighty will, the colossal organizational talent of this man..." etc. etc.

In the novel "Children of the Arbat," Kirov admits that he "supported Stalin... increased his authority." However, these real phrases of his which we have just quoted have, of course, an entirely different meaning. This is not simply "support" or "increasing authority." And the thought that Stalin supposedly himself "instilled in the people the conviction of his omniscience and omnipotence" is naive at the very least. There can be no doubt that this conviction was insinuated to the masses primarily by the people who surrounded Stalin—people who were quite different, but alike in the matter of glorifying Stalin. And Kirov, without a doubt, played one of the main roles in this.

We must note that A. Rybakov makes an effort to prove that Stalin "himself" created his cult, himself affirmed, as stated in the novel, "his exclusiveness" and "his singularity." Thus, the novel depicts in detail the utterly desperate struggle of Stalin in pursuing the goal of refuting one detail from the memoirs of Yenukidze, who wrote that only three social-democrats from the Transcaucasus knew of the existence of the underground press "Nina," which operated in 1901-1905 in Baku. Stalin was not listed among these three. Assuring him that he too knew about "Nina," Stalin in the novel almost humiliatingly—and uselessly—tries to talk Kirov into writing about this. And when he fails in this, he orders Zhdanov to call Beria and tell him to prove Yenukidze wrong.

It is entirely clear that the purpose of this scene in the novel is to show the readers how Stalin, with the aid of deception and intrigue, strived to aggrandize his achievements. Let us assume that the scene depicted by A. Rybakov really did take place (although we could prove that it is almost a total fabrication). However, we cannot help but see that the affirmation of Stalin's affiliation with the unlawful press "Nina" which operated 3

decades earlier in Baku, without any doubt, could not have given any tangible "addition" to the unprecedented cult of his personality which already reigned in 1934. Compared with the overall scope of this cult, the most decisive admission of the young Dzhugashvili's knowledge of "Nina" represented, as they say, an infinitely small value.

A decisive role in the creation of the "cult" undoubtedly belongs to the grandiose praises of Stalin, limited only by the level of oratorical skills, which poured from the lips of famous oppositionists as well as those Politburo members whom A. Rybakov—with hardly any justification—tries to present as opponents of this glorification, and finally, to the praises which came from all the other most influential political leaders of the epoch.

Nevertheless, we must note that in 1934 this cult had still in no way yet reached its apogee, so to speak. At this same 17th Congress there was probably only one speech which presented a sort of breakthrough into the near future, when Stalin arose in the image of a demigod, if we can use the polysemantic expression of Dostoyevskiy. This was not the speech of Beria, Yezhov, Zhdanov, Poskrebyshv and so forth, whom A. Rybakov presents as the Stalin's main apprentices in the matter of creating the cult.

In her speech to the Congress, Dolores Ibarruri, the legendary *Passionariya*, pronounced Stalin to be "the beloved and steadfast, steel and genial Bolshevik, your leader and ours, the great leader of the proletariat and workers of all countries, and the nationalities of the entire world! (Applause, shouts of 'Hurrah!'. The entire audience rose to their feet. Applause turns to ovations)."

It is impossible to assume that the pathos of Dolores Ibarruri was suggested to her through any intrigues on Stalin's part. It is impossible, specifically, because the most influential writers of Europe at that time were also imbued with this pathos—Henri Barbus, Romain Rolland, Leon Feichtvanger, Paul Eluard, Jean-Richard Bloch, Luis Aragon, and many others, not to mention the numerous foremost leaders of the world revolutionary movement of that time.

Rolland's open letter to Stalin which appeared in 1935 or Barbus's book, "Stalin," were totally incompatible in their meaning with the brochure by Beria which came out at that same time.

I hope it is clear that we are referring not to individual "inaccuracies" in the novel by A. Rybakov, but to the general understanding of the epoch. The cult of Stalin was certainly not the result of the intrigues by him and some of his doubtful accomplices. It was a worldwide phenomenon in the direct sense of the word, which occurred everywhere from Madrid to Shanghai.

Certainly, that which was called the "cult of Stalin" could by no means be reduced to the individual actions of one person or group of people. The idea of the cult, once it took hold of the masses, as they say, became a mighty material force. It was truly this very force which acted in history, and not an individual person whose diverse "complexes" A. Rybakov describes with such fascination.

We know that for almost a quarter of a century, all the victories and achievements were ascribed specifically to this man. Yet now A. Rybakov, as if eternally mesmerized by this "conception" (which, aside from all else, is extremely naive), in essence remains entirely true to it. He merely changes a plus to a minus, so to speak, and is trying to explain through Stalin's personality not all the victories and achievements, but rather all the defeats and misfortunes. However, our understanding of history is in no way heightened by this change of signs.

In fact, the "cult of Stalin" is a huge phenomenon in Soviet and even in world history.

In 1934, I repeat, this phenomenon had not yet taken on all of its might and scope. It was very characteristic that at the 1st Congress of Soviet Writers, which was held 6 months after the 17th Party Congress, the praises to Stalin resounded not quite so frequently and were not so unrestrained. It is true that here too there was one appeal to the writers which was far ahead of its time:

"The style of the Bolshevik epoch is in its courage and in its restraint. It is full of fire, passion, force and mirth. What can we learn from?... Look how Stalin forges his speech, how well his few words are forged, what strength they have. I am not saying that everyone should write like Stalin, but we do have to work on the word like Stalin does."

These were the words of a writer who had an all-European reputation as a master of the highest degree, the international headmaster of style, so to speak—I. E. Babel. And from these words of Babel one could go on without any obstacles to proclaiming Stalin not only a political leader of genial proportion, but also a great philosopher, historian, economist, linguist, aesthetic, etc.

By analyzing the behavior of certain people who participated in the creation of the cult of Stalin, we can in all probability prove that some of them performed their deeds by reason of shortsightedness, some—out of motivations of self-interest, some were in a state of unexplained hypnosis, etc. etc. Yet from the standpoint of history all of this is ultimately not that important.

Almost 100 years ago, F. Engels formulated the following words quite simply and yet most convincingly: "...History is made in such a way that the end result always occurs from the collision of many individual wills... There is an endless number of intersecting forces... and

from this intersection there emerges one general result... This historical result may, again, be viewed as the product of one force, acting as a whole."¹ There can be no doubt that the promotion of Stalin to the rank of a demigod was the result of the action of such a singular force, powerful and worldwide in its scope, and not the result of the machinations of the "Stalinist" grouping.

By the way, the discussion of Engels which we quoted would be incorrect to view as something specifically Marxist. It represents a condensed generalization of the concept of the course of history which was developed by all the serious philosophers and historians from the end of the 18th century (when the self-consciousness of mankind began to be permeated with true historical method) to the end of the 19th century. As V. I. Lenin affirmed, "Marxism has certainly not cast aside the most valuable achievements of the bourgeois epoch, but on the contrary has assimilated and reworked everything that was valuable."²

F. Engels, returning later to a discussion of the fact that many individual wills "intersect," and therefore in history "it is necessity which reigns, with chance being its supplement and form," came to the following conclusion: "The fact that Napoleon, specifically this Corsican, was that military dictator who became *necessary* (italics mine—V.K.) to the war-weary French republic—that was chance. If there had been no Napoleon, his role would have been fulfilled by someone else."³

All this is entirely true also for the phenomenon of Stalin (we are speaking in this case not of some "similarity" between Napoleon and Stalin,⁴ but of the necessity of their emergence). And, by depicting the creation of the Stalinist cult as some result of intrigues and machinations by Stalin himself and by his self-seeking accomplices, A. Rybakov, in essence, rejects that notion of the course of history which had already been strongly affirmed a century before.

Therefore, the narrative about historical figures in "Children of the Arbat" is often reminiscent, pardon me, of the novels of Dumas, where the entire movement of history is determined by purely individual desires and actions of certain main characters. Thus, the talks of Stalin with Yagoda and Yezhov depicted in the novel are suspiciously similar to the unforgettable conversations between Cardinal Richelieu and Milady in the "Three Musketeers..."

I fully admit that conversations similar to those which A. Rybakov depicts might have taken place. However, it was certainly not in them that real historical movement took place. If the powerful world force had not made Stalin a demigod, no back-stage intrigues of his could have created, for example, the situation in 1937.

We may rightly say that Stalin did not justify the hopes laid upon him by those who glorified him. But this is the natural course of history, clearly understood already in

the last century. Previously we presented the appropriate reasoning of Engels, but now it is fitting to remember its concluding point. Having told of the "intersection" of individual human wills in history, Engels summarized: "That which one person wants finds opposition on the part of every other, and in the final result there emerges *something that no one wanted*"⁵ (italics mine—V. K.).

It is in just this manner that we should understand the wave of repressions of 1937-1938 which crashed down largely on the very people who had created the cult of Stalin. (Among the victims, we might add, were very many foreign revolutionary leaders who for various reasons found themselves in the USSR.)

In short, 1937 (like the phenomenon of Stalin in general) was a phenomenon of world history, or at least of the world revolutionary movement, and not the result of the intrigues of some pernicious group.

Yet the novel by A. Rybakov does not contain even a hint of this true meaning of events. It is quite probable that in the 30's the real "children of the Arbat" recognized what was happening in just the same way as the author of the novel. But this, in the words of one of the novel's readers, is a "childish-Arbat" notion of history and is suitable only in a book intended for children's reading...

3

The main ambition of today's fighters for "truth"—including the author of the novel, "Children of the Arbat"—is to tell as decisively and exhaustively as possible about the terrible sacrifices in the second half of the 30's. Here are Stalin's reflections (in 1934) as presented in the novel:

"We need innumerable material and human sacrifices... We must force the people to agree to them... If several million people perish in the process, history will forgive Comrade Stalin for this."

The unprepared reader, naturally, will understand the writer to mean that the count of sacrifices must begin from the year 1934 or even later. However, this concept in no way corresponds to reality.

On 29 July 1918, when only a little over half a year had passed since the beginning of the revolution, V. I. Lenin published the article entitled "Prophetic Words," which in itself was truly prophetic. Every phrase of the article was unusually significant.

Lenin wrote that "the revolution should be compared with the act of childbirth.... The birth of an individual is associated with such an act which turns a woman into a tormented, exhausted, bloody, half-dead piece of meat crazed with pain...."

"Marx and Engels, the founders of scientific socialism, always spoke of the long torments of birth, which were inevitably associated with the transition from capitalism to socialism... The difficult acts of giving birth increase the danger of a deadly illness or lethal outcome many times over....

"The particularly difficult torments of the initial period of the act of childbirth...are now befalling our country."⁶

These are truly prophetic words, predicting with merciless directness the long years of "torments of childbirth." We cannot help but note, however, that today there are many writers who in essence are prepared to argue Lenin's thought on the "particularly difficult torments" of the first years of the revolution. These writers believe that the year 1937 was the most torturous. However, such an understanding is determined either by their lack of information, or by their strictly tendentious approach to the matter, their adherence to the purely subjective "truth" rather than to the absolute truth.

In speaking about the "danger of a lethal outcome" and the "particularly difficult torments of the initial period," Lenin, who had performed an in-depth study of the experience of preceding revolutions, turned out to be wholly and entirely correct. We might add that his correctness became totally apparent only in our time, when historians and demographers determined with a high degree of accuracy the volume of the harsh losses during the initial period of the revolution.

Let us cite at least the following studies: V. P. Danilov, "Dynamics of the USSR Population for 1917-1929" (1970); B. Ts. Ulanis, "Dynamics of the USSR Birth Rate in the Years of Soviet Rule" (1977); Yu. A. Polyakov and I. N. Kiselev, "Figures and National Composition of the USSR Population in 1917" (1980).

Quite recently (30 September 1987), LITERATUR-NAYA GAZETA published a dialogue between a historian and a literary specialist—Yu. A. Polyakov and F. F. Kuznetsov. The latter said the following to his fellow conversationalist: "Let us think...about the figures which you cite in your book, 'The Soviet State After the End of the Civil War: Territory and Population.' The country's population had declined by 13 million by 1923, and if we consider the drop in the birth rate we experienced a decline....of probably more than 25 million people."

The latter conclusion is inaccurate. It would be correct only if in 1918-1922 there had been no births at all. Only under this condition would each death reduce the overall population number. However, this is far from being so. The work of B. Ts. Ulanis mentioned above demonstrates that in 1918-1922 the birth rate was quite high (from 31 to 37 children per year per 1,000 population—i.e., 1.5 times higher than during our time, in the years 1970-1980!). It is true that the infant mortality rate was also high at that time. Yet one way or another, the All-Union General Census of 1926 showed that there

were around 16 million children in the country who had been born in the years 1918-1922. (We will remember that the soldiers born specifically during those years subsequently bore the main brunt of the start of the Patriotic War).

Therefore, it is incorrect to assume that in 1918-1922 "only" 13 million people perished, while the "rest" (F. Kuznetsov is referring to over 12 million) did not perish, but simply never came into this world... Thus, the human losses were in fact exceptionally great.

Well, the reader might say, there was a bloody war going on in the country. However, a careful study of the problem has shown that the crux of the matter was not the war as such. "Army losses in the Civil War," wrote V. P. Danilov, "were relatively small. According to the calculations of B. Ts. Ulanis they comprised 800,000 persons, including 300,000 killed, 50,000 who died of wounds, and 450,000 who died of illness."⁷

"The losses to the civilian population were more significant (or rather, much more significant—V.K.)."

Our literature and cinema all too often depict the beginning of the 20's in a sort of operatic, or even musical comedy, style. Yet in A. I. Mikoyan's memoirs, "At the Start of the Twenties," he tells about coming to Rostov-on-Don in June of 1922, i.e., a little over 2 years after the conclusion of combat action in this region. "My general impression of the center of Rostov at that time was rather grim....Here and there one could see corpses right on the streets....I was amazed at how people calmly walked past them. Evidently this had already become a common sight for them."

Today it has been determined with a high degree of accuracy that the population of the country (taken in its post-revolutionary boundaries) comprised 139.3 million people at the start of 1914, 147.6 million in the fall of 1917, and 132.5 million in mid-1922 (cf. works of V. P. Danilov and Yu. A. Polyakov). Thus, in 1914-1917 the population, despite the rather heavy losses in the World War, had nevertheless increased by 8.3 million people, while in 1918-1922 it had declined by 15.1 million people (of whom about 2 million had emigrated). Knowing this, we can clearly understand the deep truth in the reflections of V. I. Lenin which we have just quoted about the "particularly difficult torments of the initial period" of the birth of a new society.

Lenin was able to foresee this, I repeat, because he had an excellent knowledge of the history of preceding revolutions (we will speak of this later).

However, one other important question inevitably arises: who was it that perished in the years 1918-1922? We cannot deny that some will think that we are speaking here primarily of the representatives of the exploiting classes. However, the work by B. Ts. Ulanis entitled "USSR Population Over 50 Years" (1970) shows that on

the eve of the revolution, only 4 million people belonged to the exploiting classes. These included the highest ranks of the bureaucrats (and their families). We might add that they comprised the largest portion of the 2 million emigres.

So, who was it that perished? Recently the famous sculptor V. Lempert published an article in which he talks, specifically, about the portrait of Bagritskiy which he had created earlier. He writes that at one time "everything was clear to us: if a muzhik [peasant] does not give up his bread to the food collection detachment—put him up against the wall, as in Bagritskiy:

Along the ravines and along the slopes The kogan roams like a wolf. He pokes his nose into the cottages Which are the cleanest! He looks to the left, he looks to the right, He growls angrily: "Drag out of the ditch The riches that you have hidden!" Well, and whoever kicks up a fuss— Quiet, brother: Or you'll go face-down in the rubbish heap, Shot, and that's the end. The chernoziem runs in a swamp Of blood and sweat...

Would the peasant Opanas have agreed to murder and banditism," asks V. Lempert, "if they did not take away from him, for nothing, the bread which he had sown and suffered for, and, you will note, for reasons which were absolutely incomprehensible to him?"

"Maybe it was that kind of time? Whatever the time, I am amazed by the delusion of the poet."

That which today is evaluated as "delusion" for many years was the irrefutable "truth" for most writers. In 1926, the poet Nikolay Ushakov wrote about the peasant or, as he called it, the "kulak" revolt in Vyatsk Province, where an "army" of rebels had gathered in a clearing called Popov clearing. With rapture which is difficult to understand today, Nikolay Ushakov writes:

But only the three-inch shells fell like hail Over the villages toward evening. The kulak army For four days Crossed themselves in Popov clearing.

Here one really cannot help but be amazed at the author's joyful satisfaction evoked by the fact that a cast-iron hail of shrapnel crashed down on the straw roofs of the villages, and "toward evening" at that, when the families had gathered under these roofs (while the "kulak army" itself was, after all, in the middle of the forest...).

We cannot overlook the fact that the problem of the "kulak" was exceptionally complex.

In the initial period of dispossession of the kulaks, it is stated in the collective work, "Collectivization of Agriculture in the USSR: Means, Forms, Achievements" (1982), from the beginning of 1930 to the summer of that year, "the overall number of expropriated kulak

farms....comprised over 320,000. The sum of their confiscated property exceeded 400 million rubles." We are speaking of houses, household goods, cattle, etc. And then it turns out that the average value of all this property owned by one kulak family comprised around 1,250 rubles—i.e., merely the annual salary of a skilled worker at that time....

It is difficult to understand today why many writers of the 20's and 30's saw these people as some kind of monsters and considered it quite all right to fire three-inch shells at their villages...

The main thing here is not even the use of rifles or artillery against people who did not want, for example, to give up their bread. Ultimately, only a serious and in-depth study of the specific circumstances can answer the question of whether any such occurrences were an expression of absolute need or the result of irresponsible tyranny. The main point lies elsewhere—in the very understanding and evaluation of such occurrences by the writers. Here, it seems to me, there can be no doubts.

As regrettable as it may be, very many popular writers had a very calm or even complacent attitude toward the fact that in the first years of the revolution, the country, if we use the words of Lenin presented above, was "tormented, exhausted, mad with pain, bloody, and half-dead...."

Of course, there were also other writers who with all their being experienced and recreated the immeasurable tragedy of those years. Among them were Prishvin, Yesenin, Neverov, Bulgakov, Sholokhov, and Platonov. However, for most of those who actively spoke out in the literature of the 20's and 30's, the real tragedy occurred only in 1937, when a sort of chain reaction of destruction got down to them and to their blood kin....

It is this subjective "truth," in essence, which reigns in literature even today. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the losses of the first revolutionary years were immeasurably more significant than the sacrifices of the second half of the 1930's.

The epoch of the 30's has not yet been studied as thoroughly as the earlier periods. Specifically, reliable data on the population numbers are available only for the beginning of 1929, and, further, for the beginning of 1939. The figures relating to the years in between have practically not been published. However, even those figures which we have at our disposal give a completely clear picture. While in 1918-1922 the population had declined by some 15-odd million, from 1929 through 1939 it had, on the contrary, increased by 17 million. This is in spite of the fact that the birth rate in the 30's was, on the whole, no higher than in the years 1918-1922. (This is shown in the above-mentioned study by B. Ts. Uralnis on the dynamics of the birth rate). We might add that this reduction as well as this growth began from a similar level: In late 1917 the country's

population comprised 146.7 million, while in late 1928 it was 153.4 million people. By January of 1939 the population had grown to 170.5 million.[8] Of course, the growth could have been much more significant. However, the main losses occurred, without a doubt, not in the years 1937-1938, but in 1933 (i.e., even before the year 1934, from which A. Rybakov considers it necessary to keep a count of the victims).

What happened in 1933? This question is illuminated to some degree in the already quoted work, "Collectivization of Agriculture in the USSR." It tells, specifically, about the actions of Ya. Yakovlev, who simultaneously held three important posts starting in 1929: Chairman of the Commission on Collectivization under the Politburo, People's Commissar of Agriculture, and finally, chairman of the All-Union Council of Agricultural Collectives ("Kolkhoztsestr"). This work reports that in 1931 "vast agricultural zones of the Povolzhye, Urals, Western Siberia, and Kazakhstan were afflicted with a terrible drought....As a result, part of the kolkhozes....were forced to give up for state procurement not only commercial grain, but partially also seeds and fodder." Therefore, the next year, 1932, "in the major grain-growing regions of the country....bread procurement encountered great difficulties....In order to change this situation, the most decisive intervention was required....All efforts were changed over to procurement. A blow was dealt to counterrevolutionaries, kulaks and saboteurs. By the end of 1932 the fulfillment....was proceeding more quickly."

The results of this "intervention" and "blow" were clearly depicted by Mikhail Alekseyev, who recreated the life of a village on the Volga in his novel "Bullies." All of the grain was taken, and three-quarters of the villagers died of starvation....

The following figures testify most clearly to the terrible sacrifices (please forgive me for their abundance, but it is unavoidable in this case). During the years 1929-1938 the country's population increased by almost 11 percent on the whole. However, in the grain-growing regions things were quite different. Thus, in the Ukraine and in Kazakhstan the population declined during these years.... And, of course, the situation was the same on the Don, in the North Caucasuses, and in the Povolzhye region. At the same time, for example in Azerbaijan or Georgia, which were not very important from the standpoint of grain production, the population increased significantly during these years.⁹

We may raise the objection that we are speaking here of regions with a high birth rate. However, even in Belorussia, which unlike its neighboring Ukraine, was not of primary importance as a grain supplier, the population increased by almost 12 percent during the years 1927-1938.

All this proves that the heaviest human losses in the 30's occurred in 1933. According to the estimates published in 1933, whose results we have no serious reasons to doubt, the country's population on 1 January 1933 comprised 165,748,000 people. Then, up until 1939, i.e., for 6 years, the statistical agencies did not publish any information on the population figures. However, as we know, the all-union general census was conducted on 1-6 January 1937. It showed that in 4 years the population had not only failed to increase, but had declined to 163,800,000 people. (This census result was published only in the 1960's. In 1937 it was merely announced that the results of the census were "defective").

Although this may seem incredible, the decline in population is determined almost exclusively by the tragedy of 1933. According to the computations of B. Ts. Uralan presented in his work, "Problems of USSR Population Dynamics" (1974), already by April of 1933 the population had declined to 158 million people, and this terrible drop was not compensated even by the beginning of 1937.

The human losses of 1937-1938 are in no way comparable to the losses of 1933, which were immeasurably more terrible. It took almost 5 years to replenish them (we must remember that the restoration of population numbers after the Great Patriotic War took 9 years).

4

The question naturally arises, why are today's fighters for "truth" worried almost exclusively about the losses of 1937-1938, rather than about the much greater losses of the preceding periods? As I will try to prove, this is explained by a peculiar "intellectual" (in fact, pseudo-intellectual) approach to the problem.

In his time, Anatoliy Lanshchikov published a wonderful treatise about one of V. Travinskiy's essays which appeared in 1967 in ZNAMYA.

"The author of the essay," wrote the critic, "in all seriousness proposed transferring all the agriculture of the Russian Republic to Kamchatka (natural hot springs have been discovered there which could be used to build extensive, gigantic hothouses). I will not try to criticize these fantasies from the standpoint of their feasibility, economic expediency and strategic wisdom. I am interested now in something else—people....Here is how [the author] proposes to decide their fate: '...19 million kolkhoz farmers and 7 million sovkhov workers who participated in agricultural work in 1964 would this very moment find application in the industry of Siberia and the Far East. They need only be supplied with shelter and food.' This is said very precisely: not 'houses' but 'shelter.' Travinskiy believes that you need give a peasant merely a ration and a roof, and you can herd him around the whole wide world... Just imagine," concluded Anatoliy Lanshchikov, "that someone wrote an essay in which he proposed relocating not the peasantry,

but....the intelligentsia to Siberia and the Far East, supplying them with food and shelter. There would have been such analogs and such subtext....God help us!"

As sad as it may seem, this type of sharp delineation of the intelligentsia and the rest of the mortals defines the ideology of very many writers. For a quarter of a century I have not been able to forget the indignation which a discussion published by V. Lakshin aroused in me. In speaking of an innocent peasant who had been unjustly imprisoned, he lamented: "Involuntarily (yes, involuntarily—that is the set of his mind!—V.K.) you start to think about how he would be needed, simply necessary, in his village, in the kolkhoz, where after the war the men were so few. How he would have helped the peasant women pull the kolkhoz through with his conscientiousness and his knack for work."

This purely functional-pragmatic approach to people who do not belong to the intelligentsia is characteristic, of course, not only for this little-known journalist V. Travinskiy and today's widely known television commentator V. Lakshin. They simply expressed openly that which defines the consciousness of very many writers.

I used the definition "intellectual" above. Yet in fact we are speaking, of course, of the pseudo-intellectual consciousness. Sergey Averintsev recently said quite correctly on the pages of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA:

"Today, as always, the task of the intellectual is to worry not about whether others understand him, but about whether he understands others. This must be his concern. It is unrealistic to expect that all problems will be equally close to him: one has one kind of experience, another—another. Yet he dares not ignore in his thought the complexity of the whole and his own responsibility to this whole."

This is entirely correct. Peasants or workers engaged in their labor by this very fact alone are fulfilling their civil duty, which has necessary and general importance. They, if you will, have the right not to think about the "whole," since this whole depends specifically on them. However, the intellectual who does not have the life of the people as a whole constantly in his view is thereby not fulfilling his specific, personal duty.

To this we must add that the intelligentsia is not, so to speak, the sole bearer of culture. There is a specific folk culture, which has its own irreplaceable value. In the quoted article, Sergey Averintsev says with some irony: "I simply cannot imagine what criteria could be used to compare the 'cultural level' of a bearer of ancient folk culture, often completely illiterate, yet knowing how to compose a song and capable of real work of thought—and a junior or even a senior scientific associate who knows an abundance of information...."

An "intellectual" who is convinced of the "supremacy" of those like him, but who sees in a peasant and a worker only a force capable of "pulling" a kolkhoz or a plant, has no right to call himself an intellectual. He in fact belongs to the society which Mikhail Lobanov 20 years ago so aptly defined as the "enlightened petty bourgeoisie." And how significant it is that that article by Lobanov evoked such rabid attacks!

The inability to think about the "whole" and to feel total responsibility before this whole is what leads to focusing all of our attention on 1937.

This is expressed often in a most remarkable "blindness." The writer Yuriy Trifonov published the book, "Reflection of the Bonfire," which told about his father, V. A. Trifonov, who was repressed in 1937. He quoted two documents composed by his father, who at that time held an official position on the Don. The first of these, which is dated 10 June 1919, states: "We must firmly and definitely reject the policy of repression in regard to the Cossacks in general. However, this should not hinder the strict and merciless persecution of all counterrevolutionaries in a judicial order."

The second document, written a year later on 20 July 1920, sounds entirely different: "Those stanitsas, khutors, and population centers which give aid or shelter to traitors and betrayers of the workers' cause will be....mercilessly destroyed." Below he adds: "to their (the stanitsas and khutors—V. K.) complete destruction." Yu. Trifonov wrote about this: "This grave document, so different from the speech....written a year before, bespeaks not the fact that the point of view had changed, but rather the fact that the time had changed. Truly, those who now took up arms against Soviet authority were not deluded, but rather were inveterate enemies." Let us assume that this was really so. The main thing, however, is not this. It is something else which is utterly amazing: Yu. Trifonov was in no way upset by his father's statement that a stanitsa, khutor or populated area where, say, one "traitor" or "betrayer" was found would be doomed to complete destruction and annihilation....

Very many people died in 1937, as we know, merely because there turned out to be some "traitor" or "betrayer" in their midst. I. Yu. Trifonov and others who wrote about this year expressed extreme indignation at such a turn of events. However, as strange as it may seem, in quoting and commenting on his father's "Don" documents, the writer did not say a word about this undoubtedly most acute and tragic aspect of the problem. In this case the writer simply does not notice this aspect of the matter. He does not even see it at point-blank range, as they say, since the question deals with the population of some stanitsas, rather than with the residents of a house on the sea-front, or on Granovskiy Street or the Arbat....

In order to avoid any misunderstandings, I will note that, in formal language, "I personally" was certainly not born in a stanitsa, but on the Arbat, and my family paid its tribute to '37. My mother's oldest brother, S. V. Puzitskiy, a jurist who became one of the leaders of the USSR counterintelligence service and earned two Orders of the Red Banner and three badges of honor, was shot. (Today he is the leading character in several books and films). My mother's uncle, a delegate to the Second Congress of Soviets, a member of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council, later its first plenipotentiary representative in Turkey, a member of the Narkomindel, and member of the National Economic Supreme Soviet Presidium since 1927, was forced to leave the political stage at the height of his career, and only by some miracle remained alive. (After 1956 he published two books of memoirs). My father's youngest sister, Z. F. Kozhinova, a physician, was the assistant to the famous therapist D. D. Pletnev, who was sentenced in 1938 to 30 years of imprisonment for "killing" Gorky, Kuybyshev, and others. She was banished from the clinic, travelled throughout the country, and finally by her own will enlisted as a camp doctor in Vorkuta....

However, I do not consider it permissible to somehow isolate the fates of people who are near to me by blood or by deed (I am referring to writers and intellectuals in general) from the general tragic fate of the people.

I must admit that I am deeply indignant at the following reasoning of I. Erenburg in his well-known memoirs, "People, Years, Life":

"In 1934, after 'The Days of the Second,' my name was on the red board, and no one bothered me. In general, it was a good time, and we all thought that in 1937, when in accordance with the charter the Second Congress of Writers was to meet, we would have paradise" (italics mine—V. K.).

Thus, since I and all the people close to me live well, that means "in general it is a good time." Such a perception of the world, in my understanding, is unforgivable either for a writer, or for a real intellectual of any profession.

However, let us return to "Children of the Arbat." It would seem we should be happy that in A. Rybakov's novel this same 1934 is far from being depicted as a "good" time. The author seems to have been able to overcome the strange "blindness" of I. Erenburg. However, in fact everything is much more complex.

The basis for "Children of the Arbat" is a certain "conception" that is able to evoke indignation in an even greater degree than the unique "group egoism" which is exposed in the quote presented from I. Erenburg....

5

The "conception" of which we speak is not obvious, but does play a determining role in A. Rybakov's novel. It is most clearly exposed in the juxtaposition of "European" and "Asiatic" directions which pass through the novel.

This theme is most often present in the internal monologues of Stalin, who presents the question in such a way: Lenin "wanted to rule Russia by European methods, but in HIM, in Stalin, he saw an Asian." Or, in another place in the novel Stalin thinks about Kirov: "He is oriented not toward the East, but toward the West. This too he picked up from his Petersburg acquaintances. After all, they consider themselves Europeans." Yet even in the author's text Stalin is referred to, for example, as "an implacable *Asian* god" (italics mine—V.K.).

We must say that in our time the juxtaposition of Europe and Asia, which had certain foundations in the past, sounds strange. After all, it was Europe that in the 20th Century created fascist dictatorships in Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Or, maybe Rybakov believes that these phenomena too were exported to Europe from Asia?

However, the interpretation of the very phenomenon of Stalin as being "Asiatic" is only the external layer of the novel's meaning. In a more careful, indirect form the novel imposes the thought that Stalin is, so to speak, a specifically Russian phenomenon. Before Stalin affirmed his cult, the country, supposedly, was ruled by people of a "European" mentality, and all was well. Then Stalin, they say, placed the country on the "Russian" path, and everything became bad. This "idea" is, I repeat, not definitely or clearly expressed in the novel. Nevertheless, it runs through the entire narrative at every convenient turn. In the novel Stalin constantly discourses on Russian history, on Moscow, on the uniqueness of the people's spirit, etc.

Thus, Stalin has turned toward a "Russian" course (instead of a "European" one). This is where the monstrous violence leading to countless victims springs from. The names of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great come up in the novel. They, we might say, served as "examples" for Stalin—naturally, specifically "Russian" examples.

What can we say about this? First of all, it is not difficult to discern the clumsy paradox in the very reference to the figure of Peter the Great. After all, Peter was wholly oriented specifically toward Europe, and many of his closest inspirers and associates were from the West by birth. The overwhelming majority of those executed under Peter were the 1182 Strelets mutineers, and it was the Scotsman, General Patrick Gordon, who directed their executions. In a word, it is hardly possible to see in Peter an example of a specifically "Russian" (or "Asiatic") leader.

As for Ivan the Terrible, the abundance of executions under his rule is explained certainly not by his "Russianness," but by the fact that he ruled in the 16th Century. Present-day historians A. A. Zimin and A. L. Khoroshkevich correctly say in their book, "Russia in the Time of Ivan the Terrible" (1982): "Ivan IV was the son....of a stern age.... The Swedish King Erik XIV besmirched his name with no fewer killings than Ivan the Terrible. The French King Karl IX himself participated in the merciless slaughter of Protestants on the Night of Bartholomew, 24 August 1572, when a good half of the high-born French nobility was destroyed. The Spanish King Phillip II....enjoyed his presence at the endless auto-da-fe¹⁰ on the squares of Valyadolid.... The price which Russia paid for the elimination of political dissent *did not surpass* the sacrifices of other peoples of Europe placed on the altar of centralization. The first steps of the absolute monarchy in the countries of Europe were accompanied by torrents of the blood of the subjects...."(italics mine—V.K.)

However, the term "did not surpass" is rather imprecise. One of the most serious researchers of Russian history of the 16th-early 17th centuries, R. G. Skrynnikov, proved in his book, "Ivan the Terrible" (1975), that under this czar "around 3,000-4,000 people were killed." At the same time, it has long been established that in England during that same age 72,000 people were executed under Henry VIII, and over 89,000 under Elizabeth. About the same number of "people of different mind" were destroyed by their contemporaries, the Spanish Kings Karl V and Phillip II.

Yet, probably something else is much more important. In Russia there was never a "cult" of Ivan the Terrible. It is true that certain foremost leaders valued him, but these were (here is a surprise for the "idea" of A. Rybakov!) people who were of a "western," "European" spirit. They saw Ivan the Terrible as a direct predecessor of Peter the Great, though with hardly any justification, and therefore considered it necessary to justify or even to glorify him. Thus, for example, high evaluations of Ivan the Terrible's actions are found in the writings of Chaadayev, Belinskiy, Gertsen, etc. Belinskiy even wrote about Ivan IV: "This was Peter the Great who did not appear in time...." Ivan the Terrible could not become Peter, assumed Belinskiy, since for this "there were insurmountable obstacles consisting as much of the alienation of Russia from Europe as of the chaotic state of Europe itself." (This correlation of Ivan IV with Europe is rather ambiguous.) However, as Belinskiy concluded already at the end of his life, in 1847, Ivan the Terrible "nevertheless did his deed....and much of the groundwork was already laid for the reforms of Peter the Great."

Aleksandr Gertsen wrote in his well-known book, "On the Development of Revolutionary Ideas in Russia":

"Ivan the Terrible dared to call the communal institutions to his aid. He introduced corrections into his code of law in the spirit of the ancient liberties. He granted the

collection of tribute and all local government to elected officials....He even wanted to eliminate the duties of viceregent in the oblasts, granting the latter self-government....However....his ideas met with opposition. Driven by desperation to madness, full of hatred and disgust, Ivan increased the executions....'I am not a Russian, I am a German,' he once said to his jeweler, a foreigner by birth."

However, as we have already said, most of the Russian thinkers, historians and artists—particularly those of a "Slavophile" mentality—certainly did not share these notions about Ivan IV. It is enough to recall that on the monument to the "Millennium of Russia" erected in 1862, Ivan the Terrible's name is not among the 109 foremost Russian leading figures!

Unlike England, where the persons of Henry VIII and Elizabeth were highly glorified, or Spain, which reverentially honors the memory of Karl V who sent tens of thousands of people to their execution, in Russia the praises addressed to Ivan IV were always somehow doubtful.

This is why it is absurd and, bluntly speaking, unfair, to try to interpret the harshness of Ivan the Terrible as something that was characteristically "Russian."

Finally, we must note one other very important aspect of the matter. In order to find any "predecessors" of Stalin in Russia we must, as we can see, go back three or even four or more centuries. This is entirely regular, since during the 18-19th centuries Russia was truly a unique country as compared with Western Europe. In 175 years, only 56 people were executed for political crimes (6 Pugachev followers, 5 Decembrists, 31 terrorists from the time of Alexander II, and 14 terrorists from the time of Alexander III). During this same time there were many tens of thousands of political executions in Western Europe. (Thus, in only 5 days in June of 1848 there were 11,000 people executed in Paris, which a witness to these events, Herzen, describes with horror. Within several days in May of 1871—over 30,000 people were executed.)

Nothing like this ever happened in Russia. Here is a fact which is characteristic in the highest degree: in the report of Adjutant-General Golenishev-Kutuzov to Nicholas I about the execution of the 5 Decembrists, it was stated that "due to the inexperience of our executioners and lack of skill in setting up the gallows, on the first try, three of the prisoners, specifically Ryleyev, Kakhovskiy and Muravyev, fell to the ground...." Yet during this time any large city in Western Europe always had a trained professional executioner.

The only period when there were many political executions, although still much fewer than in Europe, was during the epoch of the revolution of 1905-1907, and somewhat also in the subsequent years, 1908-1910 (since

the revolutionary actions as well as the judicial investigations on the case of those previously arrested were still in progress). In the available statistics on executions, the crimes are divided into the following categories: state crimes; murders; brigandage; robbery; various military crimes, etc. Let us assume (as is usually done) that the courts also included specifically political crimes under concepts of "murder," "brigandry," etc. (and most of those prisoners sentenced for execution were classed in these categories). But even with this assumption, in the years 1905-1910 (i.e., in 6 years), only 3,151 people were executed—only 1/10 the number executed in May of 1871 in Paris....

We cannot help but notice that in the novel "Children of the Arbat" there is a scene which seems to directly disprove the "Russian" origin of Stalin's terror. In this scene, the author wanted to express another idea, but he unwittingly related something that openly contradicted the basic "directionality" of his novel.

Mark Ryazanov says to his indignant sister, the mother of Sasha Pankratov, who has been sent into exile:

"Let's be frank. In our time, 3 years of exile is a mere trifle....After all, they do execute people..."

The sister answers Ryazanov:

"So that's the way it is....they didn't shoot him....for poems published in a wall newspaper they didn't shoot him. For poems in the wall newspaper they only gave him 3 years of exile in Siberia—thank you very much! Three years, what is that, a trifle! They didn't give Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin more than 3 years in exile, and he organized armed uprisings, strikes, and demonstrations, published underground newspapers, travelled abroad illegally, and still—he only got 3 years. He escaped from exile, and they put him back for the same 3 years. Yet if Sasha were to escape now, they would give him 10 years of camps, at best...."

This correct information seems to irrefutably testify that Stalin had nothing to "learn" in Russia, and that the affirmation of the "Russian" origin of Stalin's harshness is totally unfounded.

6

The truly anecdotal "hatching" of Stalin from Ivan Grozny may somehow be forgiven to the transoceanic publicists who were molded in an atmosphere of various advertising myths. However, a writer who really takes on the task of understanding the phenomenon of Stalin should first of all think about the "long torments of childbirth" which are inevitably associated with the emergence of a new social order.

Instead of mentioning Ivan the Terrible in vain, we should turn to the history of the Great French Revolution, if you will, and remember that one of its great

inventions was the guillotine, which in a few years beheaded—in the name of the revolution—17,000 people. Among them were not only members of the royal family but also, for example, the leading scientist of that epoch Antoine Lavoisier and the great 18th century French poet Andre Chenier.

However, people perished then, of course, not only under the blade of the guillotine. Nevertheless, even these 17,000 people are a huge figure if we consider, first of all, the fact that the number of people living in France at that time was several times less than the present population and, secondly, that generally only the population of very few and very small cities (as compared to today's cities) directly participated in the revolution. Among those executed were almost all of the most important heroes of the revolution...

The author of one of the most in-depth works about the Great French Revolution, Alexis Tocqueville (1805-1859) whose name is listed today among the names of the greatest thinkers of the first half of the 19th Century, wrote: "The mighty generation which began the revolution was annihilated and weakened, as usually happens with any generation which undertakes such deeds." On the other hand, the revolution, maintained Tocqueville, "did not at all strive to forever introduce disorder, to make it permanent, to turn anarchy into the general rule, as one of the main enemies of the revolution said (referring, probably, to the extreme conservative Josef de Mestr—V.K.). On the contrary, it was concerned with *increasing the might and the rights of state power*" (italics mine—V.K.).

This grasps certain basic tendencies of the revolution, and only an utterly "childish Arbat" understanding of history could see the realization of these tendencies as the result of the insidious intrigues of some "bad men."

Moreover, the dissatisfaction with the "lawlessness" of certain actions is particularly naive. Revolution is always—at the first stage, which may last for quite a long time—the revocation of legality altogether. Instead of law, a revolutionary dictatorship is established. The "scientific concept of a dictatorship," wrote V. I. Lenin, "means nothing other than power which is not limited by anything, which is not hindered by any laws or any absolute regulations, and which directly rests on force."¹¹

Menzhinskiy, about whom A. Rybakov speaks with sympathy, wrote in his memoirs about his predecessor in the position of OGPU [Unified State Political Administration under the USSR Soviet of People's Commissars] Chairman Dzerzhinskiy: "Punishment, as such, he meted out in a principled manner, like a bourgeois approach. He viewed measures of repression *only as a means of struggle*, with everything being determined by the given political situation and prospects for the continued development of the revolution. The same counterrevolutionary act under one situation in the USSR

required, in his opinion, execution. Yet several months later he considered it a mistake to arrest a man for a similar deed" (*italics mine—V.K.*). Understandably, Menzhinskiy was his own ideal in such an approach to the matter.

In general, A. Rybakov simply could not have known all of this (to understand it is a different matter). The fact is that "lawlessness" disturbs him only in those cases when it bears unpleasant consequences for people with whom he sympathizes.

The deep essence of what is going on is generally not touched upon in A. Rybakov's novel—as in many other works on the same topic. The main thing is that the heroes of the epoch are absolutely convinced of their righteousness. The novel tells with triumphant pathos about one of the most positive heroes of "Children of the Arbat," Budyagin. It says that "he had the highest courage of a revolutionary. He took upon himself the responsibility of the fates of people who had been thrown into the crucible of social shock. Around him people, both guilty and *innocent*, were falling, but he believed that he was paving the way for a new generation" (*italics mine—V.K.*).

This "way" ceases to satisfy A. Rybakov only when the people dear to him, like Sasha Pankratov, begin to "fall." And so, he tries to explain all the misfortunes by the fact that "bad" people came to power through dark means—beginning with Stalin and ending with some Yuriy Sharokiy who is depicted in the novel.

We have already mentioned the fact that the all-people's and even the world-historical drama is substituted in the novel with the petty intrigues of scoundrels and worthless creatures. Undoubtedly, all kinds of "evil" people play their often grave role in history. However, only in children's stories is it appropriate to reduce history to this. The true tragedy of history, and particularly revolutionary history, consists of something entirely different.

Sholokhov in "Virgin Soil Uplifted" created the image of an absolutely unselfish servant of the revolution, Makar Nagulnov, who was incapable even of anger and revenge against Davydov, who runs off with Nagulnov's wife, Lushka. But here is what this Sholokhov hero shouts in 1930 to Andrey Razmetnov, who felt sorry for a family of dispossessed stanitsa dwellers:

"Vile creature! How do you serve the revolution? You feel ss-oo-ry? Why, if you lined up thousands of those vile old men, little children, women....and told me that they had to be shot....for the revolution....I would cut them all down....with a machine gun!"

The real tragedy of the revolution is in just such a consciousness and behavior of its heroes, and not in the dirty deeds of the smart dealers who hang on to it. This

is not easy to understand, much less to accept, but nevertheless the greatest and highest epochs in the history of mankind were also the epochs of the greatest sacrifices and losses....

The remarkable modern researcher in cultural history, A. F. Losev, says at the end of his treatise, "Aesthetic of the Renaissance" (1978): "The pile of corpses with which every Shakespearean tragedy ends is a horrible symbol....of the Renaissance."

To prove that Stalin was a bad man still does not mean to explain anything. As we have already said, the essence of the matter is that a powerful world force turned Stalin into a demigod, who could order anyone at all destroyed or sent off to camp. A. Rybakov tries to convince the readers that Stalin did such things because of his repulsive character. In this question, undoubtedly, I. Erenburg, for example, was more correct. We cannot argue that he was much more closely acquainted with the real occurrences during the epoch than A. Rybakov. In 1965 I. Erenburg wrote: "Evidently, Stalin considered himself a communist, student and successor of Lenin to the end of his life. Not only did he say, but he also thought, that he was leading the people to a high purpose, and to accomplish this he should not be squeamish about employing any means."

This explanation, of course, in no way "whitewashes" Stalin. "Not to be squeamish about employing any means" is a rather intolerable vice, and there is no doubt that our country's ethic tradition will never forgive Stalin—just as it did not forgive Ivan the Terrible.

Generally, in this case we are speaking not about how "bad" or "good" Stalin was, but about an understanding of the course of history. The "understanding" by which this course turns out to be dependent primarily on whether good or bad "men" hold power is in no way capable of bringing us closer to absolute truth.

7

It is well known that any depiction of life inevitably contains those of its aspects and traits which turn out to be in more or less decisive contradiction with the basic position of the one who is presenting the depiction. "Children of the Arbat" also contains such aspects and traits.

As we have already said, Stalin repeatedly discourses in the novel about the death of millions of people, but he adds that their death was inevitable and that "history will forgive him this." However, the author—most probably quite involuntarily—demonstrates, for example, the totally analogous conclusions of Kirov, who is presented in the novel as a highly positive hero. In August of 1934 Kirov reasons: "In 4 months the citizens of the USSR will be able to buy bread freely. This event proves the viability of the kolkhoz order created with incalculable losses, suffering and sacrifice." Here, looking at the

joyful, happy dentist Lipman, Kirov summarizes as follows: "The smile which he saw, the laughter which he heard, was a reward to him and to his party, justifying the firm, often stern decisions which he had to make."

Thus, Kirov, like Stalin, believes that the "incalculable sacrifices," which were the result of "stern decisions"—were "justified." At least those which had been made prior to August of 1934....

We also cannot overlook another important contradiction. The novel included many facts which proved that Stalin did not possess total power at the time when the events of "Children of the Arbat" were developing. It is true, the writer proclaims, for example, that beyond the window of Stalin's office already in 1934 there was "a country subject to his will." However, many of the realities in the novel decisively refute this affirmation.

Thus, Stalin speaks about Yezhov in the novel: "At the 17th Congress, HE (Stalin—V.K.) introduced him into the membership of the Central Committee—one of the few changes which he was able to accomplish at that time." As it turns out, Stalin could still not in any measure decide important questions individually. At that time, the Central Committee was made up of very many people whom A. Rybakov would hardly list as "Stalinists." Also, some of them (and this is especially indicative) became Central Committee members in 1934 for the first time (Litvinov, Yakir, Ikramov, and others). Krupskaya and Yenukidze (he was also elected to the Central Committee for the first time), who had so angered Stalin by their previously published memoirs, were also elected to the Central Committee.

Thus, in a country "subject to the will" of Stalin, it could not be that the membership of the Central Committee Politburo itself would include Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, Kuybyshev, and Kosior, whom Stalin, according to the novel, viewed with suspicion or even enmity. If we look at all the 14 Politburo members and candidate members at that time, it turns out that 8 of them—i.e., half—were clearly "unreliable."

Stalin's positions in the state apparatus were even weaker. The novel recounts that some of the most important people's commissariats in 1934 were certainly not headed by "Stalinists"—People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov and his deputy, Karakhan (although he is not mentioned in the novel), People's Commissar of Heavy Industry Ordzhonikidze and his deputies, Pyatakov and Rukhimovich, who is also not mentioned. We must name also the People's Commissar of Agriculture Yakovlev, who was in charge of collectivization, and the chief of the Red Army Political Administration Gamarnik.

Recognizing that such facts sharply contradict the thesis about the omnipotence of Stalin, the author of the novel decided at least to instill in the readers the concept of the "Stalinist" allegiance of People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs Yagoda. The novel states that it was Stalin himself who "stopped his selection with Yagoda...." Nevertheless, at one time "Sverdlov, whose niece was married to Yagoda, sent him....for rank-and-file work in the VChK....Dzerzhinskiy, who also disliked Yagoda, kept him in a secondary role—administrator of affairs....Menzhinskiy....was closer to him than Yagoda—a simple pharmacist from Nizhniy Novgorod."

We don't need a complex investigation to refute this. The volume of the Abridged Soviet Encyclopedia published in 1932 reads: "Yagoda, Genrikh Grigoryevich (b. 1891), an old Bolshevik....in 1904-1905 worked in the underground press. Ya. was a party member since 1907....A member of the VChK presidium since 1920. From 1924 he served as OGPU deputy chairman."¹²

Thus, already in 1920 Yagoda was not simply an "administrator of affairs," but a member of the highest organ of the VChK (which consisted of only a few people), while in 1924 Dzerzhinskiy appointed him his deputy (Menzhinskiy, Dzerzhinskiy's deputy since 1923, was 17 years older than Yagoda and became a revolutionary back in 1895; in 1924 he was appointed OGPU first deputy chairman). When Dzerzhinskiy died in July of 1926, Menzhinskiy took over his post, while Yagoda, naturally, became first deputy to the new OGPU chairman. After his death in 1934, Yagoda took his place. In short, the "information" given in "Children of the Arbat" is based on fabrication. It is enough to say that in 1929, when Stalin spoke out against Bukharin, Yagoda supported the latter....

Yagoda's leading associates—Roshal, Pauker, Main Administration of Correctional-Labor Camps Chief Berman, his deputies Rapoport and Firin, Belmorstroy Chief Kogan, and others were not "Stalin's men."

But when Stalin really became a "demigod," almost the entire make-up of the NKVD was replaced (from Yagoda's circle, only the close friend of Lily Brik, Agranov and Zakovskiy continued to work with Yezhov).

As we can imagine, we can more or less precisely point out the "boundary" from which Stalin's omnipotence begins. In 1935, Zinovyev and Kameney were sentenced to only 5 years of imprisonment for being accused of "participating in the murder of Kirov." In 1936, however, the case was reviewed, and they were sentenced to be shot. And the "stern decisions" which were made prior to this moment can in no way be unconditionally associated with the name of Stalin. I will note once again that we are speaking not of "whitewashing" Stalin (there was more than enough in his own "decisions"), but of a correct understanding of the epoch.

The head of collectivization Yakovlev played a very great role in the events taking place during the first half of the 30's. However, nothing is said about him in "Children of the Arbat"—this is hardly an accident. It is

worth quoting the article about him in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, from which it is quite clear that Yakovlev was not a "protegee" of Stalin: "Yakovlev (pseudonym; real name Epshteyn), Yakov Arkadyevich (1896-1938)....member of the communist party since 1913....In 1918-1920 was a member of the Ukrainian KPb Central Committee Politburo....from 1921 performed high-level party work in Moscow.¹³ From 1926 he was Deputy People's Commissar of the Worker-Peasant Inspection. In 1929-34 he served as USSR People's Commissar of Agriculture and simultaneously as Chairman of the USSR All-Union Council on Agricultural Collectives ("Kolkhozsentr")."

We can hardly refute the fact that this man bears the main responsibility for the tragedy of 1933. And I must sincerely confess that I cannot feel sorry about his own death in 1938.

We might add that it was Yakovlev who "promoted" Lysenko. At the 17th Congress he named among the "excellent" workers such people "as agronomist Lysenko, a practical worker who by his plant yarovization process opened a new chapter in the life of agricultural science, whose voice the entire agronomic world now listens to." Later, on 29 December 1935, Lysenko was given the floor at a conference of foremost people, and in the presence of Stalin: "Comrades, the kulak-pests are found not only in your kolkhoz life....They are no less dangerous, no less sworn enemies of science as well...." Yakovlev shouted from the presidium: "And who are they specifically, why do you not name names?" In response, Lysenko named several names, starting with N. I. Vavilov.

And finally, but far from last in importance, is this. In "Children of the Arbat," everything gloomy and harsh is juxtaposed to the image of Sasha Pankratov, who is clearly called upon to embody the light, kind, conscientious direction. But if we seriously examine this image, it becomes irrefutably clear that in its essence it is drawn wholly into the general atmosphere of the epoch, and certainly does not oppose it. Even in his early youth, he was the "secretary of the school Komsomol group. He would go up to the rostrum and begin to chop away." He was always sure of his absolute righteousness, and this is much more important than his specific ideas and intentions.

Let us turn to one very meaningful scene in the novel. Already in exile, Sasha and his friend Boris Soloveychik meet an old man, Anton Semenovitch, the former chef to the czar. He had been exiled for preparing "lazy soup" for the shock workers when he worked in the dining room. Sasha and Boris drink alcohol with him and tell the drunken old man that he will probably soon return home.

"Home?!" Anton Semenovitch looked with hatred at Boris. "Where is home?"¹⁴ In Berdichev....?

Boris got up, went over to the door, and fastened the hook.

"What are you doing, fellows?" muttered Anton Semenovitch uneasily. "I was just joking."

"You have joked for the last time, you buzzard," laughed Sasha.

Boris jumped on Anton Semenovitch and pressed his head against the table.

"Let me go, fellows," croaked Anton Semenovitch....

"Don't finish him, Borya, leave some for me," said Sasha...."You carrion! So you want to make fun of us! You snake! You scoundrel!"

"Say you're sorry, snake!"

"I'm sorry," croaked Semen Antonovitch....

Boris pushed him out the door, threw him off the porch, and sank down tiredly onto the bench."

It would seem Sasha should have considered the fact that before him was an old man who had long ago been broken by life, and whom it was too late to "re-educate." We might add, it is difficult to imagine what might have happened if Anton Semenovitch had not "apologized."

We should say with complete justification that Sasha Pankratov is certainly not the antipode to Stalin, although this is how he is supposed to appear in the novel. The internal motivation for his behavior and consciousness in no way differs from "Stalinism." Certain unconscious "missteps" often occur in literary works. Maybe in calling his hero Pankratov, i.e., "Omnipotent" in ancient Greek, the author exposed his essence.

And, it is quite suitable to predict that ultimately Sasha Pankratov (which I have already mentioned in print—cf.: DRUZHBA NARODOV, 1988, No 1) will find his place in the system with which he now, in his youth, is all too often in conflict.

I foresee a possible objection. Why have I practically not touched upon, so to speak, the specifically "artistic" peculiarities of the novel "Children of the Arbat"? I must admit that I do not find any great "art" in the novel. This, I might add, was already quite correctly expressed on the pages of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA (25 December 1987): "The author of 'Children of the Arbat' speaks for himself and for everyone from the positions of the latest knowledge. He interprets practically everything. This is prose for the lazy reader. The interested reader extracts information—interesting and heretofore not always known¹⁵—from the novel, and finds that there is nothing in the depth of the book, nothing in its heroes....This is fiction. For many years we

have spoken of fiction, relating to it successful literature which avoids major problems. As it turns out, fiction can deal with the most serious problem, and still remain fiction with all its characteristic traits: superficiality, a tendency toward simplification, and pretensions toward a certain sensationalism."

I would also add that a light understanding of history expressed in a novel corresponds fully and entirely to the "fictional nature" of the narrative.

Returning to the beginning of the article, I will say that in "Children of the Arbat," as alas, in many other currently popular works on the same theme, there is neither truth in its original, moral sense of the work, implying the courageous opposition to reigning lies (since everything "exposed" in the novel had already been exposed in 1956 and the years immediately following), nor, of course, absolute truth. The absence of absolute truth is manifested at least already in the inconsistency of the juxtaposition of Stalin and Pankratov adopted in the novel. If we say everything to the end, they are really birds of a feather.

I would feel sorry if someone thought that I believe that what I have said in this article is the absolute truth. In the very beginning we presented the words of Prishvin, affirming that "man is moving toward absolute truth....absolute truth must be sought out."

The only thing I dare hope for is the aspiration toward the absolute truth, the participation in our common progress toward it.

We must say in conclusion that the road to absolute truth is extremely difficult. It is difficult, specifically, also because today all too often some opinionated "fighters for truth" arise, who mask in every way possible their real positions and aspirations. A. M. Blokh gave a clear example of this in issue No 7 of OGONEK for 1988.

The last essay by D. Granin says that long before Lysenko, as early as the 20's (at that time Lysenko was an unknown provincial agronomist and only in 1934, after the above-mentioned speech by Yakovlev, did he settle in Moscow), biological science was "pounded" by Deborin and Prezent, who later became (quoting the essay) Lysenko's "ideologist" and "chief theoretician and dealt primarily with denouncing mechanists, Mendelists, and Morganists." Speaking of this essay on the pages of DRUZHBA NARODOV (1988, No 1), I mentioned the information presented in it. Blokh, however, maliciously deceiving the readers, "cut" off the reference to Granich and accused me of "a deliberate selection of names" with the "necessary" sound to impose a false conclusion on the readers: the ones who are truly at fault....are foreigners, that entire "Satanist power," to use the terminology of PAMYAT. The latter judgment Blokh had to "address" specifically to Granin,¹⁶ who wrote in his

essay that, "the very terms which he (Prezent—V.K.) used seemed to be some kind of devilish trick" ("satanical" and "devilish" are, after all, the same thing).

However, this, obviously, is not the main thing. Pretending to be a "fighter against chauvenism," Blokh really stands out as a man possessed with a military-nationalistic, i.e., chauvenist, spirit. He demands in the sharpest tone that we keep quiet about the bad deeds of people with names of a certain "sound," since this supposedly indicates the persecution of "foreigners."

Yet if Blokh really were that selfless and disinterested defender of "foreigners" as he tries to present himself to the readers, he should begin with a protest against the current denunciation of Stalin (Dzhugashvili) and Beriia, and even the native of Poltava, Lysenko.

I wonder what Blokh thought of the historical essay by A. Gopovkov, published in the same issue of OGONEK as his own work, which told of the repression in late 1938-early 1939 of Komsomol Central Committee Secretaries A. Kosarev, V. Pikina, and others. The essay gives the names of the NKVD investigators who used "prohibited methods," i.e., torture: Shvartsman, Rodos and Arshatskaya. Blokh, we must think, should speak out with a new angry protest.

However, with every passing day an ever broader circle of readers begins to clearly understand the purely nationalistic essence of such, supposedly "anti-nationalistic" presentations.

Footnotes

1. K. Marx and F. Engels. Collected Works, Vol 37, p 395-396. (Italics mine—V.K.).
2. K. Marx and F. Engels. Collected Works, Vol 39, p 175-176.
3. V. I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, Vol 41, p 337.
4. Stalin reminds us, more probably, of the leader of the English revolution Oliver Cromwell, who was noted for his cruelty. In writing about him, F. Engels said that he "combines in his person Robespierre and Napoleon" (K. Marx and F. Engels. Collected Works, Vol 1, p 602).
5. K. Marx and F. Engels. Collected Works, Vol 37, p 396-397.
6. V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, Vol 36, p 476-477.
7. We might add that we are speaking here of the losses both of the Red and White armies combined (since the task consisted of determining the losses to the country's population as a whole).

8. Recently in OGONEK (1987, No 51), Mark Tolts expressed doubt as to the authenticity of the results of this census. As strange as it may seem, this author, who gave his profession as "demographer" overlooked the fact that the results of the 1959 census confirm in a series of ways the reliability of the data given in the census of 1939.

9. From 1926 through 1939 the population of Azerbaijan increased from 2.6 million to 3.2 million people, while that of Georgia increased from 2.6 million to 3.5 million (BSE, 3rd edition, Vol 1, p 7).

10. Burning people alive.

11. V. I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, KVol 36, p 300. (Italics mine—V.K.).

12. For the information of readers who have not studied this question: the VChK was in charge of state security in 1917-1922, the OGPU in 1923-1934, and the NKVD after 1934.

13. In 1922-1923 he was Central Committee Agitprom deputy chief, in 1923-1924—Central Committee press section chief, and in 1925-1926—editor of BEDNOTA and KRESTYANSKAYA GAZETA.

14. Evidently a reference to the fact that the house in which he lived before the revolution was confiscated.

15. We have spoken several times of the imaginary "reliability" of this "information".

16. He, like me, is of course not "guilty" of anything before Blokh. He is simply reporting the facts.

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**Conservative Editor of 1960's MOLODAYA
GVARDIYA Defended**
*18000499 Moscow NASH SOVREMENNİK in Russian
No 4, Apr 88 pp 154-159*

[Article by Mikhail Lobanov: "Epilogue from
Memoirs"]

[Text] There is a great deal of talk now about the significance of restructuring in literature; it would be more correct to say, for literature. As always, around a new, and we will hope living and long-term cause, many fusses, intrigues, falsifications, and calculations far removed from creative work have appeared. But all in public view! In vain the literary speculators and time-servers are now beating their breast, clamoring about their past mythical heroism, which prepared the restructuring; in vain they hurry to occupy a place in the ranks of the "far-sighted persons." A commotion in a small public place passes by quickly, and once again the road

opens up which has both its beginning and its continuation and along which we must go. This is how it is in the present situation. How much smoke clouding the literary space to cover up the actions of the "commands of quick reaction" is let loose, but as before everything in public view that is worth anything. What was and what is? What is the genuine, and where is the prostituted? Through the present mixed character of what is happening in literature, only more prominently than before, past events are seen, and the participation in them of those who did not think of any restructuring, but simply did what they considered to be their personal and civic duty. And not to darken the reality of the affairs of these people with any smoke-screen. Here I would like to tell about one of those rare people. About Anatoliy Vasilyevich Nikonov, the chief editor of the journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA in the 1960's.

In 1964, articles entitled "V. Turbin Comments" were published month after month in the journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. This was a perfectly dumbfounding game of paradoxes, an intellectual clownery. As everything fashionable and clamorous at that time (poets-performers, the same "innovators" in the theater, in painting, sculpture, etc.), this "comrade art" strolled about in a super-modern aesthetic cap through the ages and literatures as through a circus arena, occupied by one goal—to astonish more trenchantly the simpletons through some issue, to compel them to open up their mouth wide in astonishment. What all there was not, with what "problems" the author did not entertain the readers—from the "dialectic" literally in everything (including in the "jolly escapades of the circus clown") to the "reporting from Christmas-tide." I was astonished by such monthly circus performances; in a youth journal, I wrote the article: "On Jolly 'Escapades' in the Critical Arena," which was printed in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (in January 1964).

What to expect after such an article? Of course, one should expect refutations, a witty "polemic," a defense of one's journal's trademark. But some time passed, several months, no answer, but soon I prove to be an author, and then also a member of the editorial board of this journal; imagine such an occurrence. But there was no incident here. Such was the chief editor of the journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, Anatoliy Vasilyevich Nikonov, who now is no longer among the living.

In my mind, the most pleasant literary reminiscences are connected with his name. For 6 years I had the good fortune of being a member of the journal's editorial board—from 1965 to 1970 (until A. V. Nikonov was transferred to other work). In this man—in the mid-1960's he was a little over 40 years of age—one sensed a great figure, an unrealized, great leader. The youth journal, it seemed then, was "somewhat narrow" for him, but now I think that precisely as the chief editor of the youth journal Anatoliy Vasilyevich should have done, and did, what would not have been done in any other, not in the "highest" post. In a manner not

connected directly with literature, and not a writer, he deeply felt its requirements in the spirit of the time, and he himself, perhaps, not leading it, stood at the head of a new literary movement.

So I see how he smiles slyly and distrustfully at these words, but it is so. A historian by education, he was not a "specialist" in history, but he had a great and deep feeling for the truth in it, for the popular and "anti-popular," as he said, and this important view of the chief editor in the end determined the orientation of the journal, which soon acquired, as is evident especially now, at a distance, enormous social significance.

For the first time in many decades, they talked about traditions—of history, the people's life, culture, and literature. That which was drowned in the "groans" and "the dark kingdom" returned from the past of Russia (although in pitiful fits and starts). It seemed, the voices of our remote ancestors—Dmitriy Donskiy and Sergiy Radonezhskiy—were heard from non-existence, and a completely unprecedented matter—the metropolitan Ilarion from the 11th century, the author of "Remarks on Law and Grace." The shoots of national consciousness sprouted in the pages of the journal. Of course, there also was a great deal that was light and noisy: The rhymes with "Rus" and "Russia," almost in every line rehashes about the "small homeland," and inadequate literacy, both historical and cultural. Quite a lot of litter was added to the flow as well. Thus spring floods carry in themselves everything that they have come across—both the good and all sorts of rubbish. Scraps of heaven are reflected in the flow, and we sensed something spring-like, festively reassuring, in the literary air of that time. And all of this is inalienable and inseparable from Anatoliy Vasilyevich Nikonov, came down to him; it would be enough to know that he will understand everything healthy, will not put a stop to it, will get it going—so that people would write "from the heart," with conviction in the necessity of the well-timed word.

Gradually, MOLODAYA GVARDIYA became the center of attention of criticism. In the third issue of the journal YUNOST for 1968, there appeared the article "The Exorcists of Spirits" by Vl. Voronov. With this journal we found ourselves in a state of sharp polemics. It was not difficult to string on the critical pin (not unlike the main character of Kafka's story "Metamorphosis") such authors of YUNOST as Aksenov, Gladilin, and others, which I did, in fact, do in my articles, but more important was the creation of a spiritual climate in which their multiplication would become impossible. This danger was picked up in our statements by the author of "The Exorcists of Spirits." In his article V. Soloukhin was criticized for "Letters from the Russian Museum," but in the main it fell to my lot—for the words "spirit," "national character," and even for citations from Dostoevsky. The "Russians" were stigmatized—the sort of partially forgotten word which flourished in double flower in Russophobe criticism, especially of the 1920's and 1930's, crawled out into the

light. And completely in the spirit of these "dialecticians," the same journal YUNOST, which reared and brought up the dissidents Aksenov, Gladilin and others (who now set the tone in the radio stations "Liberty" and "Free Europe"), accused another journal (which had criticized these authors) of "non-class character," "non-social character" and other political and idealistic crimes.

The article in YUNOST was only the beginning, more correctly the signal. Soon there appeared articles about MOLODAYA GVARDIYA in other publications, with a more complete composition of accusations, including "Slavophilism," "adherence to the soil movement," etc. I am not writing "a history of the question" here, and therefore am not dwelling in detail on the course of the criticism battle of that time. Some day this will become the subject of special research (evidently, not only literary—the bibliography on this account is abundant). Now I recall the attitude of Anatoliy Vasilyevich Nikonov to all of this. Someone else in his place, in order not to assume the responsibility, would have shifted it to one of his employees and would have found "a scapegoat" in the person of the author; he would have simply declared his article an oversight, a mistake of the editors; he would have ceased printing it; he would have quickly changed "the course" or directed it so cunningly and timidly that the same would have been left from the previous direction as the traces left by a pitchfork in water. . . . But, you see, at the head of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA there stood a man incomparably more dependent on "the armchair" than a writer, a man who understood that at the critical moment a literary name would not help him like the others, that he could not freely leave for "creative work," that he is only a "Komsomol worker" and the service for him is both his position and his future. I have not met another man who would look so unselfishly and honestly at things, who absolutely did not think about advantages for himself. Knowing Anatoliy Vasilyevich and his good-natured humorous remarks about the writers with whom he was acquainted, it is ridiculous to suggest that he valued "editorial" fame in literary circles; the noise around the journal was too heated for it to entertain his vainglory. For 5 years after the article in YUNOST, this noise did not stop—almost day after day, and month after month, at writers' meetings, sessions, plenums, and congresses, in newspapers, journals, collections, and books—everywhere they talked, argued, and accused MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. In so doing, previously secret things were discovered; everything came to be in its place. In literary criticism, people suddenly began to talk about "Slavophilism;" this discussion was organized by the journal VOPROSY LITERATURY (it seems, at the end of 1968). True, this discussion about Slavophilism (as well as the mentioning of it in the articles) resounded too much with echoes of the criticism of the 1920's and 1930's, like the accusations of Osip Beskin, in 1930, of Yessenin and other "peasant poets" of "Russianism," "the glorification of things Russian," Slavophilism, and "neo-Slavophilism." Suddenly everything changed in

literary criticism as well. The play in liberal phrases came to an end. The polemical "in-betweeners" were brought to a stop. The journals NOVYY MIR and OKTYABR were considered as some sort of antipodes, progressives and dogmatists, and they immediately found a common language. Even before this, the sham nature of such antagonism (and about this I wrote in 1967, in the article "The Inward and Outward Man" published in the journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, where, on the example of two stories published in NOVYY MIR and in OKTYABR, I showed how, in the presence of outward dissimilarity—intellectual innovation and ideological orthodoxy—the spiritual essence in these works are one and the same). Now both journals have come together in a common critique of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. The article by A. Dementyev "On Traditions and National Character" in the fourth issue of NOVYY MIR (for 1969) became the one that opened the attack. The basic target here were the article by V. Chalmayev "Inevitability" (which was tousled about in criticism for a long time for the idea, expressed in it "under inclination," of the inevitability of the return of traditions and the people's past) and my article "The Enlightened Petty Bourgeoisie." But the question was not the authors. The journal was charged with the idealization of the past, the ignoring of the revolutionary democrats, the departure from the class and party position, and the authors of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA were called "fascinated with the muzhik" (and this in the journal, whose chief editor, A. Tvardovsky, did not, as it were, renounce the peasantry in his poems). True, he did not love Yesenin, and, it is possible, the verse of Mayakovsky in connection with Yesenin: "The lead of those fascinated with the muzhik" was to his liking. In any case, NOVYY MIR did not lag behind other publications in the methods of the "polemic."

Not long ago, the journal OGONEK (No 44, 1986) printed the notes of the late Yu. Trifonov "Remembering Tvardovsky," in which he tells about this story with the article of A. Dementyev. "I remember I talked (with Tvardovsky.—M. L.) about the article A. Dementyev in the last April issue of NOVYY MIR that was published not long ago and in connection with it—about the journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA and the group of critics who considered themselves as new Slavophiles."

It should be made clear: The critics mentioned did not imagine themselves to be "Slavophiles." It was the "opponents" who gave them that nickname. And they gave them that nickname hardly out of ignorance (indeed, it is clear to every schoolboy that Slavophilism is a concrete historical phenomenon, which is unthinkable in the new social conditions). This term, already tested in the 1920's, was needed in order to pass off the modern and vitally important as the "patriarchal" and "reactionary" clearly hired from the Slavophiles (moreover represented in simplified poster fashion, who dreamed allegedly of a return to pre-Petrine Russia, of closing the window to Europe, of fencing themselves off with a Chinese wall from the world, etc.).

But the question is something else. Yu. Trifonov mentions the journal OGONEK of that time (No 30, 1969), which had published, in his words, "a malicious little article" against NOVYY MIR. A letter of eleven men of letters, who rebuked the ideological accuser, was actually published there in reply after the article of A. Dementyev. Yu. Trifonov calls this letter "an abominable campaign of slander and persecution," "deliberate and typical boorishness," which "has not existed in our press for a long time, perhaps from the time of the notorious 'struggle against cosmopolitanism.'" (For a characterization of literary morals and manners: In their time, both A. Dementyev, the author of the vigilant critical articles, and Yu. Trifonov, the author of the novel "Students" had made their contribution to the "notorious 'struggle against cosmopolitanism,'" about which they would subsequently forget and consider it necessary to accuse others of this). Yu. Trifonov relates what measures were undertaken in regard to putting a stop to the "slander" of NOVYY MIR: "We read the libelous works, were filled with indignation, it was necessary to counteract. We decided to write a letter. On one August Sunday we wrote such a letter in the dacha of Baklanov. I do not remember now to what address: either to the secretariat of the Writers' Union or somewhere higher. The letter was very short and pointed: we are indignant at the campaign of slander to which the favorite poet of the Soviet people and chief editor of the country's best journal is being subjected, and we demand that it be stopped at once. The same evening, the author continues, we ran through the settlement for signatures. "Now I already do not remember whether our letter or actions had an influence on Simonov and Surkov, but the newspaper persecution stopped."

Note what a fuss was raised, what an uproar—and all because of only one letter in support of the journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. For the critic of NOVYY MIR, any accusations are permissible. As a matter of fact, A. Dementyev, in his article, speaks unambiguously in connection with the journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA about the danger of "revisionist and dogmatist distortions of Marxism-Leninism" and the propagation of "ideological disarmament" and nationalism, and emphasizes that, "in discussing our country's traditions and national pride," the critics of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA do not remember "the heroes of 1905 and 1917" and strive to "rehabilitate and glorify the time of the Stolypin reaction," that their understanding of "Russian national traditions" is "closer to the imitative variations of Slavophilism and the soil movement than to the views characteristic of our science," that "they move into second and third place the liberation movement of the Russian people, advancing the 'thinkers' of the Slavophile type, and try to shake the authority of the revolutionary democrats and to cast a shadow on their struggle against ideological reaction"; that in their conceptions, "Russia" and "the West" have a non-historical and asocial character, that they, the critics of the journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, one step to an ideology that is incompatible with proletarian internationalism, are

publishing in the journal, they say, poets and critics who are idealizing the muzhik. Since the time of Herzen, many years have passed, a great revolution has been accomplished, a new social order has arisen—the order of socialism, a new intelligentsia from workers and peasants, devoted to the cause of communism and the socialist homeland, has appeared. It seems, this should be taken into consideration in a discussion of “the enlightened bourgeoisie.” “But was the historical and moral potential of the Russian people not embodied in Radishchev and the Decembrists, the revolutionary raznochintsy and the Bolsheviks?” “It turns out that the position of many poets (as well as critics) of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA is not such a peaceful and harmless one, but a sharply polemical and militant one.”

In his article, A. Dementyev cites with sympathy the words of Yu. Surovtsev about the criticism of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA: “. . . such ‘fine’ idle talk does not have anything in common with the cultivation of real socialist patriotism, but only does harm to it.” And A. Dementyev ends his philippic with words about the necessity “to conduct an irreconcilable struggle against the manifestations and survivals of any nationalism and chauvinism, against tendencies to national narrowness and exclusiveness, to the idealization and concealment of social contradictions in the history of the people, against customs and ways that prevent communist construction.”

The author of the NOVYY MIR article considered it possible to resort to allusions of a rather questionable character. Thus he denounces a reviewer who in the verses of one poet saw “attacks of the ideologists of modern capitalism on socialist ideology,” but actually, A. Dementyev triumphs, these verses are about something completely different, and he further cites with a question-exclamation mark:

Destroying the miracle of ancient temples, Having raised the saxophone with the trumpet into battle, Now the latter-day Judah Is trampling my Russian land.

Subsequently this quatrain, so eloquently cited by the author of NOVYY MIR, was used in an official document and played its role in the fate of the chief editor of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA.

To his heart's content, A. Dementyev spoke ironically of what he called “love for ‘sources,’” for “the land,” for the monuments and the sacred objects of the country, “which contradicts, in his words, “proletarian internationalism.” However, even before this, “the sources” caught it from NOVYY MIR—in the article of I. Dedkov (published in the third issue of the same year 1969), this author cheerfully amused himself over the criticism of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, which encompasses the splendid heroes of our country's folklore—“Ivanushkadurachok and Petrushka, “the cock-crow and the taste of the Vologda cranberry. . . the prose of Dostoevsky, Gorki, Bunin, Leonov, V. Chivilikhin, V. Soloukhin, V.

Matushkin; the poetry of S. Yesenin, V. Gordeychev, Val. Sidorov, A. Peredreyev, N. Rubtsov; the works of the archpriest Avvakum and P. Ya. Chaadayev, as well as the “intoxication of the people's soul” and its indisputable superiority over all other souls on the earth and in general all of Russia with its present grandeur and past grandeur, to the year 1917. . . . In short, such an all-encompassing pride together with arrogance started to prance all of a sudden in the slow-witted people of Vladimir that you are involuntarily filled with wonder: Where did all this come from?”

Of course, it is unpleasant in the memoirs about a great person who is dear to me to digress to the petty, to such citations, but it is directly related to Anatoliy Vasilyevich and to the thickening situation around the journal being managed by him. The citations from the article of A. Dementyev quoted above speak for themselves and graphically indicate what this article is worth, of what sort its denunciatoriness is. Such “politicized” methods, it turns out, are completely admissible in literary criticism, but to answer this ideological denunciator already signifies to start “a campaign of slander”—against “the favorite poet of the Soviet people and chief editor of the country's best journal.” Although the authors of the letter to OGONEK never mentioned A. Tvardovskiy, they were talking precisely about the article of A. Dementyev, about him as critic, about his ideological metamorphoses depending on the social situations. And what is amusing: The authors of the letter in “defense of Tvardovskiy” named by Yu. Trifonov, who had demanded the “immediate stop” of, in essence, other and “not their own” voices, in the literary dispute, represented themselves at the same time as being in the very forefront of the “thaw” trend in literature. For the time being, of course.

Objectively the situation was that NOVYY MIR, so to speak, in the person of its criticism, which set the tone for the journal, became obsolete and exhausted itself in its liberal-progressive claims (having directed its arrows, like many other publications, against MOLODAYA GVARDIYA with its “traditions and national character”). What is more, Tvardovskiy himself was already seriously ill (which is indicated by the memoirs of Yu. Trifonov) and could not manage the journal. So that the words about persecution directed at Tvardovskiy and NOVYY MIR are nothing more than the fruit of a prejudiced imagination. In general, working in literary criticism for more than 30 years, I somehow do not remember that Tvardovskiy was ever criticized by writers. Only once, in the mid 1950's, the bellicose article of I. Selvinskiy appeared, which depicted the poets M. Isakovskiy, A. Surkov, and A. Tvardovskiy as such instruments as a concertina, bayan, and accordion, and denied that these poets had the poetry-writing trick riding which alone was recognized by him as mastery, in his own person, it goes without saying. And besides, this critic and fine swordsman was quickly brought to reason and pacified with his colleagues. So that no, they never offended Tvardovskiy, both as a poet and as chief editor of NOVYY MIR.

Since that time so much time has passed (almost 20 years), how many events have taken place in literature, such irreversible spiritual changes are present in public life and in the atmosphere of literary criticism itself, and suddenly the NOVYY MIR people scramble out into the critical arena. The impression of extreme outmodedness and ideological archaicism is produced by Yu. Burtin's article "To You, From Another Generation" (OKT-YABR, No 6, 1987), with the accusation of "pogrom statements" against A. Tvardovskiy. Yu. Burtin is echoed by V. Oskotskiy in KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE (29 January 1986), who brands those "who signed the letter about NOVYY MIR, for the publication of which in the old OGONEK the dispersal of NOVYY MIR followed and the departure of A. Tvardovskiy from the journal (here V. Oskotskiy demands the punishment also of the other criminals, those who "provoked the arrest of seizure of V. Grossman's manuscript. . . , "who are personally responsible in the tragedy of Arseniy Tarkovskiy", etc.). This is stated by the same V. Oskotskiy who, in association with others, in the words of V. Astafyev, "very much wanted to destroy" me for the article "Liberation" in the journal VOLGA, and now, in the "period of democratization and glasnost," furiously calls for a settling of accounts with those who had an unseemly role in the past."

It is noteworthy that V. Lakshin, the former critical ideologist of NOVYY MIR of those years, fraternized with these extremist neo-RAPP [Russian Association of Proletarian Writers] members under one roof in ZNAMYA.

Incidentally, surely somebody, namely the former member of the editorial board of NOVYY MIR, V. Lakshin, what have to know the reason for the appearance of the letter of the "eleven writers." But he preferred to be silent about this, when he theatrically denounced these writers (of course, the grave-diggers of NOVYY MIR1) at his "creative evening" in the Central House of Writers at the end of February 1988. No one among the accusers breathed a word about what called forth the "letter of the eleven." This is mentioned in passing by N. Ilin in the article: "Hello, Young and Unfamiliar Generation..." (OGONEK, No 2, 1988), accusing the authors of the letter in OGONEK of settling accounts with A. Tvardovsky: "... by July—when the letter appeared—the struggle against democratization and glasnost had already been completed successfully. Almost. Only NOVYY MIR had not surrendered, continuing to develop the ideas of the 20th Congress, speaking the truth about our misfortunes. And in the illustrious letter, they accuse the journal (NOVYY MIR.—M. L.) of a "blasphemous" attitude to the past, of "scoffing" at the present, of "slander" and "cosmopolitanism." By February 1970 the goal was attained: The journal was pulled out of the hands of Tvardovskiy and, not defended by his name and his authority, brought to its knees. . . ."

But it is sufficient to turn to the quotations from A. Dementyev's article which we have cited to make certain that NOVYY MIR, with its ideological accusations

against MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, did not look like such a poor victim. And these NOVYY MIR voices of some 20 years ago that have reminded us of themselves are akin to the galvanization of the celebrated four on the cover of the new OGONEK, which is effectively presented as the forerunner of restructuring in order to conceal the true history of our social thought and to hide the serious real problems of our life today.

But let us return to the testimony of Yu. Trifonov about the collective letter and the measures taken "in defense" of NOVYY MIR. This letter—or the same thing—"the actions of Simonov and Surkov"—showed the proper action, the "newspaper persecution" ceased, as Yu. Trifonov writes. But not the mythical, but the real persecution of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA did not cease. The journal was surrounded on all sides. Its authors did not write anywhere, in contrast to the NOVYY MIR people. And besides, write to whom? All—both "those in charge" and those in pettier positions—with and without cause railed at MOLODAYA GVARDIYA and "the Slavophiles." The whole weight of the unceasing attacks and accusations fell on the chief editor. But not once did I hear a word of reproach or discontent from him—that here they let down the journal, that they could not permit this. As always, he was calm and made good-natured jokes. Even now I see him alive in his study, behind his desk: His head bent down, he is reading with concentration, line by line, smoking; in the expression of his face there is something distant; that is how he is, stately, in private. Now he interrupts his reading, looks not without cunning and asks: "Whom on earth did you have in mind, Nikolay Vasilyevich Gogol?" He rises from behind his desk: Derisiveness in his big eyes, something "of a bear" in his movements, in his gait.

The story of the Nikonov MOLODAYA GVARDIYA approached the end. The "criticism" did its work. The chief editor had to pay. It became clear that he could already no longer be the chief editor, and they talked about this. Although we, in contrast to the NOVYY MIR people, did not write anywhere, nevertheless we did not stand by idly. We, the members of the journal's editorial board, obtained a reception by higher authorities. Our discussion went very well, as if they understood, but everything ended the way it had to end. A. V. Nikonov was transferred to other work. But this is already a special discussion, this is already a historical fact, and this is not the place to talk about it. This is a subject for a future historian—how in December 1970 the question of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA was discussed at the highest level, who was there, who spoke, what was said, and what happened after this.

They wrote—both in our country and abroad—about the departure of A. Tvardovskiy from NOVYY MIR. But one influential French journalist, Robelle, wrote in the journal LETTRES FRANCAISES (December 1970), that the main event in Soviet literature was the departure not of A. Tvardovsky from NOVYY MIR (which had

already exhausted itself, we add), but of A. V. Nikonov from MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. Time has shown that these events proved to be of really different significance.

As I have already said, A. V. Nikonov was a historian not only in terms of education but also in terms of his way of thinking. He understood that the history of Russia begins not with "Prince Potemkin," as Pushkin ironically said, all the more not later than this. But it is common for a functionary—what kind of history, when there are so many things, sessions and conferences, and besides, who needs it, history, you don't put into your next speech, along with the striking phrases about the successes during the past years (this is where the whole of history is for him). And what is more, why stand on ceremony with this history if suddenly something inconvenient climbs out of it, some kind of fact that is difficult to understand. As one such figure, the director of a publishing house said about a manuscript that was inconvenient for him: "It needs to be cushioned." Prior to this, he was the director of a stadium, where horses were kept—a man who was used to horse-breeding terminology and who with this stock of knowledge fully coped on the new, ideological field.

From precisely this historical blindness came so many misfortunes, bungling, and irresponsibility. A. V. Nikonov understood this, as he also perfectly well understood that it is necessary to first know the history of one's own native country, and then already to assure one's plane-wide, worldwide knowledge.

I remember how satisfied A. V. Nikonov was with the publication (at the end of the 1960's) of the book of his university teacher and subsequent Academician L. Cherepnin "The Historical Views of the Classics of Russian Literature"—a rather ordinary book, with over-simplified characterizations and commentaries, but useful already through the citation of the very historical views of the great Russian writers and their thoughts about Russia. Anatoliy Vasilyevich himself was a historian in terms of his social feeling. And the point here is not the quantity of knowledge. Not without reason, someone among the German philosophers said that a creative thought, a profound aphorism is incomparably richer than a multitude of philosophical folios that are scholastic in terms of their content. The point is the understanding of his time, its requirements; the point is the conviction and the influence on his associates. A. V. Nikonov had a keen feeling of the time and its course, and in those cases it is difficult to be satisfied with stereotyped, "exhausted" assessments of contemporary phenomena and historical events. Somehow I told him about one special case in the USSR Writers' Union. There, at a session of the council for criticism and the study of literature, they discussed "the problem of national character" in present-day literature, and speaking in more precise terms, accused all those writers and critics of all

the mortal sins who still dare to think and write about the positive in village life and about national traditions. After a chorus of accusations of "patriarchal character," "non-class character," "non-social character," etc., the chairman of this council—he is the secretary of the Writers' Union, Vitaliy Ozerov, rose and, in the manner of commissar, declared: "We have discussed the question of national character, have discussed it in the most exhaustive manner, and we can close this problem and not return to it again."

Anatoliy Vasilyevich smiled while listening and then said in a serious tone: "Thus, in Russian history, too, they would like to close all problems. They have discussed and closed." He understood: In recent history in particular, although it does involve continuous wounds for the people, for such "closers of problems" everything has been solved, and for the "ignoramuses" some kind of entertaining picture is enough: If this is the Civil War—then sketches from a movie about a machine-gunner preparing to mow down rows of attackers: "They march beautifully... the anti-intellectuals." Look at the encyclopedia on the Civil War published not long ago "The Civil War and Military Intervention in the USSR"—cadres from cheerful films, scenes from stage plays, pictures, placards—one conception, and not a tragedy of the people.

However, much more memorable for some is the Civil War in Spain, which at times in the ordinary consciousness is associated only with the names of the Soviet journalist Mikhail Koltsov and the Hungarian internationalist and general Lukacs (the writer Mate Zalka). When several years ago, I and a group of Moscow writers had the occasion to be in Spain, I became a witness of how such a popular conception of the events in Spain did not work very well. There they simply do not know the above-mentioned persons.

... The last time we saw each other, at the end of June 1981, 2 years before his death, he was working then as the chief editor of the journal VOKRUG SVETA; as I had to hear, he was seriously weakened both morally and physically; the spiritual forces in him had given way.

It was an unusual day—the 40th anniversary of the beginning of the war with Germany. There were many friends sitting around him. For a long time, we reminisced about the war and comrades, and we talked about literature.

Soon the guests left, wanting to leave us, the two frontline soldiers, to sit by ourselves.

After this discussion I did not see Nikonov again.

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Concept of 'Real Socialism' Examined

18300421 Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 88 pp 5-16

[Article by Anatoliy Butenko, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, department chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System: "Real Socialism; (On the Meaning of the Concept)"]

[Text] Human thought has always sought for and found the appropriate terms and necessary concepts, which it has used to express the essence of changes which were taking place. With the emergence of Marxism, social science attained a scientific foundation, while the qualitatively differing social formations received adequate illumination in such concepts as "slavery," "feudalism," "capitalism," and "communism." In our time, due to the development of new social processes, new terms, concepts and categories are emerging in Marxist science, which are associated with the natural desire for an adequate reflection of these processes. One such concept which we encounter with ever increasing frequency in political and scientific literature is the concept of "real socialism."

What is real socialism? And, can socialism be "unreal"?

At first glance the use of the term "real socialism" is unjustified, since the social order which was victorious in the Soviet Union prior to the second half of the 30's and in the PRB, HPR, GDR, SRR and CSSR in the late 50's-early 60's is a socialist order, and therefore the long-used scientific concept of "socialism" is quite appropriate here. This, undoubtedly, is so. Nevertheless, the emergence of the concept of "real socialism" is no accident. It is determined by a number of reasons of a theoretical as well as of a practical nature. The most important among these are the following.

First of all, the concept of "socialism" which was one of the central, key concepts in Marxism-Leninism, became ever more polysemantic in the course of development of the revolutionary workers' movement and the growth of its achievements. Long before the October Revolution this concept meant: the teaching of the future order (K. Marx and F. Engels developed scientific socialism as distinguished from the utopian socialism of their predecessors; at the same time they wrote about petty bourgeois, bourgeois and feudal socialism); the future order itself, which does not yet exist in reality (socialism as the first phase of communism); the revolutionary workers' movement, which strived toward the realization of socialism (the socialist movement, revolutionary socialism, etc.).

Secondly, with the victory of Great October, V. I. Lenin wrote: "socialism has entered the age of its implementation," i.e., the time of its realization had come. In connection with this, Lenin stressed that "we have practically come up to the tasks which before were

formulated abstractly and theoretically."¹ It was specifically from the start of the practical implementation of the ideas of scientific communism that the concept of "socialism" began to be used not only in its former meanings, but also for designating the real achievements of socialism.

Thirdly, because the countries of the world socialist system, i.e., the countries of real socialism, are currently at different stages of historical development of the new social order, the concepts designating various periods, stages, and steps in the maturity of real socialism itself have become widespread: "the period of transition from capitalism to socialism," "socialism built on the basics" (or "basics of socialism"), "developing socialism," "developed (or mature) socialism."

Fourthly, with the growth of socialism beyond the boundaries of a single country and its transformation into a world system, the concept of "socialism" became even more polysemantic. There was a delineation of the concepts of "socialism as a social order" and "socialism as a world system." While the former concept began to be used to designate the internal social order (in the stage of formulation or already completed) in a number of countries, the latter (along with the concepts of "world socialism," "alliance of socialist countries") began to be used for designating a qualitatively new socio-historical phenomenon—the community of socialist countries.

Fifthly, due to the fact that the current period is the epoch of the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism, the attractive force of the new order is growing throughout the world. In this situation, the term "socialism" is widely used not only by Marxists. Today, the socialist "label" is often applied to social orders which have nothing in common with socialism, and sometimes is even extended to regimes which represent a distortion of socialism ("camp socialism").

Under these conditions, the use of the more specific concept of "real socialism" along with the general concept of "socialism" makes quite definite sense. It is clear that the former concept characterizes not the theory, but rather *the real practice of socialism*. We might add that this is not imagined socialism about whose existence pseudosocialists tell us, but *actual socialism which really exists* in the USSR and other socialist countries. It is not implemented socialism in general, but rather that *specific socialist order as it was historically formed and is developing in the countries of the world socialist system*, with all its general traits and peculiarities, and with its entire collection of everyday problems.

What we have said allows us to conclude that it would be incorrect to juxtapose the concepts of "socialism" and "real socialism." The latter emerged as the result of bringing to life the ideas of scientific socialism, as a result of the achievements of socialist construction. Stressing the reality of the socialist order and the specific

uniqueness of its problems, and delineating real socialism from the order which is only called socialism, this concept has a fully definite meaning which is not only cognitive-theoretical, but also practical-ideological.

At the present time, the Soviet Union and other countries of real socialism are discussing many problems which are important for all countries. These are: the general character of the sources of development of socialism, i.e., the contradictions inherent in this social order; the dialectics of the productive forces and production relations under socialism; the interrelation of the interests of society, the collective and the individual, the relation of democracy and centralism at various stages of socialist construction, etc.

Let us take, for example, the problem of the developmental sources of a socialist society. Marxism-Leninism always proceeded from the fact that it is specifically the contradictions which are the source of social development. Our party rejected the views of those who believed that contradictions disappear or are merely an "illness," a "frailty," a "shortcoming" under conditions of socialism. After the discussion which took place in the early 80's in Soviet social science, the opinion was adopted that contradictions are not something foreign to socialism, but that the non-antagonistic contradictions which are inherent in it are the sources of its development. Soviet social science mastered very well the truth that *antagonism and contradictions are not one and the same*, that antagonism disappears, while contradictions remain under socialism, and will also be present in communist society as well.

At the same time, the notion was justifiably stressed that non-antagonistic contradictions are immanent to socialism, and that antagonism dies out under socialism. Here we must remember that such "dying out" is not an instantaneous act, but rather a dialectical process which develops differently under different specific historical conditions. Therefore, it would be incorrect to stop at a blunt juxtaposition of antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions as opposites (which is where everyday, non-dialectical thinking stops). "The usual understanding," wrote Lenin, "grasps differences and contradictions, but not the **transition** from one to the other, yet *this is the most important thing*."² In connection with this Lenin noted that we cannot stop at a blunt statement of opposites. "*Dialectics*," he said, "is the science of how *opposites* can be and how they are (how they become) *the same*, under what conditions they are the same and turn into one another; why the human mind should not take these opposites as being dead, ossified, but rather as being living, conditional, mobile, and turning into one another."³ These statements formulate the entire program of the study and application of contradictions, including the transitions and interrelations of such opposites as antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions in the process of building a new society.

In this connection, an important theoretical and practical significance belongs to the question of the transition from antagonistic contradictions to non-antagonistic ones (and vice versa) in the course of socialist construction and development. In discussing this question we may encounter the opinion that this problem does not exist, since there are simply no antagonisms under socialism, yet the contradictions remain, and they need to be studied. However, no one can deny that antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions in society are contradictions which are opposite to each other, i.e., *antipodes*. And if this is so, then to those who deny the changing of opposite contradictions into one another, to those who deny the very possibility of the transformation of non-antagonistic contradictions into antagonistic ones in the course of socialist construction and development, we may pose two questions.

The first is a general theoretical question. Do the general principles of dialectics cease to operate under socialism? Specifically, doesn't the above-quoted thought of Lenin apply here: "...how *opposites* can be and how they are (how they become) *the same* (italics ours—Author), *under what conditions* they are the same and turn into one another"? The problem, thus, is specifically in the *conditions*. This leads to the second question, which is a practical one. Do all the representatives of the exploiting classes, and particularly the ideology and psychology of private ownership which has been imposed by them in society for centuries, disappear immediately with the transition to socialism? Evidently not!

Undoubtedly, the very antagonistic contradiction which characterized the essence of relations of the exploiters and the exploited, when the exploiters owned the means of production and on this basis exploited the workers—this very contradiction disappeared with the elimination of private ownership and exploitation. In short, the relations which were based on antagonism were transformed into relations with non-antagonistic contradictions.

Of course, it would be wrong to maintain that the problem is thereby fully solved. The essence of the matter consists of understanding the very real dynamics of the change of opposites into one another. This means that we cannot simply ascertain the transition of former relations characterized by antagonism to new relations with inherent non-antagonistic contradictions. We must clarify what those real conditions are which make such transitions possible, i.e., we must understand, following Lenin's example, specifically how opposites can be and how they become the same, *under what conditions* they are the same, changing into one another. Moving along this path, the Marxist philosophers of the socialist countries have come to certain general conclusions.

First of all, let us look at the essence of the problem. The existing Marxist literature generally understands antagonism to mean specific contradictions, and namely: contradictions between classes and social forces which

have not only non-coinciding, but also mutually exclusive interests. The most obvious is the antagonism of the exploiters and the exploited, which characterizes the social relations associated with appropriation of the results of someone else's labor. History testifies to the fact that rather acute forms of development, and often even forced methods of resolution, are inherent to antagonistic contradictions. We must remember this so as not to mistake the acute, conflict-filled form of development of non-antagonistic contradiction under socialism for the proof of existence of antagonism, so as not to blur the distinction between social contradictions which are different by their very nature.

The general program position for all Marxist-Leninists has been and is the acknowledgement of the fact that on the way toward realization of the ideal of social justice, with the completion of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism and with strengthening of the new social order, the most acute social conflicts must be overcome. The basis of these conflicts is ultimately the splitting of society into classes hostile to each other, class antagonism, appropriation of the results of someone else's labor, and relations of exploitation. This is an acknowledgement that it is specifically here that antagonisms are negated, even though non-antagonistic contradictions remain. This is the general logic of ratifying the socialist ideal and the historical development of socialism itself, which has already been confirmed by practical application.

However, today theoretical thought does not stop here. Those who are well acquainted with the works of Soviet and foreign Marxists in this sphere know that in recent years many authors certainly have not limited themselves to a statement of the fact that antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions are opposites, that the former are inherent to capitalism, and the latter—to socialism. Going beyond this limited level of thinking, which is characteristic for everyday consciousness, scientists present and discuss the following question. How and when do the antagonistic contradictions lose their antagonistic nature? Under what conditions in socialist society can non-antagonistic contradictions, in turn, change into antagonistic ones?

In outlining the general logic of historical development and the ideal means of transition from social antagonisms to non-antagonistic contradictions, it is important to remember that the historical never fully coincides with the logical, and that reality rarely embodies the ideal without any deviations. Moreover, as the accumulated experience testifies, in the course of development of real socialism there may be not only stagnant phenomena, but also deformations of socialism. This was clearly stated at the 27th CPSU Congress. We also cannot ignore the fact that real socialism is currently developing while experiencing the constant effects of capitalism, all the antagonisms inherent in it, and the forces standing

behind it. Therefore, as long as capitalism exists, the non-antagonistic character of development along the socialist path is not some fatal predeterminacy which is realized in and of itself.

It would be incorrect to think that with the affirmation of socialist forms of ownership, with the victory of socialism, the question of appropriation of the results of another's labor and the social antagonisms associated with it is negated, and that, starting at a certain boundary, we can rest on our laurels. Such optimism is entirely unjustified. This is not only because the external and internal, yesterday's and today's, the non-socialist and the socialist are in constant interaction, but also because the social justice characteristic for socialism is not established by itself, without a daily struggle against alienation of labor, against the appropriation of someone else's labor, and against other unjust forms of social relations which are foreign to socialism.

The states of real socialism still largely continue to have as their foundation *formal public* ownership of the means of production and conditions of production. This ownership is legally considered to belong to the immediate producers. However, the real system of joining the laborer with the means of production is most often so greatly complicated by the mediating links that the workers in fact do not act like and subjectively do not perceive themselves either as the masters or as the co-owners of public property. Naturally, they also do not feel that "unifying single principle" (Marx's formulation) which would join them as co-owners into a single owner and would turn them into the masters of public property.

The constant reproduction of such formalized production relations leaves its imprint on the entire system of other social relations, giving them traits of formalism, conventionalism and show, and resurrecting over and over again these and other negative phenomena. To struggle against such negative manifestations of the essence of social relations without eliminating or changing their objective basis is just as laughable as tilting windmills.

Is there hope that the development of the method of labor and its productive force will in itself eliminate the formal-socialist character of social relations and turn it into a truly socialist character?

If we assume that the development of production forces sooner or later, but inevitably, will require adequate change in production relations, then the answer is yes. However, this ultimately inevitable change may be quite painful for society—in the case where it develops elementally, building up discontent and the public energy associated with it. It may also be much less painful when the socialist society, recognizing the situation, takes conscious actions to "ease the birth pangs". History will tell what path the countries of real socialism will follow.

Today we may affirm that the countries of real socialism—from Bulgaria to Vietnam and China—are conducting an intensive search for a solution to the problem of better economic realization of ownership inherent to socialism, a more limited combination of the immediate producer with the means of production.

In the opinion of many Soviet and foreign Marxist economists, two questions come to the forefront in solving this central problem, which was presented by the 27th CPSU Congress as well as recent party congresses of the other fraternal countries. First, there is the question of the objective criterion for creating a socialist mechanism for realization of ownership. Secondly, there is the question of the structuralization of ownership.

When we speak of the objective criterion for evaluating the mechanism for realization of ownership which is being created, I believe we have reason to affirm that the socialist mechanism is a mechanism with the aid of which the functions of ownership, distribution and utilization of means of production and public resources in society are implemented both in the interests and at the will of the direct producers, the workers themselves. However, when we speak of the structuralization of socialist ownership which corresponds to this mechanism, we refer not only to the clear differentiation in the functions of ownership, distribution and utilization, but also to their interconnection with the appropriate subject—society, the collective and the individual—which would ensure the best, optimal combination of possibilities and interests of the society, the labor collective, and each individual worker.

This goal may be facilitated by a real, and not a formally pronounced, expansion of the rights and independence of enterprises, a transition to a real, and not a formal, not a bureaucratically truncated, self-government in the primary labor collective (in which one can always define the general will and the general opinion).⁴

* * *

Of course, due to its theoretical character, the general model of socialism cannot give a clear answer to the question: How should socialist society appear in all its specific traits in a given country? In order to answer this question, Marxist-Leninists, interpreting the experience of building socialism under the specific conditions of each country, must specify in their program documents a unified Marxist conception (model) of socialism, and thereby work out a more detailed scientific understanding of that socialist society which they intend to build and are building specifically in their country.

Since a unified general model of socialism is specified with consideration for the conditions of each country, then in the course of its implementation, socialism in each country takes on its own real form.

What is the *form of socialism*? It is the internal organization of socialist society in a certain country formed on the basis of regularities and principles common to all countries. It includes the distinguishing peculiarities of material production, the specifics of the structure of social, primarily economic and socio-political, relations, the uniqueness of the system of managing the national economy, the methods of economic construction, the forms of political organization, and the traits of social psychology, domestic life, culture, etc. specific only to that country. It is important to stress that the specific forms of organization of production and management of the national economy, the forms of political organization, the traits of social psychology, etc. which are characteristic for each country are *internally interrelated*. They influence each other and are expressed in the individual uniqueness of the country's development, which does not contradict the general regularities and principles. Thus, it is quite evident that the application of the concept of "real socialism" certainly does not lead to absolutization or unification of certain forms of socialist construction.

We still have to examine the following question. If "real socialism" exists, then that presupposes also the existence of "unreal, ineffective socialism." What could we mean by the latter? Doesn't the danger of negation of realism of unique means and forms of socialist construction arise here?

We have already said that the concept of "real socialism" is necessary not only to delineate reality which embodies the scientific ideal from the ideal itself—scientific socialism, but also to correlate real, practically existing socialism with that reality which sometimes is called socialist by some people (for example, social reformists), but in essence is not.

However, the problem extends beyond this. After all, even in those countries where the rule of the exploiters was overthrown and where the creation of real socialism on the basis of principles of scientific socialism was proclaimed, there were also some failures. In other words, the concept of "real socialism" unites not only the great achievements and successes of the new society. This is *real* socialism specifically because it includes all facets and aspects of the life of the new society—its historical conquests as well as its difficulties, its yet unsolved problems, its weaknesses and shortcomings. At the same time, this is *real socialism*, and therefore we are speaking here of the difficulties and shortcomings specifically of socialism, and not some other order.

Such an approach requires a sober attitude toward the achievements and possibilities of the new order, an understanding of reality as it is, the capacity to look truth in the eye. However, this is still not enough to scientifically and convincingly answer the question: but what was this reality like, let us say, in the USSR during the period of Stalin's personality cult and the mass violations of

socialist legality? What was it like in Hungary during the times of Rakoshi? What is the relationship of such social phenomena to real socialism?

The key to the correct answer to these questions is the Marxist understanding of the essence of deformations (distortions) of socialism and their relations to real socialism.

The CPSU documents and the party press have named the following examples of distortions of socialist relations in the USSR during the past two decades (1965-1985): violation of the most important principle of socialism—distribution according to labor; administration; the wide-spread attitude of complacency, all-permissiveness, and the desire to embellish the true state of affairs; the absence of continued democratism, broad openness, criticism and self-criticism, and effective control; elements of social corrosion; a certain deformation in the principles of party leadership and in the very make-up of the party cadres, and many other things.

Based on the experience of all the socialist countries, the deformation of socialism may be defined as a phenomenon which is foreign to the nature of the new social relations and which can arise as a result of the departure from the basics of socialism and distortion of socialist principles. It consists of replacing the real socialist basics and mechanisms of functioning and the development of certain aspects of social life with other premises and mechanisms. For example, it consists of replacing the public ownership of means of production with state-departmental ownership which is alienated from the workers; the principle of distribution according to labor—with levelling; the mechanism of democratic centralism—with the mechanism of bureaucratic centralism or anarchistic decentralism; bilateral ties of the managers and the managed (directed upward and downward)—with unilateral commands from above, etc.

Real socialism may become affirmed only with the realization of the principles of scientific socialism and the basics which it has established. However, history (for example, Polpotov's Kampuchea) tells us that realization may not always be the same. Only with the loss of Marxist positions it is possible to affirm that *any* form of socialist construction realized in a certain country is real and corresponds to the historical needs. Polpotov's "form of socialist construction" had nothing in common either with actual socialist construction, or with historical needs. This was true genocide, masked by socialist labels.

Therefore, real socialism is evident only where and when the ideas of socialism are not formally proclaimed, but where in deed such a social order is created which embodies the ideals of the working class and serves the interests of all workers. But what if the socio-economic and political forms (ownership, power, scientific ideology) which are associated by the theory of scientific socialism with real socialism are retained only in a

declarative manner, lose their real socialist content and take on a different meaning? Marxists actually refute the "realism" of such means and forms of socialist construction, since this kind of an order no longer serves the interests of the workers. On the contrary, it is detrimental to their interests and is subordinated to the self-seeking goals of other, quite narrow social groups, and sometimes even directly anti-socialist forces.

It is clear that this problem of the scientific definition of the essence of real socialism is far from being a simple one, and its solution, undoubtedly, requires further in-depth study. However, we also cannot refute the fact that the concept of "real socialism" has full basis for existence and practical application. The meaning of this concept is to isolate from the entire aggregate of social structures existing in the world the real socialist social order, all that which relates to the world of actually existing socialism.

How are the concepts of "real socialism" and "modern world" correlated?

Since socialism arises and develops as a result of the revolutionary transformation of capitalism, it would be incorrect to perceive the modern world as some mechanical sum of two socio-economic structures—socialism and capitalism—existing independently and in isolation from each other. Therefore, it is particularly important that it is not simply the separation and division of the world into these two parts which is characteristic for the "modern world" (in which the essence of our epoch as the age of the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism has been really embodied and has materialized). The "modern world" is distinguished also by ever-increasing interactions of these two parts of the world whole, their unceasing economic competition, their political and ideological struggle for the minds and hearts of millions of people. It is specifically this competition and opposition which will determine what the "modern world" will become tomorrow, how soon and by what means it will be able to achieve *real* socialism on a global scale.

In the course of such interaction and such a struggle, each part of the modern world experiences the effect of the results of its own development, its pluses and minuses, as well as the effect of the successes and failures of its antipode. This is what determines the complex, changing picture of the multi-planar interaction of capitalism and socialism in the process of their co-existence and development.

In his time, Lenin said that the interests of all mankind, the interests of social development as a whole, were higher than the interests of the proletariat⁵ (and especially—more important than the invented schemes which are sometimes presented by "leftists" as being "internationalist"). From the very first days of the

existence of real socialism, Lenin struggled against the efforts of the leftist elements to provoke international conflicts under the guise of defending the "world revolution." The 27th CPSU Congress stated in this regard: "Unlike imperialism, which tries to stop the course of history by force and to bring back the past, socialism by its own will has never tied its future with the military solution of international problems. This was confirmed by the first extensive discussion which took place within our party after the victory of Great October. In the course of this discussion, as we know, we refuted the views of the 'leftist communists' and Trotskyites, who defended the theory of 'revolutionary war', which was supposedly capable of bringing socialism to other countries."⁶ Such a position, as Lenin stressed in 1918, "would run entirely counter to Marxism, which always refuted the notion of 'giving a nudge' to revolutions—a notion which developed as the class contradictions giving rise to revolution acutely came to a head."⁷

Under current conditions, as M. Gorbachev stresses, "it is impossible to view world development merely from the standpoint of the struggle between two opposing social systems. The dialectics of this development represents the unity, counteraction, competition and interaction of many factors. It is specifically in this interaction of different societies that each one meets its test. This, of course, does not mean any unification or convergence on their part."⁸

Real socialism, freeing itself at the current stage of its development from all that deformed and distorted the humanistic meaning of the new society, has its decisive effect on the global international situation and determines the course of modern history.

Footnotes

1. V. I. Lenin. "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Collected Works], Vol 36, p 383.

2. V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, Vol 29, p 128.

3. Ibid., p 98.

4. For more details, cf.: A. P. Butenko. "On the Character of Ownership Under Conditions of Real Socialism" EKO, 1988, No 2.

5. Cf.: V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, Vol 4, p 220.

6. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress] M., 1986, p 11-12.

7. V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, Vol 35, p 403.

8. PRAVDA, 5 November 1987.

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12322

Georgian Youth Paper Runs Questionnaire on Family, Marriage 18300284a Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian 5 May 88 p 5

[Paper conducts reader survey on family and marriage; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] Dear readers, We ask that you complete this questionnaire which is a socio-demographic inquiry into the young family, compiled by M. Mdinaradze, a worker in the Institute for Economics and Law of the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences. We are interested in the personal opinion of both husband and wife.

Circle the appropriate response or write out your answer. Your answers will be used for scientific purposes and for the development of practical demographic policy measures and recommendations and suggestions for strengthening the family.

Send your questionnaires to the Institute for Economics and Law of the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences, 4 Makharadze St., Tbilisi, 380007 or to the editorial staff of "Molodezh Gruzii," 2 Belinskiy St., Tbilisi, 96.

Thank you for your participation in this inquiry.

We wish you a happy life together.

1. How old are you?

	15-18	19-24	25-29	30-34
Husband				
Wife				

2. How many years have you been married?

0-1	1-3	3-5	5-10	10 or more
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3. Nationality.

	Georgian	Russian	Armenian	Azerbaijan	Osetin	Other
Husband						
Wife						

4. Education.

	High School	Vocational	Some College	College	Other
Husband					
Wife					

5. Are you currently a student?

	Yes	No
Husband		
Wife		

6. How many years have you lived in your present locality?

	Up to 5	6-10	11-20	20 or more
Husband				
Wife				

7. Do you live

- 1 - in an apartment?
- 2 - with parents?
- 3 - in a communal apartment?
- 4 - in a dormitory?
- 5 - elsewhere?

8. What is your occupation?

Husband
Wife

9. Please indicate your average monthly income (in rubles).

	0-100	101-150	151-200	201-250	More than 250
Husband					
Wife					

10. What is your monthly income per family member (in rubles)?

	0-50	51-75	76-100	101-125	126-150	More than 150
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11. In your opinion, how many children should there be in a family?

	0	1	2	3	More than 3
Husband					
Wife					

12. How many children do you personally want to have?

	0	1	2	3	4	More than 4
Husband						
Wife						

13. How many children are there in your family?

	None	1	2	3	4	More than 4
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14. If you intend to have more children, indicate how many.

	None	1	2	3	3 or more
Husband					
Wife					

15. In your opinion, what should be done first to create optimum conditions for women to combine work and motherhood?

	Husband	Wife
Significantly shorten the work day for mothers without cutting pay		
Introduce a sizable family allowance		
Increase the number of days off allowed		
The mother should not work until the child reaches the age of three		
Improve the work of preschool institutions		
Improve the work of public municipal services points		
Other		

16. What kind of relationship do you have with your parents?

	Parents help children	Children help parents
Material help		
Household affairs		
With care during illness		
No help at all		

17. How are household responsibilities allocated in your family?

- 1 - The wife handles everything
- 2 - The husband handles everything
- 3 - The husband and wife do them together
- 4 - Other family members help the wife
- 5 - Parents take care of all household matters
- 6 - Other

18. On average, how much time do you spend on household work?

	0-30 min	40-1 hr	1-2 hrs	3-4 hrs	4hrs or more
Husband					
Wife					

19. How much time do you spend on raising your children?

	0-30 min	30-1 hr	1-2 hrs	More than 2 hrs
Husband				
Wife				

20. Please indicate who in your family

	Husband	Wife
takes care of finances		
makes the decisions		
organizes family life		

21. In your opinion, why do people start a family?

	Husband	Wife
Desire to have children		
Because of Pregnancy		
Love for future spouse		
Desire to have a family		
Desire to have a true caring friend by ones side		
Desire for material security		
Desire to improve one's standard of living		
Desire for legitimate intimate relations		
Because of loneliness		
Because of parental pressure		

22. What do you think is most important thing in life?

	Husband	Wife
A good family, children and family happiness		
Material well-being		
Love		
To raise children		
Health		
Interesting, creative work		
Good comrades and friends		
Mutual understanding between spouses		
Physical harmony in marital relations		
Personal freedom		

23. What do you think hinders a good family life?

	Husband	Wife
Spousal infidelity		
Lack of mutual understanding between spouses		
Immature sexual relations		
Parental "rights" to interfere		
Other		

24. In your opinion, based on your experience, what contributes most to strengthening a marriage and family unity?

	Husband	Wife
Spousal love and fidelity		
Mutual understanding and respect		
having children in the family		

	Husband	Wife
Spousal love and fidelity		
Mutual understanding and respect		
Family financial independence		
Public opinion		
Other		

25. Would you have gotten married if you had known how it would complicate your relationship?

Yes

No

Cannot say

Husband
Wife

26. On the whole, how do you rate your relationship?

Husband

Wife

Successful
Somewhat successful
Somewhat unsuccessful
Unsuccessful

For future continuation of this scientific research, please give your address.

13254

**Officials Describe Children's Fund Activities;
Rebutted by Editorial Comment**
18300334 Moscow *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA* in
Russian No 22, May 88 p 19

[Unattributed article, quoting extended remarks by Yu. Boyko, business manager of the Soviet Children's Fund, Ye. Karmanov, a deputy chairman of the fund's board, and Z. Dragunkina, a deputy chairman of the fund's board, followed by an editorial commentary by the newspaper's Department for Labor and Development of the Social Sphere, and a report from the USSR State Statistics Committee, under the rubric "1 June Is International Children's Defense Day: "In the Name of Childhood"]

[Text] "Children are the future of humanity, and it is bound to give the child all the best that it has."

Today we are trying in a distinctive way to grasp the meaning of these lines, which became one of the 10 principles of the Declaration of Child Rights that was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1959. While quite rightfully claiming that in our 70-year history much has been done in our country for the healthy and harmonious development of young citizens, we recognize that we still have a very great deal of struggling to do to implement the profoundly humane slogan: "All the best for children."

The defense of child rights. Against what and against whom? Our society, in providing actual equal rights in the area of the upbringing, education, and physical and spiritual development of children, regardless of their nationality, social origin or property status, has not yet freed itself from bureaucratism and slipshod performance, indifference and emotional poverty. Unfortunately, these vices also manifest themselves in relation to children.

That is why we are presently concerting our efforts in defense of the rising generation against the corrosion of social ills. The health-giving principle of glasnost and the democratization of society's life are helping us clearly see not only the barriers and obstacles on the path to our children's well-being, but also specific means of solving the problems. On the eve of International Children's Defense Day, *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA* is devoting a selection of materials to this topic.

The author's honorarium for the materials published in this selection will be credited to the account of the Dedenevskiy Children's Home, Dmitrovskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.

The Soviet Children's Fund imeni V. I. Lenin

Founded in October 1987. Basic purpose—the protection of childhood. Current account No 707 in the Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development.

As of the beginning of May, the account held some 180 million rubles. Of that, 9.2 percent came from personal donations, 6.1 percent from collective transfers by enterprises, institutions and organizations, and 84.7 percent from the contributions of founding organizations. The fund has 200,000 rubles in foreign exchange.

3.7 million rubles of money has been spent. The fund has 634 staff employees, including 50 on the central apparatus. Annual outlays for administrative and managerial personnel come to 2.5 million rubles.

What is the economic mechanism of the fund's work like? Where and how is the money donated to it spent? Yu. Boyko, the fund's business manager, tells about this:

"Until 1 April all the money contributed to the fund went in a centralized fashion to Moscow into our account No 707. Here the board decided where and how to allocate it. As you see, the procedure was not too democratic. Moreover, it was complicated. In the accounting department there are still several dozen sacks of postal transfers that have not been sorted. Now the situation has changed. Divisions of the fund have been established in every republic, kray and oblast. Money

now goes into the current accounts of local divisions. 40 percent of that money is placed at the disposal of the central board, and 60 percent remains at the local level and is spent in conformity with the fund's charter according to local conditions. 50,000 rubles can be used for measures at the kray and oblast level, and 200,000—for measures at the republic level. If local expenditures require more money, the amount is agreed upon in consultation with the central board.

"Donations by citizens and labor collectives are not the only source of our funds. Two enterprises have been set up under the fund. One of them is in Sochi—the Zdorovye Research and Production Complex, which produces the Zdorovye beverage for children and medicines. The other is the Kompleks, an all-union enterprise that operates on the basis of cost accounting and will carry out cultural and concert activities. Part of these enterprises' profits will go into account No 707, and part will go to maintain the management apparatus.

"We have reached agreement in essence with appropriate organizations to establish a markup to the price of certain belles lettres, mailing envelopes, postcards and buttons. We will unfailingly indicate on them why the markup has been added and for what it is intended.

"Every day citizens come to us proposing to set up cooperatives under the fund's aegis. We tell them our conditions, the chief of which is to work for the needs of children and not just for the profits of the cooperative members. They all promise to think it over and come back later, but—so far, none of the cooperative members has responded to our conditions.

"With respect to the salaries of the fund's staff employees, I can say that they have been set for us in accordance with a government document: the chairman of the board receives 600 rubles a month, the directors of structural subdivisions—300, and senior specialists—180."

Ye. Karmanov, a deputy chairman of the fund's board, talks about the work that the fund has done and its difficulties and unsolved problems:

"From the standpoint of financial outlays, the biggest action carried out by the fund has been to allocate 3 million rubles to increase staff personnel at children's homes of the general type. This will make it possible to almost cut the size of children's groups in half and thereby substantially raise the level of the children's upbringing and development. In addition, we have, along with the USSR Ministry of Health, organized and financed the so-called landing of a force of medical personnel in Chita Oblast. The purpose is to combat infant mortality which, unfortunately, is high there. The main thing for us is the effectiveness of the end results. Whereas, for example, we have acquired 100 buses (and now are acquiring another 130) for children's homes and

boarding schools, it is not just that their physical facilities and equipment are being improved. Qualitatively new possibilities are being created for children's upbringing.

"However, the following sort of thing also happens. We recently visited Moscow Boarding School No 50. Although they have a bus, the children were setting off on a field trip by trolleybus. The local authorities had not given them their gasoline allocation. We recently got a telephone call from Krasnoyarsk: they had a bus, but it was standing idle. The kray social security department could not figure out what to do and would not allocate the salary for a driver. Of course, in all cases we resolutely intervene and come to the defense of children's interests.

"We get questions from the local level: can the director of a children's institution use money allocated by the fund to provide bonuses to his best employees? I believe that close attention should be given to each specific case. If it will be simply an addition to wages, that is not a good idea. After all, you cannot improve the quality of work merely by raising wages. It is clearly inadvisable to turn the Children's Fund into a bonus fund. We frequently also turn down requests to remodel some children's home or build a club. Such functions have been entrusted to the local soviets, and the fund does not intend to duplicate them.

"What both pleases and concerns us are appeals to the fund by children themselves. Today's children do not live in isolation. The processes taking place in society are instilling in youngsters the awareness of people who demand respect for themselves. Just recently youngsters came to us from Moscow Children's Home No 8. They came with what in my opinion was a well-founded complaint. We will look into it. Here is a letter from O. Korotova: 'I entreat you to personally intervene in the actions of the Komi ASSR Ministry of Education with regard to the staffing of Boarding School No 8.' We will promptly look into that matter, as well.

"Of course, we have our shortcomings. We are slow in responding to letters. Many problems stem from a shortage of the necessary specialists in children's problems. Formalism has not been eliminated, either. We see all this and are trying to eliminate the negatives."

Z. Dragunkina, a deputy chairman of the fund's board, tells about long- and short-range plans, both big plans and those that are not so big:

"Our plans for the near future are to mark the 1 June Children's Defense Day in a new way. First of all, the first day of summer should become a real holiday for children and, without fail, a day on which state organizations, institutions, and officials give an accounting of what, specifically, they have done to strengthen the institutions of childhood and the family. We are hoping for help from television, radio and the press. After all,

things have reached the point where we read and hear everywhere, 'My plant is my family,' yet we have started to forget what a real family is.

"Perhaps the fund's main idea for the present is to establish family-type children's homes. They should consist of well-appointed cottages for families of 12 to 15 persons. Orphans will study in an ordinary school but live directly in such a cottage together with teachers and their children.

"We have been closely studying the work of family-type children's homes in Czechoslovakia. Our fund's personnel believe that the future belongs to such homes. We are already late in establishing them in our country. But we hope that the construction of 29 children's campuses—family-type children's homes consisting of 20-30 cottages each—will begin in the near future. Of course, they will not accomplish everything. But the foundation for improving the system of children's homes will be laid. The first children to be placed in them should be youngsters from children's homes in the Far North who have grown weak or have fallen behind their peers in their development.

"The selection of teachers is an extremely complex question. Let me say candidly that we ourselves have not yet determined how to select the associates we need. We have enlisted scholars in the problem of selecting personnel, and we are jointly developing tests.

"As far as other ideas are concerned, the fund has many of them. For example, the opening of an All-Union Center of Children's and Teenagers' Fashion and an All-Union Children's Academy of Arts, the use of the fund's money to institute the position of consulting pediatrician, who would be directly subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Health, for kray and oblast health departments. And less global ideas: to make the admission of children to museums, theaters and cinemas and their rides on public transportation free on Children's Defense Day. In the very near future we will put fund-raising tickets in denominations of one, three, five, 10 and 25 rubles on sale.

"Of course, we cannot get by without broad support from the public and activists. The fund needs the help of the whole population."

Commentary by EG's Department for Labor and Development of the Social Sphere

The organizational period for the fund's establishment is over. And the first ideas have already been carried out. What strikes one upon acquaintance with the results of these activities? The fund has been intensely accumulating money to implement the idea of family-type children's homes. It will take 150 million rubles for 29 such children's campuses.

There is no denying that the plan is impressive. But it might be a good idea to build four or five such homes as an experiment and monitor their work. And only after that, make a final decision. Any way you look at it, this is a question of the lives of thousands of children and the expenditure of considerable amounts of the people's money. Some specialists legitimately voice apprehensions lest the cottages become simply large bedrooms and the children's campuses that they constitute—"orphans' villages." Indeed, a single cottage, in which the children's sadness is diffused in the everyday life of an ordinary housing development, is one thing, whereas a situation in which hundreds of orphans live side by side is another.

Maybe it would be a good idea to listen to another proposal: to build hotels of Mother and Child type in cities in which there are large children's medical institutions. It is no secret that parents who bring a child for treatment in a strange city agonize with them in the search for temporary housing. Shouldn't the fund put more effort into solving this problem? And another thing: there are not enough children's homes at present. It is another matter than many of them require remodeling, and urgently. It is impossible to forget about this by putting it off on the local soviets.

It does not befit the fund to turn into the likeness of a ministry, but there are symptoms that this is happening. Ye. Karmanov, a deputy chairman of the fund's board, is evidently convinced that it is clearer from Moscow how the director of a children's home should spend contributions. If they are actually spent on a child, that is good, but if they are spent on remodeling a bedroom or increasing a teacher's pay, that is bad. But could it be that it is, in any case, clearer to the executive of a children's institution himself how money transferred to him should be spent?

And of course the fund, since it is public, needs more glasnost in its work. It was not without red tape, for example, that we even obtained information on the results of its activities. Moreover, it turned out to be incomplete. We never, for example, got a clear answer as to what medicines will be produced by the Zdorovye Research and Production Complex and why it was suddenly decided to site it in the city of Sochi. E. Sorokina, who is concerned with this matter, made the information "secret."

It also remains unclear what is preventing the implementation of the fund's initiatives. With the exception of fair but general criticism of the creative unions, which to all intents and purposes have remained uninvolved, not a single specific person or a single department were mentioned.

Now many of the country's public organizations have come under the fire of criticism. In the vast majority of cases, the criticism is fair and constructive. During the period of stagnation public organizations degenerated, in

essence, into "offices" that were concerned only with wringing money out of the population to fund their own comfortable existence. A private dwelling, an imposing sign, bombastic slogans, the composition of plans of activities and reports—that is what the activities of many of our "volunteer" societies frequently come down to. Considering the objectives of the Soviet Children's Fund and its highly humane goals, one would not want for it to turn into that sort of bureaucratic institution.

The Soviet Children's Fund imini V. I. Lenin is our common organization. Its successes are our successes, and its failures and problems affect everyone involved in its establishment and the accumulation of its funds. And we must all solve its problems together.

The USSR State Statistics Committee Reports:

**Preschool Institutions
(as of year's end)**

	1960	1970	1980	1987
Number of permanent preschool institutions (thousands)	70.6	103	128	145
Number of children in permanent preschool institutions (millions)	4.4	9.3	14.3	16.9
Rate of accommodation of children in permanent preschool institutions (as percentage of preschool-age population)	13	37	54	58

At the present time permanent preschool institutions are overcrowded: 1.1 million children above the established sanitation norms are in preschool institutions, and 1.5 million require placement in preschool institutions.

During the 12th Five-Year Plan it is planned to open preschool institutions with accommodations for 4.4 million, which is 1.5 million more than in the 11th Five-Year Plan.

In the USSR all forms of education are provided to the working people without charge, financed from public

consumption funds. More than one-quarter of the payments and subsidies received by the population from public consumption funds is now spent on education.

State expenditures per pupil, per year, amount to more than 250 rubles in general-education schools and 850 rubles in secondary specialized educational institutions.

533 rubles a year is spent to maintain one child in a preschool institution, of which more than 80 percent is paid by the state.

8756

Officials Discuss Disturbances at Yerevan Party Aktiv Meeting

18300428a Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
5 Aug 88 p 1

[Armenpress report: "Changing Over from Words to Deed: From a Meeting of the Yerevan Party and Soviet Aktiv"]

[Text] The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, having considered the decisions of the ArSSR and AzSSR Supreme Soviets with regard to the question of Nagornyy Karabakh, on the basis of the USSR Constitution that is in effect, and with the active participation of representatives of all the fraternal republics, has enacted a special decree that evolves from the interests of the Armenian and Azerbaijani nations and of all Soviet citizens. That was mentioned at a meeting of the Yerevan party and soviet aktiv that was held on 2 August in the Palace imeni S. Shaumyan. The participants discussed the question "The Rate of Fulfillment of the Decree of the Buro of the Communist Party of Armenia Concerning the Tasks of the City and Rayon Party Committees and the Republic's Primary Party Organizations in Connection With the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Entitled 'Decisions of the ArSSR and AzSSR Supreme Soviets With Regard to the Question of Nagornyy Karabakh,' and the Further Tasks of the City's Party Organizations and Soviet Agencies."

The meeting organizers attempted to depart from the traditional form of conducting such measures: the meeting did not have an elected presidium or a speaker. Portable microphones were installed in the auditorium. We might also say that the participants at the aktiv meeting included, in addition to persons who had been invited, numerous residents of Yerevan who were interested in the question being discussed.

The meeting was opened by an introductory statement by M. Minasbekyan, First Secretary of the Armenian CP Yerevan Gorkom. In the mind of many people, he said, there might arise the natural question: approximately two weeks have passed since the decree of the buro of the Armenian CP Central Committee, and we are already discussing the rate of its fulfillment. It must be said that events have been developing in such a way that even these two weeks are sufficient to give us justification today for speaking about the rate of fulfillment of the decree.

For purposes of fulfilling the decree of the buro of the Armenian CP Central Committee, the gorkom organized meetings with representatives of the most diverse segments of the workers and public organizations, during which there was a discussion of their tasks in fulfilling the decrees of the buro of the Armenian CP Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The workers in the apparatuses of the party's gorkom and raykoms and the executive committees of the city soviet and the rayon soviets are carrying out a large amount of work to explain the decrees of the Armenian CP Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the labor collectives and their internal links themselves. During those meetings the representatives of the labor collectives severely censure the strikes, the damage from which has reached almost 41 million rubles. Of course, thanks to the patriotic work of the collectives, during the period that has elapsed that disruption was reduced by one-half, but more time and efforts will be required to compensate for the psychological damage from the strikes.

We all know that there has been a buildup in the city of a rather large number of problems of a social nature which are a matter of great concern for our workers and all the residents of the city.

The solving of these questions, obviously, will require time and a calm atmosphere.

The events that have been occurring in recent months in the capital and throughout the republic have sharply increased the social participation of our residents. Our chief task is to do everything to support that active participation and to channel it into creative labor. But how does one do that? We assume that the only correct way is to go into the masses of the people, to explain our tasks and goals to people, to get them to participate in the common task, to renounce the peremptory method of administering by fiat, and to prevent any discrepancy between word and deed.

The decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the well-known decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers concerning the economic development of Nagornyy Karabakh, and especially the statement given by Comrade M. S. Gorbachev at the Presidium session, have pointed out the ways to resolve the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh. However, as we can see, this has not been perceived correctly by everyone, and it is probably advantageous for some people that the white-hot atmosphere has been preserved. Otherwise how can one explain the circumstance that, under the effect of the appeals that were made at the mass meetings, in certain places signatures are being collected in opposition to the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The question arises, "What are these signatures opposed to?" Are they opposed to the economic and cultural ties between Soviet Armenia and Karabakh, or are they opposed to the presence in Nagornyy Karabakh of a representative of CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet? We think that the persons who are collecting the signatures are by no means acting in the interests of resolving the Karabakh problem.

We are opposed to coercion. That is not our way of doing things. We propose a more effective way—the way of convincing people.

A report was given at the aktiv meeting by G. Voskanyan, chairman of the Presidium of ArSSR Supreme Soviet.

At the present time, he said, it is impossible to discuss a single serious question without taking as the point of departure the 19th CPSU Conference. The All-Union Party Conference has become a very important landmark in perestroyka, and has illumined all spheres of our life. The true picture of our achievements at this stage has opened up before us in a more clear-cut way. We have begun to see more clearly that which we will have to do, and, moreover, to do immediately. Acting decisively, eliminating all the obstacles and hindrances on the path of our progress—that is what the party calls upon us to do. And that was stated with new force at the recent Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which discussed the question “The Practical Work of Implementing the Decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.”

We are beginning a very important stage in the revolutionary reforms—the reform of the political system, the chief task of which is the restructuring of the activity of the soviets. The implementation of this large-scale measure will require a large amount of work. In this regard the plenum deemed it desirable to create a CPSU Central Committee special commission that will prepare and submit for consideration to the forthcoming session of USSR Supreme Soviet of a number of substantial additions and changes to the Constitution, the legislation that governs elections, and certain other legislative acts. Closely linked with the democratization of the activity of the soviets is the legal reform and a number of urgent measures in the area of state building and interethnic relations. As was pointed out in the decree of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, in the area of interethnic relations it is necessary to concentrate attention on eliminating the phenomena of stagnation in the development of individual regions, and of underestimating the socioeconomic and spiritual needs of the nations and nationalities.

Dwelling on the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, entitled “Decisions of the ArSSR and AzSSR Supreme Soviets With Regard to the Question of Nagornyy Karabakh,” G. Voskanyan remarked that that decree reflects the requirement, which was substantiated by the 19th CPSU Conference, to recognize the problems in interethnic relations and to achieve their just resolution. For the first time, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet discussed the very important question of interethnic relations within the framework of broad democratization.

As a whole, the decree itself was not perceived identically by everyone, but when one takes an impartial approach to it, one must note that in the situation that was created it was simply impossible to make any other decision. Two very serious principles included in the decree on the recommendation of M. S. Gorbachev are fundamentally important. For the first time a political evaluation of the situation in NKAO has been given at such a high level. The principle concerning the close cooperation that the representative of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in Nagornyy Karabakh has with the representatives of AzSSR and ArSSR means that the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet acts, as it were, as a guarantee of the unconditional fulfillment of the decisions that have been made. Thus, our republic is being offered greater opportunities for rendering practical assistance to NKAO in all spheres.

The speaker emphasized the great importance of special commission that was created at the Soviet of Nationalities, USSR Supreme Soviet, which will study and submit for the consideration of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet numerous proposals that were made at the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, including by our deputies, as well as the new circumstances that will arise in this regard in the future. As was noted by M. S. Gorbachev in his statement, in this way we will be able to study this problem better. Especially since we are proceeding toward the reform of a political system that presupposes the expanding of the rights of the union republics, their responsibility and powers, and the rights and status of the autonomous republics. Within the confines of the study of that question, we can arrive at decisions that continually intensify those guarantees. Our common task is to make every resident completely aware of the importance of the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet as the only correct one in the particular situation and to explain the principles that open up broad opportunities for developing Nagornyy Karabakh and for its future prospects.

Speaking about strikes, G. Voskanyan noted the great damage that they have caused to the country's economy. And it is not by accident that at the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in their statements, as well as in their personal conversations, the representatives of all the republics spoke with concern and surprise about the fact that strikes were occurring, considering them to be incompatible with our socialist way of social life. They demanded that the republic's workers be informed that, as a result of the strikes, the operation of the country's interconnected national-economic complex has been disrupted, and that, in various parts of the country, as a result of undershipments, output valued at hundreds of millions of rubles is not being produced. People are being deprived of their earnings, bonuses, and other benefits.

The well-known events have had a serious effect upon all spheres of life in the republic's capital. Complicated tasks have arisen in industry. The indebtedness with

respect to supplier enterprises must be covered within the shortest periods of time, and without any detriment to quality. The initiative of a number of labor collectives—the making up for what was lost by working on their days off—needs all kinds of support.

A serious situation has developed in capital construction, especially with regard to the activation of housing and of sociocultural and personal-services projects. The plans in the trade system and in the providing of personal services to the public are not being fulfilled, and this has led to financial difficulties. The situation has gone to such a point that individual collectives have experienced difficulties getting paid. It has been necessary to appeal to the union government to provide the public with their earnings. Considerable difficulties have also arisen in agriculture and the industry that processes its output.

All this, in combination with the existing shortcomings, has given serious tasks to the party and soviet agencies and to all the labor collectives in Yerevan. The party's city committee and rayon committees have developed measures and are actively implementing them, for purposes of correcting the situation within the shortest period of time. It is necessary for every Communist Party member, every worker, to display a sense of responsibility. Only in that way—unanimously, in a healthy, efficient atmosphere, by our effective labor—can we correct the shortcomings and miscalculations that are evoking the nation's just dissatisfaction.

When resolving the economic and sociocultural questions, G. Voskanyan said, we do not have the right to overlook the miscalculations and shortcomings in international education, especially the education of young people, which were revealed in the work of the republic's party and soviet agency, and in the activity of soviets at all levels. This also was thoroughly discussed in the decrees of the bureau of the Armenian CP Central Committee and the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

A report on the work of the special commission of the Soviet of Nationalities, USSR Supreme Soviet, was given by a commission member, M. Arutyunyan, chairman of the Trade-Union Council. E. Avakyan, chairman of the ispolkom of the Yerevan Soviet, and S. Davtyan, worker at the Silk Combine imeni V. I. Lenin, spoke at the session.

In conclusion G. Voskanyan, M. Arutyunyan, M. Minasbekyan, and E. Avakyan answered numerous questions asked by those present.

A resolution draft was presented at the aktiv meeting and was unanimously accepted as the basis. In the process of discussion, a number of proposals were made, after which it was decided, for purposes of the broad exchange of opinions, to discuss the draft at meetings of the party and soviet aktiv in the rayons. Those meetings were held

in many rayons in the capital. More than 1500 party, soviet, and trade-union workers, scientific and cultural figures, and advanced production workers took part in them. Approximately 50 persons spoke at those meetings, making a number of proposals and comments.

On 4 August an expanded session of the bureau of the Armenian CP Yerevan Gorkom and the ispolkom of the Yerevan City Soviet of People's Deputies was held. The participants at that session considered in a thorough manner, on democratic principles, the comments that had been made at the aktiv meetings in the rayons, and approved the resolution that had been submitted to the meeting of the city aktiv. Simultaneously the gorkom bureau assigned the party's raykoms, the ispolkoms of the rayon soviets, and the primary party organizations the responsibility of implementing without fail the practical comments and proposals that had been made at the meetings of the rayon aktivs, but that had not been included in the decision enacted by the meeting of the citywide aktiv.

In the enacted decision the aktiv meeting assigned to the party raykoms, the primary party organizations, and the trade-union and Komsomol organizations of the republic's capital the task of extending active work to guarantee the fulfillment of the decrees of the bureau of the Armenian CP Central Committee and the Presidium of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet, which evolve from the requirements stated in the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet with regard to the NKAQ question. It is necessary, from positions of firm adherence to party principles, to carry out the work among the Communists, workers, and all segments of the population, and to carry out consistent work to propagandize and explain the political meaning and importance of the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the principles and conclusions contained in the statement made by Comrade M. S. Gorbachev at the Presidium session. It has been deemed necessary, in conformity with the decisions of the July 1988 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, to pay serious attention to the regulation of interethnic relations, to reinforce ideological and political work, and to reinforce socialist internationalism.

The aktiv meeting recognized as a first-priority task of the party's raykoms, the city's primary party organizations, and the ispolkoms of the city soviet and the rayon soviets, in conformity with the requirements stated in the decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the bureau of the Armenian CP Central Committee, the thorough analysis of the situation that has developed, the taking of steps to assure its further stabilization, the reinforcement of labor discipline at all levels, the strictest observance of the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws, and the taking of decisive steps to thwart any attempts to disorient the labor collectives and destabilize the sphere in them. All efforts must be channeled into resolving the problems that have built up in the city's socioeconomic development, and into

extending active work to improve the psychological atmosphere and to confirm the principles of social justice, taking every step at such time to increase the responsibility borne by all the Communists, deputies to local soviets, Komsomol members, and social organizations.

Participants expressed the conviction that the party's raykoms, the primary party organizations, and the soviet agencies will not spare their efforts or energy in fulfilling the decree of the bureau of the Armenian CP Central Committee with regard to the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and will do everything to deepen the processes of the revolutionary transformation of our society which were planned by the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

5075

Armenian Supreme Soviet Faults Local Party Performance in Crisis

*18300428b Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
27 Jul 88 p 1*

[Armenpress report: "At the Presidium of ArSSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] The Presidium of ArSSR Supreme Soviet has enacted the decree entitled "The Tasks of Fulfilling the Decree of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet, Entitled 'Decisions of the ArSSR and AzSSR Supreme Soviets Concerning the Question of Nagornyy Karabakh.'"

The Presidium of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet has noted that the decree of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet is of great political importance, is an important landmark in our process of perestroika, and under the given conditions conforms to the fundamental interests of both nations and the interests of all Soviet citizens.

The decree of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet and the statement made at the Presidium session by M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of CPSU Central Committee, have provided well-principled evaluations of the complicated situation that has developed in ArSSR and AzSSR as a result of the events in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, and have defined the very important tasks for stabilizing the situation, which tasks are of decisive importance for the nations of both republics. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has noted that during the years of Soviet authority, on the basis of the carrying out of Leninist national policy, the workers of Nagornyy Karabakh have achieved considerable successes in the development of the economy, science, and other spheres of social life. At the same time, for a long period of time in the autonomous republic there has been no resolution of many questions that affect the national interests of the Armenian population, especially in the sphere of culture and education, and in cadre

policy. The constitutional laws of the autonomous oblast have been violated. All these negative situations not only were not eliminated promptly, but were allowed to build up.

The questions of NKAO are currently in the center of attention of the country's administrative agencies. In order to correct the situation that has developed in Nagornyy Karabakh, the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet, and USSR Council of Ministers have planned major steps to guarantee the further development of the economy and culture, to raise the standard of living of the workers in NKAO, to reinforce socialist legality and social order, and to intensify the education of the population of AzSSR and ArSSR in the spirit of fraternal friendship and cooperation. The necessary prerequisites have been created for expanding the ties that Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast has with our republic.

For purposes of normalizing and stabilizing the situation in the region, the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet has deemed it desirable to send to Nagornyy Karabakh its representatives, who will act in close cooperation with representatives of AzSSR and ArSSR to guarantee the unconditional fulfillment of the decisions that have been enacted. The Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet has deemed it desirable to entrust the study of the questions raised at the session of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet to a specially created commission of the Soviet of Nationalities, which commission will submit its proposals, as they are ready, for the consideration of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet.

These principles in the decree are of great importance for the entire Armenian nation.

At the present time it is necessary to do everything to ensure that good fraternal relations are restored between the Azerbaijani and Armenian populations. The Presidium of ArSSR Supreme Soviet has censured the irresponsible statements and appeals made by individuals at mass meetings, and the antisocial actions that have been causing a large amount of damage to the friendship of the nations of the USSR, and to the cause of perestroika and the democratization of society. It is only in the brotherhood with the great Russian nation, in the single family of the nations of our multinational Motherland, that the Armenian nation achieved unprecedented heights in its economic, social, and cultural development and that nation can look confidently into the future.

Currently, when the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference has posed new tasks in deepening the processes of the revolutionary reforms in our society, including the processes of assuring the further reinforcement and development of interethnic relations, it is especially important for the soviets of people's deputies at all levels to keep constantly within their field of vision the questions of reinforcing the friendship and completely equal cooperation of Soviet citizens on the basis of principles of

internationalism. It is necessary to be concerned about assuring that every Soviet citizen, irrespective of his nationality, feels that he is a completely equal citizen in any part of the country. The questions that arise in interethnic relations must be resolved promptly, with the maximum consideration both of the interests of every nation and nationality, and the interests of our entire socialist Homeland.

The Presidium of ArSSR Supreme Soviet has pointed to the fact that the local soviets of people's deputies have been carrying out work unsatisfactorily in the labor collectives of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, to explain the duties and responsibility of every collective in the country's single, interrelated national-economic complex, and the unacceptability of strikes as a means for resolving state questions. The damages caused by strikes are computed not only as economic losses, but also as a large psychological loss.

The executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies (Yerevan, Leninakan, Kirovakan, Aboyan, Razdan, Charentsavan, etc.), the ArSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Republic Staff of Volunteer Druzhinas have not been taking the necessary steps to assure the strict observance of the rules for conducting meetings and other mass measures, as a consequence of which there were violations of state and public order, and instances of infringement on the rights and interests of the citizens.

No effort was made to take decisive steps to discontinue the activity of the so-called Karabakh Committee, which, by the 24 March 1988 decree of the Presidium of ArSSR Supreme Soviet, was recognized as being illegal. The mass meetings that were recently held by the "committee" went beyond the confines of legality and began to take on a politically dangerous nature, and speakers at those mass meetings made incendiary appeals to carry out illegal actions. Irresponsible groups of people attending the mass meetings disrupted the operation of transportation and enterprises and carried out antisocial actions.

The 18 July 1988 decree of Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet has been approved, as a result of which the ArSSR Council of Ministers, the republic's soviets of people's deputies, and their executive and administrative agencies have been given the responsibility of taking all the necessary steps with the purpose of normalizing the situation in the republic, guaranteeing the reinforcement of labor discipline, and eliminating the lag that has occurred as a result of the strikes; note has been taken of the need for the strictest observance of the USSR Constitution and the ArSSR Constitution and Soviet laws, the need to involve the labor collectives and social organizations broadly in the fight against violators of socialist legality and law and order and violators of state of labor discipline, and in the carrying out of constantly purposeful work to assure the international education of the workers, and especially the youth, in the spirit of the

unshakeable friendship with Russians and with all the nations of our multinational country, and the taking of decisive steps to discontinue every kind of activity that is aimed at inciting national hatred, and any attempts to use democratic rights for antidemocratic purposes.

The deputies to ArSSR Supreme Soviet and to the republic's rayon, city, settlement, and village soviets of people's deputies have been given the responsibility of extending broad work in the labor collectives and at people's place of residence to explain the 18 July 1988 decree of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet and to ensure its steady fulfillment.

ArSSR Council of Ministers has been given the responsibility of developing and carrying out a series of measures to assure the effective rendering of assistance to NKAO in all spheres of the oblast's sociocultural and economic life, with the purpose of the unconditional fulfillment of the decisions of CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet, and USSR Council of Ministers, and of regularly informing the public about the rate of fulfillment of those decisions.

The Presidium of ArSSR Supreme Soviet has made it mandatory: for the executive committees of the rayon and city soviets of people's deputies and the republic's law-enforcement agencies to carry out a series of measures to ensure the strict observance of socialist legality and the protection of law and order, and for them to strive for the steady fulfillment of the legislation that defines the procedure for organizing and conducting meetings, mass meetings, and other mass measures, and to take decisive steps to discontinue any actions that violate the legal interests of the citizens of all nationalities; and for AzSSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the editorial offices of the republic's newspapers, and the republic's other mass information media to throw light constantly on the questions linked with the rate of fulfillment of the 18 July 1988 decree of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet.

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Armenian Supreme Soviet Official on Demonstration Regulations

*18300431a Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
31 Jul 88 p 2*

[Interview with V. V. Galumyan: "Observing the Law and Legality"]

[Text] The republic's press has published the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, entitled "The Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Assemblies, Mass Meetings, Marches... and Demonstrations in the USSR," and the complete text of the Ukase enacted by the Presidium of ArSSR Supreme Soviet in conformity with the previously mentioned ukase and with the purpose of guaranteeing public order and preserving the citizens'

rights and interests during mass measures. An Armenian press correspondent has asked V. V. Galumyan, deputy chairman of the Presidium of ArSSR Supreme Soviet, to answer a number of questions pertaining to the goals of these legislative acts, pertaining to their going into effect, the tasks of the soviets in guaranteeing their steady implementation, and the rights and duties of the citizens in this regard.

[Question] What dictated the enactment of the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Answer] The historic decisions of the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 27th Party Congress, by laying the foundation for the policy of perestroika, created reliable prerequisites for the fundamental democratization of Soviet society.

Thanks to the consistent policy of glasnost and democratization, during the past three years there has been a significant increase in the political participation rate among the people, and an expansion of their participation in discussing and resolving very important state questions. Moreover, in our country the public has begun to enjoy the democratic rights granted by the Soviet Constitution, particularly the right to express its will in the form of assemblies, mass meetings, demonstrations, and marches.

This constitutionally guaranteed right has also found its application in our republic. During the mass meetings, demonstrations, and marches that were held in our cities and rayons, the nation expressed its position with regard to the question of Nagorny Karabakh.

However, the mass meetings and demonstrations that were held both in Armenia and in other union republics opened up a very serious problem. The fact of the matter is that the appropriate article in the Constitution did not have any precise explanation of the procedure of applying it, which procedure would establish the rights and duties both of the participants in the assemblies, mass meetings, marches, and demonstrations, and those of the law-enforcement agencies. In part, it was precisely the lack of any precise procedure for applying the article that was the reason why, especially during recent time, confusion has begun to take place at individual mass meetings, and sometimes simply antisocial acts as well. There has been a change in the direction taken by the mass meetings, and their participants have made a number of poorly thought-out statements that contradict the incendiary motifs and goals themselves for conducting these mass measures.

That is why the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, proceeding from the interests of the state and the nation, and guided by the concern for establishing precise procedure in this questions and by the need to guarantee the security of the members of society, on 28 July 1988

enacted the Ukase entitled "The Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Assemblies, Mass Meetings, Marches, and Demonstrations in the USSR."

It must be noted that this kind of regulation of the use of constitutional rights is not an individual phenomenon. On the contrary, this regulation exists in all the civilized countries in the world. The ukase completely corresponds to the spirit and principles of the international pact governing civil and political rights and the other documents enacted by the United Nations.

[Question] What rights, in particular, are granted, and what duties are imposed by this ukase upon the citizens and the local soviets of people's deputies?

The Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet precisely establishes the procedure for organizing and conducting assemblies, mass meetings, marches, and demonstrations, and explains the rights and duties of the labor collectives, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and individual groups of citizens, as well as the soviet and law-enforcement agencies in applying the appropriate article of the Constitution.

The Ukase has established that the labor collectives at enterprises, institutions, and organizations, the agencies of cooperative and public organizations, and individual groups of citizens, in order to organize and conduct assemblies, mass meetings, marches, or demonstrations, can send a written request to the executive committee of the local soviet, by way of its empowered representatives who have reached the age of 18 years, no later than ten days before the planned date for conducting the measure.

The request must indicate the purpose, form, and place of conducting the measure, or the itinerary that it will take, the beginning and ending time, the proposed number of participants, and information concerning the empowered representatives (organizers).

The executive committee of the soviet of people's deputies, after considering the request, informs the empowered representatives (organizers) of the decision that has been made, no later than five days before the time for conducting the measure, as indicated in the request. The ispolkom has the right, if necessary, to propose to those who have made the request a different time and place for conducting the measure. The ispolkom's decision can be appealed to a higher executive and administrative agency in the procedure established by the legislation that is in effect.

For purposes of implementing these constitutionally guaranteed political freedoms enjoyed by the citizens, the ukase establishes that the executive committees of the soviets of people's deputies must guarantee the necessary conditions for conducting assemblies, mass meetings, marches, and demonstrations.

Moreover the state and public organizations, officials, and citizens do not have the right to hinder assemblies, mass meetings, marches, and demonstrations that are being conducted with the observance of the established procedure.

Citizens are required to conduct these measures in conformity with the purposes indicated in the request, and also within the established time frame and at the specified place. When conducting the measures, the empowered representatives (organizers), as well as other participants, are obliged to observe Soviet laws and public order. The participants are not allowed to have on their person any weapons or any objects which have been specially prepared or adapted and which could be used against people's life and health or to cause material damage to state or public organizations or citizens.

[Question] In what situations are mass measures stopped?

[Answer] If the purpose of conducting the measures contradicts the Constitution or threatens public order and the citizens' security, the ispolkom of the soviet of people's deputies prohibits the conducting of them.

These measures must be stopped on the demand of representatives of the agencies of authorities if no request has been submitted, if there has been a decision to ban them, or if there has been a violation of the procedure for conducting them, as stipulated by this ukase, if danger for citizens' life and health arises, or if there is a violation of public order.

Persons who have violated the established procedure for organizing and conducting measures bear the responsibility in conformity with the legislation of the USSR and the union republics.

The material damage inflicted during the carrying out of these measures by their participants on the state, cooperative or other public organizations, or citizens must be compensated for in the legally established procedure.

The procedure for organizing and conducting assemblies and mass meetings, which has been established by this ukase, does not extend to assemblies and mass meetings of labor collectives and public organizations that are conducted in conformity with legislation and with their by-laws and principles.

[Question] What could you say about the Ukase of the Presidium of ArSSR Supreme Soviet, entitled "Responsibility for Violating the Established Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Assemblies, Mass Meetings, and Demonstrations," which was enacted on 29 July 1988 in conformity with the Ukase of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Answer] The complete text of the ukase was published in the republic's press and broadcast over television, and apparently there is no need to dwell upon it in detail. It

must be noted that persons who have violated the established procedure for organizing and conducting the assemblies, mass meetings, marches, and demonstrations are to be brought to administrative and criminal responsibility.

In this regard, the appropriate changes and additions have been made to the ArSSR code that governs administrative misdemeanors and the republic's criminal code, and the provisional rules for conducting assemblies and other mass measures in the republic's cities and rayons, which measures are organized on the initiative of citizens, are recognized as being no longer in force. We have in mind the 24 March 1988 decree of the Presidium of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet.

[Question] Could you please tell us when the acts that you have mentioned will go into effect?

[Answer] In conformity with the legislation, both the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Ukase of the Presidium of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet go into effect ten days after their publication. We might recall that the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was published in newspapers on 29 July, and the complete text of the Ukase of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet, in issues of the republic's newspapers on 30 July...

[Question] Don't these acts limit the citizens' constitutional rights?

[Answer] This ukase, like all the other ukases of the highest agency of authority of the Soviet Union and the Presidium of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet and other legislative acts, evolves from the consistent policy of perestroyka, glasnost, and the democratization of our society, and the absolutely fundamental decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

It may appear to some that the ukases limit citizens' rights, and that means of punishment that are too strict have been established. But this is not so. The ukases do not limit, but, rather, they establish, regulate, and explain the citizens' rights and they can appear to be strict only to those who, proceeding from various considerations, want to use the democratic freedoms for their own purposes.

Our nation has always been typified by political maturity and prudence. Our nation has understood that strikes are not a means for resolving a question. And actually, it is to no one's benefit when demonstrations, mass meetings, and strikes disrupt the national economy, hinder the operation of transportation, and disturb the tranquility of citizens, old men and women, and children.

"...The expansion, on the whole, of democracy and glasnost," M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, "must proceed hand in hand with the

reinforcement of legality, with the education of unconditional respect for the law. Democracy is incompatible with willfulness, with irresponsibility, with lack of discipline."

The implementation of the programs confirmed by the conference for radical political and economic reforms, for the creation of a legal state, and for the deepening of democracy, require the workers in the soviet and administrative agencies at all levels, the administrators of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and every Soviet citizen to display civic participation, a well-principled political and ideological position, and a precise understanding of constitutional rights and duties.

In this regard it must be said that our local soviets and their agencies still have a lot to do. The ispolkoms of all the city, rayon, settlement, and village soviets in the republic must carefully study the acts that were mentioned and must guarantee their strictest application. The ispolkoms of the local soviets and the republic's Ministry of Justice must broaden considerably the job of explaining the ukases to the population.

The workers at soviet, state, and law-enforcement agencies must learn how to work with the masses, how to feel their needs and alarms, and how to stand alongside of them both during their moments of joy and during their difficult times. The task of the soviet and law-enforcement agencies is, in the spirit of the new policy, to enrich legal knowledge and spread it to the masses, to explain thoroughly the meaning and the essence of the ukases enacted by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the ArSSR Supreme Soviet.

And the essence of those ukases lies in the fact that the broad opportunities granted by democratization and perestroika must reinforce, rather than weaken, our country's political foundations, must be channeled into conscious, organized actions, rather than giving rise to anarchy and lawlessness.

The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held on 29 July 1988. Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, in his report that dealt with the vitally important problems confronting our country, dwelt thoroughly on the national question. He pointed out the real reasons why the contradictions arose in the interethnic relations, and emphasized that those contradictions must be resolved democratically, within the confines of the Constitution, proceeding from the interests of every nation and nationality, and preserving the unshakeability of the internationalist nature of our great Union.

The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out once again that the national question and the search for ways to resolve it in a just manner are in the center of attention of our party and government. Moreover, they

are linked with the policy of perestroika and the democratization of Soviet society. The guarantee of the resolution of the national question lies in the successful implementation of that policy.

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Armenian Justice Minister Views New Demonstration Procedures

*18300431b Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
3 Aug 88 p 2*

[Interview with A. Dadayan: "Regulating Legislative Act"]

[Text] The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has enacted the Ukase governing the procedure for organizing and conducting gatherings, mass meetings, marches, and demonstrations in the USSR. An Armenpress correspondent has asked ArSSR Minister of Justice A. Dadayan several questions about the new legislative act.

[Question] The broad rights and freedoms guaranteed by the USSR Constitution are, of course, not complete permissiveness. And it is understandable that a Law regulating the procedure for realizing them was necessary. How are the constitutional rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens realized by the recently enacted Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, entitled "Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Gatherings, Mass Meetings, Marches, and Demonstrations in the USSR"?

[Answer] First of all, it must be admitted frankly that many principles in the Basic Law of our state have been in a static condition for a prolonged period of time. During the period of the fundamental perestroika that is occurring in our country, in an atmosphere of glasnost and the democratization of social life, there was a spontaneous arising of powerful social movements having a rather broad social base. They have considerably expanded the understanding of the freedom to hold demonstrations and marches, which understanding was already customary for us. A well-organized, truly initiatory mass demonstration, as one of the democratic forms of the sovereignty of the people, has become an effective means of expressing the will of the people with respect to a particular question, and a means of opposing such flaws as bureaucratism, protectionism, corruption, etc.

Perestroika vitally needs the conscious participation of the masses and dynamic movement, so to speak, "from the bottom up."

However, there have been widely known instances—and, unfortunately, they have not been infrequent—when an unfounded prohibition was placed on a mass meeting, demonstration, etc. Of course, one could see in that action the effect of the conservative way of thinking that was so typical of the period of stagnation. However, this is our common misfortune and I think one ought not to rush ahead with accusations. It is necessary simply to

penetrate more deeply into the reasons for that phenomenon, because no one was guaranteed or, it might be more accurate to say, insured against any legal act that regulated the procedure for organizing and conducting mass meetings, demonstrations, and marches. And in the event of undesirable consequences, for example, an emergency situation, disorders, or another violation of public order, a specific official would have borne the heavy load of responsibility. I think that here you and I will agree: it is difficult to decide to undertake a serious matter (and the conducting of mass meetings is such a matter) if one lacks both the experience in conducting one and the legal basis for doing so. But the previously mentioned Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has defined rather precisely the procedure for organizing and conducting gatherings, mass meetings, marches, and demonstrations. On the one hand the Ukase is, as it were, a guarantee against bureaucratic prohibitions against holding mass meetings and demonstrations, and, on the other hand, is the limit beyond which the freedom proclaimed by the USSR Constitution becomes complete permissiveness.

[Question] The Ukase was published in all the central and republic newspapers. Familiarization with it evoked different opinions in different people. Some people feel that it is equivalent to a ban, since not a single ispolkom will give authorization to conduct a mass meeting that has the purpose of expressing dissatisfaction with the bureaucratic style of that ispolkom's own work. Others view the Ukase as a refined "formalization" of constitutional rights and freedoms which will rapidly "nullify" and "completely regulate" every initiative coming from the bottom up. What is your opinion?

[Answer] The golden rule of jurisprudence, "Whatever is not prohibited is allowed," unfortunately, has been becoming part of our life more slowly than the morality that is still alive and well—"it will come to no good!" Therefore I can understand the fears that are being expressed. One cannot optimistically guarantee the one-hundred-percent and strictest execution of the demands in the Ukase on the part of the ispolkoms or the organizers of mass meetings. Let's analyze the situation. Since March the republic has had in effect provisional rules for conducting gatherings and other mass measures organized on the initiative of the citizens in the republic's cities and rayons. These rules did not contain any clear-cut regulation and there was no specific definition of the responsibility for violating order. Paragraph 6 of the Ukase stipulated only the instances of banning gatherings, mass meetings, marches, and demonstrations if the purpose for holding them contradicted the USSR Constitution, or the constitutions of the union and autonomous republics, and threatened public order and the citizens' security. I would like to turn our attention particularly to the circumstance that mention is made here of contradicting the Constitution without the traditional addition, "or other laws." Because it is generally known that many mass meetings and demonstrations were directed precisely against normative acts that

crudely violate the USSR Constitution or that infringe upon the citizens' legal interests. We might recall, for example, the annulment of the USSR Council of Ministers decree about the redirecting of the northern rivers; the rejection of the decisions that had been made to demolish unique structures that are monuments to the history and culture of the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev; the restoration of the old names of cities and streets; etc. Everything enumerated was the result of the manifestation of social participation. And yet there had been "ivory tower" indignation with regard to the "illegality" of such manifestations, their "illegal nature," etc. All this was splashed onto the pages of the newspapers. As for public order and the citizens' security, it would seem that there is nothing that we should use to convince one another. You can imagine how dangerous it was for a crowd of many thousands of people to gather on the "northern cascade" stairway that was not designed to hold such loads. It is also inadmissible to use the rostrum at mass meetings to the detriment of the nation's interests, to the detriment of the goals of reinforcing and developing the socialist system, or for the purpose of inciting interethnic enmity, making slanderous attacks on officials or other citizens, or inciting people to commit disorders and crimes. Let us consider specific examples. The blocking of the Zvartnots airport, which led to serious consequences and mass disorders; and the motor-transport hooliganism in Yerevan, which violated the security and tranquility of hundreds of thousands of citizens—aren't these the result of those incendiary actions by certain irresponsible individuals?

[Question] But what about the place and time for conducting the measures? Should one understand that, if there is no state of agreement with regard to this question, the ispolkom can ban the conducting of the mass meeting or the demonstration?

[Answer] The stipulated minimal time period that precedes the conducting of the mass meeting is ten days. That seems to me to be sufficient for coordinating the time and place for conducting the measure. As for the second part of your question, if necessary the ispolkom can suggest a different time and place for conducting the measure, and that depends on a number of objective circumstances.

[Question] Wherein lies the role of the ispolkom in providing the conditions for conducting the specific measure?

[Answer] In this instance that role is multifaceted and is not limited simply to offering a place for conducting the measure. It is also necessary to provide the necessary sanitary conditions and illumination if the measure is being conducted during the nighttime. The ispolkom is particularly responsible for observing the proper procedure for conducting the mass measure—the assignment of personnel to protect the public order, the taking of steps to protect people's health, to provide fire safety, etc.

[Question] Do you think that this Ukase was sufficiently analyzed and discussed before it was enacted?

[Answer] The preparation of the Ukase was not done secretly. A working group was created, and that group included representatives of the Presidium of the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets, USSR Ministry of Justice, USSR Procuracy, USSR KGB, USSR MVD, responsible workers of AUCCTU and All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, and legal scientists. In the process of work performed by the group, consideration was taken of the experience of foreign states, especially the socialist countries, as well as the application of the "provisional rules" that were in effect in a number of union republics. At the present time the main thing is to implement the established norms in order to develop and confirm the democratic principles.

[Question] Of course, all the questions that are linked with the application of the Ukase cannot be exhausted by a single discussion. But I think that we must not overlook the chief question—the question of responsibility.

[Answer] A ukase has been enacted—the ukase of the Presidium of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet, entitled "Responsibility for Violating the Established Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Gatherings, Mass Meetings, Marches, and Demonstrations." Persons who have violated the established procedure for organizing and conducting the measures mentioned can be brought to criminal or administrative responsibility and be required to make restitution for the material losses caused. The sanctions for first-time offenders are a warning or a 300-ruble fine, or in exceptional instances—if, on the basis of the circumstances in the case and with a consideration of the personality of the offender, the application of these measures is deemed to be insufficient—administrative arrest for a period of up to 15 days. But the same actions committed for a second time during the course of a year after the application of measures of administrative punishment, or by the organizer of a gathering, mass meeting, march, or demonstration, result in the imposition of a fine in an amount up to 1000 rubles, or corrective labor for a period of from one to two months with the retention of 20 percent of the person's earnings, or administrative arrest for a period of up to 15 days. A violation of the procedure for organizing and conducting gatherings, mass meetings, marches, and demonstrations, which violation has been committed by the organizer of those measures after the application of measures of administrative punishment for the same actions, results in criminal responsibility and is punished by a fine up to 2000 rubles, or corrective labor for a period of up to one year, or deprivation of liberty for a period of up to six months.

It should be noted that hindrances placed by officials and citizens on the conducting of mass meetings and demonstrations in which the established order is observed are also viewed as a violation and result in the holding of those individuals appropriately accountable.

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Armenian Official on Effect of Civil Disturbances in Mashtotsskiy Rayon

18300410a *KOMMUNIST in Russian* 19 Jul 88 p 1

[Interview of A. Gegamyan, First Secretary of Mashtotsskiy Raykom, Communist Party of Armenia, by G. Miansaryan: "Displaying High Consciousness"]

[Text] Last week's strikes did not bypass the enterprises in Mashtotsskiy Rayon. In some places there were major interruptions. However, in the evening of 18 July the rayon was operating at its customary tempo. How did the party's raykom operate during those days? What are its tasks for the future? Those topics were covered in an interview that our correspondent had with A. Gegamyan, First Secretary of Mashtotsskiy Raykom, Communist Party of Armenia.

[Statement by interviewee] All last week, from 0600 hours until late in the evening, the workers in the raykom apparatus and the buro members were in the labor collectives and in the midst of the rayon residents. So we can judge everything that has been occurring on the basis of our own observations. Our comrades were in the republic's lying-in hospital when A. Markaryan, chief of the anesthesiology department, was unable to prepare for an urgent operation—there was no oxygen. We chatted with an elderly excavator operator who was on the point of tears as he told how hooligans threw rocks at his excavator as he worked in temperatures of 40 degrees to lay a bypass that 15,000 inhabitants in the Davidashenskiy housing complex have been awaiting. Residents of Building No. 20 in Block XV, who had not had any water for five days, came here to the raykom—there was nowhere that they could get the pump repaired. Incidentally, approximately 20 buildings in the rayon proved to be in the same situation.

You compare all this and involuntarily ask yourself the question, "For whom is this beneficial?" Into whose hands does it play when, because of disruptions in the operation of the visual-aids plant, the production orders sent in by the republic's schools are not fulfilled by 1 September, or because, at the fault of the transportation workers, there were repeated mass delays in people getting to work at the bakery or at medical institutions. We can scarcely believe that it benefited those who are truly concerned about the welfare of the people. Today many people assume the task of speaking boldly in the name of the people, but behind those high-sounding words they do not see and do not want to see the specific individual with his concerns.

Are we really to believe that those who picketed the operation of public transportation, who ejected old men, women, and children from motor buses, and told them to get where they wanted to go by doing so on foot in the heat of the day, were acting for the good of the people?

In the middle of the week we conducted a session of the buro of the party's raykom, to which we invited the administrators of the Spandaryanskiy Large-Panel House-Building Plant and the residents of emergency buildings; the representatives of the nation in whose name individual irresponsible persons issued appeals at mass meetings to hold strikes, gave their impartial evaluation of the strike by workers in the construction industry, and leveled just, well-substantiated reproaches at them, after which the party punishments issued by the raykom buro to the plant workers appeared to many people to be liberal.

[Question] But, Artashes Mamikonovich, weren't there collectives which worked at full capacity last week?

[Answer] Those that displayed high consciousness included the collective at the Armaviyastroy Trust. In particular, the sector that is erecting the school in Davdashen operated on two shifts. Realizing that every day was critical, the collective did not stop its work for a single hour. And when the construction workers began receiving threats from the unconscientious citizens, the collective itself organized detachments that protected the project and the peaceful labor of their comrades. And there are many similar examples.

[Question] Recently, during mass meetings, one has begun hearing more and more frequently various demands that do not have anything in common with the resolution of the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh. I have in mind the appeals to give back Komsomol identification cards, and demands to elect new chairmen of the trade-union committees.

[Answer] That is yet another example of how the members of the so-called Karabakh Committee, who consider themselves to be the champions of democracy, are attempting to exert strong pressure on the trade-union organizations and are taking the path of unauthorized, unconstitutional actions, blackmail, and threats.

I must say that a large number of unresolved moral and socioeconomic problems have built up in the rayon. Both the economic administrators and the party, trade-union, and Komsomol workers include people who are incompetent, people who are careerists and bureaucrats. And mention was made of that very loudly during the reports given at the party committees that dealt with the management of the *perestroyka*—as well as at the Physics Institute, the Ani Scientific-Production Association, a number of construction organizations, and the raykom plenum. So the criticism directed at the administrators at the rayon, city, and republic level was heard loudly in the labor collectives long before the formation of the so-called Karabakh Committee. The raykom's opinion in this question is completely unambiguous: it is necessary to take decisive steps to get rid of the incompetent

administrators, and particularly those who have compromised themselves. But I am convinced that the labor collectives have sufficient independence and maturity to do this, and they will not need any help from the speakers at mass meetings.

[Postscript] As This Issue Was Being Set in Type:

Meetings were held at the Moloko Production Association, the Spetsmetkonstruksii Plant, and the plant that produces parts and articles for the housing fund, at which Communist Party members and non-party members decisively censured the actions of persons attempting to throw the labor collectives into a state of chaos, and those who, by speculating on the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh, are making political demands and creating an unhealthy situation in the republic.

The meeting participants supported the line taken by the Armenian CP Central Committee and the party's Yerevan Gorkom, to normalize the situation and resolve the disturbing problems by constitutional means.

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Supreme Soviet NKAO Decision Praised for Addressing Nationalities Issues

*18300410b Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
23 Jul 88 p 2*

[Article by V. Nazaryan, doctor of legal sciences: "Important Landmark on the Path of Resolving the Problems of Nagornyy Karabakh"]

[Text] On 18 July 1988 the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, having considered the 15 July 1988 request from the ArSSR Supreme Soviet to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to Armenian SSR on the basis of an official request from the NKAO Soviet of People's Deputies, and having considered the 17 July 1988 decision of the AzSSR Supreme Soviet concerning the unacceptability of transferring Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to Armenian SSR, has deemed it impossible to change the boundaries and the constitutionally established national-territorial division of Azerbaijan SSR and Armenian SSR. In its decree the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet proceeded from the principle in the USSR Constitution (Article 78), in accordance with which the territory of a union republic cannot be changed without that republic's consent.

If the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet had consisted only of that principle, there could be no discussion of the national aspects of the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh, or particularly about the possibility of a further search for alternatives for resolving this problem.

However, that decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet is an act that is typical of the period of the revolutionary *perestroyka* of our country's state and

social life, an act that reflects a requirement that was substantiated by the 27th CPSU Congress—the requirement to recognize the problems occurring in interethnic relations and to resolve those problems justly.

I would like to dwell on three main tasks in the present decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet that attest to the national character of that decree.

Firstly, this decree overcomes for the first time at the level of an official act that was adopted by the country's highest agency of state authority a situation that is typical of the period of the personality cult and stagnation and that was censured by the party—the ignoring of the national aspects of the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. As is well known, for decades the attempt was made to present this problem as a social and economic one, but not a national one. And yet the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet indicates that in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast "for a prolonged period of time, there was a failure to resolve many questions that affected the national interests of the Armenian population, especially in the sphere of culture and education and in the cadre policy. The constitutional rights of the autonomous oblast were violated. All these negative situations not only were not eliminated promptly, but were allowed to build up." Thus, the decree enacted by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet implements the require contained in the resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, entitled "Interethnic Relations," in accordance with which a task of historic importance is to eliminate the deviation from Leninist norms and principles in the area of national policy. The Presidium's decree proceeds from an important principle in the Leninist conception of national policy, in conformity with which we in our country cannot resolve any matter, any problem, by ignoring the interests even of the smallest nation. We shall also say that at the Presidium the problem of Nagorny Karabakh was raised to the level of tasks that are extremely important and extremely complicated in their essence, and it was noted that this is a problem on a nationwide scale, since everything that occurs in various parts of our country affects all of us.

The second and no less important factor is the creation of firm guarantees for the Armenian population of Nagorny Karabakh. In order to prevent any repetition of what led to the current situation. The fact of the matter is that in the past there were many promises which, in many instances, proved to be empty words, and, in addition, proved to be, essentially speaking, deception against the inhabitants of Nagorny Karabakh. Proceeding from the need to create such guarantees, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has deemed it desirable to send its representatives to Nagorny Karabakh, who, in close cooperation with representatives of Azerbaijan SSR and Armenian SSR, will act to guarantee the mandatory fulfillment of the decrees issued by CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and USSR Council of

Ministers with regard to Karabakh. Among these, the one that will be discussed first of all is the 24 March 1986 decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, entitled "Measures for Accelerating the Socioeconomic Development of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of Azerbaijan SSR in 1988-1995," which reflected the participation of Armenian SSR in the resolution of a number of problems that had built up in Nagorny Karabakh. There will be a discussion of the participation of Armenian experts and specialists in restoring the monuments of the history and culture of the Armenian people on the territory of Nagorny Karabakh, the improvement of the operation of Armenian schools in NKAO, as well as other rayons in Azerbaijan SSR, etc. The current decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet does not recognize a single sphere in the economic, sociocultural, and spiritual life of Nagorny Karabakh in which our republic would not have the right to participate in eliminating the mistakes and shortcomings, or in the resolving of critical tasks that arise. And this gives the workers of our republic serious tasks with positive content, inasmuch as we are granted the opportunity to participate directly, with our own efforts, in raising the economic standard of living for our compatriots who are living in Nagorny Karabakh and in resolving the tasks in all spheres of their activity, everyday life, culture, and spiritual life as a whole.

The third basic idea which has received embodiment in this decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet is the establishment of the possibility of searching for new ways to resolve the problem of Nagorny Karabakh. In his historic speech at the Presidium session, Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated outright, "We must not consider any question to be resolved once and for all. Every question has its dynamics, its development, and this also pertains to the question of national relations." Proceeding from this posing of the question, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet deemed it desirable to give the responsibility of studying the questions that are linked with this problem and that were posed at that session to a specially created commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which commission will make its recommendations, as they are ready, for consideration by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. That means that both the numerous proposals that have been introduced at the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the new circumstances that are linked with them and that arise subsequently must be discussed at the special commission of the Soviet of Nationalities that was created to deal with the problem of Nagorny Karabakh, and the proposals developed by that commission will be discussed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. "Thus," M. S. Gorbachev said in his speech, "we will be better able to study that problem. Moreover, we are proceeding to a reform in the political system which presupposes the increase in the rights of the union republics, their responsibility and powers, and the

expansion of the rights and status of the autonomous republics. Within the confines of the study of this question, we will be able to reach decisions which, once again, intensify the guarantees that we have discussed here." The same posing of the question occurred in the final statement made by Comrade A. A. Gromykov, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. He emphasized that not only have all the opportunities for seeking decisions not been exhausted, but, practically speaking, that work has not even been begun.

This posing of the question gives responsible tasks to our republic—the tasks of substantiating and submitting to the special commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet new proposals for resolving the problem of Nagorny Karabakh, which correspond to the spirit of the perestroika that is widespread in our country and in the spirit of democratization and glasnost.

Changing over to an overall evaluation of the discussion of the problem of Nagorny Karabakh at the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the decree that was adopted, it is necessary to emphasize particularly that the Presidium session itself was an unprecedented example of the discussion of problems on the basis of a democratic dialogue, in an atmosphere of glasnost. It is not by accident that that session was evaluated by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee as being a historic event. Both the discussion of the question and the decree that was adopted represent a remarkable example of the exceptionally serious and responsible approach to the resolving of the important tasks in the fate of a nation, and of resolving them on the solid basis of socialist legality and the sovereignty of the people.

This decree, which is a historic landmark for resolving the problem of Nagorny Karabakh, can be implemented only under the conditions of socialist legality. The strained situation that has developed in our republic and in Nagorny Karabakh as a result of the aggravation of the problem removes every possibility of beginning to resolve it in a practical way. It must be stated directly and frankly that those persons who have been calling for a strike recently, and particularly those who have been striking or violating the socialist law and order that has been established in our country, are creating, whether they want to or not, a serious hindrance on the path of the just resolution of the problem of Nagorny Karabakh.

5075

Police, Transport Workers Play Role in July Yerevan Disturbances

*18300408a Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
16 Jul 88 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "At the ArSSR MVD"]

[Text] As was previously reported, on 6 and 7 July certain drivers of privately owned vehicles, for hooliganistic reasons, carried out crude violations of the traffic

rules and the rules pertaining to passenger hauls. By their actions they subjected citizens' life and health to serious danger. Their behavior evoked well-founded complaints and censures on the part of the residents of the capital and certain rayons in the republic.

In the circumstance that developed, the internal affairs agencies took appropriate steps to identify those drivers and stop their actions, as a result of which 192 of them were given fines, 106 had their driver's license withdrawn, and 23 were subjected to administrative arrest. They included Yerevan resident Oganeg Mgerovich Grigoryan and Yenok Mishayevich Yenokyan, neither of whom work anywhere; David Rafikovich Muradyan, resident of the village of Nalbandyan, Oktembereyanskiy Rayon, worker at the Lenstroy Trust in Leninakan; Samvel Sashikovich Abramyan, worker at Salon Zakaza Obuvi; Martiros Yesayevich Petrosyan, welder at the Yerevan Trade Technicum; and others. It was also established that, as a consequence of the irresponsibility and the unsupervised actions of a number of managers of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, official motor transport had also been used in the crude violations of law and order that had been committed.

Materials pertaining to a large group of these persons were sent for consideration by the management and the party, Komsomol, and trade-union organizations of the enterprises and institutions for the taking of appropriate steps.

One's attention is also attracted by the fact that recently groups of young people in various parts of Yerevan have been stopping public transportation, evicting the passengers, forcing the drivers to stop working, and employing coercive actions against them. Those illegal actions have been disorganizing the work of public transportation and frequently create an emergency situation.

ArSSR MVD warns that persons who use violence toward passengers and drivers have been held, and will continue to be held, accountable for their actions in conformity with the law.

The MVD also reports that, as they attempt to guarantee public order, individual workers in the MVD system fail to cope with their duties in discontinuing the illegal actions of the violators and in taking steps to detain those persons.

For example, on 12 July, near the village of Marmarashen, Masisskiy Rayon, hooligan elements, for purposes of destabilizing the situation and increasing the tension, stopped truck transportation and destroyed agricultural produce that was intended for sale to the public in the trade network. The losses incurred by the state came to approximately 5000 rubles. However, the militia personnel who arrived at the scene did not take any decisive steps to identify and detain the participants in that criminal action.

Criminal proceedings have been instituted, investigation is under way, and the guilty individuals will be punished.

An official investigation has been carried out with regard to the indicated facts, and the guilty employees of the internal affairs agencies have been strictly punished.

5075

Armenian CP Buro on Local Party Tasks in Light of NKAO Decision

18300408b Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
24 Jul 88 p 1

[Article: "At the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia"]

[Text] **The buro of the Communist Party of Armenia, at its session, discussed the tasks of the party's city and rayon committees and the republic's primary party organizations in the light of the decree issued by the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet, entitled "The Decisions of the ArSSR and AzSSR Supreme Soviets on the Question of Nagornyy Karabakh."**

The Armenian CP Central Committee Buro has noted that the consideration, at the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, of the decisions issued by the ArSSR and AzSSR Supreme Soviets with regard to Nagornyy Karabakh is evidence of the tremendous amount of attention that the CPSU Central Committee is paying to the fates of the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples. This very important political document, which was adopted on the basis of the results of complete consideration, provides the correct resolution of the question and conforms to the fundamental interests of the peoples of both republics and the interests of all Soviet citizens. The Presidium decree and the statement made by M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, contain well-principled evaluations of the situation in Armenian SSR and Azerbaijan SSR as a result of the events in NKAO, and define the real ways to stabilize that situation and to get out of the blind alley that has been created. CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet, and USSR Council of Ministers have planned major steps to guarantee the further development of the economy and of culture, to raise the standard of living of the workers in NKAO, and to reinforce socialist legality, and have created the necessary prerequisites for expanding the ties between NKAO and Armenian SSR.

It is fundamentally important that the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet has deemed it advisable to send to Nagornyy Karabakh its representatives, who will operate in close cooperation with representatives of AzSSR and ArSSR to guarantee the unconditional fulfillment of the decisions that have been enacted. A specially created commission of the Soviet of Nationalities has been given the responsibility of studying the

questions which were raised at the session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and which, as they are prepared, will be submitted for consideration by the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet.

Participants at the Presidium session expressed the concern felt by all the fraternal republics for the events that have been occurring in Armenia and Azerbaijan. It was emphasized that the agencies of authority took a superficial approach to evaluating the situation that had developed, failed to realize the political danger of the unsubstantiated appeals to reconsider the existing national-territorial structure in the region, and occupied a passive, wait-and-see position.

Individual irresponsible individuals have been attempting to pursue a policy aimed at confrontation and to heat up passions. As a result, the situation in the republic continues to be strained. The rallies and demonstrations in Yerevan and other cities that are being carried out by the so-called Karabakh Committee, which was abolished by a decree of the Presidium of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet, have gone beyond the confines of legality and taken on a politically harmful nature. Incendiary appeals to commit illegal actions have been issuing from them. Irresponsible groups of rally participants blockaded the Zvartnots airport, disrupted the work of enterprises and transportation, and carried out other antisocial actions.

Strikes at many enterprises have considerably harmed the national economy and people's welfare. The disruption of the contractual pledges has had a very detrimental effect on the operation of a large number of the country's enterprises.

Recently, individuals with an extremist mentality have been calling openly for including as part of the party and trade-union committees and the soviets at labor collectives "their own" people and have been making statements in an inadmissible form against the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The party committees in the emergency situation were unable to lead the people, to persuade them not to engage in poorly thought-out actions, or to convince them that pressure on the agencies of state authority would not lead to anything other than the aggravation of the situation.

No decisive steps were taken to discontinue the activities of the so-called Karabakh Committees. The primary party organizations did not see any danger in them, or the inflammatory, provocational nature of their actions. Many of them have not yet given a political evaluation of the statements and actions of Communist Party members, individual administrative workers, or cultural and scientific figures who have not been occupying clear-cut and well-principled positions.

The Armenian CP Central Committee Buro has noted that the situation that was created in the republic is the result of crude miscalculations and errors in the political, organizing, and ideological work of the party committees and the primary party organizations.

The workers of Armenia was troubled by the serious shortcomings in economic and social development, by the ecological problems that have become more acute, by the major omissions in cadre policy, and by the violations of the principles of social justice. Such phenomena as protectionism, bribe-taking, and the "black-market economy" are widespread in the republic. There have been serious shortcomings in carrying out the Leninist principles of national policy.

It was perceived acutely in the republic that in NKAO, for a prolonged period of time, many questions affecting the national interests of the Armenian population, especially in the sphere of culture and education and in cadre policy, had not been resolved. However, the leadership of the Armenian CP Central Committee had not shown any initiative in raising and resolving the problems that had been building up in NKAO.

The shortcomings in the activities of the republic's party organization were thoroughly and sharply discussed at the June 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, but the buro of the Armenian CP Central Committee and the party, soviet, and economic agencies failed to make the necessary conclusions from the just criticism.

In a unanimously enacted decision, the buro of the Armenian CP Central Committee approved the decree of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet, entitled "The Decisions of the ArSSR and AzSSR Supreme Soviets on the Question of Nagorny Karabakh." It was noted that the enacted decree and the statement given by M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of CPSU Central Committee, at the session of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet are imbued with profound concern for the welfare of the Armenian nation, the Azerbaijani nation, and all the nations of the USSR.

Under the conditions that have developed, a different resolution would contradict the genuine interests of the nations of both republics, and would cause serious harm to interethnic relations.

The party's gorkoms and raykoms, the party organizations, soviet, trade-union, and Komsomol agencies, and social organizations must persistently and convincingly, from party positions, carry out work to explain the political meaning and importance of the enacted document and the principles and conclusions contained in the statement made by M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of CPSU Central Committee, among the Communist Party members, non-party members, and all segments of the republic's population.

It is necessary without delay to analyze everywhere, thoroughly and from all angles, the situation that has been created, to achieve the restoration of the normal labor tempo in the branches of the national economy, and to intensify the international and patriotic education of the population.

It is important to analyze carefully the activity of the so-called Karabakh Committees and to evaluate from fundamental positions the behavior of the Communist Party members who were attracted to them. Managers who displayed political immaturity must be held strictly accountable.

The buro of the Central Committee considers it to be a very important task for all the party, soviet, and economic agencies to extend aggressive work to resolve the problems that have accumulated in social development and to improve the moral atmosphere. The first-priority tasks must include the questions of providing the population with housing, kindergartens, hospital beds, clinics, and trade outlets. Special attention must be devoted to the employment rate of the able-bodied population and to increasing the production of foodstuffs. In practical work as a whole it is necessary to put in first place the fight to restore the principles of social justice.

It has been recommended to the Presidium of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, in conformity with the decree of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet, that they take the necessary steps to normalize the situation, guarantee the reinforcement of labor discipline and the strictest observance of the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws, and act decisively to discontinue any actions aimed at inciting national hatred or attempts to use democratic rights for antidemocratic purposes.

5075

Armenian Party Members Expelled for Yerevan Disturbance Roles

*18300409a Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
16 Jul 88 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "The Communist's Responsibility"]

[Text] The republic's workers have been expressing great concern about the situation that was created in Yerevan and in other cities and rayons. That situation is being heated up by irresponsible persons from the so-called Karabakh Committee, who have been attempting to resolve complicated national-territorial questions by exerting pressure on the agencies of state authority, in an atmosphere of heightened emotions and passions. At mass meetings and demonstrations, certain persons have been engaging in inflammatory actions, encouraging people to engage in poorly thought-out actions, and violating the established procedure. The completely unjustified strikes that are being held by individual

irresponsible elements have been inflicting serious economic and moral harm on the republic, and undermining its authority. Under these conditions the party organizations are acting permissively to the instigators and have not been giving them the proper rebuff. Individual Communist Party members who have lost their political vigilance have also proven to be caught up in the maelstrom of unhealthy emotions.

The buro of the Yerevan Gorkom of the Communist Party of Armenia has expelled from the ranks of the CPSU A. S. Manucharyan, nonschool and non-classroom work organizer at Yerevan School No 183, as a result of his nonfulfillment of the requirements in the CPSU Rules, which nonfulfillment was expressed in his continuing appeals for strikes, despite the decisions of the party agencies with regard to this question and despite frequent warnings, and also as a result of his failure to admit his errors.

The buro of the party's Abovianskiy Raykom has expelled from the ranks of the CPSU V. G. Yegibaryan, director of the cultural and sports center at the Abovianskiy Machine Plant, as a result of the political immaturity that he displayed, and actions that are incompatible with the rank of party member, which were expressed in inciting others to engage in strikes and disorders, thus leading to mass refusals to go to work.

5075

Gorkom Head Reviews Yerevan Situation in 17 July TV Appearance

*18300409b Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
19 Jul 88 p 1*

[Article: "Statement by M. S. Minasbekyan, First Secretary of the Party's Yerevan Gorkom, on Armenian Television on 17 July 1988"]

[Text] Good evening, fellow residents of Yerevan!

Obviously, in an ordinary circumstance my statement would be premature, because only three days have passed since the plenum. However, taking into consideration the extreme tense situation in the city and the continuing strikes at a number of enterprises, I have felt it necessary not to lose any time.

As a whole, during the period of the strike, the republic has failed to receive output valued at approximately 70 million rubles. Those are the direct losses. As for the overall losses, the figure can be increased by a factor of 10. For the city of Yerevan alone, the population has failed to receive approximately 400 apartments, accommodations for 300 students, accommodations for 200 children in kindergartens, and 150 hospital beds. During one day of strike, we fail to activate approximately 32

apartments, and this is almost equivalent to one ten-story building. This is occurring at a time when there is a waiting list in the city of Yerevan of approximately 150,000 persons. Who, then, are we punishing, comrades?

As always, in a stressful situation the prices jump up at the market, and all aspects of economic life become more complicated. But certain people are attempting to prove that all this is occurring in the interests of our citizens. Every striker fails to receive an average of approximately 100-150 rubles of wages.

In addition to this, we are suffering large psychological losses that we are all well aware of. Workers from many republics in our country are asking their fellow members of the working class not to disrupt their labor tempo.

Let's take a look and see if, perhaps, nothing has changed since the February days. In which case, as the expression, all means are acceptable. I can state firmly that this is not so. The problem of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast has become well known to everyone. The legal proceedings have been transferred to RSFSR, and the session of the ArSSR Supreme Soviet, with the active participation of the nation, enacted the decision that is well known to everyone. The statement made by Comrade S. G. Arutyunyan, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia, presented the clear-cut and acceptable position of the republic's party organization. Finally, the 19th All-Union Party Conference was held, and that conference adopted a special resolution dealing with the national question; and a Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee to deal with the national question is being prepared. We all have been discussing decisively the Sumgait events, and this is, in general, natural. It is difficult to imagine a normal person, regardless of his nationality, who could find even the slightest justification for this. What, then, is the crux of the matter? In my opinion, a small group of people headed by the so-called Karabakh Committee, under the concealment of the Karabakh movement, is moving over into the area of political struggle.

In order to be convinced of this, all one has to do is to recall the appeals that have been issued in recent days. Those appeals have dealt with the turning in of Komsomol cards and with the need for people to prepare for the struggle, the difficult struggle not only for Karabakh. They also include the monitoring of the conducting of party meetings to hear reports and hold elections; the re-election of the soviets at labor collectives in order to include "their own" people there; the banishment of trade-union leaders; and many, many other things. There has also been a change in the methods: there has been an increase in the pressure exerted on deputies, a violation of the public order, the carrying out of violence against transportation workers, against labor collectives that are opposed to the strikes, etc. That is, the attempt is being made, in essence, to take over the control of the political system.

As I have previously said, the methods of exerting pressure are taking on an increasingly frank nature. In this regard I would like to say a few words about the blockading of the Zvartnots airport. Without repeating what has been said, since various comments have already been expressed on this topic, I would like to mention only one factor. At a time when the party and soviet workers, over a period of two days, were working with people to assure that they did not leave the air terminal complex, members of the Karabakh Committee, figuratively speaking, were sitting out the situation in the bushes. And even if they did appear, they made approximately one and same statement: "What can we do? The people won't listen to us." But after the lifting of the blockade at the airport began, the "leaders" were the first to leave it. Therefore, in my opinion, it becomes completely obvious as to who is guilty and who benefits from this.

I would like to say a few words about expelling Ashot Manucharyan from the ranks of the CPSU. He was invited to the party's city committee. A discussion with him lasted for approximately three hours. He had his errors pointed out to him. He was told that, by a decision of the party agencies, the strikes were deemed to be unacceptable, and yet he was continuing to instigate people and make appeals to them to participate in the strikes. A. Manucharyan gave completely unambiguous answers to all this: he was right and he would continue to do what he had done. Moreover, to everyone's surprise, he stated that he thought he had been invited to come to the gorkom in order to "barter," that is, he thought that the discussion would result in mutual concessions. But, naturally, he was told that he was a Communist and a member of the party's city committee, and that posing of the question was simply unacceptable. After which the question was submitted to the buro. I must say that here too Comrade Manucharyan's comrades attempted, so to speak, to make him listen to reason, but, unfortunately, nothing came of that. Therefore the question of his expulsion was unanimously resolved. When he felt that the situation was becoming more complicated, he stated only one thing to the buro of the city committee: if you do this, it is not precluded that terroristic acts might follow. Moreover, those would be terroristic acts for which he would bear no responsibility at all.

Incidentally, one can already discern here the work style of the Karabakh Committee. It is expressed approximately in the following: it is our job to tell people what to do, but we are not responsible for the consequences, however negative they may be. It is the government, and only the government, that must be responsible for the consequences. That is, the real conditions are created to come out unscathed each time. Are we really to believe that it is possible to fight for the interests of a people while completely freeing oneself of responsibility?

I must say that Ashot Manucharyan was expelled correctly. Certain people ask how this should be understood from the point of view of paragraph 10 of the CPSU

Rules. I want to say that those who have read the CPSU Rules, before they reached paragraph 10, must have read paragraph 9. I shall read it to you: "A Communist who has committed a misdemeanor answers for it first of all to the primary party organization. In the event that the Communist is brought to party responsibility by a superior agency, the primary party organizations is informed about this." Consequently, there are no doubts concerning the legality, if one can express it in this way, of the expulsion of Ashot Manucharyan from the ranks of the CPSU.

Comrades! It is that irresponsibility, irresponsible statements such as this, that are complicating very much the life in our city. Who should be responsible for the losses that we are incurring? Who will answer for the incendiary appeals? Who will answer for the persistent cultivation of the concept "nation," behind which there is no sight of individual people with their concerns or, in general, of their difficult life? Those constant appeals to the people, these statements in the name of the people, have completely excluded from one's understanding individual people with their concerns. This is not surprising, when it was necessary for me, for example, to speak about the fact that the operation of the urban transportation system is simply necessary for the life of the city. We have elderly people, we have sick people and children who have difficulty going places on foot in this kind of heat. But the answer would be approximately, "Let those old people stay at home! They're not supposed to be out strolling!" Are we really to believe that that is an Armenian's answer? Our nation has always been proud of its respectful attitude toward our old people, and that always has been mandatory, and will continue to be mandatory. Statements like that are simply not statements that we have made. Therefore, comrades, I am convinced that the party's city committee and the Communists in the capital, together with all the workers, will wage a decisive struggle against irresponsibility. We shall not allow the demagogues to encroach upon the authority. And I state that firmly to everyone.

And one last thing. What shall we do in the future? What is our attitude toward mass meetings? We discussed that question very seriously and for a very long time at the party's city committee. We propose the following: tomorrow, everyone, without exception, should go back to work. This is the basis of the normalization of the situation, without which it will simply be impossible to carry out any further normalization of the situation. At the party's gorkom we are developing measures to normalize the situation and have asked all the gorkom members to present their proposals. I think that the participants in this should include both the individual citizens of our city and the labor collectives. And I request that, with regard to all these questions and proposals, people get in touch with the organizational department of the party's gorkom. And it is not mandatory for this to be in written form. This can also be done

by phone. I think that we will be able to take into consideration all the comments and proposals in order to work out a program that would be acceptable to the population of our city.

We have already taken the first steps. I must tell you that a decision has been adopted to ensure that every week, on Tuesday and Thursday, at definite hours, the gorkom secretaries or the deputy chairmen of the gorispolkom will make statements. There is just one purpose for these chats—the providing of constant information to the city population about the events that are occurring, and about the life of the city, so that the people will be completely informed. But, most important, we want to use these statements to wage a decisive struggle against rumors, which, in my opinion, are basically the result of the actions of irresponsible, selfish people. That is, the rumors are spread deliberately, but this is not the only matter. I think that broadcasts such as this would be very beneficial. I must also say that a direct line will be set up during the broadcasts. The questions can either be asked ahead of time, with the person knowing about those broadcasts, or can be asked during the course of the broadcast itself. When our future work program is ready, and I think that that will occur somewhere in the middle of August, we intend to conduct abroad discussion of it in the city, with the participation of the entire population. It is completely unprecluded that such discussions might occur at mass meetings also. Incidentally, our attitude to mass meetings is completely unambiguous: we consider them to be a completely normal phenomenon, especially under the conditions of the expanded democracy and glasnost. But we are in favor of mass meetings that occur within the confines of the law. We are in favor of mass meetings that are held during nonworking hours. We are in favor of mass meetings that do not violate the public order and do not bar the road to transportation. We are, finally, in favor of mass meetings that are of a constructive nature. But, comrades, you and I still have a lot to do. I have in mind also the problems of providing people with water and housing, and problems of the ecology. Finally, without enumerating all these problems, about which you are very much aware, I have in mind also the fight against bribe-taking, corruption, speculation, and protectionism. That is, the fight against all kinds of negative situations. And if it can be expressed in a single word, comrades, you and I will have to work very, very hard to assure that all the principles of social justice are restored properly in our city. It seems to me that the restoration of the principles of social justice is definitely the chief question for us. And I think that we do not do this, we shall not achieve anything. But if we have done it, if we have restored the principles of social justice, if we use people's active participation, we shall achieve a very great deal. But we must march hand in hand with all the inhabitants of our city. Only in that way can all of us, together, resolve all these questions. You and I simply do not have any other way.

Armenian-Azerbaijani Unity Urged

'Our Common Land'

18300339a Baku MOLODEZH AZERBAYDZHANA in Russian 16 Jun 88 p 2

[Unattributed report: "This Is Our Common Land"]

[Text] Those words—"this is our land"—in various languages and with various meanings are being repeated at demonstrations and rallies in Baku, Yerevan, Stepanakert... It has turned out that the slogan that previously united neighbor nations which had lived for centuries side by side on the same common land, sharing woes, joys, and misfortunes, has suddenly become the symbol for territorial claims and interethnic frictions.

The rallies, marches, demonstrations, frankly hooliganistic attacks, strikes, pogroms, hunger strikes, lines of refugees, blood, and finally... More and more people both in Armenia and Azerbaijan are coming to the logical question: when will all of this end?

When? It is difficult for any one person to answer that question. It can be answered by the peoples of both republics—by their intelligent actions and by their response to unintelligent actions. The rally on 13 June at Ploshchad imeni V. I. Lenina became the answer of labor Baku to the provocative attacks that had occurred recently. That rally was testimony to the consolidation of the healthy forces and of their firm resolve to prevent emotions from taking the upper hand over reason.

There has also been a consolidation of the healthy forces in NKAO, although it must be said that this has proven to be more difficult there. The Buro of the Nagorno-Karabakh Obkom of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan has provided a sharp party evaluation to the situation that has developed in the oblast; the Stepanakert gorkom and the party's raykom have been given the responsibility of taking exhaustive steps to assure the immediate cessation of the rallies and marches.

The number of rallies and other manifestations and demonstrations of people's opinion were more than sufficient throughout the republic. The question has been resolved: by a democratic, constitutional way. The Presidium of the AzSSR Supreme Soviet deemed it to be unacceptable to transfer NKAO to Armenian SSR. Thus the Presidium expressed the will of the republic's people. The final resolution of such questions is within the competency of our republic, and that decision must be known to everyone: Nagornyy Karabakh as an autonomous formation remains part of Azerbaijan SSR.

This is our common land—the land of Armenians and Azerbaijani, of people of other nationalities who are residing in NKAO, Azerbaijan SSR.

We continue to get telephone calls from readers who are agitated by the events in Nagornyy Karabakh and around it. But we must note that, after the rally at which the first secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee spoke, the voices contain more optimism, more hope and conviction that the situation will normalize.

We did not ask the nationality of the persons who called. But many of them, when introducing themselves, mentioned that nationality themselves. "I am an Armenian," Baku resident Stella Grigoryan said, for example, "and I am all the more indignant at the behavior of the people in Stepanakert. Isn't it obvious that their position is leading to an aggravation of the interethnic relations? It seems to me that we need stronger measures to be applied to the instigators, and to those who have already been staying off the job for the fourth week. They are the ones who are causing tremendous harm to our oblast, our republic, and the entire country. They ought to be punished for this."

Many people nowadays are talking about the need for strong measures to be applied to hooligans and troublemakers. Makhir Aliyev, a student, told our correspondents at a rally: I am ashamed of the people who are attempting to provoke conflicts in Baku; they shame all of us. People like that ought to be separated from the nation behind whose name they hide; it is time to use power against them; I think that we students must unite into *druzhinas* that would patrol the streets and stop all kinds of provocations.

Worker Iskender Zeynalov immediately objected to him: why just the students? What about us workers? These people are shaming the nation, and they must be given a rebuff by the entire nation.

This is our common land, and consequently we, and no one else, must introduce order on it. We must stop the outrages, we must take the troublemakers by the arm and censure them, we must unmask the zealous loudmouths for whom personal popularity that is based on speculations with national feelings is dearer than the fundamental interests of the nation, both Azerbaijani and Armenian.

One can change the names of streets and squares. Sometimes this is even necessary. But will that alone change their outward appearance? Will the roads become better as a result of that, will the housing expand, will the water supply improve? In Baku, Sumgait, Stepanakert, and other cities and rayons in Azerbaijan during the years of stagnation which we used to call emotionally quite recently "the Red Banner years," a tremendous number of social and economic problems accumulated. That was the consequence of the many years of the "volitional style" of resolving matters, a style that did so much harm to the republic and the nation, when a person's personal career and the interests of the clan were put above the fate of Azerbaijan and the country. It is necessary to

analyze the processes that occurred in the republic in recent years. Because the events in Nagornyy Karabakh are also, to a definite degree, a consequence of them.

Our readers mention all these things, as did the participants of the 13 July rally, right on the square itself, as they discussed among themselves the statement made by A. Kh. Vezirov.

Recently, even before the rally, we received a telephone call from Manaf Mamedov, who identified himself as an engineer at one of the Baku plants. The question that he asked is rather exact: "Aren't the anti-perestroika forces attempting, by inciting national passions, to divert the attention of all of us away from the republic's social misfortunes and the persons guilty of them?" It would seem that Comrade Mamedov got his answer at the rally: "...The anti-perestroika forces are attempting to compromise the policy of democratization and glasnost and to aggravate the interethnic relations even more. We are well aware that definite individuals have even gone so far as to beat up troublemakers who had the goal of repeating the tragic events in Sumgait and Askeran. At such time they had no aversion to those who had drunk a bit too much, who gave narcotics to minors and parasites, and who promoted frankly nationalistic slogans."

Answers were also received for many other questions linked with social problems. Our housing, our health, the air that we breathe, the food that we eat—all these matters contain a large number of problems that cannot be resolved in just a single hour. Those problems, which agitate many people, also were mentioned at the rally, and the frankness with which that was done, and the level at which the problems were stated, instill optimism. We agree: their resolution requires time. But not only that: it also requires the efforts of all of us, both at the level of ideas and decision-making, and when we are implementing the decisions. At the present time our new leadership needs our help also—first of all to normalize the situation; we shall render it, we all—the healthy majority—shall consolidate ourselves and give a decisive rebuff to the troublemakers.

Chanting slogans, staying off the job, and tearing down street signs are actions that do not require any great amount of intelligence or any great love for one's people.

But doing things to assure that the events that happened in Karabakh and Sumgat, in Askeran and Ararat, will never be repeated, is more complicated and more difficult.

But we do not have any other path. This is our land, we must live on it, and must continue to live on it for centuries.

Together.

'Historical Friendship'

18300399b Baku MOLODEZH AZERBAYDZHANA in
Russian 23 Jun 88 p 2

[Interview with N. Shakhnazaryan by N. Abduragimov
(AZERBAYDZHAN GYANDZHLYARI, 21 Jun 88):
"A Nation True to Friendship"]

[Text] Starting in the morning of 21 June, people made telephone calls concerning an item published in the AZERBAYDZHAN GYANDZHLYARI newspaper. The interview that associates had had with Comrade N. Shakhnazaryan, chairman of the Nizaminskiy Rayon Ispolkom, had evoked a positive response in readers of different nationalities. Our readers, on the other hand, telephoned us to request that we publish a translation of the interview. We are fulfilling this request, after making, however, certain abridgements in it.

[Question] Nikolay Petrovich, are we correct in thinking that you are familiar with the message sent by the Armenians living in Baku to the Armenians in Nagorny Karabakh?

[Answer] Yes, I have read both that message and the article "Let's Look Truth in the Eyes," by Communist Party member Aleksandr Mizoyan, which was published both in MOLODEZH AZERBAYDZHANA and in AZERBAYDZHAN GYANDZHLYARI. Consider that my signature appears both under the message and under A. Mirzoyan's article.

[Question] Do you consider it necessary to add anything to them?

[Answer] I would like to add a lot to the questions raised both in the message and in the article "Let's Look Truth in the Eyes." First of all, that it is not seemly to abuse hospitality or to trample the truth. How can one violate a friendship that has given us so much? Take me, for example. I was an ordinary worker at one of the Baku enterprises, and my comrades elected me deputy. For a certain time I worked as the deputy chairman at the Ordonikidzevskiy Rayon Ispolkom in Baku. For the past several years I have been in charge of an ispolkom in a rayon having a population of more than 160,000.

Most of my friends, both in Baku and elsewhere, are Azerbaijanis. And not only I, but all the members of my family are friendly with Azerbaijanis. We are proud of that friendship. During all these long years we have nothing but good from Azerbaijanis. Even now, when endless rallies are being held in Stepanakert, calling for separation from Azerbaijan; even now, when in Armenian SSR, despite all the rules and laws, people are considering questions that are the prerogative of Azerbaijan SSR, and that, naturally, encounters a lack of understanding, as well as indignation, here in Azerbaijan; even now my Azerbaijani friends call us daily on the telephone, emphasizing their friendly attitude to our family. I do not know another nation that is so true in its

friendship. As for the question that has been troubling all of Azerbaijan today, the demand to transfer NKAO to Armenian SSR... Stating it outright, this demand has caused harm to the relations between two nations that have been fraternal since ancient times. And it must also be stated outright that the Azerbaijanis have no blame in this matter. Because the ideas that have shaken our friendship were advanced primarily by Armenian troublemakers. They were also the first to change over from words to deed.

It was they who cast a shadow on the name of the honest Armenian workers. Armenians who prevent other Armenians from living peaceably will someday answer for this. These people are enemies of the Armenian nation. They do not think of the fact that Armenians live not only in Armenian SSR, but also throughout the country and in many other countries of the world. What, then, will be the attitude toward them after these events? I can express in this way the opinion of honest Armenians living in Baku and other cities in the republic: we are ashamed, and cannot look Azerbaijanis in the eyes, although we do not have any blame for any of these matters.

Respecting the nation with which you live side by side, the nation of the republic on whose territory you live—what can be more natural? Or more obvious than the fact that Nagorny Karabakh has been and continues to be the land of Azerbaijan.

I also want to say that the present situation in NKAO and around it was the result not only of the indecisiveness on the part of our republic's leadership, but also, and especially, the decisiveness on the part of the law-enforcement agencies. Because the AzSSR Criminal Code contains Article 62, "Sabotage," in which it is stated: "Action or inaction aimed at undermining the industry, transportation, agriculture, the monetary system, trade, or other branches of the national economy, or the activity of state agencies or social organizations with the purpose of weakening the Soviet state, if that act is carried out by means of the use of state or social institutions, enterprises, or organizations, or by means of the opposing of their normal operation, is punished by incarceration for a period of from 8 to 15 years, with the confiscation of property, and with exile for a period of from 2 to 5 years, or without exile."

Are we really to believe that this law could not have been implemented from the very beginning of the events in NKAO? Because this is the direct duty of the law-enforcement agencies. If the troublemakers had been identified promptly, could the events have taken on such scope? But now we are forced to eat the fruits of these events: the large amount of deprivation that hinders the normal lives of people, plus the large economic damage. Because a tremendous damage has been inflicted on our republic's economy during the past four months! During the critical period when the republic is changing over to cost accountability. Who is supposed to pay for this? Once again the working people? No! We must be able to

differentiate among people and to identify those who, hiding behind the back of the working people and covering themselves by its name, are carrying out all kinds of provocations. We must punish them severely and within the shortest period of time. As the expression goes, better late than never. I see that the way out of this situation, in the name of preserving the historic friendship between our two nations, lies in this.

[Question] **The session of the AzSSR Supreme Soviet has rendered its final decision with regard to NKAO...**

[Answer] Yes, the session expressed the will of the entire people in the republic: we do not agree to the separation of Nagorny Karabakh from Azerbaijan. I was among those who voted for that decision.

[Question] **Thank you for this frank discussion.**

[Answer] Thank you also for giving me the opportunity to express everything that has been boiling inside me.

'Stab in Back of Perestroyka'

18300399c Baku MOLODEZH AZERBAYDZHANA in
Russian 23 Jun 88 p 1

[Letter to editor, signatures at end: "Full of Alarm and Anxiety"]

[Text] At the present time, when the events in Nagorny Karabakh and around it have reached their limit, we, the representatives of the 200,000 Armenians living in the city of Baku, are seized by alarm and anxiety, by deep unrest at everything that has been occurring, because the situation that has been created is extremely tense.

This is the fifth month that passions have been blazing around a question which, essentially speaking, ought not to be. The reasons for its arising and the specific ways to resolve completely, from Leninist positions, the problems that have come to a head were provided in the Message of M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the Workers and Peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers have enacted a decree dealing with the acceleration of the socioeconomic development of Nagorny-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. A program to accelerate the oblast's social and economic development and to raise the standard of living of its population has already been developed and is being implemented. That program sets as its goal the satisfying of the workers' interests and demands.

These measures will require as much as 400 million rubles of capital investments. Those millions, which are so necessary for the country's perestroyka, have been given by the country to Nagorny Karabakh.

And if the Communists and all the workers of Karabakh trust and want perestroyka, then the time is long since come to roll up our sleeves and start working. There is a tremendous amount of work to be done. But apparently this kind of approach is not to everyone's liking. Personal vanity takes the upper hand. The enterprises are not operating.

This is a stab in the back of perestroyka and our party's bright plans.

Involuntarily the question arises: where are the troublemakers, extremists, and nationalists leading the people? Specifically what goal do they set for themselves and what do they hope finally to achieve? Not a single person with common sense will find for that question an answer which would correspond to any extent to the yearnings either of the Armenian or the Azerbaijan nation. Because it is only the enemies of perestroyka, the enemies of the age-old friendship between the Azerbaijan and Armenian nations, that could, during this period of time that is so critical, so revolutionary for our party and our country, waive our ideals and advance absolutely unacceptable claims.

We censure them in the most decisive manner and demand the taking of effective steps with regard to the troublemakers, extremists, and their accomplices.

The real state of affairs attests to the fact that the events occurring in Nagorny Karabakh are the work of individual persons who are attempting to use for their own purposes the tense situation that has been created.

We are completely in favor of the democratization of all aspects of our life, but we are categorically against using its opportunities to allow any incidents of arbitrariness, chaos, or disorders to occur.

The normalization of the situation in NKAO and around it, as is attested to by the facts, also depends largely upon the state of affairs in Armenian SSR.

We hope that our fellow countrymen, the nation and the workers of Armenian SSR, will prevent any actions that lead to the aggravation of the situation or the worsening of interethnic relations.

However, the tension in the area has been growing. How could it happen that in Azerbaijan recently there appeared people who had left their homes in Armenia? Who must put an end to these outrages?

Why are steps not being taken? How could it happen that this is the fifth month that we have not known even the most elementary calm? Who will answer for the traumas inflicted on the still weak souls of our children?

The tardy, sluggish resolution of the questions that have accumulated has been destabilizing the situation in Baku, where, for five months, by the efforts of the party and soviet agencies and the workers, a normal labor tempo has been preserved.

In the name of the 200,000 Armenians living in the city of Baku, we request the taking of urgent steps to introduce order in NKAO, and to bring to party and criminal accountability the persons responsible for the situation that has been created.

We cannot wait any longer!

[Signed]

Ayriyan, A. A., AzSSR minister of timber and wood industry; Gabriyelyan, N. V., deputy chairman, Azeritifik; Bedzhanyan, A. S., procurator, Investigative Administration, AzSSR Procuracy; Ogandzhanyan, M. G., first deputy chairman, Azerselkhozkhimiya Association; Grigoryan, A. V., deputy editor, KOMMUNIST newspaper (in Armenian); Karamayan, L. M., deputy editor, KOMMUNIST newspaper (in Armenian); Ayrapetov, B. A., deputy chairman, Bakgorispolkom, chairman of Bakgorplan; Sarkisova, Zh., S., procurator, Department for Supervision of Criminal Cases Considered in the Courts, Baku Procuracy; Gazaryan, R. M., procurator, Department for Supervision of Observance of the Laws in ITU [corrective-labor institutions]; Mezhlumyan, N. A., chief accountant, AzSSR Procuracy; Oganessian, L. V., chief of special and general unit, Baku Procuracy; Gevorkyan, S. A., steward, AzSSR Procuracy; Gasparyan, E. S., assistant procurator for supervising the execution of laws in transportation; Petrosyan, E. A., senior inspector, AzSSR Procuracy; Parsadanov, O. V., procurator, KGB department; Arzumanyan, A. A., manager of Bakremstroy Trust, deputy to Bakgorsovet; Ambartsumov, A. S., bureau member, Leninskiy Raykom, Communist Party of Azerbaijan, chairman of party commission attached to party raykom; Aseryan, M. S., fitter-toolmaker, Baku High-Voltage Equipment Plant, deputy to AzSSR Supreme Soviet; Bagiryants, R. S., deputy chief, Kaspromneftegazprom VPO, candidate of economic sciences, Honored Worker of USSR Gas industry; Bunyatyan, M. B., chief of operations administration, Azerbaijan Bank of USSR Promstroybank; Vartapetyan, L. I., first deputy chief, Bakvodoprovod Administration, AzSSR Honored Worker of Housing and Municipal Management; Gasparyan, G. G., deputy to AzSSR Supreme Soviet, leader of brigade of installation workers, DSK-2; Gaykazyan, S. N., chief engineer, Bakgaz PGU; Grigoryan, G. A., leader of brigade of armature workers, DSK-2, Glavbakstroy; Danelyants, R. N., senior instructor, Baku Higher Party School; Yegiazarov, V. P., deputy ispolkom chairman, Leninskiy Raysovet of People's Deputies; Oganyan, A. Kh., chief engineer, Bakkanalizatsiya Administration; Oganov, S. A., doctor of technical sciences, professor at Azneftekhimiya imeni M. Azizbekov, recipient of AzSSR State

Prize, Honored Worker of USSR Gas Industry; Safaryan, R. V., leader of combined brigade, SU-9, Sotskultstroy Trust, member of BK, Azerbaijan CP; Ulubabyan, S. V., deputy to AzSSR Supreme Soviet, delegate to 19th All-Union Party Conference, baker foreman, Bakkhlebozavod No. 2; Shakhnazaryan, N. P., ispolkom chairman, Nizaminskiy Raysovet of People's Deputies; Khalapov, A. L., retiree.

5075

New Lithuania-Poland Border Checkpoint Opened
18000635a Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 1 Jul 88 p 2

[ELTA report: "To Poland Through Lazdiniai"]

[Text] Lazdiniai, 30 June—Today in this rayon at the state border of the Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic a border checkpoint was opened. The first to cross were Polish students headed for our republic for vacation, and our Pioneers who spend the summer in neighboring Poland. The route into the Polish People's Republic has now been shortened by several hundred kilometers, so now tourists in automobiles and trucks with freight will not have to drive through Belorussia.

B. Zaykauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Gosplan spoke at the opening and noted that the new border checkpoint will add a new quality to inter-republic relations. Already scientists are cooperating with one another on problems of history and literature. They conduct ecological research and solve agricultural and other problems. Many industrial enterprises and agricultural collectives have set up direct ties. They cooperate in production, exchange equipment and technology. Thanks to trade across the border, the republic's stores have a diversity of products and offer unobtainable items. This border checkpoint will further strengthen ties in all areas of life, facilitate the possibility of meetings of specialists, and it will also be more convenient for tourists.

Z. Kurovskiy, PPR deputy minister for foreign economic cooperation, spoke of the stable, historical cooperation of neighboring republics and its further improvement under new conditions.

B. Zaykauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Gosplan, K. Stontselis, first secretary of the Lazdiyskiy raykom, I. Buynauskas, chairman of the Lazdiyskiy rayispolkom, Z. Kurovskiy, PPR deputy minister for foreign economic cooperation, V. Berdyga, PUWP first secretary of the Suvalkskiy voyevodship committee and K. Yablonskiy, head of the Suvalkskiy voyevodship, cut the ribbon. The national anthems of the PPR, the USSR and the Lithuanian SSR are heard.

The following participated in the opening of the border checkpoint: V. Mikulchyauskas, Lithuanian SSR minister of foreign affairs, N. Raguotis, head of the Lithuanian

CP Central Committee department of trade and municipal services, M. Sadovskiy, head of the Central Committee department of foreign relations, P. Makritskas, minister of transportation, M. Obedzinskiy, PPR consul general in Minsk, R. Petrauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian Society of Friendship and Cultural Ties With Foreign Countries, A. Petraitis, head of the Vilnius Section of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Tourism, and other official party and soviet workers of the republic, representatives of the headquarters staff of the Baltic Military District Border Guards, leading workers of the Lithuanian customs service.

A meeting of representatives of the twin-collectives of Lazdiyskiy rayon and Suvalskiy voyevodship was held.

UD/313

Proposed Boycott of Lithuanian Newspaper TIESA Criticized

18000635b Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
17 Jul 88 p 2

[Unattributed report: "At the Lithuanian CP Central Committee"]

[Text] The movement for restructuring made public a resolution "On the Newspaper TIESA," in which is included, along with constructive criticism of the work of the editorial collective, a series of unfounded, offensive attacks.

Unutilized resources exist in the work of the editorial board of the newspaper TIESA, as in the republic's press on the whole. The press should not only actively promote perestroika, but should restructure itself in the spirit of the resolutions of the 19th Party Conference.

Acknowledging the constructive criticism addressed to the newspaper TIESA, the Lithuanian CP Central Committee considers the resolution "On the Newspaper TIESA," especially that part in which it is recommended to boycott the newspaper, not to buy it and not to subscribe to it, to be unfounded, antidemocratic, contradictory to the principles of glasnost, freedom of the press and socialist pluralism.

For its part, the editorial board and the party organization of the newspaper TIESA should radically restructure their work and more actively participate in propaganda and the implementation of the resolutions of the 19th Party Conference.

It is recommended that party gorkoms, raykoms and primary party organizations constantly work together in the party press. UD/313

Latvian Demographic Statistics Examined

18280074z Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
4 May 88 pp 2-3

[Article by P. Eglite, head of the LaSSR Academy of Sciences Department of Manpower Resources under the "Conversations With Readers" rubric: "A Model for the Future—The Family As Seen by a Demographer"]

[Text] Fairly recently, the LaSSR ranked a strong last place among the other union republics in birth-rate and natural population growth figures, and first place for the number of divorces per 1,000 marriages.

This is because, at the time, our country was undergoing a general trend which was exacerbating our demographic situation: the number of people born was not completely replacing the members of the older generations, and the average life-span was getting shorter.

According to data from research conducted as far back as the 1960's by the Central Statistical Administration and the republican Ministry of Health, republican demographers had found the basic reasons for the low birth-rate: contentment with the existing number of children (less than two, on average), the difficulty of finding places for them in pre-schools, crowded living conditions, low per-capita incomes in families with several children, the total number of people employed and undergoing training, family conflicts....

Consequently, proposals were formulated on measures for increasing the number of children in families. Propaganda programs were set in motion to encourage families to have three children. Some kolkhozes began paying benefits to young mothers. In May 1980 a decree designed to improve the demographic situation was adopted by the LaSSR CP Central Committee and the republican Council of Ministers. It provided certain benefits for families with three children, outlined plans for expanded production of children's goods and for increasing trade in these goods, provided facilities for marriage ceremonies, etc.

Results have not been long in coming. As long ago as 1981, before the all-union measures to aid families with children were put into effect in November 1982, more second and third children were being born, and the overall birth-rate began increasing. When mothers began receiving partial paid child-care leave, one-time birth benefits for the first three children and a number of benefits for mothers with two or three young children, the birth-rate and the natural growth of the population showed marked increases and reached the highest levels attained during the 1950's. The average number of children born per woman increased from 1.9 at the end of the 1970's to 2.09 in 1985-1986. According to this indicator, we no longer rank last among the union republics, are ahead of the UkSSR (2.07) and are practically even with the BSSR.

However, it is still too soon to talk about a final breakthrough. It has been estimated that at the younger generation's present rate of marriage, infertility and death, in order to accomplish full generation replacement (and the corresponding constant renewal of the numbers of the entire able-bodied population as well as the natural movement of the population), every woman needs to have 2.15 children, or at least 2.5 per family.

So we can see that this goal has not yet been reached. And the negative factors cited above are still making themselves felt. This is why continued efforts are needed to overcome hindrances to increasing the number of members in families with three and more children. This is precisely the aim of the comprehensive program, "The Population of the LaSSR," in force in the republic since 1986. The program calls for the provision of a full complement of places in preschool institutions and extended day-care classes, improvements in housing distribution, the setting up of family services, the provision of counseling for family conflicts, improved methods for treating infertility, upgrading of the list of jobs proscribed because of hazards to women, and for setting up work-places with shortened work-days for mothers of young children. More emphasis will be put on propaganda related to the moral values which our children can acquire only through education.

To be sure, the creation of the necessary material and moral prerequisites has an effect primarily on the behavior of families who want to have several children. But it is no simple matter to form such socially-oriented behavior. Although a certain percentage of couples prefer not to have children, almost 20 percent lean towards limiting themselves to an only child. This choice is not determined only by opportunities, but by a great many other reasons as well.

Thus, families living in rural locales traditionally have more children than urban families. The former have already attained the level which, in the language of the demographers, ensures full generation replacement. (Thus, the migration of recent years of rural residents into the cities, which has practically ceased, has proved to be an objective aid in improving the general demographic situation). As for urban families, 2.6 for men and 2.4 for women represent not the actual, but the desired (with the necessary favorable conditions) number of children.

The widespread opinion that less-educated women have a greater desire to have children has not been corroborated. Our data irrefutably show that the increase in the birth-rate runs parallel to the rise in the educational level. Nine out of ten newborn children in Latvia are born to mothers with college or full middle-school educations.

According to data from a random sample survey conducted in 1978-79 by the LaSSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, urban women with higher educations want even more than the average number of

children, with women who failed to complete their middle-school educations wanting fewer. It is another matter altogether that all the desired conditions, including giving educated women the opportunities to successfully combine their professional work with the raising of their children, have not been provided. Since increasing efforts have been made under restructuring to improve these conditions, the level of women's education has also failed to hinder increases in the number of children in families.

Along with the increased birth-rate, each newborn child needs to be ensured of a long and productive life, so that everything it took for the family to care for, and which society had to pay to form this person can be paid back with interest. Unfortunately, we have thus far had only modest successes in this matter. True, the infant mortality rate in Latvia—13 per 1,000 newborn—is almost half the average for the country and is higher than just the LiSSR (11.6 per 1,000, as of 1986). However, 18 European countries have lower levels than ours, and in some of them—Iceland, Sweden and Finland—it is less than half as high.

Thanks to its relatively low infant mortality rate, the average life-span of the Latvian population is also above the average for the country. However, in this case, the infant mortality indicator (which is relatively favorable), does not show the big picture. It is a case of our being 7th with regard to life-span among the union republics—after Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, Belorussia, the Ukraine and Estonia. Consequently, the rate of premature death for our mature population is higher than in the above-named republics. The average life-span for men here is 65.5 years, or 5 years less than for men in the Armenian SSR, 9 years less than for our women and 9.5 years less than for Iceland, whose men live longer than other Europeans.

One of the main reasons for this short life span is a widespread unhealthy way of life. Prior to our stepping up the war against drunkenness and alcoholism in 1985, the average life-span in our country was even lower, at 63.6 years for Latvian males. Thanks to the limits on alcoholic beverage consumption, the frequency of accidental deaths, injuries and traumas to men fell by 27 percent, as did deaths from diseases to respiratory organs, though only by 13 percent. These are the reasons that reducing the number of fatalities has lengthened the life-span. However, as has already been mentioned, this is still far lower than what is possible, and the few measures already taken to combat drunkenness and smoking are clearly not enough for us to achieve further successes.

The measures called for in the above-mentioned goal-oriented program "The Population of the LaSSR" and aimed at improving the state of our population's health and lowering the premature death rate, will expand the material base for active leisure, improve students' diets and better inform our young people about possible ways

to live a healthy life, will eliminate unhealthy conditions in industry, and will make the urban environment more healthy. The latter measure will obviously be considerably enhanced by our recently-developed environmental protection program.

Every collective, every family and every person can and must join in the struggle to create healthy living conditions. Only then will we have any hope, not only for consolidating the thus-far-achieved improvements in the demographic situation, but also for continuing to advance towards full replacement of generations and for long and healthy life.

12659

Latvian Arrests, Sentences for Demonstrations Reported

*18000663a Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
28 Jul 88 p 3*

[Unattributed report: "At the Procuracy of the City of Riga"]

[Text] Recently in Riga several meetings took place for which the organizers did not make preliminary application to the ispolkoms of the rayon soviets of people's deputies. This is a violation of Article 174-3 of the Latvian SSR Administrative Code.

The procuracy of the city of Riga reports that administrative sanctions for violating regulations for holding meetings have been imposed against E.A. Repshe, responsible engineer of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Polymer Mechanics, A.A. Pauls-Pavuls, instructor of the Mangalskiy Ship Repair Plant fire-fighting unit, and V.A. Titavs, supply manager of the 8th Riga Youth Sports School. An administrative deposition has been filed as well against pensioner E.K. Berklaivs, who has been issued a procuratorial warning about the unacceptability of his violation of regulations.

Administrative depositions in connection with Yu.Ya. Dobelis, engineer of the Latvian SSR Gosagroprom Republic Information-Computer Center for Material-Technical Supply, and V.K. Turins, instructor at the 2nd Riga Extended-Day School, have been forwarded for review by the administrative commission of the city of Riga Kirovskiy rayispolkom. A deposition has also been issued against A.I. Zhukovskis, resident of the city of Elgava.

By order of the Kirovskiy Rayon People's Court, M.Ya. Pukitis, senior laboratory worker of the Latvian State University imeni P. Stuchkis Botanic Garden, has been sentenced to administrative arrest for 15 days for violating public order.

The procuracy of the city of Riga is conducting a criminal investigation in connection with M.A. Luyans, VEF Production Association transportation worker. He

is accused of displaying a sign containing insulting, slanderous accusations directed at a number of leaders of the party and state organs of the Soviet Union and of the Latvian SSR. Under Article 204, Section 2 of the Latvian SSR Criminal Code, the actions of M.A. Luyans qualify as malicious hooliganism and can carry with them a sentence for imprisonment for a period of one to five years. M.A. Luyans was arrested on 27 July.

UD/313

LaSSR: Stricter Enforcement of Laws on Demonstrations Urged

*18000663b Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
29 Jul 88 p 3*

[LATINFORM report: "Activizing Procuratorial Control"]

[Text] On 28 July an expanded session of the Latvian SSR Procuracy Collegium was held, in which city, rayon, transportation procurators, responsible workers and secretaries of party organizations of the procuracy apparatus participated. The collegium reviewed the tasks of the procuracy organs stemming from the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Ya.E. Dzenitis, procurator of the Latvian SSR presented a report on this topic.

After an active discussion of the report's proposals, a resolution was adopted on concrete measures for the further restructuring of the work of the procuracy, which was called upon to strictly control the implementation of these measures using a uniform interpretation and application of the laws. Paramount attention must be given to the legal defense of individuals, the observation of political, economic, social and individual rights and freedoms of citizens, and the complete elimination of violations in criminal court procedures. One of the basic directions of the work of the procuracy, as before, remains the supervision of the implementation of laws on protecting the environment.

In the resolutions of the collegium, it was noted that measures in the republic for combatting crime are inadequate in their results. Goals were defined in improving the efficiency of the work of the organs of the procuracy.

Given the conditions of the political situation in the republic, the collegium obliged the procurator to significantly activize control over the implementation of laws which guarantee the national equal rights of all citizens in Latvia. It is deemed imperative that individuals making use of demonstrations and meetings to violate the social order and incite inter-ethnic dissension be brought to administrative and criminal justice in strict accordance with the law.

A.S. Pobezhimov, deputy general procurator of the USSR, Ya.Ya. Okherin, secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee, S.V. Zukul, chairman of the Latvian SSR Committee for State Security, took part in the work of the collegium and presented reports.

UD/313

Serpukhov Gorkom Battles Ministry on Environmental Issue

18300324a Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 May 88 p 6

[Article by Yuriy Kazmin: "Gorkom Against the Ministry"]

[Text] Alarm signals about the ecological crisis situation at the Kondensator Factory came from the medical service. The Serpukhov city party committee urgently created a special KNK commission, which included scientists and experienced specialists. What had taken place at the factory?

It must be said that the crisis did not break out suddenly. The medical and epidemiological station took its first administrative measures against this factory back in 1973 for its pollution of the environment with "various" substances, when the condensers began to saturate the environment here with foreign substances of the first danger category. This was being done with gross violations of the technology of processing condensers, and failure to observe the practices of drying, condensation and discharge of toxic liquid, so-called trichlordiphenyl. This trash has now been detected in the soil, vegetables, fruit and eggs at the local bazaar from nearby private garden plots.

Already from the second half of the 1970s the use of trichlordiphenyl as a dielectric fluid was prohibited in the majority of countries. Instead of it, construction of condensers with treatment by harmless liquids or dry execution began to be widely used. The leaders of the institute of power condenser construction (VNIISK), as the lead organization of the sub-branch, must know all this.

A characteristic example of harmless Soviet dielectric liquid is "Don." Samples of it were sent to VNIISK back in 1983, but the research center sent the testing document to its colleagues from GosNIikhlorproyekt only in 1987. According to data of VNIISK itself, "Don" is superior to similar foreign samples in its characteristics. It is also important to note one other thing. Production of "dry" condensers would make possible a radical solution to the problem of the ecology and automation of production. However, these developments are carried out feebly and ineptly, and therefore there are simply no regional plans for introducing them into production.

The commission established yet another scandalous fact. At the present time Serpukhov condensers, in which more than 50,000 tons of toxic substance are contained, are being used in the country.

"The absence of an existing technology for utilization of broken down condensers containing chlordiphenyls, and lack of control over the dumps where industrial wastes are discarded, may lead to contamination of the environment in other regions of the country as well," I was told by A. Volkov, first secretary, Serpukhov Gorkom, CPSU.

The "Branch Scientific and Technical Program for Development of Power Condenser Construction for 1986-1990," approved by the Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry, does not provide for the sub-branch to reach the world level, but locks in at least a 5 year lag. And the foreign economic activity of VNIISK amounts mainly to importing. Commission members were frankly amazed that many institute employees do not understand the crisis situation in which VNIISK finds itself with its experimental factory. The commission was still more amazed by the many years of inaction by the branch headquarters on this important question.

For dangerous contamination of the environment and criminal negligence, the commission recommended to the city people's control committee that it request the prosecutor's office to call forth criminal proceedings against the contaminators. The party gorkom instituted party punishment against many of them. The factory was fined a total of 285,000 rubles. But efforts to restore the environment will require still more funds.

The commission proposed to the Serpukhov City Soviet of People's Deputies that it look into the matter of closing Kondensator in the event USSR Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry does not fulfill all of the measures proposed by the commission for cleaning up production and the environment.

Today, owing to the principled efforts of employees of the oblast medical service, the Moscow-Oka Basin Directorate, and the party gorkom, the use of toxic substances in the factory is prohibited, and harmful technological lines have been sealed.

9069

Official Outlines Uzbek Environmental Protection Strategy

18300324b Tashkent SELSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 88 p 3

[Article by A. A. Alimov, deputy chairman, Republic Soviet Presidium, Uzbekistan Environmental Protection Society: "Green Fields, Fresh Air, Pure Water." First four paragraphs are boldface source introduction.]

[Text] Along with the most popular words today—perestroika, glasnost, democracy—the word ecology has begun to be heard more and more often. Publications in

the press, and discussions about the ecological situation in one or another region, are attracting general attention and heightened interest. The fate of Lake Baykal, the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, Lake Ladoga, and the Aral Sea has not left millions of Soviet people indifferent, and has aroused many to speak out, take a principled position, and stand up for protection of our environment. People who are not only competent, but even very far from the subject of dispute, are taking part in the broad discussion of ecological problems. Some rely on deep knowledge and many years of experience, and others simply on their emotions. But, no matter how it goes, the extensive and open discussion of the problems of the ecology, characteristic of the period of perestroyka, on the whole, has played a positive role. The broad masses understand the danger threatening society, and resolutely and openly come out against gross instances of interference in nature. Unfortunately, it is also more and more often necessary to confront the superficial and incompetent approach in discussion of ecological problems. Absurd and exaggerated statements about the present ecological situation, and gloomy forecasts of the future at times sow disbelief in the possibility of correcting the situation that has taken shape. And constructive proposals and practical recommendations for improving the ecological situation are extremely rare. Still more rarely can one hear about a personal contribution to protection of the environment.

Perestroyka has entered the second stage of its development, this fear of practical actions. Obviously, in questions of the ecology as well, explanations alone are insufficient. Here too it is already time to shift from words to deeds. Time to shift to all-round development and practical implementation of measures in every city and rayon, at the enterprise and in the school, in the residential section, the kolkhoz, sovkhoz, and not only in the country as a whole. And the benefit would be much more substantial if each of us, through his personal labor, created green places, and watched vigilantly for cleanliness and order in the home and around him.

The editors of our newspaper have asked veteran of the party and labor, one of the most senior workers in our republic, who is participating actively in its life today, Arif Alimovich Alimov, deputy chairman, republic soviet presidium, Uzbekistan Society for Environmental Protection, a number of questions.

How are things with environmental protection?

What is being done to preserve the environment?

What are the prospects and unsolved problems?

What is the role of society in the struggle to protect the environment?

Ecological Situation

"Let us begin in the order asked," states Arif Alimovich. "The ecological situation in the republic, without exaggeration, causes the most serious alarm and concern. The problems of protecting the environment have become extremely exacerbated and gone very far. And if decisive measures are not taken, extremely undesirable consequences are possible.

"Serious omissions and errors committed in management of the republic economy in the last 15-20 years have had a pernicious effect on the state of nature. Excessive fascination with extensive economic methods, and ignoring scientifically-based systems of agricultural production have had their effect.

"The yield of the land has sharply declined due to the thoughtless employment of mineral fertilizers and huge doses of toxic chemicals. This process is continuing. To our great misfortune, even today our republic is using many times more toxic chemicals, both per hectare and per capita, than the nationwide average.

"We have an impermissibly high level of dust and gas content, and pollution of the atmosphere. A careless attitude toward protecting and intelligent use of water resources has had a serious effect on the Aral Sea, which one time was rich in fish. The lower reaches of our rivers are turning into canals with waste water coming from the plants and factories, cities and agricultural lands. Forests in mountains and bottomlands are being cut, and the animal world is declining.

"The Ministry of Health alone can do nothing with dozens of ministries and departments that are systematically polluting the environment. The foundation of health is protection of nature from all manner of contamination. Mountain people live a hundred years, and it is not surprising—they breathe the cleanest air.

"Take such a component as water. We say: Water is life! But today this slogan is beginning to lose its meaning. Neither Syrdarya, nor Amu Darya, nor Zarafshan water is drinkable. Water purification equipment is not in operation in the majority of enterprises. Out of 11 fiber factories (all in Tashkent Oblast) 7 lack purification equipment. And at the other 4 the equipment exists but it is not in operation. Fiber factories require a huge amount of water for technological purposes, and 60 percent of the effluence is discharged right into the Akhangaran River without purification. Numerous animal husbandry farms have been built on the banks of rivers.

"There is a documentary film, 'How is Your Health, Syrdarya?' It reflects a mass of outrages. Horrible contamination and environmental pollution. It was widely presented, shown to deputies of the republic supreme soviet. A year later they went out and took a look, little had changed. They drove 1,500 km along the Zarafshan

River. What is happening is difficult to relate. Zarafshan means 'bearing gold.' But as a matter of fact, it is bearing almost everything. All the impurities from the swine farm at the Samarkand agricultural institute training farm are being discharged right into the Zarafshan. It is not even necessary to say how horrible this is for the population living there. But this troubles the institute leaders little. Students see all this. After all they are undertaking practical work in the training farm. They are taught ecology. And there are many such examples. Purification structures at the Kattakugan Oil and Fat Combine have been under construction for 10 years already, but completion of construction is not even in sight.

"Kolkhozes and sovkhoses have existed for a half century already, but in the majority of them normal storage houses for toxic chemicals have not been built. All discharges with toxins go into the reservoirs, and contaminate subsoil waters. And it is not at all a matter of financial means or construction materials; the requirement for them is not all that great. It is a matter of attitude. At the Alimkent Cotton Gin treated seeds lay for 13 years without inspection. When this was shown on television it was brought to order. This means it could have been done sooner.

"It has become popular to come out in defense of the environment, create tension, and appeal to higher authorities. But the majority of issues are of local importance, and depend on economic leaders and local soviets.

"The question of the Aral is a major question. Yes, and we ourselves are guilty for its dying. Who forced us to build cattle-breeding facilities on the riverbanks? Who is forcing us to store toxic chemicals under rain and snow?

"There are many troubles from the chemical industry. Our land is sick. And it is we ourselves by our attitude toward the land who brought it to this state. Along with harmful insects, we are also destroying useful ones.

"Working with a ketmen (Turkestan hoe) we obtained 30-40 centners of cotton per hectare. Now we obtain 23. First of all it is necessary to observe crop rotation. It is possible to sow alfalfa, and instead of that we sow cotton plants above the plan requirements. In the face of a norm of water expenditure per hectare of 10,000 cubic meters, we spend 17,000 and complain all the time that there is not enough water. For growing rice in Karakalpakiya, 50,000 cubic meters are spent per hectare, and it could be much less.

"We are afraid of punishing and levying fines for infringements against nature as is done in other countries. And for no reason.

"Assessing the state of nature objectively and honestly, it is necessary to recognize that it is more than serious, and that only urgent radical and decisive measures can restore the ecological balance."

A Measured Approach, Constructive Decisions

"The restructuring of the entire life of Soviet society that is taking place cannot avoid such an important sphere of the economy as environmental protection and rational use of natural resources. The problems of protecting nature have finally become the subject of extensive, open and public discussion. And with such decisiveness, and how uncompromisingly the CPSU Central Committee took up the most important environmental protection problems here and at Baykal, and Lake Ladoga, the Sea of Azov, and the Black Sea. The largest enterprises that were having a deleterious effect on nature were closed. And study of the problems of the Aral is now going on with such scope and so extensively and thoroughly. A specially created government commission is preparing measures on the rational use and protection of water resources in the Aral Sea basin. And it must be believed that in the immediate future a rational solution will be found.

"The Central Committee, Communist Party of Uzbekistan, Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers are continuously monitoring the ecological situation in the republic. The commission on environmental protection and rational use of natural resource of the republic council of ministers presidium regularly discusses this problem. Commissions of deputies on environmental protection of the UzSSR and oblast soviets are also paying attention to this question. Every year the republic government allocates more than 100 million rubles to environmental protection measures. All of this, of course, contributes to reducing the level of pollution of the biosphere. Nevertheless, we can in no way be satisfied with the state of the environment. The ministries and departments have for too long not listened to the voice of the public, and have had too liberal an attitude toward instances of violations of the law on environmental protection. Protection of the environment in our country is an integral part of state policy, stated Comrade M. S. Gorbachev at the 27th CPSU Congress. To my great sadness, so far neither the environmental protection, nor the law enforcement organs, nor the ministries and departments have changed their attitude toward the protection and rational use of natural resources. The roots of indifference, and at times even simply criminal attitude toward nature in their homeland are very deep.

"Through our own hands we have dealt tremendous damage to nature. But it is also within our power to cease this fatal process. It is possible and necessary not only to preserve, but also to multiply the riches of nature.

"Here is an example: The level of air pollution in 1987 in the republic not only stabilized, but even somewhat declined. Discharges of harmful substances into the atmosphere in Fergana, Samarkand, Bukhara, Syrdarya, Namangan and Andizhan oblasts have significantly declined. The use of toxic chemicals has been somewhat reduced. In Namangan and Syrdarya oblasts, as well as

in many republic rayons, the people have rejected the use of toxins and shifted to biological methods of protecting vegetation. This is very advantageous, both economically and from a social standpoint. The decision to prohibit completely the production and use of one of the strongest toxins, butifos was received by the population, especially the rural population, with great gratitude. This is a very vivid example of what society can achieve under conditions of glasnost and democracy. Or here is another example. The republic soviet of the Environmental Protection Society, along with the Uzbek Directorate of Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, Ministry of Automobile Transport, and the UzSSR MVD held a competition for the best automotive enterprise on organization of efforts associated with environmental protection. Many collectives took a serious attitude toward this competition, and this gave positive results. The content of carbon monoxide in the air was significantly reduced. In Tashkent, for example, it is now even lower than the permissible medical norms. This is the result of our efforts.

"However, far from everywhere are existing opportunities being used. The plan for putting purification structures into operation is not being systematically fulfilled. In 1987 the plan was only 65 percent fulfilled. And no one bore responsibility for this.

"Year after year the funds allocated for other environmental protection measures are not utilized. Our land is seriously sick. Approximately 700,000 hectares of arable land have been subjected to salinization, and approximately 80 percent to wind and water erosion. There are many reasons. One of them is a lack of forests. In connection with this, the UzSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium last year approved a resolution about annually carrying out a two month woods and garden project, as well as approved a request of the society to all residents to take an active part in planting trees and shrubs throughout the republic.

"Organizational and explanatory work was extensively developed, and the press, radio and television systematically provided information on the course of the two month project. All of this made it possible to overfulfill substantially the target for planting. Some 133 million nursery trees and plants were planted. Planting in the city of Tashkent and in Fergana and Dzhizak oblasts was especially well organized. Here the target was overfulfilled by 1.5-2 times. Navoi, Surkhandarya, and Andizhan oblasts, and a number of ministries, which did not meet the established targets, distressed us.

"It is necessary to take a careful attitude towards preserving the forests. It is necessary to prevent them from being cut down. You see, in our republic forests occupy a meager territory, equal only to one percent of the overall area.

"Unfortunately, dozens of our trees are disappearing, entire protective forest strips, as once was in the Kokand group of rayons, precisely where the winds are most fierce, and all of this was done with impunity.

"It is necessary to cherish the forests like the apple of our eye. And as much as possible plant new ones. Today the Ugam-Chatkal National Park is being created in Tashkent Oblast. And we hope that this picturesque corner of the republic will serve both for ourselves, and for future generations."

Some More Specific Deeds

"What can be said about the work of our environmental protection society? We are also restructuring in the spirit of the times. We will strive to assess the work of all our subelements according to the end result. The main goal of the environmental protection society of Uzbekistan, our voluntary mass public organization, is to contribute actively to implementation of the measures of the party and government for environmental protection, and rational use and reproduction of its riches.

"The society operates under the guidance of party and soviet organs, and structures its work based on the principles of broad democracy, initiative and independence of society members, and in close contact with social and cooperative organizations and state organs. Recently more attention has begun to be paid to visible agitation, and to making more active use of films, television, and radio, and to discuss more extensively questions of environmental protection in the press. More literature has begun to be published on the topic of environmental protection. We have begun to take a more critical attitude toward evaluating the quantitative indices of agitation and propaganda work. Whereas in past times those who organized the most lectures and carried out discussions and meetings received the highest evaluation, now other criteria are used: how much the environment and its air and sea basins were improved, how planting of forests was carried out, what was the growth rate of the planted nursery trees, etc. That is, what was the tangible end result, and how is the main objective of improving the environment and protecting natural resources being achieved.

"On order of the society, television took eight video films and seven topical films of the satirical newsreel 'Nashtar.' These films are known to broad layers of the population, and they were shown repeatedly on television. Showing films on environmental protection in the theaters and on television not only serves the ecological education of the population, but is also a means of emboldening negligent leaders and violators of the laws on environmental protection, and helps correct errors and omissions. But, even under conditions of glasnost and extensively developed criticism, some cleverly maintain silence, and give the impression that nothing

has taken place. Various competitions held with the union of journalists, Goskomizdat, and Gosteleradio are having tangible influence on the ecological education of the population.

"Businesslike, creative contacts have been developed in Namangan, Kashka-Darin, and a number of other oblasts, with the editors of oblast and rayon newspapers. Among the best editors are the oblast newspapers LENIN YULY of Samarkand Oblast, TASHKENTSKAYA PRAVDA, NAMANGAN KHAKIKATI, and others. Among the rayon newspapers are SHONGLI MEKHNAT of Dzhabdambayevskiy Rayon, UCHKUN, of Namanganskii, GALABA of Kitabskii rayons, and others. Among the large circulation newspapers are NAVOIYSKIY KHMIMIK and SOVETSKIY PEDAGOG of the Tashkent Pedagogical Institute, and MARGILON ATLASI.

"Unfortunately, not all newspaper editors are so active. Not once were represented in our competition the republican newspaper of Karakalpakiya, or rayon newspapers from Syrdarya or Tashkent oblasts. Of course, here this is most of all the fault of our workers, and the responsible secretaries of the societies in the oblasts, cities and rayons.

"Radio and television make an invaluable contribution to the cause of propagating ecological knowledge. The programs, 'Man and Nature' and 'Akhborot Criticizes...', and the radio news program, 'In Defense of Nature,' have become traditional. The judges at the republic competition noted interesting radio transmissions from the Bukhara and Tashkent oblast radio broadcasting committees, as well as Khorezm television.

"A series of photo selections, brochures and their literature have been published on the environmental protection topic. And this to a certain extent is having an influence on education of the population. However, effect from these training aids is still small.

"From the above it is clear that work at protecting nature is going on, and it is considerable. But, why then is the condition of the environment slow to get better, and in a number of places even worsening?

"The fact is that often there is no unity of word and deed, the gross approach and pretense are not yielding their positions, and deceptiveness and fraud have not been entirely eliminated.

"For example, 650 nature lovers' clubs, and 38 'Priroda' peoples' universities are numbered in reports, and in them thousands of pupils and students are receiving ecological knowledge. Not bad, right? But, this is only according to the reports. In fact, some of them do not exist at all, and in many the work is being carried out for show, in a slipshod manner. We say a lot about improving lecture propaganda. We approved a joint resolution with the Znaniye Society; however, locally nothing has

changed for the better. As before we find complacency and tranquility, and low demandingness toward oneself and one's comrades in joint work. As never before, energetic actions are now needed in the spirit of our tempestuous times.

"Our society is called upon to carry out a responsible and noble mission, and to make an active contribution to implementing the measures of the party and government on environmental protection, rational use of its riches in production, and education of broad strata of the population in the spirit of love for their home region.

"This has been clearly stated in a decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, 'On Fundamental Restructuring of Environmental Protection.' The decree criticizes social organizations for the fact that they are not paying the necessary attention to ecological education and indoctrination of people, or to raising the ecological caliber of all strata of the population, as one of the most important conditions for improving environmental protection.

"The environmental protection society in our republic represents a significant force. Oblast, city and rayon society soviets are in operation. They are headed by first deputy chairmen of oblast, city and rayon ispolkoms. In each rayon and city are our assigned representatives in the person of a responsible secretary of the society soviet, and more than 15,000 primary organizations have been created, which combine in their ranks approximately 4 million people and many other social formations on environmental protection.

"Recently a number of serious organizational measures have been taken to increase the activeness of the society. The exchange of membership tickets that was carried out played a positive role in strengthening the ranks of the society, and especially of the primary organization. Thorough organizational work preceded the exchange. As a result, in the majority of primary organizations the exchange took place at a good level. And most importantly, this campaign disclosed serious shortcomings and omissions in the work, in counting society members, and in the activity of primary organizations, and at the same time helped, to a certain extent, end the practice of falsification and deception, and also to get rid of other negative phenomena.

"In connection with the end of the terms of authority last year, an electoral campaign was conducted in the primary organizations. Particular attention was paid to the selection of chairmen of primary organizations and the leaders of other formations. Many outstanding new comrades, responsible and conscientious, arrived, among them enthusiasts and good economic specialists. And where people are restructuring their work in the spirit of the times, with a sense of responsibility, the results are apparent.

"According to the results of the 1987 work, the Kashkadar Oblast section took first place in socialist competition. The Samarkand, Namangan, Andizhan, and Bukhara oblast sections, and Tashkent city section of the environmental protection society worked well. Well thought out, balanced planning in their work, timely implementation of planned measures, continuous and businesslike ties with primary organizations, environmental protection and law enforcement organs, effective use of agitation and propaganda materials, and initiative in their work are characteristic of them. Among the best are the primary organizations of the rug factory in the city of Almalyk, the Kuylyuk experimental reinforced concrete bridge design factory, the EPAP automotive enterprise in Tashkent, Andizhan School No 50, the Margilan silk combine, School No 63 from Samarkand, Sovkhoz imeni Dzhumanazarov in Kegeyliyskiy Rayon, and many others. These organizations are working with initiative, chose good leaders, and most importantly are achieving positive end results in protection of the environment.

"However, on the whole the status of the work of the society cannot satisfy us. A substantial portion of the sections, and the republic soviet itself are working in the old way in many things. We are often satisfied with the quantitative side of matters, and evaluation according to the end result is having difficulty making its way, at times causing bewilderment and even dissatisfaction. The main reason for all of our troubles is poor attention to the work of the primary organizations, and they are, you see, the foundation of the society.

"Unfortunately, many of our workers do not fully understand this. Otherwise what explains the fact that in 1987 the Bukhara, Kashkadar, Navoi, Samarkand, Surkhandarya, Fergana, Khorezm and Tashkent oblast sections did not create a single primary organization. And in Karakalpak, and Andizhan, Navoi, and Fergana oblasts, last year not a single person was received as a society member. And our base is huge. A society member can be any citizen of the Soviet Union who has reached 10 years of age.

"The level of work of the society depends to a great extent on the style and methods of work of the republic soviet and its sections. Even though presidiums are held regularly, the most important questions of environmental protection are examined, and good decisions are made, if the ecological situation does not improve we cannot give our work a favorable assessment. In recent years society members have repeatedly directed attention to the fact that the state environmental protection organs are subordinate to different ministries and departments, and defend primarily their own narrow bureaucratic interests, and that existing laws on environmental protection artificially divide nature into its component parts. Seven ministries and departments were engaged in questions of environmental protection, and this interfered with achieving the necessary results.

"Now more favorable conditions are being created in the organizational plane. By edict of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, recently a state committee of the Uzbek SSR for environmental protection was formed. It is based on the Uzbek Directorate of Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, Gosagroprom, the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, the Ministry of Forestry, and a number of other organizations. It was created for the purpose of improving the management of environmental protection and regulating the use of natural resources.

"It is now the sole organ for state monitoring of environmental protection. And the society is faced with concentrating its main efforts on working with the public, and actively involving it in environmental protection measures.

"Restructuring is gaining speed and has encompassed all aspects of our life. And we workers and activists of the environmental protection society also must significantly increase our work.

"Yes, this is truly necessary. The problems of ecology in the modern world are so significant, and so important for mankind, that they are placed beside, right behind the problem of a nuclear free world, and they trouble progressive mankind. We often hear and read that the problems of environmental protection and their favorable solution depend on high levels. And this is true. But it is also necessary to look at the other side. What has each of us done to protect the environment, and to create a favorable ecological situation in our own home localities, where we live, work and rest. And here, if each of the 4 million members of the society does even a small, but practical step, to the benefit of environmental protection, tremendous positive advances would take place. This, no doubt, is the main task of the Uzbekistan environmental protection society."

9069

Ethnic Newspapers To Be Published In Moldavia
18000640 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Aug 88 p 1

[Report by N. Gusarov: "Newspaper To Be Issued In Three Languages"]

[Text] As of tomorrow, in addition to the basic daily newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, there will appear two socio-political biweeklies as supplements to the paper. In translation their titles will read "The Native Word." One will be in the Gagauz language and will be called ANA SOZU; the other will be in Bulgarian and will be called RODNO SLOVO.

The fact is that the territory in which the Moldavian SSR lies today has from time immemorial been inhabited by large groups of Bulgarians and Gagauz. These peoples have preserved their traditions and speak their own

native tongues. Moreover, they have preserved the sources of their national cultures, despite close relations with their Moldavian neighbors. The decision to publish the two new newspapers is the realization of the constitutional right of each nationality to have an organ of the press in its own language.

UD/311

Bus Drivers' Strike in Kishinev Discussed

18000650 [Editorial Report] Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian on 13 July 1988 published on page 3 a 1600-word article by E. Shalimov under the "Party Line" rubric entitled "After the Strike." The article reports that a strike by the Kishinev bus drivers took place on 12 July 1988 and that it was condemned as a "deviation from the principles of socialism" at the ad-hoc meeting of the party. The article notes that the strike was organized by "informal leaders" and that the party aktiv of the bus drivers was "unable to exert any influence on the events." Measures to prevent the occurrence of strikes are stressed by the article, pointing out the need to "improve the collective's standard of living."

Improved Subterranean Water Resource Development Urged

18300325a Moscow NASH SOVREMENNİK in Russian No 4, Apr 88 pp 139-146

[Article by V. I. Nikitin, candidate of technical sciences: "Too Many Cooks..."]

[Text] Quite recently the press (including NASH SOVREMENNİK No 7, 1985; No 1, 1987) published articles against the strategy employed for many years by the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, which is aimed at "turning the rivers around," and just criticism was leveled at the situation itself, when it has become possible to accept gigantic ruinous projects that divert human and material resources from the vitally important tasks of the national economy.

As a result of these adventuristic projects there was a clear-cut manifestation of the departmental expenditures-oriented mechanism, that exists only for the effective pumping of money from the state budget into the ministerial pocket. But the thing that has served as the basic "elaboration" is the imperfect system of relations between the customer (agriculture) and the contractor (Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources), by which the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources independently decided where, when, and how much land it was to irrigate or drain, and, in essence, acted itself in the role both of customer and contractor, leaving the disenfranchised kolkhozes and sovkhoses only the right to use the dubious fruits of the "improvement."

Since the creation of Agroprom, which was supposed, according to intention, to eliminate this abnormal situation, and, in particular, to set up the job in such a way that the funds which the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources owns are used effectively to fulfill those tasks of land irrigation and drainage that are assigned to it by agriculture. However...

It is well known that effective administration is accessible only to the Owner. This is an axiom in social life. But there is no Owner of the water in our country. Like the land, water legally belongs to the state, but on the countrywide scale no one answers to anyone for it. For example, Gosplan, Minvodka, and Gosagroprom engage in planning the distribution of water resources; prospecting is carried out by Gosstroy, the Ministry of Geology, and the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources; monitoring is carried out by the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, the Ministry of Geology, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of the Fish Industry, and the ispolkoms. In water supply, where designing, construction, technical operation, and elimination of water-management projects are under the supervision not just one category of water-users, as ought to be the case, but at the very least to seven different categories, an especially motley situation has developed. Everyone designs to his own specifications, everyone builds wherever and however he wants, and the technical operation is done from situation to situation... And so it turns out, as in the famous proverb, that "Too many cooks spoil the broth."

It would probably be possible to eliminate many of the undesirable features in water supply by intensifying the monitoring of the activities of the water-users. But are we really to believe that the consumer will begin to monitor himself effectively, as is stipulated by the modern structure of administration? Or are we hoping that various consumers, various departments, will begin to supervise one another for the common good?

Unfortunately, experience shows us that it is simply for departments, as it is for people, to establish a certain unspoken deal among themselves and to "fail to notice" the neighbor's transgressions. And the fact that this kind of collective selfishness ("You leave me alone, and I'll leave you alone") is akin to collective insanity: all of us together are squandering the by no means bottomless source of the existence of our very life—but that's a matter of no consequence!

Paradoxical as it sounds, for the departmental psychology the preservation of the purity of our rivers, lakes, and subterranean springs is something incidental, that does not pertain to the situation at hand, although, as an individual consumer of water, every worker in those departments, obviously, does not want himself or his children to use water that has been poisoned by pesticides or industrial runoff.

Prior to the creation of the Agroproms, the self-elimination of the customers from the administration of their own water management was explained, on the one hand, by the "dependent" psychology, by the attempt to make one's own life easier by narrowing the group of questions to be resolved, and, on the other hand, by frequent subsidies from the state budget to cover the losses. The appearance of the Agroprom led only to having those losses now being covered not only by subsidies, but also by profits from the sale of agricultural produce. And all of this is yet another subjective reason for the poor business practices—the underestimation of the role played by water in the development of agriculture—and as a consequence, the lack in the Agroproms of water-supply specialists, the low level of operation of water-management systems, the activation of inferior and incompletely built projects, etc., etc.

As a result of the departmental strategy of Glavnechernozemvodstroy and RSFSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, organizational questions pertaining to the comprehensive water supply of settlements, animal-husbandry complexes, and animal farms have remained unresolved for years, and the technical administrations of those organizations have done almost no planning to resolve the technical and technological problems. Moreover, the administrative subdivisions of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources have practically no specialists in locating and using underground water, and its production subdivisions have few engineer-technical workers specializing in water supply. It is difficult to believe, but even in the leading departments of those organizations many of the engineers have never seen "in real life" a well, a pumping unit, etc., that is, the things that they deal with every day on paper. And this situation is observed in many construction-and-installation, repair, design, and other organizations of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources.

It is extremely telling that Glavnechernozemvodstroy's Administration for Land Reclamation and Water-Management Construction lacks, strange as it seems, even a department for the construction of water-supply structures. Just one leading engineer in the irrigation department is responsible for this kind of construction. And even then he is responsible only for material-technical support.

The departmental strategy of developing water reclamation has not only caused economic damage to the national economy, but has also led to harmful ecological and social consequences. One need only recall the essentially squandered Lake Sevan and the dried-out Kara-Bogaz, the foolishly drained swamps and the swamped land, the dried-out wells and the uncontrollable foundations of underground water from neglected wells, the lack of fish in small rivers and the flooded villages, and many other things that must be saved, restored, or mourned as being irreversibly lost. Therefore there is

nothing surprising in the fact that the land reclaimer has begun to be associated frequently in the public's mind with the concepts "destroyer" and "squanderer."

Frequently the question arises, "Has anyone checked the practical benefit from irrigating where that should not be done?" In a serious way, probably not. In the arid parts of the country, irrigation is necessary. But is it really necessary to construct irrigation systems in the Nonchernozem Area of the central chernozem oblasts (TsChO), where there has been a stable rate of more than 600 millimeters of precipitation a year? That is nothing but a waste of funds. For example, in Kursk Oblast during the past 15 years approximately 220 million rubles were expended for irrigation, but the harvests, as reported by the local press, have been falling per hectare of irrigated land to levels below those of unirrigated land. Moreover, in the TsChO, as is attested to by specialists, no more than 3-5 percent of the land-reclamation structures are operated (and even this is under pressure from above). At the remaining structures, the sprinkling equipment is either rusting from not being used, or is just dumped into the ditches. In addition the land-reclamation structures are frequently activated hurriedly, or else at the very end of the year, when frosts are on the ground.

A no less depressing situation exists in the Nonchernozem Area.

So it turns out that before land reclamation the kolkhozes were poor, but after it they became even poorer. Because the depreciation deductions from the kolkhoz and sovkhoz cashboxes constitute annually thousands and tens and thousands of rubles! What kind of profitability is this?

But the most alarming situation is that the Agroproms cannot fail to know either about the intricate mechanism of land-reclamation construction or about the fact that the agricultural enterprises do not want it or cannot oppose it. The essence of this mechanism can be summarized as follows.

Using the funds allocated by the state for the development of land reclamation, the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, according to a plan that was previously drawn up and coordinated with Gosagroprom, plans and carries out the land-reclamation construction in the rural area. At such time the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources associations and trusts construct a large number of structures that the rural areas do not need, but the Minvodkhos boards of directors order the construction of those structures and provide for their transferral to the agricultural enterprises. It is as though the boards of directors, subordinating themselves to the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, must defend the interests of agriculture. Is that possible? It would seem that there is only one answer. Why not, then, subordinate the boards of directors to Gosagroprom, making them a real customer? It would seem that this is impossible, and this is

why: the farms will not order the construction of structures that they do not need, and the incompleting constructed ones or the ones with inferior construction will not be accepted and put into operation. As a result the associations and trusts with large-sized PMK will remain without any work and it will be necessary to disband them partially. Apparently the same fate will befall the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources with its subdivisions.

Now would be the best time to reorient the activity of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources with water reclamation for water supply. But instead of that, a search is under way for new alternatives for improving water reclamation. People are thinking, for example, of requiring the associations and trusts to operate the reclamation structures being built by them. This would seem to be reasonable. If they themselves will operate them, then they will build them better and it will be more profitable for the farms. Actually, however, it will be more profitable for the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, since it will begin to take money not only for the inferior construction, but also for the inferior operation of what has been built. In addition, it will not have any increased responsibility, because it does not answer for the final product of its activity. In this kind of situation it will be easier and calmer for the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources to use the funds that have been allocated for land reclamation. Because now, when the plan is "hot," the person who is criticized severely at the ministry board is not so much the association chief or trust administrator who does not guarantee the prompt and efficient completion of construction, as the manager of the board of directors who fails to guarantee the prompt activation of the structure (that is, who has failed to foist that structure on the farm). Under the new conditions there will be no one to criticize severely.

Today the efforts of the water-management organizations are directed at achieving a continuous water supply for farms at any price, and, properly speaking, it is difficult to see anything reprehensible in this. Is it really possible, for example, to deal with the losses if, at a kolkhoz animal farm, the livestock has not been watered and complaints are coming in from the public about the interruptions in the supplying of water? Nevertheless continuous water supply should not be equated with effective water supply, as is done in the practical situation, or, even more so, be elevated to the rank of water-management strategy.

We shall say something more. In order to assure that our home always (!) has tasty and pure water, we must be concerned precisely about the effectiveness of acquiring, storing, transporting, and purifying it, rather than only being concerned about its quantity. The path to effective water supply lies through the improvement of the technical and sanitary condition of the water-intake structures, the reduction of the quantity of equipment outages, the reduction of the length of emergency periods,

the observance of protective measures... That is, a mandatory condition for effective water supply is its **quality**.

On the other hand, in order to guarantee the continuous supply of water, it is by no means mandatory to put the equipment in order, because many technical problems (the rupturing of the hermetic seal on wells, the destruction of a water tower, the deactivation of lightning protection, etc.) do not influence that process. But everyone knows the serious consequences to which they can lead. The reduction in the number of emergency outages is also not a mandatory condition for continuous water supply, since it can be achieved by excessively increasing the labor expenditures and the expenditure of material-technical resources for the restoration operations. If, for example, at two wells at a structure (one of which is a reserve well) the pump is alternately taken out of service and replaced, the supplying of water to the consumer will not stop, but there will arise a shortage both of equipment and of labor resources.

The continuity strategy to which, following the old way of thinking, the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources organizations still adhere is an expenditure-oriented strategy that is advantageous only for the contractor department. It is that strategy which, to a large extent, gave rise to that calamitous situation in which water supply in the rural areas has found itself. And the contractor has no plans to change that strategy, because it is completely to his liking. Under the conditions of uncontrollable water use and the continuity strategy, all one's miscalculations can easily be written off as the poor business practices of the incompetent customer. If, for example, there are not enough pumps, then the customer is to blame. If the structures are turned over before construction is completed, he is to blame for that too. If the wrong things are being built, or if they are being built in the wrong places, he is to blame for that too. If the wells are gushing like fountains, it is also the customer's fault. And no one will prove otherwise, because water-supply specialists are not invited to the nondepartment commissions, and intradepartmental ones simply do not exist.

The present-day water-management strategy must be aimed not at the continuous supplying of water, but at the effective supplying of it. And that task requires a large amount of concern of all kinds.

In olden times the people in the water-construction occupations were respectfully called water-pumping and water-raising experts. In those days it was an extremely difficult job to find water under the ground. With the aid of a dousing rod—a primitive indicator of an underground spring—they would find water, would dig wells by hand, and would also build by hand gravity-feed water mains. And they built them in such a way that, as we look at what they created with their hands, we continue to this day to remember them with admiration.

Today the previous names of the water-construction occupations do not exist, although specialists do find and supply water to the consumer. The concept of "well-digger" disappeared from our vocabulary long ago; the word "driller" is associated with the concept of "prospector of mineral resources" or "oil worker." In addition, we have not only depersonalized the specialists in the water-construction occupations, but have also begun calling them reclamation specialists. Thus it can be said about the people in water construction, "Of all the occupations, this is the only one whose praises have not been sung in poetry or songs." And yet its praises ought to be sung, inasmuch as this is a very difficult occupation.

Despite the requirements stated in the Labor Code, the workers in drilling and water-main crews work, as a rule, during the entire period of daylight, but drillers also work around the clock. At such time the individual output per person reaches 30,000-40,000 rubles a year, but his earnings are no more than 250-300 rubles; in terms of an eight-hour shift this currently constitutes only 120-150 rubles a month.

The noticeable bias at the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources in the direction of water reclamation operations also has an effect upon the unequal status of the workers in the reclamation and water-management organizations, and that status, in turn, has an effect upon the quality of water supply.

The drilling and water-main brigades execute operations on the entire territory of an oblast or ASSR, live in field trailers that are poorly provided with amenities, return to relax with their families only two days a week, and the men are pensioned at the age of 60 years. But reclamation workers, as a rule, return to their families every day. Their retirement age (with easier conditions) is 55 years of age. The heavy labor of the drillers and water-main workers is not encouraged by paying them increased wages, reducing the retirement age, improving the working conditions, awards for many years of exemplary work, the awarding of titles, etc. Therefore it is no accident that the personnel turnover rate in drilling operations reaches 50-60 percent, and young people do not want to work under the complicated field conditions without receiving substantial benefits in exchange.

The high profitability of the water-management mobile mechanized columns and construction-and-repair administrations is frequently used by the reclamation associations and the trusts to which they are subordinate for purposes of covering the losses of the reclamation PMK. As a result the water-management workers prove to be in an economically disadvantageous position, in which their wage fund is cut, as much as 30 percent of the material-incentive fund is withdrawn, and the "excess" working capital is taken back.

The intradepartmental inequality of the water-management PMK and the construction-and-repair administrations is intensified even more by the underestimation of the results of their activity. For example, in each of the five central chernozem oblasts of RSFSR, the reclamation operations are carried out annually for a total amount that exceeds 15 million rubles, at a time when a large number of the constructed projects are idle. In contrast to this, practically all the newly constructed projects in water supply are operated, and the annual expenditures for water supply within the confines of 3-5 million rubles are insufficient to satisfy the requisitions issued by the agricultural enterprises. In addition, funds which are, in general, insignificant are expended for the capital repair, remodeling, and elimination of water-management projects, although tens of thousands of water-intake and water-main structures are in unworkable and half-ruined condition.

The most substantial shortcoming of construction planning lies in the fact that it is based on the notorious "gross." The volume of contract operations is planned in rubles; the amount of drilling of rocks is planned in meters; and the length of water-main networks, in kilometers; however, the final result—the extent to which the farm is provided with water—is not planned. If one takes, for example, the building of wells, then, paradoxical as it sounds, in this matter the drillers' goal of finding water has definitely yielded to the goal of fulfilling the plan. Gross planning has led to serious moral changes also in the worker's psychology. Former drillers, who are now retired, have told me that in days gone by they were ashamed to hand over for operation wells that yielded less than one cubic meter of water an hour. That was a disgrace and a compromising of the high rank of "expert water-raiser." But what is the situation now? The main thing is to fulfill the plan, to report "meters drilled," even though grass wouldn't grow there. The present-day drillers are not embarrassed that the farms will have to pay unjustified expenditures to construct additional wells or that the obtaining of water by means of a pump greatly exceeds the productivity of the wells. Because, to justify themselves, they can always find an important "reason." If only the reason is that the plan is a law for the enterprise!

The measures undertaken by the party and government to convert industry and capital construction to low-level planning, self-support, self-financing, and cost accountability are also needed in water-management construction.

However, we assume that those measures will be effective only after the fundamental restructuring of the administration of water use. Who, one might ask, needs that kind of cost accountability when the payment will be made on the basis of the number of meters drilled, and the drilling brigade already works the entire period of daylight? And what about self-financing under conditions of social injustice with respect to the water-management PMK and contract-and-repair administrations? There are many such questions.

Monitoring of the construction of water-management projects is not carried out by another—not the contractor, the customer, the design organization, or the financing agency. As a rule, the state commission signs the acceptance-transfer document, so to speak, without looking at it, in the offices, without taking a trip out to the project. In addition the commission is not competent to evaluate the quality of the basic structure—the wells. Here the contractor is subject only to geological monitoring. But this monitoring is carried out, as a rule, only once every few years, and even that is at operating projects, when it is impossible to correct defective work.

Wherever projects are built in other than a complex, the state commission does not exist at all. If people have drilled a well, for example, and have drawn up a bilateral document with the customer, that finishes the matter. But who is going to build a pumping station, adjust the control system, or bring in electric transmission lines? Well, they reply, this is something for the customer to worry about! And that is why the newly built projects either have not used for a long time by the farms or are operated before they are completely built.

There exists another unattractive side to the lack of monitoring. Not a single commission is capable of determining that the depth of a well is less than the depth paid for by the customer, or that the cement to line it was used at all. Everyone is very well aware of these and other "professional secrets," but people generally do not talk aloud about figure-padding.

In addition, drilling or water-main equipment that is produced in series is practically unadaptable for water-management construction in rural areas, as a result of which one sometimes observes a strange contradiction between technical progress and new technology. Whereas the cost of drilling rigs during the past 15-20 years almost doubled, their productivity increase by no more than one percent. Or, for example, prior to the 1970's the excavator used was the multibucket ETU-354, which was simple in design, which cost 8000 rubles, and had a mass of 12.5 tons, but then the water-management organizations began getting ETTs-252 excavators with a cost of 25,000 rubles and a mass of 25 tons. Transporting this kind of heavy equipment for a distance of up to 200 kilometers or more (and, moreover, over dirt roads with wooden bridges) began to be much more complicated. As a result the labor productivity remained unchanged, but the production costs increased noticeably.

Many technical, technological, and organizational questions pertaining to construction production are either not resolved at all, or are resolved at the PMK or construction-and-repair administration level.

Not too long ago—20-30 years ago—the streets in settlements had several wells with pure, tasty drinking water. It was also fairly easy to find a specialist (a well-driller) to build that kind of well, and the price of 30-40 rubles for every meter drilled was to everyone's liking. The years

went by, and now one can see, where the wells used to be, water tanks that are rusted and leaning to one side, or that are completely grown into the ground, that freeze over in the winter and break at any season of the year. The water in them frequently not only contains iron, but is simply rusty. If anyone wants to have a drink of tasty well water nowadays, it will not be easy to do that. At best the local residents have succeeded in saving one or two wells. But it is dangerous to drink water from old dilapidated wells without boiling it. If one wants to dig a well somewhere else, it is difficult to find a well-digger. But if, let's assume, you do find one, he will definitely not be an experienced one, and moreover he will charge 100 rubles for every meter of depth. Where is an ordinary kolkhoz member supposed to get money like that? Because it is also necessary to buy scarce reinforced-concrete rings.

According to data provided by Yuzhgiprovdokhoz Institute, the number of shaft-type wells in the villages and settlements of the RSFSR is supposed to decrease from approximately 516,800 in 1983 to 85,800 in 2000. But the number of drill holes and water-main networks is supposed to increase by a factor of 2-2.5. I am not opposed to drill holes and water mains. But is it really necessary to destroy the wells? Because people need them also.

The places that especially need them are the orchard and vegetable-garden associations and the homestead farms, since the water is also needed during the wintertime, when the tank pipes freeze and the public water-supply system is not operating. Currently many people are beginning to understand this. But the RSFSR does not have any state contractors to build ordinary wells.

In order to provide water to individual consumers in Kursk Oblast, the following method is being used successfully by the capable hands of the local PMK-11: a small bore hole is drilled and is equipped with a Malys household pump to serve several households. The well is serviced by the residents themselves. It is cheap and convenient. This arrangement, which is advantageous for everyone, should be extended throughout the country. But the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources and Gosagroprom are not doing anything about it. Meanwhile it is being actively introduced by private individuals, using state equipment and stolen pipes and filters. Two to three hundred rubles is the cost of the well.

From my own personal experience I know that water for orchard growers is problem number one. That problem has not been resolved everywhere, despite the laying of thousands of kilometers of unburied steel water mains, the water in which is rusty and unfit for drinking. Why not, then, create an organization operating under cost accountability which, on a credit basis, in exchange for having the associations turn over fruit and vegetable produce to the state, could resolve this problem cheaply and quickly?

Nevertheless we must pay the basic attention to the question of supplying water to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes that have been called upon to provide the country with food products.

Unfortunately, as has been indicated by practical life, the agricultural enterprises have not been engaging properly in economic operation, and therefore the majority of their water-management structures present a pitiful picture: petty thieves steal equipment from the pump-control stations and steal the barriers from the sanitation-protection zones, the pumping stations are covered with dirt, and the wells are filled with trash. Many farms do not even have anyone responsible for the protection of those structures, and the electricians do not monitor the control of the pumps or engage in servicing the electrical networks.

Only a few farms protect the well pumps from current overloads by turning them on only at specially designated times and giving a specially trained worker the responsibility of monitoring the equipment in manual mode. A worker like this would scarcely switch on the pump under unfavorable weather conditions, as occurred, for example, on many farms in the central chernozem oblasts during the period of the disaster of January 1985, when, because of ice formation and breaks in the electrical transmission lines, hundreds of pumps burned out simultaneously.

In recent years, rayon subdivisions of Selkhozenergo have begun servicing the intrafarm electrical transmission lines. However, in many rayons they are still inoperative, and wherever they have indeed been put to work, there is, as yet, little benefit for water-management affairs.

One cannot avoid speaking with indignation about the fact that many farms fail to observe the elementary sanitation norms in water use. How does one evaluate, for example, the repeated instances when a public toilet is built in direct proximity to a well, or when the opening of an unsealed well is kept warm by wood chips or, even worse, by manure, a rushing stream of flood water flows into the well, bird droppings float in a water tower...

At projects belonging to the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources contractors (who, it would seem, have been called upon to serve as examples in water use), the sanitation standards are also not observed. The harm caused to society by the failure to observe sanitation standards is tremendous, because this threatens people's life and health. But for some reason not a single one of the previously mentioned departments has any information about this at their disposal. That information can be found only at the oblast or rayon sanitation and epidemiology stations. But this serves no purpose. If the people at those departments knew of instances of the mass poisoning of people and livestock by substandard water, they would certainly change their attitude to this problem.

It is necessary to say a few special words about the technical operation of the water-management projects in the rural areas, which operation is carried out basically by the contractual water-management organizations of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources under contract with the agricultural enterprise. In addition, many farms independently carry out the technical service and repair of the pump units, but use the services of the contractors (since they are the assets-holders responsible for the water-lifting equipment) when they need a pump.

The technical servicing of the water-management projects exists in three forms: planned preventive maintenance; emergency maintenance; and emergency-prevention maintenance. Many years of practice have shown that planned preventive maintenance is economically advantageous not only for the farm, but also for the contractors. In the first place, it makes it possible to reduce the number of equipment outages, and, consequently, to reduce the losses of agricultural output; secondly... It is also beneficial and convenient for the contractor. From 1975 through 1982 this kind of servicing was widely employed by the Remselburvod Trust. It has been established by statute that a pump must be hoisted up from the well once a year for preventive maintenance or replacement until it goes out of service. After several years it was ascertained that in certain rayons the repair crews improved the overall state of water supply and began withdrawing the pump from the well not once a year, but considerably less frequently. The benefit was obvious, but there were more frequent instances of making settlements with the customer for operations that were not fulfilled.

An analysis of the situation that developed after 1980 has shown that managers of agricultural enterprises, when signing authorizations for payment on the basis of a percentage of work completed, are guided by the interests of the farms, since the fault-free operation of the equipment at the water-supply projects is practically guaranteed. At the same time the crew that receives the percentage authorization (and, consequently, wages) for unfulfilled operations is guided by personal interests, but on the basis of well organized unregulated labor. In order to eliminate a negative legal stroke "for unfulfilled [operations]," the trust had to meet halfway the cooperative venture that had developed—to introduce customer service and a system without work orders to pay for labor on the basis of cost accountability. However, planned preventive maintenance of a willful nature and despite any protests was replaced by emergency maintenance, and the state suffers losses of millions of rubles as a result.

The emergency form of service stipulates the replacement, on the basis of a call from the farm, of equipment that has gone out of commission. If, for example, a pump has burned out, the contractor drives out to the structure, but if it has not burned out, he doesn't. Under

conditions of poor business practices, this form of service incurs losses for the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and is profitable for the contractors, since the frequently repeated equipment outages cause the losses to grow for the former, and the profit to grow for the latter. This is the most widespread form of service not only in RSFSR, but also in other union republics.

The preventive-emergency form of service possesses all the flaws of the emergency form. It was introduced into practice by the Remselburvod Trust in 1982. With its introduction there was not only an increase in the expenditure of pumps in the trust's activity zone, but conditions were also created under which the workers and the engineer-technical personnel completely deliberately stopped striving for the efficient fulfillment of the operations. Now they have become self-interested not in the preventive maintenance of the pumps on the basis of schedules, but in increasing the number of outages and pump breakdowns, because otherwise the workers receive less wages and the engineers receive bonuses. As a result there has been a worsening of water supply in the rural areas, and there has been a noticeable increase in the intensity of the growth of wages for the trust.

The planning of the volumes of operational activity, rather than the results of the activity, gives rises to the contractor's indifference to the needs of the rural areas and to a self-seeking approach. Where, one asks, can one get vehicles and fuel to enable the contractor to visit each of the 3000-6000 structures in the oblast once a month or once a quarter? No one can answer that question, and therefore the manager continues to be faced by the choice—either the plan fulfillment at any cost, or its nonfulfillment.

There have been known instances when, after the completion of some tiny bit of work, for example, the applying of heat to open a frozen water-main valve, the farm manager has signed a percentage authorization for a total amount of more than a thousand rubles. Why does he undertake such an obviously unprofitable and illegal operation? Well, because the concentration of the barter fund of pumps with the Minvodkhoz contractor has put the farms in an enslaved dependence upon people who have nothing to do with the final result of agricultural production. And that is why the sovkhoz and kolkhoz managers agree to any terms—even the ones that are the most unprofitable for the farm—that are set by the owners of the scarce equipment, and not infrequently those managers themselves suggest a percentage authorization in exchange for a pump. Anyone who has heard unwatered cows mooing, or has seen hogs gnawing at one another after being crazed by thirst, will not haggle for a pump with the contractor's representative. Hagglng would prove to be more expensive for himself.

But how many illegal pumps do the farms buy from the contractors without hagglng, by using the wheeler-dealers' cash account? The farm managers even have a commandment in this regard: if you do not want to get in trouble with OBKhSS, buy the pump in a neighboring oblast.

Starting in 1984, at Remselburvod Trust, if one judges from their reports, there was a considerable increase in the volumes of work to remodel water-management structures. And this is natural, since it had to carry out the rebuilding of a considerable number of wells, pumping stations, water towers, and other structures that were in unsatisfactory condition. However, as was shown by an analysis of the documents, this innovation was in no way linked with the interests of agriculture, since it pursued a narrowly department goal—the transferral of certain operational activities into the capital-construction section. This naive paper operation had the final goal of obtaining bonuses for activating "remodeled" structures.

But, all things considered, the trust had no intention of engaging in real remodeling.

To be completely fair, it should be noted that many special mobile mechanized columns in that trust do carry out the real repair and remodeling of water-management structures. However, those operations are not reinforced by the material-technical resources and no incentive payments are made for them. They are executed in a volume that does not exceed one percent of the total need.

The situation is even worse with the capital repair and remodeling of the water-management structures in the Nonchernozem Zone, although the specialized Nechernozemselkhozvodsnabzheniye Trust exists there. Can one reconcile oneself to the situation when, simply in the 20 oblasts and autonomous republic that are included in the activity zone of Glavnechernozemvodstroy, 70,000 operating structures require, as was indicated by a questionnaire survey of PMK's and SMU's, the replacement or complete rebuilding of more than 16,000 pumping stations, more than 25,000 fences for sanitation-protection zones, and approximately the same number for water towers?

At the present time there are approximately nine methods of getting underground water from wells. But basically one method is employed—the method of using ETsV artesian pumps, which have a limited range of effective application. In addition, the method is extremely costly, inasmuch as it required a compression-pump pipe, special housing means, motor transport, diagnostic stations, and special diagnostic instruments. The operations crew that guarantees the obtaining of water by this method must consist of no fewer than two or three qualified specialists.

One might ask, then, why use the energy-intensive ETsV pumps if you can get to the water in the well by hand? It would seem that you could use those that are installed in a boiler room—and you would have no additional expenditures. But no! people invariably want an expensive artesian pump!

Very frequently the pump productivity exceeds the well productivity (yield). In order, in such situations, to prevent the well from running dry, causing the windings of the electric motor to burn out because of overheating, the feeding of the water is artificially retarded with the aid of simple technical tricks. Can you imagine whether a person would be able to breathe if his nasopharynx is partially closed? Yes, he will be able to breathe, but will he be able to do that for long? And so the pumps also prove to be unable to do that for long.

Or take another ordinary situation. ETsV pumps, which have the smallest productivity of 4 cubic meters an hour, are used to provide water to consumers who expend 4 cubic meters a day! As a result, the equipment and structures stand idle. Most frequently, however, pumps supplying from 6 to 16 cubic meters of water an hour are used, although they could be boldly replaced, for example, by household vibrating pumps of the Malysh type, with productivity of 0.3 to 1.5 cubic meters an hour. Soviet industry has assimilated the production of household pumps of another type also. Certainly this is a way out of the situation if the shortage of EtSV pumps for the RSFSR alone annually exceeds tens of thousands!

The Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry is currently carrying out work to create a system that is even more complicated and even more expensive, which system is based on minicompressors, although the developers are well aware that the effectiveness of shielding the motors from current overloads depends not so much upon the level of technical perfection of the automatic systems as upon the quality of the economic operation of the water-supply structures. What, for example, does a rural electrician do if, during the period when animals are being watered, the control station automatically turns off the pump because of problems in the electrical network? And what is he to do if the livestock has not been watered? Either he ought to be taught simple methods of operating the pump units, or help should be given to the farm in establishing order on the electrical transmission lines. But who is going to do that? For the time being, no one. They do not have their own specialists. Selkhozenergo is only beginning to bestir itself, and to the contractor from Minvodkhoz this is not only a lot of trouble, but also unprofitable, because, under conditions of poor business management, it is easier for him both to fulfill the plan and to get a bonus. The farm pays—that is the most important thing for it. As for the fact that there are not enough pumps... Well, it would be possible to increase the volumes of their production or to import them.

For a long time our country has imported from the socialist countries thousands of artesian pumps with a value of millions of rubles a year. However, their efficient repair has not been organized by a single one of the consumers of the imported pumps: not Minvodkhoz, not Gosagroprom, or Minenergo, or Mingeo. As a result, not

only expensive articles that could be repaired are tossed on the scrap heap, but also spare parts for them which are valued at hundreds of thousands of rubles.

The same fate befell the foundation plates for Soviet-produced pumps (cast-iron castings with a mass of 30-50 kilograms). Most frequently they are thrown all around and are rusting at production bases, in heaps or individually.

Especially egregious business practices manifest themselves in the last phase of the water-management process—the elimination of water-management structures. It frequently happens that, as a result of the natural aging of the structure, or of a particular unsolvable problem in the operation of a spring, the structure has to be eliminated. The Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources contractors carry out only the elimination of wells. But, practically speaking, no one engages in ridding the territory of other structures, and therefore they turn into ruins or take years to fall apart.

The elimination of a well includes such operations as the withdrawal or the cutting of the casing pipes that protrude above the surface of the ground; the filling in of the shaft with cement mortar and local building materials (gravel, crushed stone, sand, clay); and the sealing of the top of the well.

The elimination operations are not put into an independent category, and therefore they are not planned. They are executed by unspecialized crews, and in addition, as a rule, as a hasty measure before the construction of a new well begins. At such time the shaft of the old well, as well as the water-bearing level and the sealing materials are not disinfected. It also happens that the well is simply filled up hurriedly with whatever comes to hand, and the casing pipe is either cut off or crushed by a bulldozer. Then you won't find any traces of it!

Inasmuch as the pavilion of a pumping station over a well is not disassembled, no attempt is made to withdraw from it the casing pipes that could be reused. For the country as a whole, the losses of these pipes annually come to thousands of tons. In principle, if they took a property-owner's attitude to them, the contractors right now could provide themselves with 50-70 percent of the casing pipes. The interior casing column in many of the wells that are currently being eliminated could easily be withdrawn without any special trouble, by using an ordinary winch-type drilling rig.

According to tentative data provided by Tsentrgeologiya Association, there are currently situated in rural areas more than 8000 wells that should be eliminated. Of them, approximately 500 are self-discharging, completely ownerless, and more than 5000 are self-discharging, maintained as ownerless. The remaining wells, which do not discharge water, are in the same condition.

Both these and other wells represent ecological danger. The self-discharging ones, for example, annually discharge to the surface hundreds of millions of cubic meters of fresh and mineralized water, and the nondischarging one are neglected as extraneous objects or all kinds of pollutants pour into them. That is why the technology of eliminating self-discharging wells has not yet been developed, and the carrying out of complicated elimination operations is not advantageous for even a single department. The situation is complicated by the fact that no one—not the Ministry of Geology, the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, or Gosagroprom—has any reliable information about the technical condition of these wells.

Whoever has seen these streams of fresh or bitter, salty water gushing up from beneath the earth uselessly for years or decades, streams that were formed as a result of man's senseless interference in the environment, and whoever has enough imagination to visualize our planet as being a living organism, cannot remain calm, because the reserves of drinking water that are so necessary to us are being senselessly squandered, and these very vital juices, mixing with the dirt, lose forever their initial natural properties.

Ownerless or almost ownerless wells that should be eliminated or converted to faucet mode of operation exist in practically every oblast, kray, and autonomous republic. There is an especially large number of them in Volgograd, Vologda, Pskov, Kalinin, and other oblasts. According to local specialists, more than a thousand of them exist in the northern Caucasus.

In Novgorod Oblast, according to tentative data provided by local Minvodkhoz organizations, there are approximately 300 self-discharging wells. Of them no fewer than 200 (such as the ones on the Leninskiy Put and Urozhay kolkhozes) should be eliminated. The water that flows out of them, as a rule, is strongly mineralized (to the point of bitter-salty). Most of it is supplied to animal farms to water the animals (surprisingly, they become accustomed to this kind of water), and the rest of it, which forms a small lake around the well, first flows into small rivers, then into large ones, and finally into Lake Ilmen. Naturally, the mineralization of the water in the rivers and lakes has begun to rise, and therefore the amount of fish in them has begun to decrease. One can scarcely think that the pollution of the water would have a favorable effect either on the health of the Novgorod population. Moreover, the steel water pipelines in Novgorod have begun to go out of commission more rapidly, and it has been necessary to replace them with zinc-coated ones.

At the present time the country has a procedure whereby, in order to build new wells, the farms must first eliminate the inoperative wells on their territory. But if the wells are self-discharging, the specialized organizations will do nothing to eliminate them. And the agronomists themselves are not too insistent about that, because they

know that the farms will scarcely be able to find for that purpose two or three extra million rubles (computed on the basis of 200 wells). What, then, are they supposed to do? Reconcile themselves to the situation?

With regard to the protection of underground springs from depletion or contamination, governmental documents have been enacted in recent years. However, steps have not been taken with respect to even a single one of them. In our opinion, the construction-and-installation organizations of Minvodkhoz, as the basic organizations that carry out drilling operations in rural localities, should engage in the elimination of self-discharging wells. The elimination work should be financed by those ministries and departments that drilled the wells and performed defective work. The completely ownerless wells should be eliminated at the expense of the Ministry of Geology or Gosagroprom, as the organizations mainly guilty of the unsupervised carrying out of drilling operations in rural areas.

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Public Debate on Dry Law Issue to Take Place in Kiev

18000664 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Sep 88 p 6

[Article by N. Baklanov, IZVESTIYA correspondent: "A Dry Law in Kiev?", under the rubric: "From the Local Press"]

[Text] RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 4 September published material under the headline "A Dry Law in Kiev?" The issue concerned rumors in Kiev to the effect that starting in January 1989, all alcohol and all smoking in the city will be banned. To elucidate the matter, the newspaper published an interview with V. Grab, secretary of the city trade union and V. Didychenko, head of the Kiev gorispolkom's board of health.

To be honest, their answers left a strange impression which, I think, only served to give rise to new questions. Judge for yourselves. Comrade Grab, for example, resorting to diplomatic obfuscation, announced that he cannot categorically confirm what provoked the rumors; however, he thinks what caused them was the resolution "On the all-encompassing scientific-practical program 'Health' in the city of Kiev for the years 1988-1990," which was adopted by the Kiev gorispolkom and the presidium of the city's council of trade unions. That document contains the following point: "To conduct preparatory work and to proclaim that from the year 1989 on, Kiev is to be an alcohol-free city which does not smoke; a city of physical fitness and a city maintaining a healthy lifestyle."

Further on in the interview, the discussion centered on how harmful it is to drink and smoke; both lung cancer and diseases of the cardio-vascular system were mentioned, as well as the destruction of families because of drink. Reading these lines I involuntarily thought about how uncomfortable physicians and trade union workers in the country's other cities and villages must probably feel in knowing the threat to the populace from cigarettes and alcohol and not having insisted on the adoption of alcohol bans in their locales.

But, the biggest impression is made by the news announced by V. Grab and V. Didychenko. It seems that broad discussions on this contentious point of the resolution are being planned in the local press, on the radio and on T.V. Moreover, the city's citizens will have the last word in the matter.

It goes without saying that the mere fact of a broad discussion of one or another decision affecting the lifestyle of millions of people must be welcomed. But what is disturbing is the unusual manner in which the procedure is being conducted; that is, first the resolution is adopted, and only then is its discussion planned.

True, there is a logic to this "innovative" approach. Perhaps it is simply awkward for the responsible comrades to admit that they reacted perfunctorily to the resolution being adopted and did not grasp the meaning of the document, simply missing the point which is now eliciting a storm of emotion. I agree that to reveal this is shameful. But then, it is honest. And, it seems to me, people will more readily understand this position better than attempts to put a brave face on a sorry business. Strictly speaking, this is why belated recollection of the "public's opinion" has become necessary.